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UHFVSRSITY  Of 
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SAN  DIE60 


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IMPRESSIONS    OF   THE    KAISER 


Other  Books  by  David  Jayne  Hill 

A  History  of  Diplomacy  in  the  In- 
ternational Development  of  Europe 

Vol.  I — The  Struggle  for  Universal  Em- 
pire. With  5  Colored  Maps,  Chronologi- 
cal Tables,  List  of  Treaties  and  Index. 
Pp.  XXIII-481.     $5.00. 

Vol.  II — The  Establishment  of  Territorial 
Sovereignty.  With  4  Colored  Maps, 
Tables,  etc.     Pp.  XXIV-688.     $5.00. 

Vol.  Ill — The  Diplomacy  of  the  Age  of 
Absolutism.  With  5  Colored  Maps, 
Tables,  etc.     Pp.  XXVl-706.     $6.00. 

World  Organization,  as  Affected  by 
the  Nature  of  the  Modern  State 
Pp.  IX-214.    $1.50. 

Translated  also  into  French  and  German. 

The  People's  Government 

Pp.  X-288.     $1.25  net. 

Americanism — What  It  Is 

Pp.  XF-283.     $1.25  net. 
Translated  also  into  French. 

The  Rebuilding  of  Europe 

Pp.  X-389.     $1.50  net. 
Translated  also  into  French. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I    The  Sources  of  the  Kaiser's  Power  .      .  1 

II    The  Kaiser's  Methods  of  Personal  Con- 
trol        30 

III  The  Kaiser  as  a  Stage-Manager  ...  63 

IV  The  Kaiser  Under  Fire 90 

V    The  Kaiser's  Reversion  to  Type  .      .     .  118 

VI    The  Kaiser  and  His  People 144 

VII     The  Kaiser's  Attitude  Toward  War  and 

Peace 168 

VIII     The  Kaiser's  Efforts  for  British  Neu- 
trality        200 

IX    The  Kaiser's  Double  Diplomacy  .     .     .  224 

X     The  Kaisep  's  Responsibility  for  the  War  251 

Epilogue 296 

Illustrative  Documents 326 

Index 363 


IMPRESSIONS  OF 
THE    KAISER 


BY 

DAVID    JAYNE    HILL 

FORMER   AMERICAN    AMBASSADOR   TO    GERMANY 


HARPER    y    BROTHERS 

PUBLISHERS 
NEW   YORK   AND   LONDON 


Impressions  of  the  Kaiser 


Copyright,   1018,   by  Harper  &   Brothers 

Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 

Published  November,  1918 


PREFACE 

tion,  What  must  be  done  to  prevent  a  similar  as- 
sault upon  civilization  in  the  future? 

The  one  blessing  we  may  hope  for  as  the  outcome 
of  this  struggle  is  that  out  of  the  sorrow,  desolation, 
and  impoverishment  which  it  will  leave  behind  it 
enough  courage  and  resolution  may  survive  to  ren- 
der impossible  a  purpose  to  repeat  it. 

David  Jayne  Hill. 

September,  1918. 


PREFACE 

As  I  send  this  book  to  the  press  I  find  that,  al- 
though it  has  been  written  in  a  strictly  judicial 
spirit,  appealing  only  to  facts  that  have  been  care- 
fully verified,  I  have  described  the  genesis  of  the 
greatest  crime  which  history  records. 

The  fifth  year  of  the  Great  War  reveals  the  enor- 
mity, but  it  does  not  yet  disclose  the  denouement, 
of  this  crime ;  which  has  filled  with  grief  and  smit- 
ten with  poverty  tens  of  millions  of  homes,  swept 
from  the  earth  in  the  vigor  of  youth  the  flower  of 
the  manhood  of  several  great  nations,  and  leaves 
vast  spaces  scorched  and  blasted  by  the  fires  of 
devastation  to  be  again  rendered  habitable  by  the 
labors  of  old  men,  cripples,  and  half-famished  chil- 
dren. 

With  such  a  scene  spread  out  before  the  eyes  of 
the  civilized  world,  vituperation  and  invective  are 
only  signs  of  impotence.  We  cannot  repair  this 
calamity  by  denunciation.  We  cannot  prevent  its 
recurrence  without  suppressing  its  cause.  The  first 
necessity  is  to  perceive  wherein  is  to  be  found  the 
root  of  this  evil. 

At  first  sight  we  seem  to  have  discovered  it  in  a 
single  spontaneous  personal  act,  but  a  little  reflec- 
tion should  convince  us  that  no  human  being  alone 


PREFACE 

and  unaided  could  perpetrate  such  a  crime  as  has 
been  committed.  To  render  it  possible  there  is 
necessary  a  contributory  perversion  of  human  in- 
stitutions. Through  such  a  perversion  this  catas- 
trophe has  come  to  pass. 

It  is,  therefore,  not  merely  with  William  II  as  a 
personality  that  we  are  here  concerned,  but  with 
the  whole  process  of  seduction  by  which  as  German 
Emperor  he  has  led  the  German  people,  at  first  dis- 
trustful of  his  purposes,  to  render  themselves 
subservient  to  the  Prussian  conception  of  the  state 
and  the  ambitions  of  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty. 
Under  his  tuition  and  guidance,  from  motives  which 
he  has  been  able  to  excite  and  call  into  action,  they 
have  built  up  a  war-machine  of  perilous  potency 
without  providing  means  for  its  rational  control. 
They  have  rendered  the  state  omnipotent  and  irre- 
sponsible, and  have  placed  its  powers  at  the  dis- 
posal of  a  single  will  that  holds  itself  without 
accountability  to  men. 

The  first  four  chapters  of  this  volume  were 
printed  in  Harper's  Magazine  for  May,  June, 
July,  and  August  of  the  present  year.  They  con- 
stitute only  the  vestibule  of  the  present  record, 
which  broadens  into  an  outline  of  Imperial  German 
diplomacy  after  Kaiser  William  II  became  the  ac- 
knowledged master  of  Germany's  destinies.  It 
culminates  in  an  answer  to  the  primordial  question 
upon  which  the  future  Peace  Congress  will  be  called 
upon  to  act,  Who  is  to  be  held  responsible  for  caus- 
ing the  Great  War?  and  raises  the  collateral  ques- 


IMPRESSIONS 
OF  THE   KAISER 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  SOURCES  OF  THE  KAISER'S  POWER 

/TpHE  true  lessons  of  a  tragedy  are  not  to  be 
■*■  found  in  the  supreme  moment  when  the  drama 
has  reached  the  climax  of  passion,  but  in  the  errors 
of  judgment  or  defiance  of  moral  law  that  have 
made  it  a  tragedy. 

In  attempting  at  this  time  an  analysis  of  the 
sources  of  the  Kaiser 's  power  and  the  methods  em- 
ployed for  its  further  development,  my  purpose  is 
to  throw  a  new  light,  if  possible,  upon  the  present 
European  situation  by  lifting  a  curtain,  not  upon 
the  scene  as  it  is  set  upon  the  stage  of  contemporary 
action,  but  upon  the  evolution  of  the  chief  character 
of  the  drama  in  the  course  of  his  preparation  for 
the  role  which  he  has  cast  for  himself. 

This  process  of  development  is  possibly  more 
vivid  to  my  mind,  and  certainly  more  impressive 
in  my  judgment,  from  the  fact  that  it  was  my  lot 
to  be  in  Germany  in  the  two  most  critical  periods 
of  the  political  evolution  of  the  Empire.  As  a 
result,   there    is    an    inevitable    concentration    of 

1 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

thought,  not  merely  upon  the  contrast  between  the 
two  periods — which  may  be  roughly  designated  as 
1888-90  and  1908-14 — but  upon  the  causes  that  have 
connected  them  and  that  explain  the  transition  from 
the  earlier  to  the  later  period. 

In  these  two  periods  my  points  of  view  were  dif- 
ferent, and  each  had  its  peculiar  advantage.  In 
the  first  period  I  saw  William  II  as  his  own  people 
saw  him,  and  intimacy  with  them  disclosed  the  esti- 
mate they  placed  upon  him.  In  the  second  period 
my  personal  contacts  with  the  Kaiser  himself  dur- 
ing more  than  three  years  were  more  intimate  and 
more  varied  than  usually  fall  to  the  lot  of  a  foreign 
ambassador  at  the  Court  of  Berlin. 

At  the  time  of  the  accession  of  William  II  as 
King  of  Prussia  and  German  Emperor,  on  June  15, 
1888,  after  the  brief  reign  of  Frederick  III,  the  Ger- 
man Empire  had  already  taken  on  its  definite  form 
and  was  regarded  as  a  firmly  established  great 
power,  which  might  or  might  not  become  a  menace 
to  the  rest  of  Europe  according  to  the  policies  by 
which  its  future  might  be  determined.  The  unity 
of  the  German  states  was  secure,  the  power  of 
Prussia  was  everywhere  felt  among  them,  and  the 
work  of  Bismarck  was  complete. 

That  the  Empire  was  an  achievement  of  superior 
military  force  on  the  part  of  Prussia,  and  in  no 
sense  a  creation  of  the  German  people,  was  uni- 
versally understood.  No  one  familiar  with  the 
history  of  Prussia  doubted  that  its  influence  would 
continue  to  be  dominant  in  the  Empire.    The  Prus- 


IMPRESSIONS    OF    THE    KAISER 


THE  SOURCES  OF  THE  KAISER'S  POWER 

sian  philosophy  of  the  state  had  completely  tri- 
umphed ;  and  to  that  philosophy,  based  on  monarch- 
ical absolutism,  the  idea  of  parliamentary  control 
was  known  to  be  repugnant.  The  King  of  Prussia 
was  by  heredity  the  German  Emperor,  and  no  King 
of  Prussia  had  ever  forgotten  the  traditions  of  the 
House  of  Hohenzollern,  which  had  advanced  from 
a  Suabian  lordship  to  the  eminence  of  empire  by 
centuries  of  conquest,  annexation,  and  unscrupu- 
lous diplomacy,  seeking  alliances  wherever  addi- 
tional power  or  prestige  could  be  obtained,  and 
renouncing  them  whenever  they  became  a  burden  or 
ceased  to  offer  an  advantage. 

Every  intelligent  German  understood  this;  but 
now  that  the  strength  and  policies  of  Prussia  were 
at  the  service  of  the  Empire,  the  state  that  had  long 
been  the  common  menace  and  often  the  hated 
enemy  had  become  the  protector  and  potential  or- 
ganizer of  all,  and  the  primitive  tribalism  that  had 
always  characterized  the  Germans,  that  had  at- 
tached them  to  their  local  princes,  that  had  in  its 
time  effectively  nullified  the  Holy  Roman  Empire 
of  the  German  nation,  that  had  embroiled  them  in 
internecine  wars,  and  for  centuries  had  made  Ger- 
man territory  a  prey  to  foreign  conquest  and  hope- 
less division,  was  now  merged  in  a  larger  tribalism. 
Germany  had  at  last  become  self-conscious  as  a 
nation,  and  the  mutual  hostility  that  had  doomed 
the  German  tribes  to  separatism  was  now  trans- 
formed into  a  general  hostility  to  all  that  is  not 
German.    No  longer  a  mere  geographical  expres- 

2  3 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

sion,  as  for  centuries  it  had  been,  Germany  had  be- 
come through  blood  and  iron  the  victor  over  a  com- 
mon foe.  Thenceforth,  as  throughout  German  his- 
tory the  stronger  tribe  had  dominated  over  the 
weaker,  so  now  Prussia,  which  had  evoked  the  soul 
of  Deutschtum,  had  imposed  upon  it  a  superior 
will,  and  there  arose  from  a  united  people  the  cry, 
"Deutschland  uber  Alles!" 

The  economic  advantages  of  the  Empire  had  be- 
come evident  and  immense.  A  great  realm  for  ages 
divided  by  a  tangle  of  limited  frontiers  was  now 
made  one.  Exchanges  had  been  promoted  by  the 
Zollverein,  which  had  afforded  a  foretaste  of  the 
advantages  of  unity ;  but  now  the  walls  of  separa- 
tion were  entirely  swept  away.  Central  authority 
was  clearing  the  ground  of  local  impediments  to 
general  industrial  and  commercial  prosperity.  But, 
above  all,  the  provincial  spirit  of  earlier  times  was 
vanishing,  a  universal  emancipation  of  thitherto 
restricted  energies  was  occurring.  Germany,  uni- 
fied, victorious,  prosperous,  and  aspiring,  felt  a 
sense  of  mighty  strength  and  a  keen  impulse  toward 
wider  expansion.  Poverty  was  giving  way  to 
wealth,  frugality  to  luxury,  and  humility  to 
pride. 

Before  the  Germany  of  1888  two  paths  were  open. 
Had  Frederick  III,  surnamed  the  "Noble,"  con- 
tinued to  reign  a  decade,  instead  of  only  ninety-nine 
days,  the  tendency  in  government  would  have  been 
toward  liberalism.  More  and  more  the  Imperial 
Constitution  would  have  been  interpreted  in  a  lib- 

4 


THE   SOURCES  OF  THE   KAISER'S  POWER 

eral  spirit.  Ministers  would  have  been  chosen  with 
reference  to  the  will  of  the  people  as  expressed  in 
the  Reichstag.  The  Emperor  would  have  reigned, 
but  his  Ministers  would  have  governed.  The  high~ 
est  ideals  of  self-government  might  not  have  been 
swiftly  realized,  and  certainly  not  immediately; 
for,  as  all  German  statesmen  and  writers  have 
agreed,  the  Germans  have  not  been  bred  to  self- 
government.  They  have  always  relied  upon  their 
princes  as  more  or  less  paternal  rulers,  and  they 
would  think  it  presumptuous  to  dictate  to  their 
recognized  superiors.  But  actual  government  al- 
ways consists  more  in  a  spirit  than  in  a  form. 
Autocracy  and  democracy  are  theoretically  anti- 
thetical ;  but  practically  a  ruler  nominally  absolute 
may  listen  to  the  voice  of  his  people,  while  the  head 
of  a  democracy  may  exercise  the  will  and  display 
the  qualities  of  a  Caesar. 

For  Germany  strong  central  control  seemed  to  be 
essential,  and  the  character  of  the  Prussian  mon- 
archy opened  a  path  toward  absolutism  in  the  fu- 
ture development  of  the  Empire.  There  was,  it 
must  not  be  forgotten,  an  Imperial  Constitution. 
The  whole  future  of  Germany  depended  upon  the 
interpretation  of  it.  Without  changing  an  article, 
it  could  be  administered  liberally  or  autocratically ; 
for  in  all  constitutional  governments  it  is  the  his- 
toric spirit  that  prevails. 

The  point  of  conspicuous  interest  here  is  the  in- 
terpretation of  the  Imperial  Constitution  that  was 
actually  made  and  accepted,  and  to  this  must  be 

5 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

added  the  tendency  to  confirm  or  to  reject  it  that 
has  been  developed  during  the  present  war. 

Whoever  will  take  in  hand  the  Constitution  of  the 
German  Empire  x  and  read  it  merely  as  a  document 
will  be  surprised,  if  not  already  familiar  with  its  con- 
tents, at  the  f acade  of  liberalism  that  presents  itself. 
First  of  all,  it  is  a  written  constitution;  which 
implies  that  it  is,  in  effect,  a  definition  and  re- 
striction of  sovereign  power  so  far  as  the  preroga- 
tives of  government  are  concerned.    It  begins  with 
a  list  of  independent  sovereigns— kings  and  grand 
dukes — the  King  of  Prussia  heading  the  list  and 
acting  in  the  name  of  the  North  German  Confed- 
eration, who  "conclude  an  eternal  alliance  for  the 
protection  of  the  territory  of  the  Confederation  and 
the  rights  of  the  same,  as  well  as  for  the  promotion 
of  the  welfare  of  the  German  people."    It  neither 
renounces  nor  abrogates  the  sovereign  rights  of 
the  monarchs  who  form  this  new  alliance.    It  con- 
fers a  "common  citizenship"  upon  all  Germans 
and  enumerates  their  rights.     "Against  foreign 
countries  all  Germans  shall  have  an  equal  claim 
upon  the  protection  of  the  Empire."     The  legis- 
lative power  of  the  Empire  is  conferred  upon  the 
Bundesrat  and  the  Eeichstag,  a  majority  of  the 
votes  of  both  bodies  being  necessary  and  sufficient 
for  the  passage  of  a  law.     The  King  of  Prussia 
has  merely  the  "presidency"  of  the  Confederation, 
with  the  title  of  "German  Emperor." 


iDodd,  Modem  Constitutions,  Chicago,  1912,  I,  pp.  325,  351. 

6 


THE   SOURCES  OF  THE   KAISER'S   POWER 

Nothing  in  all  this  sounds  in  the  least  autocratic. 
On  the  contrary,  all  seems  very  liberal.  The  Ger- 
man Emperor  is  not  a  monarch,  except  in  Prussia. 
All  the  other  confederated  sovereigns  are  equally 
monarchs  in  their  own  realms.  He  is  only  a ' '  presi- 
dent," primus  inter  pares.  Whence,  then,  his  auto- 
cratic power? 

Ninety-nine  one-hundredths  of  the  Imperial  Con- 
stitution could  be  transcribed  into  the  constitution 
of  the  most  democratic  federal  state  without  seri- 
ous criticism.  The  absolute  authority  which  the 
Imperial  Constitution  undoubtedly  confers  upon 
the  King  of  Prussia  is  ingeniously  concealed  under 
the  most  plausible  camouflage. 

It  is  impossible  here  to  enter  upon  a  detailed 
exposition  of  this  device,  in  which  Bismarck  be- 
lieved he  had  triumphed  over  parliamentarism, 
which  he  bitterly  opposed,  and  had  rendered  him- 
self as  Imperial  Chancellor  omnipotent  in  the 
Empire  under  a  " president"  whom  he  intended  to 
be  merely  titular.  The  whole  structure  of  govern- 
ment in  the  Empire  pivots  on  the  action  of  the 
Imperial  Chancellor,  as  provided  in  Articles  15  to 
17.  The  Chancellor  is  appointed  by  the  Emperor, 
requires  no  confirmation,  and  cannot  be  removed 
except  by  the  Emperor.  The  Imperial  Chancellor 
alone  can  by  his  signature  give  validity  to  the  de- 
crees and  ordinances  of  the  Emperor,  and  "thereby 
assumes  responsibility  for  them";  but  only  to  the 
Emperor,  who  has  the  right  of  forcible  execution 
in  all  the  states. 

7 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

It  did  not  require  very  long  for  the  alert  intel- 
ligence of  William  II  to  perceive  who,  under  this 
organic  law,  possessed  all  the  power  in  the  Empire. 
Armed  with  the  prerogative  of  personally  appoint- 
ing and  recalling  every  one  of  real  importance  un- 
der the  Imperial  Constitution,  and  with  the  author- 
ity to  execute  by  force  his  own  decrees  and  ordi- 
nances, "this  young  man,"  as  Bismarck  rather  con- 
temptuously called  him,  at  the  age  of  twenty-nine, 
ascended  what  he  understood  to  be,  in  effect,  the 
imperial  throne,  regardless  of  the  pretense  that  it 
was  only  the  seat  of  a  "presidency."  As  soon  as 
the  death  of  Frederick  the  Noble  was  announced,  he 
promptly  took  possession  of  his  entire  heritage,  in 
the  full  consciousness  that  as  King  in  Prussia  he 
could  extend  the  prerogatives  of  kingship  over  the 
entire  Empire. 

As  a  youth  he  had  aroused  the  deep  concern  of 
his  father.  On  the  twelfth  anniversary  of  his  son's 
birth,  Frederick  III  wrote  in  his  diary : 

"It  is  an  occasion  for  fear  when  one  thinks  of  the 
hopes  that  rest  from  this  time  forward  upon  the 
head  of  that  child,  and  what  a  great  responsibility 
is  incumbent  upon  us  toward  our  country  for  the 
direction  of  his  education,  since  considerations  of 
family  and  rank,  the  life  of  the  Court  of  Berlin, 
and  so  many  other  things  render  his  education  dif- 
ficult." 

The  condition  of  Germany  in  the  years  that  fol- 
lowed in  no  way  diminished  the  reasons  for  this 
solicitude.     The   return   to    Berlin   of   victorious 

8 


THE  SOURCES  OF  THE  KAISER'S  POWER 

armies,  the  coronation  of  his  grandfather,  William 
I,  the  universal  exhilaration  of  newly  unified  Ger- 
many, the  glory  and  the  praise  of  Prnssia,  had  all 
acted  upon  his  sensitive  nature  like  the  excitement 
of  a  play,  and  yet  it  was  palpable  reality.  All  the 
prose  of  life  seemed  dull  to  him.  As  a  young 
soldier  he  passed  rapidly  through  the  different 
grades  up  to  that  of  general ;  but  it  was  never  for- 
gotten by  his  comrades  when  at  school  in  Bonn,  or 
in  the  army,  that  he  was  some  day  to  be  the  head 
of  that  glorious  Germany  that  had  more  than  real- 
ized the  dreams  of  the  medieval  time,  when  mailed 
knights  led  their  armies  over  the  Alps  to  be  crowned 
at  Rome ;  and,  most  of  all,  the  young  prince  himself 
never  forgot  it.  All  the  realities  with  which  he 
came  in  contact  were  veiled  in  the  glamour  of  a 
time  when  it  seemed  that  everything  was  pos- 
sible, and  that  a  new  and  marvelous  era  had  just 
begun. 

Of  all  those  youthful  impressions  that  had 
touched  the  imagination  of  the  young  Kaiser  the 
deepest  was  that  of  the  victorious  army  which  in 
his  boyhood  had  returned  from  France.  Of  the 
three  rescripts  with  which  he  began  his  reign,  the 
first,  on  the  day  of  his  accession  to  the  throne,  was 
addressed  to  the  soldiers.  "The  absolute  and  in- 
destructible fidelity  of  the  army,"  runs  this  first 
utterance  of  the  young  Emperor,  "is  the  heritage 
transmitted  from  father  to  son  from  generation  to 
generation.  .  .  .  We  are  inseparably  united.  .  .  . 
We  are  made  for  each  other,  I  and  the  army,  and 

9 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

we  shall  remain  closely  attached  whether  Cod  gives 
us  peace  or  storm.  "x 

This  has  been  the  keynote  of  the  Emperor's  entire 
reign.  The  army,  that  was  his  first  thought,  for  it 
was  that  which  had  created  his  imperial  heritage, 
it  was  that  which  could  enable  him  to  read  into  the 
Imperial  Constitution  the  full  meaning  of  the 
Hohenzollern  traditions,  and  make  the  whole  realm 
what  his  ancestors  had  made  Prussia,  a  patrimonial 
estate  to  be  transmitted  by  him  to  future  genera- 
tions of  his  House. 

To  William  II  the  army  was  a  dynastic  pos- 
session. Was  it  the  "nation  in  arms,"  as  Germans 
love  to  speak  of  it,  that  was  in  his  mind1?  Perhaps, 
but  not  the  nation  controlled  by  the  people's  will. 
The  oath  of  its  allegiance  is  not  taken  to  the  Con- 
stitution, but  personally  to  the  Emperor.  The 
Prussian  Constitution  openly  proclaims  this,  and 
explicitly  declares,  "A  swearing-in  upon  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  country  does  not  take  place."  As 
King  of  Prussia  and  as  Emperor  the  Kaiser  is  the 
head  and  chief  of  the  Prussian  and  the  Imperial 
army,  to  whom  alone  and  without  question  they 
owe  obedience.    He  has,  therefore,  the  legal  right 


1  In  quoting  from  the  Kaiser's  speeches,  unless  otherwise  stated, 
the  text  has  been  taken  from  one  of  the  following  authorities : 
Wilhelm  II,  die  Reden  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II  (Reclams  Universal 
Bibliothek,  4  vols.)  down  to  1912;  The  Kaiser's  Speeches,  trans- 
lated and  edited  by  Wolf  von  Schierbrand,  New  York,  1903;  The 
German  Emperor  as  Shown  in  His  Public  Utterances,  by  Christian 
Gault,  New  York,  1915;  and  Arren,  Guillaume  II,  ce  qu'il  dit  ce 
qu'il  pense,  Paris,  1912.  To  avoid  multiplying  foot-notes,  the  date 
and  place  of  utterances  are  mentioned  in  the  text,  which  renders 
easy  reference  for  verification. 

10 


THE   SOURCES   OF  THE   KAISER'S   POWER 

to  say,  as  he  has  said,  "The  more  people  shelter 
themselves  behind  catchwords  and  party  considera- 
tions the  more  firmly  and  securely  do  I  count  upon 
my  army,  and  the  more  confidently  do  I  hope  that 
my  army,  either  without  or  within  my  realms,  will 
wait  upon  my  wishes  and  my  behests."  Not  only 
this,  but  he  felt  it  necessary  to  say  to  the  new 
recruits:  "You  have  sworn  loyalty  to  me;  that 
means  that  you  are  now  my  soldiers,  you  have 
given  yourselves  up  to  me  body  and  soul ;  there  is 
for  you  but  one  enemy,  and  that  is  my  enemy.  In 
view  of  the  present  agitations  it  may  come  to  pass 
that  I  shall  command  you  to  shoot  your  own  rela- 
tives, brothers,  yes,  parents — which  God  forbid — 
but  even  then  you  must  follow  my  command  with- 
out a  murmur."  And,  in  saying  this,  he  knew 
that  he  was  appealing  to  an  instinct  of  personal 
fealty  nowhere  in  the  world  so  strong  as  that  bred 
into  the  nature  of  Germans  through  the  many  cen- 
turies of  obedience  when  existence  depended  upon 
the  feudal  consecration  of  a  vassal  to  his  lord,  who 
alone  could  afford  protection  to  his  life. 

Such  an  army  cannot  inquire  into  the  causes,  the 
laws,  or  the  moralities  of  war.  Mute  and  obedient, 
it  marches  where  it  is  ordered  to  march,  stands 
where  it  is  ordered  to  stand,  and  falls,  when  it  must 
fall,  in  the  faith  that  God  will  reward  its  fidelity 
with  eternal  blessedness. 

The  second  thought  of  the  new  Emperor  on  the 
day  of  his  accession  was  of  the  neglected  little 
navy.    Already  his  fancy  had  taken  wings  beyond 

11 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

the  frontiers  of  the  Empire,  and  led  him  to  dream 
of  its  extension  beyond  the  sea.  No  German  Em- 
peror had  ever  thought  it  worth  while  to  address  a 
rescript  to  the  navy,  but  it  was  William's  second 
act.  "Whoever  knows  the  navy,"  he  wrote,  "is 
aware  that  every  man  is  ready  to  sacrifice  his  life 
for  the  German  flag.  ...  In  grave  moments  we 
shall  certainly  be  united,  and  in  fair  or  cloudy  days 
we  shall  always  be  ready  to  shed  our  blood  to  safe- 
guard the  honor  of  the  German  flag  and  the  glory 
of  our  German  Fatherland.'' 

Having  thus  identified  the  army  and  the  navy 
with  himself  as  the  two  most  powerful  instruments 
of  his  purposes,  it  was  not  until  the  fourth  day  that 
he  issued  a  rescript  to  the  people. 

The  eagerness  with  which  the  new  Emperor  had 
addressed  himself  to  the  army  and  navy  before 
issuing  a  general  proclamation  to  the  nation  as  a 
whole,  joined  with  his  reputation  for  impulsive- 
ness, his  inexperience,  and  his  independence  of 
character,  awakened  in  serious  minds  much  appre- 
hension. 

In  his  proclamation  of  June  18,  1888,  to  the  peo- 
ple, William  II  apparently  endeavored  in  some  de- 
gree to  mollify  this  feeling  of  popular  distrust. 
His  filial  references  to  his  father,  whose  noble  quali- 
ties had  won  for  him  the  love  and  trust  of  the 
people,  aided,  perhaps,  to  dissipate  the  rumor  that 
they  had  not  been  in  close  accord.  "Looking  to 
the  King  of  all  kings,"  he  said,  "I  have  vowed  to 
God,  following  the  example  of  my  father,  to  be  a 

12 


THE  SOURCES  OF  THE  KAISER'S  POWER 

righteous  and  gentle  prince,  to  foster  piety  and  the 
fear  of  God,  to  maintain  peace,  to  be  a  help  to  the 
poor  and  oppressed,  and  to  be  a  righteous  man,  a 
true  protector. " 

Notwithstanding  this  effusion  of  lofty  sentiments, 
and  the  formal  declaration  of  public  policies,  on 
June  25th,  before  the  Keichstag — in  which  the  hand 
of  Bismarck  is  plainly  visible — there  remained  for 
some  time  in  the  minds  of  thoughtful  Germans  a 
deep  solicitude  for  the  future  of  the  Empire,  and  a 
fear,  often  freely  expressed  in  private  conversa- 
tion, that  the  impetuosity  of  the  young  Emperor 
might  involve  the  country  in  serious  complications, 
especially  in  relation  to  foreign  powers. 

Conscious  of  this,  and  determined  not  to  be  in- 
fluenced by  it,  William  II  took  his  own  counsel,  but 
not  without  resentment  toward  his  critics.  Years 
afterward  he  said,  referring  to  this  period  of 
doubt :  "I  assumed  the  crown  with  a  heavy  heart ; 
my  capacity  was  everywhere  doubted,  and  every- 
where I  was  wrongly  judged.  Only  one  had  con- 
fidence in  me,  only  one  believed  in  me,  and  that  was 
the  army;  and,  with  its  support,  and  trusting  in 
our  old  God,  I  undertook  my  responsible  office, 
knowing  full  well  that  the  army  is  the  mainstay  of 
my  country  and  the  chief  pillar  of  the  Prussian 
throne,  to  which  God  in  His  wisdom  has  summoned 
me." 

This  passage  reveals  not  only  Kaiser  William's 
original  and  persistent  basis  of  self-confidence,  but 
the  ground  of  the  public  anxiety  regarding  his  want 

13 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

of  discretion.  In  a  sense,  all  Germany  was  mili- 
tary, and  relied  upon  the  army  for  its  protection; 
but  many  a  shoulder  was  significantly  shrugged 
at  the  thought  of  what  this  imaginative,  sponta- 
neous, and  as  yet  undisciplined  potentate  might 
rashly  undertake  to  say  or  do  that  would  involve 
danger  to  his  country. 

With  violently  militaristic  inclinations  the  Em- 
peror combined  a  disposition  to  introduce  the 
practice  of  personal  government  and  personal 
diplomacy.  The  first  public  acts  of  the  new  reign 
were  hardly  over  before  William  II,  to  the  dread 
of  the  conservatively  minded,  started  out  upon  a 
round  of  personal  visits  to  the  neighboring  courts. 
On  July  14th  he  reviewed  the  fleet  at  Kiel  in  the 
uniform  of  a  Prussian  admiral,  which  no  King  of 
Prussia  had  ever  worn.  The  next  fortnight  was 
consumed  in  calls  upon  his  Baltic  neighbors.  Cruis- 
ing from  port  to  port  on  the  Hohenzollern,  he  spent 
five  days  at  Cronstadt  with  the  Czar  of  Russia,  and 
followed  this  with  personal  visits  to  the  King  of 
Sweden  and  the  King  of  Denmark.  A  little  later 
Stuttgart,  Munich,  Vienna,  and  Rome  were  visited ; 
and  the  year  ended  with  the  laying  of  the  first 
stone  of  the  free  port  of  Hamburg  and  an  inspec- 
tion of  the  shipyards  of  the  Vulkan  Gesellschaft  at 
Stettin.  Already  the  thought  was  plainly  in  the 
Kaiser's  active  mind  which  he  afterward  expressed 
in  the  sentence,  "  Germany's  future  lies  on  the 
water.' ' 

Germany  was  not  at  that  time  quite  ready  for  so 

14 


THE   SOURCES  OF  THE   KAISER'S  POWER 

great  a  widening  of  its  horizon,  but  William  II 
evidently  intended  to  make  it  so.  The  staid  con- 
servatism of  Bismarck,  tempered  with  the  moder- 
ate liberalism  of  "Unser  Fritz, "  as  the  Germans  af- 
fectionately called  Frederick  III,  would  have  been 
far  more  acceptable  to  those  who  had  played  a  great 
role  in  the  founding  of  the  Empire ;  but,  so  far  as 
sounding  the  depths  of  the  German  soul  is  con- 
cerned, William  II  was  a  better  psychologist  than 
either  of  them.  The  people  might  distrust  the 
Kaiser's  personal  diplomacy,  but  they  were  in- 
spired by  his  imagination.  He  was  bent  on  creat- 
ing a  new  age;  and  Germany,  especially  Young 
Germany,  was  ready  to  welcome  it. 

What  the  new  Kaiser  most  completely  repre- 
sented was  that  vague  entity  known  as  Deutschtum. 
From  myth  and  saga  and  song,  from  the  clash  and 
rattle  of  arms  and  the  blare  of  trumpets,  he  knew 
how  to  evoke  it.  What  Richard  Wagner  caught 
and  put  into  music  that  William  II  caught  and  put 
into  government.  All  that  lingered  about  the  Rhine 
was  laid  on  German  lips  to  sing  again.  All  that 
was  heroic  in  chivalrous  adventure  was  once  more 
recalled,  and  it  was  all  made  to  seem  German — only 
German. 

Running  through  all  this  was  the  legend  of  the 
Kaiseridee — the  religious  sanctity  of  God's  anoint- 
ed shepherd  of  the  people.  Barbarossa  had  at  last 
awakened  from  his  long  sleep  and  come  forth  from 
the  mountain  fastnesses  which  had  hidden  and 
guarded  his  tomb  until  the  day  of  his  deliverance, 

15 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

and  his  spirit  had  become  reincarnated  in  the  new 
Emperor. 

It  is  difficult  for  strangers  to  realize  the  forces 
wrapped  up  in  the  revival  of  a  national  culture 
restored  from  the  mold  of  ages.  As  a  German 
writer  has  phrased  it: 

"It  was  as  if  the  golden  lute  of  Walther  von  der 
Vogelweide  sang  again  softly  through  the  ruined 
castles ;  as  if  unseen  hands  touched  the  bells  in  the 
weatherbeaten  cathedral,  and  a  glint  of  the  morning 
rose  over  consecrated  cities.  There  was  a  rushing 
in  the  deep,  as  if  the  treasure  of  the  Nibelungen 
moved  in  the  green  house  of  the  water ;  there  was  a 
thrill  in  the  air,  as  if  Siegfried's  horn  sounded  in 
the  distance."1 

If  the  dim  remembrance  of  an  old,  almost  dead, 
national  culture  worked  such  wonders,  how  much 
more  would  a  new,  living  culture  be  the  sanctuary 
around  which  in  the  future  the  Germans  should 
gather  from  near  and  far?  German  power  and 
German  beauty — these  should  be  the  goals  of  the 
new  Germany!  As  the  fathers  had  made  the 
Rhine  a  German  river,  so  the  sons  should  make  the 
ocean  a  German  lake!  "Noch  lebt  der  alte  Gott  in 
unserem  Blutl" 

Frankly,  this  is  a  revival  of  primitive  paganism. 
"The  old  German  God"  is  not  the  sorrow-burdened 
Saviour  of  the  world.    He  is  a  god  of  battles,  made 


1  Fuchs,  Der  Kaiser,  die  Kultur,  und  die  Kunst,  Munich  and 
Leipzig,  1904. 

16 


THE   SOURCES  OF  THE   KAISER'S   POWER 

potent  through  the  swing  and  blows  of  his  hammer. 
He  is  not  the  All-Holy,  or  even  the  Creator  of  the 
universe,  the  All-Father.  He  is  a  purely  tribal 
divinity,  the  apotheosis  of  tribal  power  and  tribal 
hate,  whose  plans  and  protection  are  for  Germans 
only.  How  otherwise  can  he  with  any  sense  always 
be  referred  to  as  "the  old  German  God"?  Only 
thus  can  he  be  spoken  of  as  "our  unconditional 
and  avowed  ally."  "Unconditional,"  because 
whatever  Germans  do  is  right;  and  "avowed"  be- 
cause success  in  arms  is  the  sufficient  evidence  of 
his  alliance. 

"What  made  William  II  the  master  of  German 
destinies  was  the  fact  that  he,  more  than  any  other, 
was  the  embodiment  of  these  tribal  rhapsodies. 

And,  in  spite  of  all  opposition,  he  became  the 
master.  His  idealism,  his  impetuosity,  his  self- 
confidence,  to  Bismarck  appeared  positively  dan- 
gerous. To  many  the  venerable  Chancellor,  the 
virtual  creator  of  the  Empire,  seemed  the  essential 
counterpoise  and  balance-wheel  to  the  young  Em- 
peror's spontaneity;  and  this  was  the  opinion  of 
Prince  Bismarck  himself,  who  intended  to  keep 
"this  young  man"  within  proper  bounds. 

It  is  unnecessary  here  to  repeat  the  story,  so 
often  told,  of  the  "dropping  of  the  pilot."1  Bis- 
marck himself  believed  it  to  be  impossible.    When 


1 A  very  circumstantial  account,  and  the  most  recent,  is  given 
in  Germany  Under  Three  Emperors,  by  Princess  Catherine  Radzi- 
will  (Catherine  Kolb-Danvin),  London,  etc.,  1917,  to  which  I  am 
indebted  particularly  for  the  quotations  from  Holstein,  Bismarck's 
confidential  clerk  in  the  Foreign  Office,  and  other  quotations. 

17 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

they  appeared  upon  the  streets  of  Berlin,  where 
I  often  saw  them  pass  in  open  carriages,  the  Chan- 
cellor received  as  many  signs  of  deference  and 
devotion  as  the  Emperor.  In  truth,  to  all  observ- 
ers, in  1888-89,  Bismarck  seemed  to  be  the  corner- 
stone of  the  whole  imperial  structure.  The  best 
asset  of  the  young  Emperor  was  the  fact  that  this 
seasoned  statesman  was  by  his  side  as  friend  and 
counselor. 

In  the  Emperor's  eyes  the  country  squire,  whom 
his  grandfather  had  made  a  prince,  was,  notwith- 
standing his  ability  and  his  services,  merely  the 
creature  and  the  temporary  instrument  of  the 
Hohenzollern  dynasty,  for  that  alone  possessed  true 
authority,  which  God  had  directly  bestowed  upon 
it.    The  difference,  he  thought,  must  be  understood. 

Personally,  William,  as  Crown  Prince,  had 
learned  much  from  the  astute  statesman,  and  Bis- 
marck's great  services  to  the  House  of  Hohen- 
zollern were  distinctly  recognized  by  him ;  but  from 
the  moment  of  his  accession  the  Emperor  felt  that 
he  was  overshadowed  in  the  world's  esteem  and 
made  distinctly  secondary — he  who  should  be  first. 

For  the  break,  which  in  the  Emperor's  mind  was 
inevitable,  there  were  many  reasons.  Not  only  was 
the  Prince  too  conscious  of  his  importance,  but  he 
was  scheming  to  cast  the  mantle  of  succession  to 
the  chancellorship  upon  the  shoulders  of  his  un- 
principled son,  Count  Herbert,  for  whom  he  had 
an  inordinate  affection.  The  Prince  had  aimed  to 
stamp  out  Socialism ;  but  William  intended,  to  the 

18 


THE   SOURCES   OF  THE   KAISER'S  POWER 

Chancellor's  disgust,  to  destroy  it  as  a  party  by 
winning  it  as  a  benericiary.  Bismarck,  after  form- 
ing the  Triple  Alliance  with  Austria  and  Italy,  be- 
lieved he  had  a  reinsurance  for  peace  in  a  close 
friendship  with  Russia;  but  William,  who  had 
seen  with  indignation  the  grim  fortifications  at 
Brest-Litovsk — a  name  recently  made  famous  by 
almost  farcical  peace  negotiations — had  conceived  a 
profound  distrust  of  the  Czar's  purposes,  and  was 
disposed  to  cultivate  the  good-will  of  France  and 
hold  firmly  to  the  Austrian  alliance. 

It  was  a  risk  of  some  magnitude  for  the  young 
Kaiser  to  base  the  Chancellor's  overthrow  on  a 
question  of  foreign  policy,  in  which  he  was  re- 
garded by  all  Germans  as  a  past-master.  It  was, 
therefore,  on  an  issue  of  personal  primacy  that  the 
rupture  was  staged. 

On  March  15,  1890,  having  reprimanded  the 
Chancellor  on  the  day  before,  through  a  court  of- 
ficer, for  having  held  conversation  with  Wind- 
thorst,  chief  of  the  Catholic  party,  without  the  pre- 
vious assent  of  the  Emperor,  and  having  received 
the  Chancellor's  reply  that  he  would  allow  no  one 
to  say  whom  he  should  receive  in  his  house,  William 
II  drove  to  the  palace  of  the  Prince  and  demanded 
to  see  him  in  person. 

Although  it  was  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning,  the 
Chancellor  was  still  in  bed  and  had  to  rise  and 
dress.  A  stormy  interview  followed,  in  which 
William  II  asked  Bismarck  what  he  meant  by  nego- 
tiations with  Windthorst  without  previously  con- 

3  19 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

suiting  him.  The  Prince  replied  that  there  were 
no  negotiations,  only  a  private  conversation; 
whereupon  he  was  instructed  that  in  the  future  he 
must  keep  the  Emperor  informed  when  he  con- 
ferred with  parliamentary  leaders. 

Deeply  resentful,  the  Prince  replied  that  he  could 
not  permit  interference  with  his  relations  with  any 
one,  affirmed  that  it  was  only  in  compliance  with  a 
promise  to  "William  I  that  he  had  consented  to 
remain  in  the  service  of  his  grandson,  and  that  he 
was  ready  to  retire. 

Contrary  to  the  Chancellor's  expectation,  the 
Emperor  cried  out,  "I  accept  your  resignation, " 
and  left  the  room  in  a  rage,  without  being  accom- 
panied by  the  Chancellor,  as  the  etiquette  of  the 
court  required. 

For  days  Bismarck  struggled  with  his  pride,  his 
ambition,  and  his  indignation,  holding  back  the 
resignation  on  the  ground  that  so  important  a  step 
required  careful  preparation.  In  the  end  it  was 
peremptorily  sent  for  and  delivered.  Unwilling  to 
admit  that  he  was  forced  out  of  office,  the  Prince 
aimed  a  parting  arrow  in  his  words  to  Moritz 
Busch,  that  he  ''did  not  wish  to  take  upon  his 
shoulders  at  the  close  of  his  career  the  stupidities 
and  mistakes  of  a  presumptuous  and  inexperienced 
mind."1  To  Holstein,  who  had  worked  with  him 
in  the  Foreign  Office,  he  said:  "It  is  all  over,  and 
destiny  wants  me  to  look  upon  the  destruction  of 


1  Busch,  Bismarck:    Some  Secret  Pages  of  His  History,  New 
York,  1904. 

20 


THE  SOURCES  OF  THE  KAISER'S  POWER 

my  own  work.  .  .  .  Can  you  understand  what  it  is 
to  feel  that  one  has  become  nothing  after  having 
been  every  thing  V1 

It  was  the  Kaiser's  victory.  Men  called  him 
light-minded,  but  he  had  appropriated  the  last 
ounce  of  personal  power,  and  that  is  what  he  de- 
sired. The  appointment  of  Caprivi,  a  general 
without  experience  in  foreign,  or  even  civil,  affairs, 
as  Chancellor  seemed  the  acme  of  rashness.  Yet 
no  one  was  disposed  to  challenge  "this  young 
man. ' ' 

At  one  moment,  after  the  indignities  heaped  upon 
the  fallen  'Chancellor  when  the  Kaiser  intervened 
to  prevent  his  promised  audience  by  Francis  Joseph 
at  Vienna,  and  other  honors  he  was  expecting  on 
the  occasion  of  his  visit  to  Austria  to  attend  Count 
Herbert's  wedding  to  an  Austrian  lady,  Bismarck 
was  disposed  to  react  openly  against  his  royal  and 
imperial  master.  Holstein  had  gone  to  him  to 
negotiate  a  peace  with  the  Kaiser,  and  as  a  last 
argument  had  said,  what  if  his  sovereign  should 
in  his  anger  have  him  imprisoned.  "I  wish  he 
would,"  answered  the  old  Prince;  "that  would  be 
the  end  of  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty." 2 

But  this  was  only  an  ebullition  of  the  Prince's 
long  pent-up  wrath.  Bismarck  himself  had  closed 
the  door  to  revolution.  In  framing  the  Imperial 
Constitution  he  had  introduced  a  "joker"  for  him- 
self, but  the  card  was  in  the  Emperor's  hand.    He 


1  Radziwill,  Germany  Under  Three  Emperors,  p.  344. 

2  The  same,  p.  356. 

21 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

had  made  the  Emperor  absolute,  irresponsible,  with 
no  tribunal  before  which  he  could  be  summoned, 
and  no  legal  power  in  the  hands  of  government  or 
people  by  which  his  personal  will  could  be  con- 
trolled. He  who  had  dealt  a  death  blow  to  par- 
liamentary government  could  not  appeal  to  the 
Reichstag,  which  he  had  emasculated.  At  a  word 
from  the  Emperor  it  would  be  dissolved.  If  it 
resisted,  the  army  was  there  to  execute  the  law. 
In  the  Bundesrat  the  case  was  equally  hopeless. 
Nothing  but  a  general  revolution  could  shake  the 
power  of  the  Kaiser.  The  ease  with  which  the 
Chancellor  had  been  overthrown  by  a  single  mes- 
sage, delivered  through  a  court  officer,  was  a  con- 
clusive demonstration  of  his  utter  impotence,  ex- 
cept as  he  spoke  by  the  Emperor's  authority. 

There  was,  moreover,  something  else  besides  the 
Constitution  and  the  army;  there  was  the  German 
tribal  religion,  of  which  the  Kaiser  was  the  High 
Priest.  "My  grandfather,"  the  Emperor  said  to 
his  faithful  Brandenburgers  a  few  days  before 
Bismarck's  fall — "my  grandfather  considered  that 
the  office  of  king  was  a  task  that  God  had  assigned 
to  him,  to  which  up  to  the  last  moment  he  conse- 
crated all  his  forces.  That  which  he  thought  I  also 
think,  and  I  see  in  the  people  and  the  country  that 
have  been  transmitted  to  me  a  trust  that  is  con- 
fided to  me  by  God,  which  it  is  my  duty  to  increase. 
.  .  .  Those  who  wish  to  aid  me  in  that  task,  who- 
ever they  are,  I  welcome  with  all  my  heart;  those 
who  oppose  me  in  this  work  I  shall  crush," 

23 


THE  SOURCES   OF  THE  KAISER'S   POWER 

The  overthrow  of  Bismarck  was  a  convincing 
object-lesson.  Fortified  by  the  law,  the  army,  and 
the  religious  sentiment  of  the  people,  the  Kaiser 
was  supreme. 

But  William  II  was  too  intelligent  to  permit 
himself  to  be  considered  ungrateful  for  the  immense 
services  rendered  to  the  House  of  Hohenzollern  by 
the  recognized  creator  of  the  German  Empire.  In 
every  way  he  tried  to  make  it  appear  that  the  dis- 
missal of  the  Chancellor  was  to  him  a  painful  act 
of  duty.  Two  days  after  the  Prince  was  relieved 
of  his  office  the  Kaiser  telegraphed  to  Count  Gorz 
Schlitz  at  Weimar:  "I  suffer  as  if  I  had  for  a 
second  time  just  lost  my  grandfather.  But  God 
has  so  willed  it.  I  must  support  it."  And  then,  as 
if  to  justify  his  action  as  a  high  political  necessity, 
he  adds:  "I  have  the  position  of  officer  of  the 
watch  on  the  bridge  of  the  Ship  of  State.  The 
course  remains  the  same;  and  now,  full  steam 
ahead ! ' ' 

But  neither  in  spirit  nor  in  fact  did  the  course 
remain  the  same.  Between  William  II  and  Prince 
Bismarck,  who  was  by  no  means  pacified  by  being 
created  Duke  of  Lauenburg  at  the  time  of  his  re- 
tirement, there  were  differences  of  view  so  wide 
as  to  be  utterly  incompatible,  and  this  was  recog- 
nized by  both.  The  result  was  that  the  influences 
emanating  from  Bismarck's  estate  at  Friedrichs- 
ruhe  had  to  be  officially  repressed.  On  May  23d  a 
general  order  was  issued  by  the  new  Chancellor, 
Caprivi,  to  all  the  diplomatic  representatives  of 

23 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Germany  to  inform  the  governments  to  which  they 
were  accredited  "that  His  Majesty  distinguishes 
between  the  Bismarck  of  other  days  and  the  Bis- 
marck of  the  present,' '  and  that  "no  importance 
should  be  attached  to  what  the  press  may  say  re- 
garding the  views  of  Bismarck." 

A  later  Chancellor,  Prince  von  Hohenlohe,  who 
heard  from  the  Kaiser's  own  lips,  as  the  Prince 
reports  in  his  memoirs,  the  story  of  the  es- 
trangement, quotes  William  II  as  saying  to  him 
— and  for  this  revelation  the  Kaiser  never  for- 
gave him — that  for  the  three  weeks  before  his  dis- 
missal of  Bismarck  he  had  had  "a  devil  of  a 
time"  with  him,  the  question  being  "whether  the 
dynasty  Bismarck  or  the  dynasty  Hohenzollern 
should  reign. ' ' 1 

In  the  public  speeches  immediately  following 
Prince  Bismarck's  retirement  the  Kaiser  took  pains 
to  make  it  understood,  both  at  home  and  abroad, 
that  in  foreign  relations  it  was  the  head  of  the 
state  alone  who  should  be  reckoned  with.  At  a  ban- 
quet in  the  royal  palace  at  Christiania,  on  June  29, 
1890,  for  example,  he  said:  "I  consider  it  neces- 
sary for  a  sovereign  that  he  should  personally  in- 
form himself  about  everything ;  that  he  should  form 
his  opinion  for  himself ;  that  he  should  become  ac- 
quainted with  his  neighbors,  in  order  to  establish 
and  maintain  good  relations  with  them :  such  is  the 

1  Prince  von  Hohenlohe's  Memoirs  were  not  published  until 
after  his  death,  in  1906.  His  account  makes  it  indisputable  that 
the  Kaiser's  motive  was  personal  supremacy.  The  conversation 
with  Windthorst,  the  Prince  considers,  was  only  an  excuse.  See 
Illustrative  Document  No.  i,  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 

24 


THE  SOURCES  OF  THE  KAISER'S  POWER 

object  of  my  foreign  journeys."  In  the  next  six 
months  he  made  six  visits  to  foreign  courts. 

It  was  this  personal  diplomacy,  this  attempt  to 
base  international  relations  upon  personal  senti- 
ments and  compliments  and  toasts  after  dinner, 
that  had  seriously  disturbed  the  mind  of  Bismarck ; 
and,  as  we  shall  have  occasion  to  see  in  following 
the  consequences  of  this  policy,  in  opposition  to  a 
policy  of  foreign  affairs  based  on  legal  principles 
and  a  reasoned  understanding  of  mutual  interests, 
it  is  this  attitude  that  has  kept  the  German  Empire 
in  a  ferment  and  all  Europe  in  a  state  of  periodical 
crises  ever  since  the  reign  of  William  II  began. 
"It  is  very  natural,"  said  Bismarck,  after  his  re- 
sentment had  cooled  down,  "that  a  mentor  like  my- 
self does  not  please  him,  and  that  he  rejects  my 
advice.  An  old  cart-horse  and  a  young  courser  go 
ill  in  harness  together.  Only  political  problems  are 
not  so  easy  as  a  chemical  combination:  they  deal 
with  human  beings. ' ' x 

In  the  opinion  of  William  II,  the  only  human  be- 
ings to  be  considered  in  international  politics  were 
the  sovereigns;  but  Bismarck  understood  that  di- 
plomacy has  also  to  do  with  the  interests  of  nations. 
The  Prince  had  warned  him  not  to  trust  to  merely 
personal  relations  and  impressions,  but  the  Kaiser 
had  pursued  his  own  course.    His  early  visit  to 


1  Paul  Liman,  Der  Kaiser,  Berlin,  1904,  endeavors  to  show  that 
Bismarck  was  not  really  greatly  mortified  by  his  dismissal  and 
bore  no  grudge  against  his  young  master ;  but  this  view  cannot  be 
sustained  in  the  light  of  the  evidence.  Even  Hans  Blum,  a  partisan 
of  Bismarck,  Das  Deutsche  Reich  zur  Zeit  Bismarcks,  Leipzig, 
1893,  does  not  dispute  this. 

25 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Alexander  III,  a  man  of  experience  and  calcula- 
tion, immediately  after  his  accession  as  German 
Emperor,  had  left  him  with  a  deep  prejudice 
against  Russia.  The  Czar  had  not  taken  his  youth- 
ful enthusiasms  very  seriously,  and  the  Kaiser  had 
not  failed  to  resent  this.  When,  therefore,  Bis- 
marck insisted  that  care  must  be  given  to  the 
friendship  with  Russia,  William  II  was  disposed  to 
think  lightly  of  it. 

What  Bismarck  had  feared  was  a  possible  alli- 
ance between  France  and  Russia,  both  of  which 
were  left  isolated  by  the  situation  that  had  been 
created  on  the  Continent  by  the  formation  of  the 
Triple  Alliance,  begun  by  the  defensive  agreement 
of  Germany  and  Austria  in  1879,  and  completed  by 
similar  agreements  between  Austria  and  Italy  and 
Germany  and  Italy  in  1882.  But  the  friendship 
of  Prussia  with  Russia  was  a  far  older  one,  and  in 
Bismarck's  mind  it  was  still  of  great  importance  to 
Germany.  He  had  been  anxious  to  retain  it,  and 
had  taken  measures  to  do  so.  In  fact,  had  he  not 
feared  making  Germany  altogether  dependent  upon 
Russia,  and  liable  in  this  relation  to  be  held  in 
check  by  her  in  any  future  attack  upon  France,  he 
might  even  have  preferred  an  alliance  with  Russia 
rather  than  with  Austria;  for,  as  he  once  said,  "In 
point  of  material  force  I  held  a  union  with  Russia 
to  have  the  advantage.' '  It  was,  in  fact,  the  policy 
which  Emperor  William  I  would  have  preferred. 

Bismarck's  alter  ego,  Herr  Holstein,  the  cunning 
spider  at  the  center  of  the  web  in  Wilhelmstrasse, 

26 


THE   SOURCES  OF  THE  KAISER'S   POWER 

lias  left  on  record  a  sentence  that  reveals  the  main- 
spring of  Bismarck's   diplomacy  with  a  sudden 
glare  of  light :    "With  Kussia  as  an  ally  we  might 
crush  Austria,  but  we  could  never  destroy  France, 
and  it  is  France  that  must  be  destroyed  before  the 
German  Empire  can  develop  itself,  as  it  is  essential 
it  should  do  in  the  future."1    A  friendship  with 
Russia  strong  enough  to  secure  her  neutrality  in 
the  future  as  in  the  past,  but  not  the  obligations 
of  an  alliance — unless  it  became  necessary  to  peace 
— that,  in  Holstein's  mind,  was  the  policy  of  Bis- 
marck.   "You  see,"  he  went  on,  in  a  confidential 
interview,  "the  next  war  is  bound  to  be  for  us  a 
question  of  existence.     If  we  fight  it  successfully, 
then  we  shall  be  able  to  proceed  to  a  general  dis- 
armament of  Europe,  together  with  a  restriction  of 
our  own  military  forces.    Therefore,  we  ought  to 
watch  carefully  for  the  moment  when  this  war  can 
be  brought  about  with  the  minimum  of  risk  to  our- 
selves and  the  maximum  to  our  foes.     When  Ave 
consider  this  moment  to  have  arrived  we  must  be- 
gin it,  whether  we  like  it  or  not ;  and  what  neither 
Bismarck  nor  myself  was  sure  of  was,  whether 
Russia  would  allow  us  to  seize  it,  whereas  with 
Austria  no  such  complication  could  be  feared.  .  .  . 
With  Austria  beside  us — who  knows — perhaps  one 
or  two  Balkan  States,  we  can  crush  both  France  and 
Russia  and  neutralize  England. ' ' 2 

Equally  with  Bismarck,  William  II  understood 


1  Radziwill,  Germany  Under  Three  Emperors,  p.  266, 

2  The  same,  p.  266. 

27 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

the  importance  of  another  war  in  Germany's  pro- 
gram of  development;  but,  whereas  the  old  Chan- 
cellor found  the  real  enemy  in  France,  the  Kaiser 
found  him  in  Russia.  The  difference  was  based 
upon  different  conceptions  of  empire.  Bismarck 
contemplated  a  Germany  ultimately  dominant  on 
the  continent  of  Europe  at  the  least  possible  ex- 
pense. Hence  a  general  reduction  of  armaments 
when  that  position  was  once  attained.  But  "William 
II  wished  no  such  limits.  He  aimed  at  world  pre- 
dominance, and  understood  that  the  disarmament 
of  Europe  would  terminate  the  necessity  for  kings 
and  emperors  altogether.  Bismarck  was  planning 
as  a  Prussian  statesman,  William  II  as  proprietor 
of  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty.  From  the  beginning 
he  looked  toward  the  East  as  the  path  of  empire. 
It  was  not  France  but  Russia  that  blocked  the  way. 
A  permanent  friendship  with  Russia  was,  in  his 
eyes,  impossible.  The  Balkan  Peninsula,  the  de- 
bris of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  Constantinople — 
these  were  the  real  pawns  in  the  imperial  game. 
Bismarck  believed  nothing  of  this.  For  him  Ger- 
many's greatness  would  consist  in  drawing  the 
Austrians  into  the  German  union;  the  permanent 
weakening  of  France,  to  be  kept  in  conflict  with 
Great  Britain  over  the  spoils  of  colonial  expansion ; 
the  development  of  Russia  on  the  Asiatic  side ;  and 
the  consequent  military  domination  of  the  Euro- 
pean continent  by  Germany  with  a  minimum  of 
cost.  "William  II  wanted  as  much  as  possible 
of  all  this,  but  also  new  territories   and  access 

28 


THE   SOURCES  OF  THE   KAISER'S   POWER 

to  the  southern  waters,  a  route  to  the  Far  East. 
In  1890  this  was  only  a  vague  dream,  but  across 
every  vista  of  the  vision  loomed  the  shadow  of  a 
resisting  Russia. 

In  these  first  years  of  the  Kaiser's  reign  was 
sounded  the  key-note  of  his  personal  use  of  power. 
"I  can  hardly  believe  that  he  will  ever  bear  to  have 
a  Chancellor  with  a  private  opinion  of  his  own," 
Bismarck  once  remarked.  "That,"  he  went  on, 
"means  a  return  to  absolute  government,  which 
requires  different  qualities  from  those  of  William 
II."  When  asked  why  he  spoke  of  a  "return"  to 
absolute  government,  and  not  of  a  continuance  of 
it,  since  he  himself  had  governed  absolutely,  the 
Prince  replied:  "Ah!  that  was  quite  a  different 
matter.  I  may  have  been  autocratic,  but  I  never 
boasted  of  it!"1 

We  now  know  what  the  Kaiser's  boasting  has 
brought  upon  Germany,  upon  Europe,  and  upon 
the  world. 


1  Radziwill,  Germany  Under  Three  Emperors,  p.  363. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE   KAISER'S   METHODS   OF   PERSONAL 
CONTROL 

TIKE  money  put  out  at  usury,  power  in  govern- 
-L'  ment  grows  with  astonishing  rapidity.  When 
it  is  both  concentrated  and  undisputed,  as  in  the 
case  of  imperial  absolutism,  it  soon  becomes  irre- 
sistible. 

No  better  example  of  the  rapid  centralization  of 
power  can  be  found  in  history  than  the  growth  of 
Kaiser  William  II 's  personal  control  not  only  of 
German  action,  but  of  German  thought. 

William  I,  who  had  the  habits  of  mind  of  a 
Prussian  king,  had  hardly  become  accustomed  to 
think  imperially — a  task  which  he  intrusted  chiefly 
to  Bismarck — when  his  reign  came  to  an  end  by 
his  death.  Frederick  III,  an  invalid  from  his 
accession,  hardly  had  time  as  Emperor  to  consider 
any  great  question.  But  William  II  was  a  child  of 
the  Empire.  His  thought  was  imperial  from  the 
beginning. 

Germany,  too,  was  ready  to  think  imperially. 
The  reaction  from  the  constraint  of  small  kingdoms 
and  the  parochial  rule  of  tiny  principalities  was 

30 


THE  KAISER'S  PERSONAL   CONTROL 

a  stimulus  that  made  all  kinds  of  mere  bigness 
objects  of  aspiration  in  which  all  Germans  were 
prepared  to  participate.  There  was  a  revulsion 
from  the  littleness  of  the  past  and  an  abnormal 
craving  for  modernity. 

On  the  material  side,  as  he  has  more  than  once 
assured  me,  the  great  example  in  the  mind  of 
William  II  was  America.  Too  remote  to  be  a 
rival,  in  the  political  sense,  as  it  then  seemed,  its 
large  ways  were  most  interesting  to  the  young 
Kaiser.  They  awakened  his  interest  and  fired  his 
imagination.  Americans  who  could  tell  him  of  the 
great  achievements  of  the  United  States  in  its  eco- 
nomic development  were  always  welcome  guests. 
Although  in  other  respects  not  much  approved  of, 
America  was  the  model  upon  which  the  Kaiser  built 
his  plans  of  material  prosperity,  and  the  great 
movements  that  quickened  the  economic  life  of  the 
Empire  were  initiated  by  men  who  took  the  pains, 
first  of  all,  to  learn  the  lessons  of  America.  The 
sympathy  between  the  two  countries  at  that  time 
was  intense  and  sincere.  Friendship  was  not  so 
much  sought  for  as  spontaneously  offered.  It  was 
not  apparent  that  the  interests  of  the  two  peoples 
would  ever  anywhere  come  into  collision.  The 
world,  it  was  felt,  was  large  enough  for  the  full 
development  of  both;  and,  with  sincere  pride  and 
appreciation,  a  German  Geheimrat  somewhat  later 
called  his  book  about  the  United  States  The  Land 
of  Unlimited  Possibilities. 

Even  a  young  country,  the  United  States  had 

31 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

proved,  could  become  great.  The  late  arrival  of 
the  German  Empire  in  the  family  of  nations  should 
not,  therefore,  the  Kaiser  thought,  prevent  it  also 
from  attaining  a  great  position  as  a  world  power. 
It,  too,  had  " unlimited  possibilities."  What  could 
not  be  accomplished  with  the  resources  and  within 
the  limits  of  the  German  Empire,  as  it  existed, 
must  be  accomplished  by  extending  the  power  of 
the  Empire  beyond  its  frontiers,  and  even  beyond 
the  sea.  This  ambition,  which  the  Kaiser  lost  no 
opportunity  of  promoting  in  his  people,  he  himself 
pre-eminently  entertained.  Nothing  has  so  facili- 
tated the  growth  of  William  II  's  personal  power  as 
the  conviction  of  his  subjects  that  he  was  sincere  in 
his  constantly  reiterated  assurances  that  the  in- 
crease of  his  personal  authority  was  identical  with 
the  increased  power  of  the  Empire,  which  they  al- 
ways translated  into  the  tacit  assumption  that  this 
meant  the  wealth,  the  prosperity,  and  the  glory  of 
all  the  German  people. 

How  much  of  this  ambition  was  personal  and 
dynastic  few  persons  felt  disposed  to  inquire.  A 
simple  test  would,  however,  have  answered  the 
question.  No  one  ever  doubted  that  there  is  room 
enough  in  the  world  for  the  prolific  German  race, 
but  William  II  thought  that  German  territory 
should  increase  with  the  German  population,  in 
order  that  as  few  Germans  as  possible  should  cease 
to  be  his  subjects.  To  this  end  they  must  be  re- 
strained from  migration  until  the  Empire  could  be 
so  expanded  as  to  provide  homes  for  all  Germans 

32 


THE  KAISER'S  PERSONAL   CONTROL 

under  the  German  flag.  When  this  could  not  be 
done,  in  every  foreign  land  the  Teuton  must  be  a 
missionary  for  German  culture  and  German  trade. 
Germans,  wherever  they  lived,  should  have  their 
own  schools  and  their  own  churches,  where  the 
maternal  language  should  be  kept  alive. 

In  this  respect  the  Kaiser's  policy  was  a  glaring 
anachronism.  No  other  monarch  in  the  world  in- 
sisted that  personal  fealty  to  himself  must  be  car- 
ried into  foreign  lands.  Seldom,  perhaps,  did  the 
faithful  surmise  that  the  Kaiser's  interest  in  them 
was  chiefly  dynastic,  regarding  them  not  as  Ger- 
mans, but  as  his  subjects. 

That,  in  the  circumstances,  there  should  be  a 
Pan-German  party  and  propaganda  in  Germany 
was  inevitable.  We  know  what  it  has  accomplished 
since  the  organization  of  the  Alldeutscher  Verband 
in  1894.  In  every  form,  from  popular  tracts  to 
erudite  volumes,  its  literature  has  been  scattered 
broadcast  among  the  German  people.  Appealing 
ostensibly  to  racial  unity  and  sentiment,  its  under- 
lying motive  is  imperial.  Wherever  a  German  goes, 
he  must  never  forget  that  he  is  a  German ;  and,  as  a 
German,  he  owes  perpetual  fealty  to  the  Kaiser. 

One  would  have  supposed  that  at  least  one  class 
of  Germans  would  resist  this  influence  and  would 
defend  the  broad  cosmopolitanism  which  character- 
ized the  German  universities  in  the  early  part  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  It  is  a  matter  of  surprise, 
therefore,  that  the  learned  world  of  Germany,  in 
all  the  constituent  states  of  the  Empire,  including 

33 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

teachers  and  professors,  from  the  universities  down 
to  the  lowest  schools,  should  become  rabid  imperi- 
alists and  adulators  of  Prussian  aims  and  Prussian 
methods.1  To  their  keeping  had  been  intrusted  the 
treasure  and  ideals  of  academic  freedom,  the  tradi- 
tions of  personal  political  independence  as  its  nec- 
essary support,  and  the  example  of  their  forerun- 
ners who  were  responsible  for  the  democratic  and 
constitutional  movement  of  1848,  which  a  little 
more  political  experience  might  have  made  trium- 
phant. It  was  well  known  that  it  was  Prussia  that 
had  rendered  that  development  abortive;  that 
Prussia  had  never  been  a  home  of  culture,  as  even 
the  smallest  German  principalities  had  been;  and 
that  every  flower  of  philosophy  that  by  its  own 
vigor  and  without  the  nurture  of  the  state  had  ever 
blossomed  on  the  great  northern  plain  had  been  cut 
down,  as  Immanuel  Kant  and  William  von  Hum- 
boldt had  been — Kant,  who  boldly  declared  that 
there  would  be  no  lasting  peace  in  the'  world  until 
all  states  were  republican,  and  was  publicly 
snubbed  for  it  by  the  King;  and  Von  Humboldt, 
who  fell  into  disfavor  because  he  championed  pop- 


1  In  a  discourse  of  December  4,  1800,'  at  the  first  session  of  the 
Commission  on  Secondary  Education,  William  II  violently  op- 
posed classical  education,  as  contrasted  with  technical  instruction ; 
insisted  upon  the  duty  of  teachers  to  inculcate  right  doctrines 
regarding  the  government  and  to  see  that  students  were  not  "se- 
duced" by  "political  novelties" ;  and  asserted,  regarding  the  "new 
edifice  of  the  state,"  the  Empire,  "I  can  judge  of  it  with  absolute 
certainty,  for  I  am  at  the  apex  of  all  the  questions  having  refer- 
ence to  me."  "Consider  the  young  generation  which  you  prepare 
for  the  defense  of  the  country,"  he  continues.  "/  have  need  of 
soldiers,  we  want  vigorous  men  who  can  also  serve  their  country 
as  intellectual  leaders  and  functionaries." 

34 


THE  KAISER'S   PERSONAL   CONTROL 

ular  liberty,  and  sought  solace  for  his  wounded 
spirit  by  leaving  Prussia  and  exercising  his  great 
talents  in  more  congenial  climes. 

That  the  teachers  and  writers  of  Germany  wore 
in  twenty  years  transformed  into  "Byzantines,"  as 
they  privately  accuse  one  another  of  having  be- 
come, was  indeed  unnatural;  and  the  phenomenon 
is  inexplicable  until  the  process  by  which  it  was 
accomplished  is  explained. 

Even  the  possibility  of  such  a  transformation 
does  not  become  apparent  until  one  considers  that 
in  Germany,  since  it  has  been  Prussianized,  the 
state  is  omnipotent,  and  that  all  education  in  Ger- 
many is  a  function  of  the  state.  All  teachers  being 
state  officials,  the  employment  and  promotion  of 
professors  are  regulated  by  state  authority;  and 
all  state  authority  is,  in  the  last  analysis,  an  emana- 
tion of  the  power  of  the  Emperor.  Nothing  of  im- 
portance can  happen  in  Germany  in  direct  and  open 
opposition  to  his  will. 

The  decapitation  of  Bismarck  as  Chancellor  all 
the  world  knows;  but  it  does  not,  perhaps,  recall 
how,  near  the  commencement  of  his  reign,  William 
II  began  his  program  for  the  subjugation  of  the 
professors. 

In  1844  there  was  established  at  Berlin  the 
"Verdun  Prize,"  in  memory  of  the  separation  of 
the  Carlovingian  empire  into  the  distinct  nationali- 
ties of  Germany  and  France  by  a  treaty  of  843. 
It  had  been  the  annual  custom  to  award  this  prize 
to  the  most  meritorious  historical  work  of  the  year, 

4  35 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

and  in  1894  the  Academy  of  Berlin  had  unani- 
mously awarded  it  to  the  well-known  historian,  Von 
Sybel,  for  his  great  work,  The  Foundation  of  the 
New  German  Empire.  To  the  amazement  of  every 
one,  when  the  award  was  submitted  to  William  II 
for  his  ratification,  the  Kaiser  drew  his  pen  through 
the  name  of  Von  Sybel  and  awarded  the  prize  to 
Erdmannsdorfer,  a  Heidelberg  erudite,  who  had 
produced  a  rather  crude  work  on  the  Great 
Elector.1 

What,  then,  was  the  fault  of  Von  Sybel?  Cer- 
tainly not  that  he  was  not  a  loyal  Prussian,  wholly 
devoted  to  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty ;  but  the  Em- 
peror had  indicated  his  wish  that  German  histori- 
ans should  in  the  future  give  to  the  representation 
of  the  Prussian  monarchs  a  "heroic  grandeur." 
This  Erdsmannsdorfer  had  tried  to  do  for  Fred- 
erick William,  but  Von  Sybel  had  had  the  hardi- 
hood to  make  Bismarck  the  hero  of  the  founding 
of  the  Empire,  and  relegated  King  William  I  to 
second  place! 

If  any  German  had  deserved  the  gratitude  of  the 
Prussian  dynasty,  it  was  undoubtedly  Treitschke, 
who  with  incomparable  fervor  had  for  more  than 
two  decades  poured  forth  a  volcanic  stream  of 
weird  eloquence  blazing  with  satire  and  invective 
against  democracy,  and  had  frescoed  with  all  the 
colors  of  the  rainbow  the  House  of  Hohenzollern  as 
the  Savior  of  Europe.     Not  only  so,  but  at  Kiel, 


1  For  further  details,  see  Guilland,  L'Allemagne  nouvelle  et  ses 
historiens,  Paris,  1899. 

36 


THE  KAISER'S  PERSONAL   CONTROL 

as  professor,  he  had  been  hissed  by  the  Danes,  and 
at  Freiburg  had  been  personally  menaced,  because 
of  his  eulogy  of  the  Prussians — all  this  before  the 
advent  of  the  Empire — to  a  point  where  it  was  nec- 
essary to  pack  up  and  hastily  leave  the  place.  Yet 
this  martyr — for  he  had  suffered  deeply  for  his 
devotion  to  Prussia — although  he  had  hailed  with 
an  outburst  of  joy  the  accession  of  William  II  as 
the  salvation  of  the  Empire,  was  caused  to  feel  the 
power  that  could  make  and  unmake  the  idols  of  the 
day. 

Venturing  in  the  self-confidence  of  his  great 
fame  to  draw  a  picture  of  Frederick  William  IV 
which  reflected  upon  the  foibles  of  William  II, 
Treitschke  had  aroused  the  Kaiser's  wrath. 

"Having  imagined,' '  wrote  Treitschke,  "with 
the  fancy  of  an  artist  a  world  of  magnificent  plans, 
being  now  the  master,  Frederick  William  wished  to 
realize  them.  Weary  of  the  parsimony  of  the  Court 
of  Berlin,  in  order  to  maintain  a  state  of  sumptu- 
ousness  worthy  of  the  Hohenzollerns,  he  hoped  to 
assemble  all  that  was  great  in  the  realm  of  art.  He 
was  never  happy  except  when  emitting  a  flood  of 
thoughts  and  sentiments.  'I  could  not  rest  until  I 
had. spoken,'  he  wrote  one  day  to  a  friend."1 

The  picture  was  too  accurate  to  be  mistaken. 
The  old  professor  fell  under  disfavor,  and  he  was 
threatened  with  having  the  archives  closed  to  him. 
A  worse  punishment  would  have  followed  upon  the 
least  sign  of  resentment,  but  the  death  of  Treitschke 


1  See  Guilland,  as  above. 

37 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

ended  the  process  of  humiliation.  As  in  the  case 
of  Bismarck,  every  court  of  appeal  was  closed  to 
him.    Had  he  not  written,  "The  state  is  power"? l 

The  case  of  Quidde,  the  Munich  professor,  is  less 
pathetic  and  more  amusing.  In  1894  he  published 
in  a  magazine,  and  afterward  in  a  pamphlet,  an 
article  entitled  "Caligula."2 

"The  young  prince,"  wrote  Quidde,  ostensibly 
of  the  Roman  Emperor,  "was  suddenly  called  to  his 
high  office  before  obtaining  maturity.  His  father, 
Germanicus,  had  succumbed  to  a  vicious  disease  in 
the  prime  of  his  years.  The  people  had  adored  the 
deceased  man,  from  whom  they  had  hoped  to  secure 
an  increase  in  freedom  and  happiness.  The  posi- 
tion of  Caligula's  father  as  presumptive  heir  to 
the  throne  had  been  delicate  enough  during  the  de- 
clining years  of  old  Emperor  Tiberius  and  was 
made  still  more  trying  by  the  haughty  and  pas- 
sionate temper  of  Caligula's  mother,  who  was  an 
extremely  unpopular  woman. 

"The  new  Emperor  was  at  first  considered  to  be 
an  unknown  and  enigmatic  character  and  every- 
body expected  that  Marco,  the  all-powerful  Minis- 
ter of  State  and  Prefect  of  the  Guards,  would  rule 
in  fact,  especially  since  the  imperial  house  was 
greatly  indebted  to  him.    But  soon  the  great  states- 


1  Of  Treitschke  Guilland  says :  "He  is  not  a  veritable  historian. 
A  man  of  sentiment  and  imagination,  he  needs  to  be  carried  away 
by  his  subject,  to  be  inspired  by  enthusiasm,  to  storm  or  to  curse. 
He  is  incapable  of  studying  scientifically  a  question  in  itself :  it  is 
necessary  for  him  either  to  love  or  to  hate." 

2  A  copy  of  Quidde's  Caligula  may  be  found  in  the  Congressional 
Library  at  Washington. 

38 


THE  KAISER'S   PERSONAL   CONTROL 

man  fell  into  disgrace  and  the  Emperor  assumed 
complete  control  of  affairs  and  established  a  purely- 
personal  regime.'' 

For  this  Quidde  was  summoned  to  answer  to  a 
charge  of  lese-majeste.  "Whom  have  you  in  mind 
in  writing  this  article  V  demanded  the  cross- 
examiner.  "Caligula,  of  course,"  was  the  prompt 
reply.  "Whom  have  you  in  mind,  Mr.  Solic- 
itor ?" 

The  government,  for  once,  was  completely  cor- 
nered. The  proceedings  were  dropped,  but  the 
pamphlet  is  said  to  have  run  through  more  than 
thirty  editions. 

More  successful  was  the  discipline  administered 
to  Professor  Delbriick,  of  Berlin,  a  devoted  Prus- 
sian, who  had,  nevertheless,  in  1898,  the  courage  to 
criticize  in  his  Preussische  Jahrbucher  the  brutal 
policy  applied  to  the  Danish  subjects  in  Schleswig- 
Holstein.  A  reprimand  and  a  fine  of  five  hundred 
marks  served  as  a  caution  to  those  who,  on  grounds 
of  justice,  were  disposed  to  pass  judgment  on  the 
government.  So  long  as  professors  and  writers 
did  not  express  doubts  of  the  rightful  omnipotence 
of  the  state,  of  the  divine  appointment  and  holy 
mission  of  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty,  or  of  the  high 
destiny  of  Deutschtum,  they  were  permitted  to  lec- 
ture and  write  about  almost  anything  they  pleased, 
and  this  is  what  is  now  understood  in  Germany  by 
"academic  freedom."  Attacks  on  religion  and  on 
the  family,  and  even  atheism  and  socialism  of  the 
most  rampant  kind,  pass  without  official  censure; 

39 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

but  no  one  is  permitted  with  immunity  to  cast  re- 
flections upon  the  government. 

But  the  power  of  the  Kaiser  consists  in  practice 
far  less  in  what  he  can  prevent  than  in  what  he  can 
promote.  From  top  to  bottom  civil  life  is  controlled 
by  the  long  line  of  his  servitors,  whose  interest  al- 
ways lies  in  courting  his  favor  as  well  as  in  avoid- 
ing his  displeasure.  To  be  a  guest  at  his  table,  to 
be  the  recipient  of  his  confidence,  to  be  rewarded 
■with  a  word  of  his  approval,  is  a  passport  to  esteem 
in  every  community  of  Germany.  By  the  ignorant, 
obedience  to  his  will  is  regarded  as  a  religious  duty. 
To  inculcate  this  duty  on  the  part  of  the  people  is 
esteemed  a  service  to  the  state.  To  glorify  the 
state  on  all  occasions,  therefore,  becomes  an  official 
obligation  which  it  is  deemed  a  grave  delinquency 
to  disregard.  Why  should  even  chemists,  or  physi- 
cists, or  mathematicians — not  to  speak  of  histori- 
ans and  philosophers,  who  must  discuss  such  mat- 
ters— be  expected  to  obstruct  their  own  promotion 
by  a  failure  to  meet  this  expectation?  And  when 
in  time  of  need  a  manifesto,  declaring  the  inno- 
cence of  the  German  army  in  the  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium and  its  right  to  impose  the  superiority  of 
German  culture  upon  neighboring  peoples,  was 
passed  around  for  signature  by  the  most  eminent 
university  professors  and  men  of  science  in  the 
Empire,  for  the  purpose  of  balancing  this  violation 
of  neutral  soil  by  the  weight  of  their  great  author- 
ity, what  wonder  that  they  were  induced  to  sign  a 
false  and  purely  dogmatic  statement  in  open  con- 

40 


THE   KAISER'S   PERSONAL   CONTROL 

tradiction  of  documentary  evidence  in  the  hands  of 
every  scholar  in  every  neutral  country? 

Knowing  personally  many  of  the  ninety-three 
distinguished  Germans  who  signed  this  manifesto 
in  1914,  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  they  were 
actuated  by  mere  vulgar  fear  of  what  might  hap- 
pen to  them  if  they  refused  to  sign.  Their  act  was 
the  fruit  of  twenty-five  years  of  subservience  so 
habitual  that  they  solemnly  proclaimed  a  falsehood 
because  they  had  been  accustomed  to  think  that 
whatever  the  Emperor  ordered  could  not  be  wrong. 
He  had  so  shaped  public  opinion  that  the  political 
and  ethical  standards  of  judgment  in  Germany  had 
ceased  to  be  individual. 

It  is  difficult  for  men  not  indoctrinated  in  the 
imperial  cult  to  accept  such  an  explanation.  But 
listen  to  the  most  celebrated  scholar  in  Germany, 
the  son-in-law  of  Mommsen,  Wilamowitz-Mollen- 
dorfT.  He  is  speaking  of  the  superiority  of  Prussia 
to  Athens : 

"Your  sages,"  he  says,  in  an  apostrophe  to  the 
Athenians, — "your  sages  tell  us  of  that  highest 
love  which,  freed  from  all  bodily  entanglements, 
spends  itself  on  institutions,  on  laws,  on  ideas.  We 
Prussians,  a  rough,  much-enduring  tribe  of  North- 
erners .  .  .  believe  that  love  is  on  a  higher  level 
when  the  fullest  devotion  to  an  institution  and  an 
idea  is  linked  with  an  entirely  personal  devotion  to 
a  human  being.  .  .  .  "When  our  children  have  scarce 
learned  to  fold  their  little  hands  before  God,  we 
set  a  picture  before  them,  we  tell  them  to  recognize 

41 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

the  noble  features;  we  tell  them,  'This  is  our  good 
King.'  Our  young  men,  when  they  are  of  age  to 
bear  arms,  look  with  joy  and  pride  on  the  trim  garb 
of  war,  and  say,  'I  go  in  the  King's  coat.'  And 
when  the  nation  assembles  to  a  common  political 
celebration,  the  occasion  is  no  Feast  of  the  Consti- 
tution, no  Day  of  the  Bastille,  no  Panathenaic  Fes^ 
tival.  It  is  then  that  we  bow  in  reverence  and  loy- 
alty before  him  who  has  allowed  us  to  see  with  our 
oAvn  eyes  that  for  which  our  fathers  dreamed  and 
yearned,  before  him  who  ever  extends  the  bounds 
of  the  kingdom  in  freedom,  prosperity,  and  right- 
eousness; before  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  and 
King." 

Here  is  the  secret  of  Junkertum,  the  old  feudal 
relation  of  a  vassal  to  his  lord,  beside  whom  con- 
stitutions, conventions,  and  treaties  are  mere 
scraps  of  paper !  Did  not  King  Frederick  William 
IV  once  say,  speaking  of  a  proposed  constitution, 
"Never  wall  I  permit  a  piece  of  paper  to  come  be- 
tween God  and  my  people ' '  ?  Safe  from  divine  con- 
demnation in  "the  trim  garb  of  war,"  covered  with 
righteousness  by  "the  King's  coat,"  the  German 
soldier,  regardless  of  "institutions,  laws  and 
ideas,"  goes  forth  wherever  he  is  led,  to  "extend 
the  bounds  of  the  kingdom."  Whoever  does  this 
loyally  to  his  lord  does  nothing  wrong! 

Every  German  professor  is  proud  to  wear  "the 
King's  coat."  When  he  does  not  wear  that,  he  is 
proud  to  wear  the  Order  of  the  Red  Eagle — the 
Black  Eagle  is  usually  too  much  to  hope  for — third 

43 


THE  KAISER'S  PERSONAL   CONTROL 

or  fourth  class.  Not  to  become  a  Geheimrat  is  to 
live  a  wasted  life.  And  this  is  not  wholly  a  matter 
of  vanity.  It  is  social  status.  It  is  more  than  that ; 
it  is  a  baptism,  a  chrism,  in  a  holy  service,  the 
service  of  the  Emperor,  who  is  a  king  by  "divine 
right. "  Not  that  every  German  professor  really 
believes  in  "divine  right";  for,  logically,  that 
would  imply  the  existence  of  a  divinity,  in  whom 
frequently  he  does  not  believe.  To  him  the  expres- 
sion means  that  the  Kaiser  is  divinely  right,  be- 
cause he  symbolizes  the  might  of  Germany.  To  be 
a  conscious  part  of  this  higher  system,  a  privy 
councilor,  is  to  attain  a  great  height;  but  to  be  a 
"Wirklicher  Geheimrat,"  with  the  attribute  of 
"Excellency,"  that  is  to  reach  the  highest  pinnacle 
of  earthly  honor  attainable  by  a  German  professor. 
In  private  many  Germans  would,  no  doubt,  be 
disposed  to  smile  over  the  strange  conception  of 
values  implied  in  this  passion  for  decorations ;  but 
no  one  would  dispute  the  fact  that  the  expectation 
of  imperial  recognition  exerts  a  powerful  influence 
over  the  German  mind.  It  would,  no  doubt,  be 
unjust  to  say  that  these  honors  work  the  miracle  of 
making  otherwise  democratic  minds  imperialistic. 
The  more  exact  statement  would  be,  that,  to  minds 
already  bred  to  imperialism,  these  honors  have  a 
value  which  to  others  they  could  never  seem  to 
possess,  and  are  on  that  account  an  important 
means  of  extending  the  influence  which  the  Kaiser 
is  able  to  exert  over  thought  and  its  expression  by 
the  learned  world. 

43 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Where  affirmative  support  cannot  be  obtained 
open  opposition  must  at  least  be  silenced ;  and  hence 
the  control  and  subjection  of  the  German  press  and 
news  agencies.  A  perfectly  free  press  would  speed- 
ily undermine  this  system,  and  it  cannot  therefore 
be  tolerated.  Above  all,  no  strictures  must  be  made 
upon  the  Kaiser's  authority;  and,  as  personal  re- 
spect is  the  ultimate  basis  upon  which  it  rests,  all 
public  criticism  of  the  Kaiser's  words  or  conduct 
is  regarded  as  lese-majeste — a  crime  whose  gravity 
seems  to  be  augmented  by  the  weight  of  the  Ger- 
man name,  Majestatsbeleidigung , — to  be  severely 
punished  even  in  its  mildest  forms. 

Personally,  the  Kaiser  sees  no  value  in  public 
opinion  as  an  independent  personal  state  of  mind. 
The  proper  substitute  for  it  is  imperial  instruction 
followed  by  strict  obedience.  In  private  conversa- 
tion, and  even  in  public  addresses,  he  does  not  hesi- 
tate to  express  his  bitter  antipathy  to  the  whole 
pestilent  tribe  of  editors  and  journalists.  Even 
those  who  are  under  government  influence  and  in 
government  pay  hardly  command  his  considera- 
tion. They  are  regarded  as  mere  hirelings,  and  are 
not  invited  to  court.  Armed  with  power  to  sup- 
press all  hostile  publications — a  power  frequently 
exercised  upon  such  periodicals  as  Harden 's  Die 
Zukunft,  the  Social-Democratic  Vorwarts,  and 
others  far  less  radical — the  Kaiser's  government 
takes  pains  to  see  that  his  own  views  are  authori- 
tatively expressed  in  officially  dictated  articles  fur- 
nished to  the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung 

44     * 


THE   KAISER'S   PERSONAL   CONTROL 

and  other  inspired  publications,  which  sometimes 
have  a  lively  experience  in  their  endeavors  to  in- 
culcate a  safe  political  orthodoxy  and  to  explain 
such  unguarded  conduct  and  expressions  of  His 
Majesty  as  the  bureaucracy  finds  it  expedient  in 
the  Kaiser's  own  interest  to  interpret  or  disavow. 

Believing  that  the  only  legitimate  function  of  a 
German  newspaper  is  to  increase  the  prestige  of 
the  Emperor,  William  II,  at  times  finding  that  duty, 
as  he  thinks,  neglected,  himself  gratuitously  sup- 
plies the  deficiency  in  public  speeches  and  open 
telegrams.  Quite  in  the  manner  of  American 
statesmen,  he  has  occasionally  availed  himself  of 
the  good  offices  of  the  "interview";  sometimes, 
however,  with  disastrous  results  to  his  reputation 
for  discretion.  Even  in  Germany  it  has  occasion- 
ally been  doubted  if  the  chief  function  of  the  press 
is  to  extol  the  Emperor  and  his  system,  but  such 
dissent  does  not  augment  the  list  of  privy  coun- 
cilors. 

Quite  naturally,  the  attitude  of  the  Kaiser 
toward  the  press  is  manifested  also  toward  all 
other  organs  of  public  opinion.  He  has  always 
been  particularly  hostile  to  the  whole  idea  of  po- 
litical parties.  His  condemnation  of  the  Social 
Democrats  is,  of  course,  unqualified,  since  the  aim 
of  their  existence  as  a  party  is  to  control  public 
policies,  and  even  to  take  them  entirely  out  of  the 
Kaiser's  hands.  But  he  is,  in  fact,  opposed  to  all 
parties,  irrespective  of  their  objects ;  for,  however 
organized  and  whatever  its  aims,  a  political  party 

45 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

exists  for  the  purpose  of  making  effective  the  views 
of  its  own  members.  When  many  parties  exist, 
there  is  of  necessity  a  division,  and  a  consequent 
weakening,  of  the  national  force.  What  William 
II  desires  is  the  total  abolition  of  political  parties 
and  unrestricted  direction  of  the  Empire  by  him- 
self. In  technical  matters  he  is  willing  to  accept 
advice  from  experts  and  specialists,  but  he  claims 
as  his  own  right  the  shaping  of  all  general  policies 
without  counsel  or  obstruction  of  any  kind. 

At  the  very  commencement  of  his  reign  William 
II  openly  declared  his  position  on  this  subject  and 
endeavored  to  impress  it  upon  the  nation.     The 
German  people,  he  announced,  constitute  one  great 
family,   of  which   their   sovereign   is   the   father. 
Nothing  can  be  more  lamentable  than  family  dis- 
putes, which  can  be  avoided  only  when  the  head, 
the  sovereign,  decides  every  question.    "It  is  one 
of  the  great  merits  of  my  ancestors, "  he  said  to 
the  deputies  of  Brandenburg,  on  February  20, 1891, 
"that  they  have  never  belonged  to  a  party,  that 
they  have  always  been  above  all  parties,  and  that 
they  have  succeeded  in  making  them  work  together 
for  the  common  good."    Even  before  this  he  had 
said  at  Kbnigsberg :    ' '  The  King  of  Prussia  is  high 
above  all  parties,  above  the  manceuvers  and  hates 
of  politicians.  ...  I  know  very  well  what  you 
need,  and  I  have  ordered  my  conduct  accordingly. " 
But  it  is  not  only  as  King  of  Prussia,  it  is  as  Em- 
peror, that  William  II  considers  himself  above  all 
parties.     In  1899,  at  Hamburg,  speaking  of  the 

46 


THE  KAISER'S  PERSONAL   CONTROL 

needs  of  national  unity  of  action,  he  said:  "This 
sentiment  spreads  but  slowly  among  the  German 
people,  who,  unfortunately,  spend  their  forces  too 
freely  in  party  conflicts.  It  is  with  profound  dis- 
quietude that  I  have  observed  what  slow  progress 
is  made  in  Germany  by  interest  in  the  great  ques- 
tions which  stir  the  world,  and  in  the  comprehen- 
sion of  them.  ...  It  requires  from  me  and  from 
my  government  strenuous  efforts,  which  can  prove 
successful  only  if  the  Germans  are  all  behind  us, 
renouncing  the  divisions  of  party.' ' 

Already,  in  1899,  the  Kaiser  had  left  far  behind 
him  the  constitutional  idea  of  a  German  "presi- 
dency," and  insisted  upon  applying  in  the  entire 
Empire  the  patriarchal  tradition  of  the  Kings  of 
Prussia.  A  year  later,  in  1900,  responding  to  a 
toast  of  Prince  Euprecht  of  Bavaria,  at  Wilhelms- 
haven,  on  the  occasion  of  the  launching  of  the 
Wittelshach,  the  Kaiser  showed  that  he  did  not  fear 
publicly  to  proclaim  his  supreme  authority  over 
the  entire  Empire  and  its  destiny,  even  in  the  pres- 
ence of  a  royal  representative  of  the  second  great- 
est state  in  the  confederation.  "Your  Royal  High- 
ness, "  he  said,  "has  been  able  to  see  with  what 
force  the  waves  of  the  ocean  come  to  knock  at  the 
doors  of  our  country  and  force  us  to  take  our  place 
as  a  great  people  in  the  world ;  in  a  word,  to  enter 
into  world  politics.  The  ocean  is  indispensable  to 
the  greatness  of  Germany.  But  the  ocean  proves 
also  that  on  its  billows,  and  beyond  it,  nothing  great 
can  be  decided  without  Germany  and  without  the 

47 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

German  Emperor.  I  do  not  believe  that  our  Ger- 
man people  have  conquered,  and  have  shed  their 
blood  under  the  conduct  of  their  princes,  thirty 
years  ago,  to  be  left  aside  in  great  international 
decisions.  If  that  should  happen,  once  for  all  the 
position  of  the  German  Empire  in  the  world  would 
be  done  for,  and  I  am  not  disposed  to  let  that  occur. 
To  use  in  this  sense  without  hesitation  the  means 
most  appropriate,  and,  if  necessary,  the  most  ener- 
getic, is  my  duty  and  my  high  prerogative."  In 
the  execution  of  that  task,  he  added,  he  expected 
the  princes  and  the  German  people  to  be  behind 
him;  but  there  was  no  intimation  that  his  " pre- 
rogative "  would  be  determined  by  their  will.  His 
divine  authorization  was  as  clear  to  him  for  the 
Empire  as  it  was  for  his  kingdom  of  Prussia.  Of 
the  constitution  he  made  no  mention.  It  is  doubt- 
ful if  it  was  even  in  his  mind. 

That  the  German  Empire  had  anything  to  do 
with  "the  empire  of  the  sea,"  of  which  the  Kaiser 
spoke  with  confidence,  as  if  it  were  a  part  of  his 
divine  right,  few  Germans  were  originally  disposed 
to  believe.  When  he  first  began  to  exploit  this  idea 
of  sea-power,  some  considered  it  an  adventurous 
fancy  that  might  involve  Germany  in  serious  inter- 
national complications,  while  others  received  it 
with  indifference.  Germans  had,  in  general,  no 
expectation  of  ever  becoming,  by  nature  of  their 
country,  a  great  sea-power.  To  the  life  and  use 
of  the  sea  only  a  few  of  them  were  accustomed. 
The  sea-coasts  were  narrow  and  secluded  from  the 

48 


THE  KAISER'S   PERSONAL   CONTROL 

great  waters.  Much  labor  and  expense  were  neces- 
sary to  give  them  safe  and  ample  harbors.  The 
recent  acquisition  of  Schleswig-Holstein  made  pos- 
sible to  them  the  Kiel  Canal,  and  the  purchase  of 
Helgoland  from  England  gave  them  a  strong  ma- 
rine fortification;  but  even  with  these  it  was  felt 
that  they  were  at  a  great  disadvantage  as  a  sea- 
power.  Without  the  urgency  of  William  II,  it  is 
doubtful  if  Bavarians,  Saxons,  and  Wurtembergers 
would  ever  have  become  aware  of  a  close  commu- 
nity between  themselves  and  the  seafaring  inter- 
ests of  Hamburg,  Bremen,  and  Liibeck. 

To  effect  this  awakening  the  Kaiser  had  first  to 
Prussianize  commerce,  industry,  and  finance.  This 
was  not  difficult.  Prussia  had  learned  the  secret  of 
effective  organization.  The  army  in  all  its  many 
branches  was  a  unit,  and  subject  to  one  command. 
All  Germans  were  soldiers.  The  task  involved 
nothing  but  the  transfer  of  the  military  system, 
with  its  unity,  correlation,  discipline,  and  obedi- 
ence, into  the  affairs  of  civil  life — the  railways,  the 
mines,  the  factories,  the  banks,  and  the  mercantile 
marine. 

The  Kaiser  made  himself  the  patron  of  organ- 
ized industrial  and  commercial  life.  "My  prin- 
ciple is,"  he  said  at  Brunsbuttel,  in  1899,  "to  find 
everywhere  new  points  of  departure  for  our  activ- 
ity. .  .  .  With  a  German,  a  spark  has  always 
ignited  the  fire  of  an  idea ;  everything  will  soon  be 
aflame. ' ' 

Industry    demanded    commerce,    commerce    a 

49 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

mercantile  marine,  a  mercantile  marine  a  navy,  a 
navy  coaling-stations ;  and  colonies  alone,  the  Kai- 
ser thought,  could  furnish  a  firm  and  secure  basis 
for  this  world-wide  development  of  German  power. 

Such  an  intrusion  into  the  sphere  of  world  rela- 
tions by  a  great  power — already  the  greatest  mili- 
tary force  in  the  world — would,  of  course,  excite 
apprehension.  The  spark  was  struck  and  the  fire 
was  kindled,  but  it  threw  a  new  light  on  the  whole 
problem  of  world  relations. 

No  one  had  ever  interfered  with  peaceful  Ger- 
man commerce,  even  after  the  world  was  deeply 
penetrated  by  German  industry ;  but  the  Kaiser  had 
plans  which  he  believed  would  be  resisted.  "You 
know  that  our  industry,"  he  said  at  Crefeld,  in 
1902,  "in  spite  of  all  our  labor,  can  prosper  only  on 
condition  that  a  sovereign  sufficiently  powerful 
maintains  the  peace  of  the  world."  Since  the  for- 
mation of  the  Empire,  he  went  on  to  declare,  the 
force  had  been  created  which  permits  Europe  to 
work  tranquilly  and  in  peace.  The  army  could  pro- 
tect the  German  frontiers.  "But  you,  a  commer- 
cial city,  well  understand  that,  besides  the  army, 
something  else  is  necessary:  it  is  our  fleet.  ...  A 
fleet  is  necessary  in  order  that  you  may  everywhere 
tranquilly  sell  your  products!" 

It  was  not  a  question  of  coast  defenses;  it  was 
not  a  question  of  the  freedom  of  the  sea — no  one 
disputed  that — for  all  ports  were  open  to  German 
traders  and  all  waters  were  safe  for  German  ships. 
But  peaceful  commerce  under  the  police  protection 

50 


THE  KAISER'S  PERSONAL   CONTROL 

of  a  limited  navy  was  not  what  the  Kaiser  had  in 
mind.  The  purpose  of  William  II  was  to  carry 
militarism  beyond  the  frontiers  of  the  German 
Empire,  and  through  it  eventually  to  win  for  Ger- 
many "the  empire  of  the  sea." 

To  the  Kaiser  "the  empire  of  the  sea"  meant 
colonies  and  coaling-stations  in  every  part  of  the 
world,  to  be  acquired  through  superior  power  on 
the  sea.  On  January  1,  1900,  he  said:  "What  my 
grandfather  did  for  the  army  on  land  that  is  what 
I  shall  do  for  the  navy ;  without  permitting  myself 
to  be  troubled,  I  shall  accomplish  the  work  of  re- 
organization, in  order  that  it  may  hold  the  same 
rank  as  my  land  forces,  and  that,  thanks  to  it,  the 
German  Empire  can  take  the  place  in  the  world 
that  it  does  not  yet  occupy.  By  means  of  the  two 
armies,  land  and  sea,  I  hope  to  be  able,  with  the 
aid  of  God,  to  realize  the  saying  of  Frederick  Will- 
iam I,  'When  one  wishes  to  decide  anything  in  this 
world,  the  pen  is  not  sufficient,  if  it  is  not  supported 
by  the  force  of  the  sword.'  " 

In  view  of  the  whole  history  of  colonization  by 
the  states  of  Europe,  and  the  imperial  pretensions 
that  had  sometimes  been  made  by  them  regarding 
remote  portions  of  the  earth,  the  desire  of  the 
Kaiser  to  see  his  people  equally  fortunate  was  not 
unnatural.  Unquestionably,  they  had  come  to  be 
heartily  in  sympathy  with  him  in  this  regard,  and 
were  disposed  to  support  his  plans  of  naval  and 
colonial  expansion.  Thus  the  industrial  and  com- 
mercial magnates  who  at  first  were  inclined  toward 

5  51 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

liberalism  in  government,  flattered  by  the  personal 
attentions  which  the  Kaiser  bestowed  upon  them, 
and  stimulated  by  the  prospect  of  increased  re- 
wards held  out  by  his  policy  of  expansion,  were 
converted  into  ardent  imperialists,  eager  to  form 
an  alliance  with  the  military  party  of  the  Empire 
for  the  realization  of  a  Greater  Germany.    As  for 
the  great  landed  proprietors  who  constitute  the 
nobility  of  the  country,  while  less  interested  than 
the  commercial  class  in  oversea  development,  they, 
by  all  the  instincts  and  necessities  of  their  caste, 
were  bound  to  the  chariot-wheel  of  the  Emperor, 
without  whom  their  whole  fabric  of  feudal  survivals 
would  be  swept  away.     While  they  looked  down 
upon  the  navy  as  a  plebeian  upstart,  born  of  the 
vulgar  necessities  of  trade,  the  army  offered  to 
their  sons  the  only  great  profession  open  to  gen- 
tlemen in  a  country  where  politics  had  been  mech- 
anized into  bureaucracy  and  the  clergy  were  cus- 
tomarily drawn  from  the  peasant  and  bourgeois 
classes.    Diplomacy  and  high  administrative  office 
were  for  the  small  nobility  the  only  available  sup- 
plements to  the  army,  and  the  almost  exclusive 
appropriation  of  these  functions  by  this  caste  was 
dependent  upon  the  maintenance  of  the  imperial 
system.    The  divine  right  of  the  hereditary  land- 
owners to  these  positions  was  closely  bound  up  with 
the  divine  right  of  royalty,  which  therefore  had  to 
be  sustained.     To  imperialism  the  only  ultimate 
alternative  was  democracy;  but,  for  the  Junker, 
democracy  meant  extinction. 

52 


THE  KAISER'S   PERSONAL   CONTROL 

And  so  it  happened  that  the  power  inherited  by 
the  Kaiser  in  1888  had  by  1904  been  so  skilfully 
exercised  as  to  weave  into  one  solid  fabric  all  the 
threads  of  German  self-interest,  nntil  one  by  one 
the  tribal  spirit  of  the  old  principalities,  through 
the  exigencies  of  a  new  age,  had  merged  them  into 
the  wider  and  more  compact  tribalism  of  the  new 
German  Empire. 

The  German  people,  thus  compacted,  had  at  this 
time  attained  not  only  to  great  industrial  prosper- 
ity, such  as  no  German  state  had  ever  known,  but 
to  a  dangerous  self-consciousness  of  imperial 
strength.  The  Navy  League  and  the  Colonial 
party,  inspired  by  the  Kaiser,  were  carrying  on  a 
strenuous  propaganda  for  world  dominion,  backed 
by  a  marvelous  growth  of  popular  Pan-German 
sentiment,  the  result  in  large  measure  of  the  activ- 
ities of  the  Alldeutscher  Verband. 

In  June,  1904,  King  Edward  VII  had  come  to 
Kiel  to  attend  the  regatta,  accompanied  by  a  squad- 
ron of  British  battle-ships,  which  were  saluted  by 
the  German  fleet  at  anchor  in  the  harbor.  Together 
the  two  navies  were  able  to  form  a  splendid  oceanic 
police  force  to  protect  the  commerce  of  both  na- 
tions. Nothing  was  wanting  but  an  agreement  be- 
tween the  two  countries  to  insure  to  each  other, 
and  to  all  other  maritime  powers,  equal  commercial 
rights  upon  the  sea. 

At  the  gala  dinner  the  Kaiser  said  to  his  royal 
guest:  "Your  Majesty  has  been  welcomed  by  the 
thunder  of  German  guns.    It  is  the  youngest  navy 

53 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

in  the  world,  and  an  evidence  of  the  growing  im- 
portance upon  the  sea  of  the  German  Empire,  re- 
created by  my  grandfather.  It  is  designed  to  pro- 
tect its  commerce  and  its  territory,  and  it  serves, 
like  the  German  army,  for  the  maintenance  of 
peace." 

What  a  snperb  opportunity  for  cementing  a  good 
understanding  with  Great  Britain!  Was  King 
Edward  in  a  mood  for  this  ?  We  have  the  Kaiser 's 
own  testimony  on  this  subject,  for  in  the  course 
of  the  meeting  William  II  telegraphed  to  Nich- 
olas II: 

"Uncle  Albert's  visit  going,  of  course,  well.  He 
is  very  lively  and  active  and  most  kind.  His  wish 
for  peace  is  quite  pronounced,  and  is  the  motive 
for  his  liking  to  offer  his  services  wherever  he  sees 
collisions  in  the  world."  ' 

But  what  was  the  Kaiser's  own  attitude?  Was 
he  offering  his  services  to  avoid  future  collisions! 
He  was,  as  usual,  prompt  in  declaring  his  peaceful 
intentions ;  in  fact,  he  seemed  altogether  to  protest 
too  much.  Was  German  commerce  or  German  ter- 
ritory likely  to  be  anywhere  attacked?  If  so,  why 
did  he  not  join  with  "Uncle  Albert"  in  an  endeavor 
to   avoid   collisions?     The    British   and    German 


1  Bernstein,  The  Willy-Nicky  Correspondence,  New  York,  1918, 
p.  47.  This  interesting  little  volume,  reprinted  from  the  private 
correspondence  of  the  late  Czar  of  Russia,  Nicholas  II,  with  Will- 
iam II,  with  a  "Foreword"  by  ex-President  Roosevelt,  is  of  capi- 
tal importance.  It  throws  new  searching  light  upon  the  secret 
plans  of  the  Kaiser,  while  to  the  world  at  large  he  was  making 
professions  which  are  placed  in  contrast  in  the  pages  immediately 
following.  A  critical  examination  of  the  text  confirms  its  authen- 
ticity. 

54 


THE  KAISER'S   PERSONAL   CONTROL 

navies  united  could  command  peace  everywhere  on 
the  ocean. 

There  is  no  evidence  in  the  available  records  of 
this  period  to  indicate  on  the  part  of  the  Kaiser 
either  a  disposition  to  arrange  for  avoiding  future 
collisions  or  of  a  complaint  to  "Uncle  Albert"  that 
Great  Britain  was  in  any  way  menacing  German 
rights  on  the  sea ;  yet,  on  September  6th,  at  a  great 
dinner  at  Hamburg,  the  Kaiser  announced,  "The 
German  Empire  has  the  right  to  have  the  army  and 
the  fleet  of  which  it  has  need  to  defend  its  interests, 
and  no  one  shall  prevent  it  from  organizing  them 
as  it  pleases!" 

Who,  then,  was  disputing  the  right  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire  to  have  the  army  and  navy  it  thought 
necessary  to  defend  its  "interests"?  If  those  in- 
terests were  the  safety  of  its  shores  and  the  privi- 
leges of  its  commerce,  no  one  was  disputing  them. 
Yet  the  Kaiser  was  representing  to  his  people  that 
some  one  was  trying  to  prevent  Germany  from 
organizing  its  navy  as  it  pleased.  It  could  not  at 
that  time  have  been  Russia,  then  engaged  in  war 
with  Japan;  for,  on  October  8th,  the  Kaiser  was 
saying  to  the  Czar,  "I  think  it  would  be  practical 
for  you  to  begin  ordering  a  line  of  battle-ships  to 
be  built,  with  private  firms,  as  the  Japanese  have 
done  in  England,  so  that  when  in  a  year  or  two  the 
negotiations  for  peace  begin  you  can  dispose  of  a 
fresh  reserve  to  impose  your  will  and  make  your- 
self independent   of   foreign  intervention."1     It 


1  The  Willy-Nicky  Correspondence,  p.  59. 

55 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

could  not  be  Japan,  for  he  then  expected  the 
strength  of  Japanese  sea-power  to  be  shattered  by 
the  victorious  success  of  the  Baltic  fleet  of  Russia. 
It  could  not  be  the  United  States,  for  in  his  melo- 
dramatic fashion  he  telegraphed,  on  November 
19th,  to  President  Roosevelt: 

"The  friendship  of  Germany  and  the  United 
States,  of  which  Frederick  the  Great  laid  the  first 
stone,  rests  on  an  unshakable  granite  founda- 
tion."1 

Was  it,  then,  "Uncle  Albert,"  of  whose  passion 
for  avoiding  collisions,  and  of  whose  pronounced 
wish  for  peace,  he  had  so  lately  testified,  of  whom 
the  Kaiser  was  thinking1? 

We  have  positive  evidence  that,  notwithstanding 
his  own  pacific  protestations  and  the  peaceful  dis- 
position of  "Uncle  Albert,"  it  was  precisely  Great 
Britain  which  was  the  power  he  had  in  mind  as 
the  obstructor  of  German  oversea  projects.  As 
Great  Britain  certainly  had  no  designs  on  German 
territory,  and  was  not  interfering  with  German 
commerce — the  Kaiser  made  no  complaints  upon 
*hese  points — the  "interests"  the  Kaiser  was 
anxious  to  '  *  defend ' '  were  other  than  these.  What, 
then,  were  those  interests? 

Every  German  and  every  Englishman  under- 
stood what  "interests"  William  II  had  in  mind. 
He  had  made  it  evident  in  his  public  speeches.  The 
Pan-German  writers  had  indicated  it  on  their  maps 
— in  Asia,  in  Africa,  and  in  America.    The  aim  of 


1  Arren,  Guillaume  II,  p.  279. 

56 


THE  KAISER'S   PERSONAL   CONTROL 

the  great  increase  in  the  German  navy  was  to  con- 
vince Great  Britain  and  other  maritime  powers 
that  it  would  not  be  wise  to  obstruct  the  colonial 
expansion  of  the  German  Empire  by  the  protection 
of  the  weak  nations  from  which  new  colonies  were 
to  be  taken. 

Now  that  Russia  was  rendered  temporarily  pow- 
erless by  her  war  with  Japan,  the  opportunity  was 
presented  for  Germany,  as  it  seemed  to  William  II, 
to  gain  more  by  an  arrangement  with  Nicholas  II 
than  by  taking  immediate  advantage  of  his  dis- 
tress. Accordingly,  behind  the  scenes  William  II, 
through  secret  correspondence  with  the  Czar,  which 
the  accidents  of  the  present  war  have  revealed,  was 
urging  Nicholas  II  to  pursue  what  promised  to  be 
a  ruinous  war  between  Russia  and  Japan,  and  in 
the  mean  time  availing  himself  of  an  opportunity 
to  isolate  Great  Britain  by  creating  a  secret  alli- 
ance between  Germany  and  Russia,  into  which 
France  was  to  be  artfully  drawn,  as  a  preliminary 
to  his  own  maritime  expansion.  Great  Britain  iso- 
lated, Russia  weakened  in  the  war  with  Japan  and 
bound  to  Germany  by  ties  of  obligation  and  a  secret 
treaty,  France  would  be  secure  in  the  imperial  net ; 
for,  as  the  Kaiser  boldly  stated  to  the  Czar,  al- 
though Delcasse  was  termed  by  him  an  "anglophile 
enrage,"  he  would  "be  wise  enough  to  understand 
that  the  British  fleet  is  utterly  unable  to  save 
Paris!''  And  withal  what  a  fine  stroke  of  busi- 
ness! "Do  not  forget  to  order  new  ships  of  the 
line  also,  so  as  to  be  ready  with  some  of  them  when 

67 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

war  is  over.  They  will  be  excellent  'persuaders' 
during  the  peace  negotiations.  Our  private  firms 
would  he  most  glad  to  receive  contracts!"1 

Precipitately,  like  a  hypnotic  subject,  Nicholas 
II  fell  into  the  trap.  The  new  treaty  was  already 
fully  prepared  by  William  II.  Once  signed, 
France,  it  appeared,  in  order  to  retain  her  only 
ally,  would  be  bound  to  sign  it  also.  To  the  Czar 
it  seemed  to  mean,  as  had  been  suggested  by  the 
tempter,  ''peace  and  rest  for  the  world."  But  in 
November  the  conscience  of  Nicholas  II  hesitated. 
Ought  not  France  to  know  of  the  compact  that  was 
to  secure  this  peace  and  rest?  "A  previous  infor- 
mation of  France,' '  the  Kaiser  urges,  "will  lead  to 
a  catastrophe.  ...  It  would  be  absolutely  danger- 
ous to  inform  France  before  we  have  both  signed 
the  treaty."  In  December  William  II  becomes 
solicitous.  The  Russian  need  of  coal  for  ships, 
which  Germany  as  a  neutral  could  not  supply  in 
accordance  with  international  law,  became  an  occa- 
sion for  urgency. 

"Serious  news  has  reached  me,"  writes  the 
Kaiser ;  "there  is  now  no  time  to  be  lost  any  more. 
No  third  power  must  hear  even  a  whisper  about 
our  intentions  before  we  have  concluded  the  con- 
vention about  the  coaling  business." 2 

Nicholas  II  was  complaisant;  but  the  coaling 
convention,  whatever  it  was,  appears  to  have  prof- 
ited him  little.    Insistence  that  France  was  leaving 


1  The    Willy-Nicky   Correspondence,   pp.   69,   70. 

2  The  same,  p.  90. 

58 


THE  KAISER'S  PERSONAL   CONTROL 

him  in  the  lurch,  while  Germany  was  his  only  true 
and  loyal  friend,  seems  to  have  overcome  his 
scruples  about  not  informing  his  ally ;  and,  on  July 
23,  1905,  at  a  meeting  secretly  arranged  to  appear 
as  a  merely  casual  encounter,  the  treaty  of  alliance 
was  signed  at  Bjorko,  without  the  presence  of  min- 
isters on  either  side. 

Personal  diplomacy  had  reached  its  zenith. 

But  what  had  "William  the  Peacemaker"  done 
for  the  benefit  of  Nicholas  II  or  the  cause  of  uni- 
versal peace  1  Having  repudiated  the  Russian  pro- 
posal for  the  limitation  of  armaments,  and  the 
Anglo-American  plans  for  an  international  tribunal 
of  justice,  at  the  first  Hague  Conference,  the  Kaiser 
had  never  once  proposed  any  plan  for  maintaining 
peace,  except  the  supremacy  of  German  armed 
force.  During  the  whole  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
War  he  had  exercised  no  influence  upon  the  plastic 
mind  of  the  Czar,  except  to  urge  him  to  war  and  to 
fire  him  with  displeasure  toward  England  and  sus- 
picion of  France. 

Missing  every  chance  to  be  a  peacemaker,  Kaiser 
William  was  using  every  secret  means  of  fanning 
the  flames  of  war.  To  Nicholas  II  he  intimated 
that  the  suggestion  of  mediation  between  Russia 
and  Japan  seemed  to  leave  a  trail  ' '  that  led  across 
the  Channel,"  as  if  mediation  for  peace  were  a 
crime  to  be  tracked  to  its  lair.  With  better  infor- 
mation the  Czar  replied,  "across  the  Channel  or, 
perhaps,  the  Atlantic";1  and,  in  February,  1905, 


1  The  Willy-Nicky  Correspondence,  pp.  62,  67. 

59 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

the  American  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  pre- 
sented an  offer  of  mediation  by  the  President  of 
the  United  States.  It  was  not,  however,  until 
months  afterward,  when  the  preliminaries  of  peace 
had  been  agreed  upon,  that  the  Kaiser  said  of 
President  Roosevelt's  efforts:  "I  hear  he  has 
made  nearly  superhuman  efforts  to  induce  Japan 
to  give  way.  He  has  really  done  a  great  work  for 
your  country  and  the  whole  world. ' ' *  But  even 
then  he  could  not  resist  the  impulse  to  intimate 
that  "  England  had  not  budged  a  finger  to  help 
him.,,  What,  then,  had  the  Kaiser  himself  done  to 
help? 

And  what  was  he  saying  to  the  world  during  all 
these  secret  intrigues  with  the  Czar  ? 

On  March  22,  1905,  while  he  was  still  awaiting 
the  signature  of  the  secret  treaty  for  the  isolation 
of  England,  in  his  address  at  Bremen — the  famous 
"We  are  the  salt  of  the  earth"  speech,  at  the  un- 
veiling of  the  monument  to  Frederick  III — the 
vision  of  a  "worthy"  Germany  seemed  to  spread 
out  before  him,  the  tone  of  aggression  was  wholly 
suppressed,  and  the  note  of  a  " golden  peace" 
was  sounded,  in  which  Bremen,  as  he  ex- 
pressed it,  might  "grow  green,  bloom,  and  pros- 
per." 

Was  it  the  memory  of  Frederick  the  Noble  that 
on  this  solemn  occasion  touched  his  deeper  springs 
of  sentiment,  and  recalled  him  for  a  moment  to 
those  eternal  verities  which  ambition  had  obscured? 


1  The  Willy-Nicky  Correspondence,  pp.  128,  129. 

60 


THE  KAISER'S  PERSONAL   CONTROL 

"I  have  made  a  vow,"  he  confided  to  his  world 
audience,  "as  a  result  of  what  I  have  learned  from 
history,  never  to  strive  for  an  empty  world  domin- 
ion. For  what  has  become  of  the  so-called  world- 
empires?  .  .  .  The  world-empire  of  which  I  have 
dreamed  shall  consist  in  this,  that  the  newly  cre- 
ated German  Empire  shall  first  of  all  enjoy  on  all 
sides  the  most  absolute  confidence  as  a  quiet,  hon- 
orable, and  peaceful  neighbor;  and  that,  if  in  the 
future  they  shall  read  in  history  of  a  world-empire 
of  a  Hohenzollern  world-ruler,  it  shall  not  be 
founded  upon  acquisitions  won  with  the  sword,  but 
upon  the  mutual  trust  of  the  nations  who  are  striv- 
ing for  the  same  goals." 

Here  is  pictured  what  Germany  might  have  been 
if  Frederick  III  had  lived  to  direct  the  energies  of 
the  German  nation.  But  was  it  really  for  this  that 
William  II  had  built  his  navy,  and  upon  so  many 
occasions  exhorted  Germans  to  strive  for  the  mas- 
tery of  the  sea?  Was  it  true  that  he  had  steadily 
gathered  into  his  own  grasp  all  the  potencies  of  the 
German  people  in  order,  from  the  height  of  his 
throne,  in  a  critical  moment,  to  cast  the  die  for  a 
regenerated  world  and  go  down  in  history  as 
"William  the  Peacemaker"? 

Listening  to  his  Bremen  speech,  there  were  many 
who  looked  with  gratitude  and  hope  to  the  future 
influence  of  William  II. 

"To  develop  steadily;  to  shun  strife,  hate,  and 
jealousy;  to  rejoice  in  the  German  Fatherland  as 
it  is,  and  not  to  strive  for  the  impossible" — these 

61 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

were  the  noble  words  with  which  in  that  speech  the 
Kaiser  described  the  task  he  had  set  for  the  Ger- 
man people.  What  a  glorious  mission,  if  this  were 
true !  How  superbly  he  could  render  his  final  ac- 
count to  God,  if  this  were  really  the  secret  inspira- 
tion of  his  life ! 

But,  if  this  was  the  expression  of  his  inmost 
desire,  why,  on  July  23d,  just  four  months  after- 
ward, did  he  conclude  the  secret  treaty  with  Nicho- 
las II,  for  the  purpose  of  isolating  Great  Britain, 
which  he  was  at  this  very  time  negotiating?  Why 
isolate  a  power  that  could,  together  with  Germany, 
secure  peace  throughout  the  world,  at  a  time  when 
the  King  of  England  was  ready  to  "  offer  his  ser- 
vices wherever  he  sees  collisions  in  the  world"1? 

Did  William  II  in  this  Bremen  speech  describe 
the  Germany  he  really  desired,  or  was  he  merely 
staging  a  new  scene  in  the  drama,  by  presenting 
the  picture  of  a  Germany  which  all  the  world  might 
respect  and  trust  implicitly,  while  he  was  plotting 
in  secret  to  control  Eussia  through  his  influence 
upon  Nicholas  II,  bring  France  into  vassalage 
through  the  agency  of  her  only  ally,  and  leave 
Great  Britain  to  watch  in  her  "splendid  isolation" 
the  progress  of  Germany  to  that  world-empire,  of 
which  even  then,  while  Germania  in  white  robes 
was  chanting  hymns  of  peace  in  the  middle  of  the 
stage,  Kaiser  William  had  never  for  a  moment 
ceased  to  dream? 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

TlyriTHOUT  question,  Kaiser  William  II  is  the 
*  *  most  histrionic  sovereign  of  his  time,  and 
perhaps  of  any  time.  As  a  boy  in  school  at  Cassel, 
he  was  fond  of  amatenr  acting  and  sketched  a 
scenario  and  dramatis  personce  of  a  play  in  which 
Charlemagne  was  the  principal  character.  The  in- 
stinct to  set  the  stage  has  been  manifested  in  every 
period  of  his  life.  He  has  not  only  collaborated  in 
the  writing  of  plays ;  he  has  superintended  the  re- 
hearsal of  them  on  the  stage,  and  is  fond  of  organ- 
izing historic  ballets.  In  the  larger  field  of  scenic 
impression  which  only  a  monarch  can  command,  he 
has  displayed  the  same  talent  for  dramatic  effect. 
Not  only  has  he  patronized  the  theater,  but  he 
has  affirmed  the  value  of  it  to  him  as  a  sovereign. 
"Yes,"  he  once  stated  in  public,  "the  theater  is  also 
one  of  my  weapons.  ...  It  is  the  duty  of  a  mon- 
arch to  occupy  himself  with  the  theater,  because  it 
may  become  in  his  hands  an  incalculable  force." 

Among  the  Kaiser's  rules,  one  is  that  no  Hohen- 
zollern  may  be  represented  on  the  stage  without  the 
Emperor's  express  permission,  and  he  must  be  pre- 

63 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

viously  given  an  opportunity  personally  to  revise 
the  part.  Nothing  political  can  be  permitted  to  be 
introduced.  Joseph  Lauff's  "Frederick  of  the 
Iron  Tooth,"  dealing  with  a  revolt  against  an  Elec- 
tor of  Brandenburg,  was  thus  revised;  and  Leon- 
cavallo was  invited  to  write  an  opera  upon  it,  "Der 
Roland  von  Berlin,,;  but  the  Kaiser  personally  cut 
out  the  story  of  the  woman  who  figured  as  Fred- 
erick's mistress,  and  wrote  in  the  margin  of  the 
manuscript,  "A  courtesan  has  no  place  in  a  Hohen- 
zollern  drama. ' ' * 

He  has  even  attempted  to  rescue  the  reputation 
of  the  half-mythical  kings  of  antiquity,  apparently 
for  no  other  reason  than  to  maintain  the  dignity  of 
the  royal  caste.  The  Greeks  and  Lord  Byron  had 
represented  Sardanapalus,  the  Assyrian  king,  as 
the  most  effeminate  and  debauched  monarch  that 
ever  existed ;  but  the  Kaiser,  at  the  expense  of  two 
hundred  thousand  marks,  with  the  help  of  the  As- 
syriologists,  in  an  opera  of  great  magnificence  has 
restored  him  to  respectability  as  a  brave  sovereign 
who  could  face  a  heroic  death  rather  than  yield  to 
his  enemies.  The  effort  was  incidentally  a  fine  trib- 
ute to  scholarship  as  well  as  to  kingship,  but  it  was 
not  so  great  an  artistic  success  as  the  Emperor  had 
expected.  "You  can't  dramatize  a  museum,' '  a 
Berlin  critic  had  the  courage  to  say,  and  the  public 
joined  in  confirming  the  judgment. 

It  is  convenient  for  a  monarch,  claiming  to  rule 
by  divine  right,  to  possess  a  gift  for  histrionic  ac- 


1  Shaw,  William  of  Germany,  London,  1913,  p.  234. 

64 


THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

tion.  Not  being  able  by  any  current  system  of 
philosophic  thought  to  establish  the  thesis  of  a  right 
to  rule  by  special  divine  authority,  such  a  claimant 
must  resort  to  other  means.  This  pretension  being 
merely  a  dogma  incapable  of  proof,  it  belongs  to  the 
realm  of  faith  rather  than  of  knowledge.  To  induce 
faith  in  it,  or  assent  to  it,  signs,  symbols,  and,  above 
all,  the  practical  advantages  of  the  doctrine  to  the 
believer,  must  be  employed.  In  brief,  whoever 
makes  this  claim  must  play  the  part  it  implies  suc- 
cessfully, or  he  is  lost.  As  a  claimant  of  divine 
right  a  plain  person  in  civilian  clothes,  and  crowned 
by  a  silk  hat,  could  hardly  hope  to  have  a  follow- 
ing, even  among  a  superstitious  people. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  as  a  young  prince 
William  II  was  especially  pious  or  exceptionally 
devoted  to  the  offices  of  religion ;  but  he  understood, 
as  Frederick  the  Great,  although  personally  a  dis- 
ciple of  Voltaire,  understood,  that  there  was  in  the 
German  people  a  deep  undercurrent  of  religious 
feeling  which  German  princes  had  successfully  util- 
ized to  increase  their  power  and  their  estates. 

In  his  first  proclamations  to  his  subjects  the 
Kaiser  did  not  set  up  the  claim  which  he  afterward 
made  the  foundation  of  his  throne.  The  memory 
of  the  Kulturhampf,  in  which  Bismarck  had  so 
deeply  offended  the  Catholics  of  the  Empire,  was 
a  sufficient  reason  for  not  too  much  accentuating 
questions  of  religion  at  a  time  when  the  new  Em- 
peror was  gaining  his  foothold.  It  was  not  until 
these  wounds  had  at  least  partly  healed,  and  Bis- 

65 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

marck  had  been  disposed  of,  that  the  claim  was  posi- 
tively asserted  in  the  Phnperor's  speeches;  for 
Bismarck  considered  the  expression  von  Gottes 
Gnaden  to  mean  "by  the  grace  of  divine  permis- 
sion," not  "by  the  grace  of  divine  appointment.' ' 
He  had  had  too  much  to  do  with  maintaining  the 
Prussian  throne  and  establishing  the  Empire  to 
accept  any  form  of  mysticism  in  connection  with 
either. 

The  Kaiser's  first  enunciation  that  even  remotely 
savored  of  the  full-blown  dogma  wras  in  March, 
1890,  at  a  meeting  of  the  provincial  diet  of  Bran- 
denburg, where  he  spoke  simply  of  "a  talent  in- 
trusted to  me  by  God,  which  it  is  my  task  to  in- 
crease." A  year  later,  at  Bremen,  he  said,  "We, 
the  Hohenzollerns,  regard  ourselves  as  appointed 
by  God  to  govern  and  lead  the  people  wdiom  it  is 
given  us  to  rule."  It  was  not,  however,  until  1895, 
at  Konigsberg,  that  he  announced  that  his  crown 
was  "born  with  him,"  and  that  he  would  follow  the 
same  path  as  his  ancestor,  Frederick  I,  "wrho  of 
his  oicn  right  wras  sovereign  prince  in  Prussia." 
Two  years  later,  at  Coblentz,  he  spoke  of  his  "fear- 
ful responsibility  to  the  Creator  alone,  from  which 
no  human  being,  no  minister,  no  parliament,  no 
people  can  release  the  prince." 

So  long  as  this  presumption  led  practically  to  no 
oppressive  act,  the  German  people  felt  no  impulse 
to  challenge  this  apparently  harmless  obsession. 
German  writers  who  have  commented  upon  it  have 
not  taken  it  very  seriously,  and  have  been  inclined 

66 


THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

to  excuse  it  as  an  ebullition  of  sincere  religious 
rapture,  induced  in  great  measure  by  the  thrilling 
events  of  the  War  of  1870  and  the  sudden  rise  of 
the  Empire,  which  had  touched  all  imaginations  and 
appeared  to  many  pious  minds  as  a  direct  divine 
intervention.  If  the  Empire  itself  was  a  miracle, 
why  should  not  the  Emperor,  Avho  certainly  had 
never  been  chosen  by  the  people,  be  recognized  as 
a  part  of  it? 

The  Kaiser  has  always  seemed  to  his  people  a 
sovereign  over  whom  a  special  divine  watchfulness 
was  needed,  and  might,  therefore,  be  graciously 
vouchsafed.  Who  could  prove,  or  wish  to  prove, 
that  his  extraordinary  spontaneity,  his  occasional 
Delphic  ambiguity,  and  his  extreme  exaltation  of 
will  and  purpose  unfitted  him  to  be  a  medium  of 
supernatural  influence?  He  has  been  so  devoted  to 
his  task,  so  industrious,  so  versatile,  so  completely 
a  symbol  of  the  aspirations  of  the  German  people, 
that  he  has  had  only  to  play  the  role  in  order  to 
create  faith  among  his  trustful  subjects  and  to  si- 
lence, upon  nearly  all  occasions,  the  impulse  to 
detraction.  Other  nations  do  not  understand  this. 
The  impossibility  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  are  not 
Germans. 

The  Teutonic  race  may  not  possess  so  refined  an 
esthetic  sensibility  as  the  Latin,  but  it  has  been 
peculiarly  receptive  to  the  symbolism  of  art.  Here 
was  an  avenue  to  German  faith  which  the  Kaiser 
was  quick  to  perceive  and  to  utilize.  Monuments 
in  great  numbers  have  marked  his  reign,  the  silent 

6  67 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

sentinels  of  national  glory.  Not  only  have  his  an- 
cestors been  thus  memorialized,  but  he  himself  has 
been  constantly  brought  home  to  every  city,  town, 
hamlet,  and  home  in  Germany.  He  has  been 
painted  as  a  Roman  Emperor  and  as  the  war-god 
Mars.  His  life-size  statue  in  marble  forms  part  of 
the  external  decoration  of  the  new  portal  of  the 
cathedral  of  Metz,  where  he  figures  as  a  canonized 
saint.  He  and  his  House  are  glorified  in  windows 
of  stained  glass,  and  magnificent  vases  of  porcelain 
are  adorned  with  his  portraits.  Every  German 
embassy  throughout  the  world  possesses  a  life- 
size  representation  of  his  well-known  face  and 
figure.  Photography  has  made  his  features  fa- 
miliar in  a  hundred  ways,  until  his  image  is 
stamped  indelibly  upon  the  memory  of  nearly 
the  whole  human  race.  He  would  be  recog- 
nized if  he  passed  by  in  any  village,  not  only 
of  Germany,  but  wherever  the  printing-press  is 
known.  This  is  no  accident.  The  world  wants 
to  know  what  a  sovereign  by  divine  right  is 
like. 

One  distinction  which  William  II  is  said  to  have 
craved  has  been  denied  him.  His  grandfather, 
William  I,  had  raised  objections  to  the  title  "Ger- 
man Emperor"  ("Deutscher  Kaiser7'),  and  wanted 
to  be  called  "Emperor  of  Germany."  To  this  Bis- 
marck objected  that  it  would  involve  a  claim  to 
non-Prussian  territory,  that  the  council  had  chosen 
the  former  title,  and  that  the  German  sovereigns 
would,  perhaps,  not  agree  to  a  change;  and,  after 

68 


THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

some  contention,  but  in  a  testy  humor,  the  lesser 
title  was  accepted. 

When  William  II  became  Emperor,  it  is  said,  he 
desired  to  magnify  his  office  by  the  ceremony  of  a 
regular  coronation,  and  in  1892  had  a  throne  con- 
structed for  this  purpose  after  antiquarian  draw- 
ings made  by  Emile  Dopier.  There  was  to  be 
ordered  a  reproduction  of  the  crown  of  Charle- 
magne, Emperor  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  who 
on  Christmas  Day,  800,  had  been  crowned  at  Rome. 
The  unwillingness  of  the  federal  princes  to  assent 
to  a  coronation  is  reported  to  have  defeated  the 
project;  but  it  is  claimed  that  a  photograph  is  in 
existence  in  which  the  Kaiser  is  represented  seated 
upon  the  throne,  an  ermine  cloak  over  his  shoul- 
ders, the  imperial  scepter  and  the  globe  in  his 
hands,  and  a  gilded  imitation  of  the  crown  of 
Charlemagne  in  stucco  on  his  head. * 

But  this  is  only  the  corollary  of  a  far  greater 
demonstration.  Art,  all  art,  in  the  Kaiser's  opin- 
ion, is  a  valuable  and  appropriate  vehicle  of  sover- 
eign influence.  History  is  wholly  the  work  of 
princes.  All  that  is  great  in  the  world  emanates 
from  them.  Of  his  grandfather,  William  I,  he  has 
said:  "God  had  destined  him  to  realize  the  desire  of 
all  Germans  and  to  give  unity  to  Germany  on  the 
field  of  battle.  For  that  work  he  was  able  to  find 
great  men  who  had  the  honor  to  execute  his  designs, 
and  as  his  councilors  to  work  with  him. "  The 
whole  of  civilization  is  nothing  but  the  result  of 


1  Nousanne,  The  Kaiser  as  He  Is,  New  York,  1905,  p.  173. 

69 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

such  instruments  of  God,  chosen  to  carry  out  the 
divine  plan  in  human  life.  "Properly  speaking," 
he  says,  "William  I  has  become  for  us  a  saint." 
By  inference,  all  Hohenzollerns  are  saints,  or  in 
process  of  becoming  saints.  All  painters,  sculp- 
tors, musicians,  and  architects  have  the  duty  of 
teaching  this  religion  of  imperial  supremacy,  re- 
vealed through  their  princes.  ' '  The  cult  of  the  ideal 
is  the  greatest  work  of  civilization.  ...  It  can  ac- 
complish its  task  only  with  the  aid  of  art."  But 
what  is  the  "ideal"  in  the  Kaiser's  mind?  It  is 
defined  by  him  as  "the  inspiration  which  God  sends 
to  the  artist,"  and  the  highest  existing  example  of 
it  is  in  the  Siegesallee,  which  tells  the  story  of  the 
House  of  Hohenzollern. 

Believing  himself  especially  open  to  this  form  of 
inspiration,  Kaiser  William  II  has  always  consid- 
ered himself  a  great  critic  of  art,  and,  therefore, 
the  most  competent  person  to  direct  its  develop- 
ment. Even  in  Germany,  however,  this  conviction 
is  not  generally  shared.  Indeed,  the  Kaiser  and 
the  experts  in  art  have  seldom  agreed ;  but  in  prac- 
tice his  judgment  has  usually  triumphed. 

Although  artistic  feeling  is,  perhaps,  the  most 
refractory  and  untamable  of  all  the  impulses  to 
self-realization,  artists,  being  human,  have  for  ob- 
vious reasons  been  anxious  to  receive  imperial  ap- 
probation. But  the  artistic  inspiration  of  Kaiser 
William  is  not  always  calculable. 

The  passion  of  the  Kaiser  for  the  grandiose  is 
celebrated  sumptuously  in  Berlin.    What  it  might 

70 


THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

lead  to  in  time  is,  perhaps,  only  prefigured  in  the 
attempt  to  embody  Prussian  history  in  the  vista 
of  the  Siegesallee,  in  the  image  of  Germania  on  the 
top  of  the  Siegessaule,  and  in  the  Gargantuan  archi- 
tecture of  the  Kurfiirstendam.  Grossartig  and 
kolossal  are  the  vocables  that  express  the  impres- 
sion everywhere  created. 

In  a  long  personal  conversation,  the  substance  of 
which  it  is  no  violation  of  confidence  on  my  part  to 
repeat,  the  Kaiser  dwelt  upon  the  value  of  "form" 
as  a  medium  of  public  education.  "Men  think  most 
often  and  most  deeply,"  he  said,  "of  what  they  have 
seen.  To  impress  the  eye  is  to  take  possession  of 
the  mind."  It  is  a  mode  of  conquest  which  the 
Kaiser  has  practised  all  his  life. 

In  the  large  field  of  imperial  development  also 
art  has  had  a  great  part  to  play.  The  time,  the 
place,  and  the  scenic  accessories  for  dramatic  ef- 
fect, with  the  world  for  an  audience,  have  been 
carefully  chosen.  The  result,  primarily  calculated 
for  Germany,  has  not  always  been  precisely  what 
was  intended.  At  Damascus,  for  example,  on  No- 
vember 8,  1898,  during  his  journey  in  the  East, 
William  II  took  occasion  to  say  how  deeply  moved 
he  was  "at  standing  on  the  spot  where  one  of  the 
most  knightly  sovereigns  of  all  times,  the  great 
Sultan  Saladin,  had  stood";  overlooking  the  fact 
that  this  "knightly  sovereign"  was  a  heartless  mur- 
derer who  had  sacked  Jerusalem  and  turned  its 
holy  places  into  mosques.  Not  content  with  this 
fulsome  compliment  to  a  fanatic  of  the  past,  the 

71 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Kaiser  next  proceeded  to  offer  the  hand  of  perpet- 
ual friendship  to  the  most  notorious  criminal  of  the 
age,  the  Sultan  Abdul-Hamid,  and  ' '  the  three  hun- 
dred million  Mohammedans  scattered  over  the 
earth  who  venerate  him  as  their  caliph.' '  While 
at  home  the  words  were  passed  over  lightly  as  an 
excusable  means  of  preparing  the  Mohammedan 
mind  for  the  favorable  reception  of  German  com- 
mercial penetration  and  control,  even  in  Germany 
the  performance  evoked  smiles  among  those  who 
knew  that  the  Kaiser  was  astray  by  a  hundred  mill- 
ion of  the  population  in  his  estimate  of  his  Oriental 
friends,  and  that  it  was  precisely  Saladin  who  had 
struck  Christendom  its  most  fatal  blow  by  the  cap- 
ture of  the  Holy  City;  while  to  other  nations  this 
adulation  was  a  clear  premonition  of  the  exclusive 
Oriental  policy  on  the  part  of  Germany  that  has 
culminated  in  a  world  war. 

Under  ordinary  circumstances,  the  Kaiser  finds 
it  easy  to  play  the  role  of  apparent  omniscience, 
because  he  can  summon  to  his  side  for  his  informa- 
tion on  any  subject  the  most  learned  specialists  in 
the  Empire,  who  are  always  eager  to  enjoy  this 
distinction.  Having  utilized  this  advantage  to  an 
extraordinary  degree,  he  is,  undoubtedly,  in  matters 
in  which  he  is  interested,  as  far  as  German  knowl- 
edge extends  and  German  prejudice  permits,  one 
of  the  best-informed  persons  in  the  world.  For  all 
his  important  audiences  and  utterances  he  carefully 
prepares.  He  speaks  with  American  exchange 
professors  with  a  fullness  of  knowledge  of  their 

72 


THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

subjects  that  frequently  surprises  them.  Nothing 
gives  him  greater  pleasure  than  to  exploit  in  con- 
versation with  his  guest  some  new  discovery  just 
learned  of  from  a  German  professor,  or  from  a 
military  or  naval  officer.  Sometimes,  however,  his 
informant  has  been  wrongly  selected  or  has  misun- 
derstood the  theme ;  as  when,  for  example,  the  Em- 
peror delivered  a  rather  technical  discourse  to  a 
supposed  expert  in  the  science  of  seismology,  only 
to  learn  that  his  visitor  was  a  geographer. 

Within  the  limits  of  his  knowledge,  which  is  wide, 
and  served  by  an  excellent  memory,  the  Kaiser's 
mind  is  extremely  alert  and  active,  prone  to  resort 
to  and  to  evoke  repartee.     He  is  seldom  caught 
napping,  for  his  position  gives  him  every  advan- 
tage, and  his  courtiers  are  disposed  to  leave  him  the 
victor  in  every  encounter  of  wit,  and  even  in  every 
serious  controversy.    Except  by  Americans,  he  is 
seldom  f  rankly  dealt  with ;  and  his  interest  in  them, 
when  it  is  not  for  purely  political  purposes,  arises 
largely  from  his  real  interest  in  the  freedom  with 
which  they  are  accustomed  to  express  themselves. 
The  legend  of  the  Kaiser's  "spontaneity"  has 
caused  to  be  ascribed  to  him  some  indiscretions 
which  were  not  original  with  himself.     Such,  for 
example,  was  the  celebrated  "Kruger  telegram " 
of  January  3, 1896.    It  is  now  well  established  that 
this  was  not  an  impulsive  and  personal  perform- 
ance.   It  was  so  strictly  official  that  the  text  of  it 
was  prepared  in  the  Foreign  Office  and  brought 
ready  for  signature  to  the  Chancellor's  palace  by 

73 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Baron  Marschall 
von  Bieberstein,  the  Kaiser  having  been  summoned 
to  Berlin  from  Potsdam  to  approve  it. *  He  at  first 
demurred,  but  at  last  permitted  himself  to  be  per- 
suaded; and  Herr  von  Holstein,  who  was  waiting 
for  the  result  in  the  anteroom,  has  testified  to  the 
jubilation  of  the  Secretary  as  he  came  from  the 
presence  of  His  Majesty  waving  in  triumph  the  pa- 
per to  which  the  Kaiser  had  just  appended  his  sig- 
nature. The  telegram  was  generally  interpreted  as 
a  purely  personal  message  of  congratulation  to 
President  Kruger  that  he  had  defeated  the  Jameson 
raid  "without  calling  on  the  help  of  foreign  pow- 
ers"; thereby  conveying  the  intimation  of  willing- 
ness on  the  part  of  the  Kaiser  to  intervene  if  it  had 
been  necessary.  Not  unnaturally  the  British  gov- 
ernment, considering  it  as  a  menace  that  might  be 
followed  by  action,  as  an  answer  put  a  flying  squad- 
ron in  immediate  commission  and  made  an  official 
announcement  that,  by  a  convention  of  1884,  the 
foreign  relations  of  the  Transvaal  had  been  placed 
under  the  supervision  of  the  British  Foreign  Office. 
As  nothing  further  happened,  the  Kaiser  for  many 
years  bore  in  silence  the  odium  of  this  unwise  sug- 
gestion of  German  intervention.  It  was  just  that 
he  should  do  so,  for  by  his  own  theory  of  govern- 
ment there  is  no  definite  distinction  between  his 


1  The  text  of  the  Kruger  telegram  is  as  follows  : 
"I  express  to  you  my  sincere  congratulations  that,  without  ap- 
pealing to  the  help  of  friendly  powers,  you  and  your  people  have 
succeeded  in  repelling  the  armed  bands  which  had  broken  into 
your  country  and  in  maintaining  the  independence  of  your  country 
with  your  own  forces  against  foreign  aggression." 

74 


THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

personal  and  his  official  acts.  Being  responsible  to 
no  one,  a  sovereign  by  divine  right  can  never  be  ex- 
pected to  apologize  or  explain.  To  do  either  would 
be  a  confession  of  his  own  accountability.  An  ab- 
solute ruler  can  punish  a  councilor  for  giving  him 
bad  advice,  but  if  he  follows  it  the  act  cannot  be 
regarded  by  him  as  an  error.  The  king  can  do  no 
wrong. 

The  attempt  in  any  way  to  separate  the  personal 
and  the  official  acts  of  the  Kaiser  is,  therefore, 
purely  academic.  So  long  as  William  II  's  theory  of 
his  personal  supremacy  is  not  rejected,  the  Imperial 
German  government,  and  even  the  whole  German 
nation,  are  bound  to  assume  responsibility  to  other 
powers  for  what  the  sovereign  does  or  fails  to  do. 
It  is  the  necessary  consequence  of  submitting  to 
absolute  personal  authority. 

The  speech  made  by  William  II  at  Tangier,  on 
March  31,  1905,  only  nine  days  after  the  ''We  are 
the  salt  of  the  earth"  proclamation  at  Bremen,  was 
regarded  throughout  Europe  as  an  open  challenge 
to  France,  whose  proposals  of  reform  in  Morocco 
the  Sultan,  Abdul- Aziz,  was  practically  cautioned 
not  to  regard. 

"It  is  to  the  Sultan,"  said  the  Kaiser,  "in  his  po- 
sition of  an  independent  sovereign  that  I  am  paying 
my  visit  to-day.  I  hope  that  under  the  sovereignty 
of  the  Sultan  a  free  Morocco  will  remain  open  to 
the  peaceful  rivalry  of  all  nations,  without  monop- 
oly or  annexation,  on  the  basis  of  absolute  equality. 
The  object  of  my  visit  to  Tangier  is  to  make  it 

75 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

known  that  I  am  determined  to  do  all  that  is  in  my 
power  to  safeguard  efficaciously  the  interests  of 
Germany  in  Morocco,  for  I  look  upon  the  Sultan 
as  an  absolutely  independent  sovereign.' ' 

The  news  of  the  pronunciamento  was  instantly 
flashed  round  the  world,  and  for  weeks  all  Europe 
was  breathlessly  awaiting  what  would  happen  next. 
Like  the  "Kruger  telegram,''  this  fulmination  was 
at  first  set  down  as  one  of  the  Kaiser's  personal 
indiscretions ;  but  it  soon  became  evident  that  it  was 
the  Foreign  Office  where  the  mise  en  scene  of  Ger- 
many's new  foreign  policy  had  been  conceived. 
Prestige  in  Europe  was,  undoubtedly,  one  of  the 
objects  to  be  obtained;  but  there  was  a  still  more 
important  reason  for  declaring  the  "integrity"  of 
Morocco.  Kaiser  William  had  promised  the  Mo- 
hammedans "scattered  over  the  globe"  that  the 
German  Emperor  "will  be  their  friend  at  all 
times."  "We  should  have  completely  destroyed 
our  credit  in  the  Mohammedan  world,"  said  Von 
Biilow,  "if  so  soon  after  this  declaration  we  had 
sold  Morocco  to  the  French.  Our  ambassador  in 
Constantinople,  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieberstein, 
said  to  me  at  the  time,  'If  we  sacrifice  Morocco  in 
spite  of  Damascus  and  Tangier,  we  shall  at  one  fell 
swoop  lose  our  position  in  Turkey  and  therefore 
all  advantages  and  prospects  that  we  have  painfully 
acquired  by  the  labor  of  many  years.'  "  x 

Certainly,  no  more  effective  method  of  proclaim- 
ing an  intention  to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of  North 


1  Von  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  London,  etc.,  1913  and  1916. 

76 


THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

Africa,  where  Germany  was  exposed  to  no  danger 
and  had  no  other  than  very  limited  commercial  in- 
terests, could  have  been  chosen.  What  shocked  the 
chancelleries  of  Europe  was  that  it  was  thought 
necessary  thus  publicly  to  strike  France  a  blow  in 
the  face.  It  seemed  like  the  opening  of  an  entirely 
new  school  of  diplomacy,  in  which  the  mailed  fist 
was  to  take  the  place  of  argument. 

From  a  less  strident  declaimer  than  William  II 
the  same  acts  might  not  have  been  subject  to  the 
same  interpretation;  but,  notwithstanding  profes- 
sions of  peace,  he  was  constantly  justifying  the  im- 
putation of  aggressive  purposes  by  his  utterances 
at  home.  At  the  gala  dinner  attending  the  unveil- 
ing of  the  statue  of  Moltke,  for  example,  a  short 
time  after  the  speech  at  Tangier,  the  Kaiser  intro- 
duced his  toast  by  crying  out,  "We  have  seen, 
gentlemen,  in  what  a  position  we  are  placed  with 
reference  to  the  rest  of  the  world :  in  consequence, 
hurrah  for  the  powder  dry  and  the  sword  sharp- 
ened, for  the  recognized  purpose  and  our  forces  ever 
on  the  alert,  for  the  German  army  and  the  General 
Staff!" 

It  is  true  that  there  had  been  in  1904  an  agree- 
ment between  Great  Britain  and  France,  whereby 
Great  Britain  was  not  to  be  interfered  with  by 
France  in  safeguarding  her  interests  in  Egypt,  and 
France  was  to  be  free  to  demand  reforms  in  her 
near  neighbor,  Morocco;  but  the  commercial  in- 
terests of  Germany  were  in  neither  case  denied  or 
affected.    The  attitude  of  Germany  was  expressed 

77 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

in  the  speech  from  the  throne  of  November,  1905. 
"The  difficulties  which  have  arisen  between  France 
and  ns,  apropos  of  the  Morocco  affair,"  said  the 
Kaiser,  "have  no  other  origin  than  a  tendency  to 
regulate  without  our  collaboration  questions  where 
the  German  Empire  has  interests  to  defend." 

In  claiming  equal  commercial  privileges  in  an 
independent  country  awaiting  future  development, 
the  position  of  Germany  was  entirely  reasonable; 
but  it  was  the  first  time  the  saber  had  been  publicly 
rattled  and  a  virtual  threat  of  war  uttered  by  a 
great  power  in  the  face  of  friendly  nations  for 
such  a  cause.  "The  signs  of  the  times,"  the  Kaiser 
declared  in  his  speech  from  the  throne,  "make  it  a 
duty  to  the  German  people  to  reinforce  their  de- 
fenses against  all  aggression." 

A  different  temper  might  have  secured  to  Ger- 
many, without  disturbance,  every  right,  in  so  far  as 
her  interests  could  be  made  to  appear ;  but  the  pur- 
pose of  William  II  was  not  so  much  to  maintain 
German  interests  in  Morocco,  which  at  most  were 
inconsiderable,  as  to  assert,  in  a  manner  to  force 
recognition,  the  dominant  position  of  Germany  as 
a  world  power  that  had  always  to  be  reckoned  with 
in  every  question.  To  force  this  admission,  the 
demand  was  made  that  France  should  be  summoned 
before  a  European  Conference — a  tribunal  before 
which  the  Kaiser  has  since  systematically  held  that 
no  nation  could  honorably  be  compelled  to  appear. 

For  a  time  it  seemed  as  if  the  boast  of  Berlin 
were  well  founded.    M.  Delcasse,  who  had  negoti- 

78 


THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

ated  the  arrangement  with  Great  Britain,  was 
forced  ont  of  office,  while  Von  Biilow  was  created  a 
Prince.  Diplomatically,  the  calling  of  the  Confer- 
ence of  Algeciras,  in  1906,  at  first  appeared  to  be 
a  triumph  for  Germany ;  but  in  the  end  proved  the 
virtual  isolation  of  the  German  Empire,  except  for 
the  loyal  adherence  of  Austria-Hungary,  which  won 
the  distinction  of  a  " brilliant  second."  It  served 
to  reveal  the  ambition  of  Germany  to  dominate ;  but 
substantially  it  obtained  for  her  nothing  that  could 
not  have  been  secured  by  a  reasoned  exchange  of 
notes — namely,  the  "open  door"  in  Morocco,  which 
was  never  denied.  In  its  ultimate  consequences,  as 
a  thinly  veiled  threat  to  France  at  the  moment  when 
Russia  was  impotent  as  an  ally,  German  insistence 
threw  the  stress  of  future  diplomatic  intercourse 
upon  armed  force  and  rendered  the  problems  of 
equity  mere  problems  of  power.  It  is,  however, 
only  in  the  light  of  later  developments  that  the  true 
significance  of  the  Moroccan  question  can  be  accu- 
rately understood. 

It  immediately  became  evident  that  France  would 
never  permit  herself,  through  a  rapprochement  be- 
tween Russia  and  Germany,  to  be  brought  into  vas- 
salage to  the  Kaiser,  as  he  had  intended.  The 
interest  of  William  II  in  the  secret  treaty  with 
Nicholas  II,  therefore,  soon  began  to  relax.  The 
agreement  the  two  Emperors  had  made,  that  the 
Kaiser,  on  his  visit  to  Copenhagen,  in  July,  1905, 
should  inform  the  King  of  Denmark  that,  in  case 
of  war  with  England,  Germany  and  Russia  would 

79 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

be  obliged  jointly  to  seize  and  occupy  that  kingdom, 
fell  by  the  wayside;  and  the  Kaiser  informed  the 
Czar,  "I  thought  it  better  not  to  touch  the  subject 
with  the  Danes  and  refrained  from  making  any 
allusions,  as  it  is  better  to  let  the  idea  develop  and 
ripen  in  their  heads  and  to  let  them  draw  the  final 
conclusions  themselves,  so  that  they  will  of  their 
own  accord  be  moved  to  lean  upon  us  and  fall  in 
line  with  our  two  countries."1 

Evidently,  since  Russia  was  losing  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  and  threatened  with  domestic  revo- 
lution, the  Kaiser  was  not  so  eager  to  insist  upon 
the  alliance  he  had  been  laboring  to  impose  upon 
Nicholas  II.  In  fact,  in  the  changed  conditions,  an 
alliance  would,  perhaps,  be  wholly  undesirable ;  for 
it  might,  without  a  substantial  equivalent,  place 
Germany  under  obligations  to  a  power  unable  even 
to  save  itself. 

Just  here  we  have,  through  recent  disclosures, 
an  interesting  revelation  of  the  Kaiser's  real  esti- 
mate of  the  divine  right  and  responsibility  of  rul- 
ers. In  August,  1905,  William  II  was  encouraging 
Nicholas  II  to  accept  parliamentary  government 
for  Russia.  "I  beg  you,"  he  writes,  "to  accept  my 
warmest  congratulations  for  this  great  step  for- 
ward in  the  development  of  Russia."  Not  only  so, 
but  he  explicitly  advises  the  Czar  to  place  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  terms  of  peace  upon  the  Duma ! 
"I  would  in  your  place  not  miss  this  first  and  best 
opportunity,"  he  continues,  "to  decide  to  get  in 


1  Bernstein,  The  Willy-Nicky  Correspondence,  New  York,  p.  119. 

80 


THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

close  touch  with  your  country's  feelings  and  wishes 
about  peace  or  war,  giving  the  Russian  people  the 
long-wished-for  opportunity  to  decide,  or  take  part 
in  the  decision,  relating  to  its  future.  .  .  .  The  de- 
cisions which  are  to  be  taken  are  so  terribly  ear- 
nest in  their  consequences  and  so  far-reaching  that 
it  is  quite  impossible  for  any  mortal  sovereign  to 
take  the  responsibility  for  them  alone  on  his  shoul- 
ders without  the  help  of  his  people."  l 

Is  this  the  spirit  in  which  the  Kaiser  was  ruling 
Germany,  when  he  said,  "Yon  Germans  have  only 
one  will,  and  that  is  my  will ;  there  is  only  one  law, 
and  that  is  my  law"?  Should  the  people's  parlia- 
ment bear  "the  odium  of  the  decision"  between 
peace  and  war,  as  the  Kaiser  proposed,  and  have 
nothing  to  say  regarding  secret  treaties  of  alliance 
which  might  lead  to  war?  Yet  the  Kaiser  wishes 
the  secret  treaty  to  remain  secret,  although  he  at- 
taches less  importance  to  it  than  before.  Still,  with 
a  change  in  the  cards,  it  might  prove  useful.  "We 
joined  hands  and  signed  before  God,  who  heard  our 
vows,"  he  says.  "I  therefore  think  the  treaty  may 
well  come  into  existence. ' '  Nevertheless,  as  bitterly 
as  any  democrat,  he  rails  against  the  alleged  secret 
diplomacy  of  "the  arch  mischief-maker  of  Europe 
in  London,"  as  he  calls  Edward  VII,  whom,  he 
says,  "the  revelations  of  Delcasse"  convict  of 
"planning  war  against  our  friendly  nation  in 
peace."  "Like  brigands  in  a  wood,"  he  declares, 
he  has  sent  the  Russian  ambassador  to  Copenhagen 


1  The  Willy-Nicky  Correspondence,  pp.  123,  124. 

81 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

on  a  clandestine  mission,  to  induce  the  Czar's 
mother  to  influence  him  for  a  policy  against  Ger- 
many. x 

Nicholas  II,  with  the  war  off  his  hands  and  the 
Duma  to  "bear  the  odium"  of  the  terms  of  peace — 
but  only  to  be  disbanded  a  short  time  afterward — 
was  resuming  his  independence,  defending  his  am- 
bassador as  grossly  misunderstood,  and  thinking 
lightly  of  the  secret  treaty.  William  II,  on  the 
other  hand,  having  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that 
England,  after  all,  was  likely  to  be  a  more  useful 
friend  than  Russia,  while  tightening  the  alliance 
with  Austria-Hungary,  who  at  the  Conference  of 
Algeciras  had  proved,  "la  fid  elite  d'un  allie  sur," 
was  soon  staging  a  closer  entente  with  Great  Brit- 
ain. On  August  3, 1906,  during  the  visit  of  Edward 
VII  at  Kiel,  the  Kaiser  wrote  to  the  Czar :  ' i  The 
maintenance  of  friendly  relations  between  Germany 
and  England  is  an  absolute  necessity  for  the  world. 
I  am  pleased  about  this  result  of  Uncle  Bertie's 
visit."  In  less  than  a  year,  "the  arch  mischief- 
maker  of  Europe"  had  become  the  mainstay  of 
peace.  The  meeting  with  Uncle  Bertie  at  Wilhelms- 
hohe,  in  August,  1907,  was  also  "satisfactory"; 
and  the  Kaiser  recorded,  "Uncle  Bertie  in  good 
humor  and  peacefully  disposed."2  In  November 
of  that  year  William  II  returned  the  King  of  Eng- 
land's visit,  and  in  his  speech  accepting  the  degree 
of  Doctor  of  Civil  Law  conferred  upon  him  by  Ox- 

1  The  Willy-Nicky  Correspondence,  pp.  HI,  131,  139. 

2  The  same,  pp.  152,  155. 


THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

ford  University,  praised  Cecil  Rhodes — who  had 
been  reported  to  be  the  inspirer  of  the  Jameson 
raid — for  "the  amplitude  of  his  views"  in  founding 
scholarships  at  Oxford  which  "permitted  young 
Germans  to  associate  themselves  with  young  Eng- 
lishmen in  studying  the  character  and  qualities  of 
their  respective  nations."  Even  the  journalists 
were  not  neglected,  and  in  a  speech  to  them  the 
Kaiser  said:  "We  belong  to  the  same  race  and  to 
the  same  religion.  These  are  bonds  which  ought  to 
be  strong  enough  to  maintain  harmony  and  friend- 
ship between  us. "  Wearing  a  British  uniform  and 
adorned  with  British  academic  honors,  for  the  Kai- 
ser there  was  now  no  need  of  the  secret  treaty  with 
Russia. 

Thus,  within  two  years,  and  without  other  rea- 
son than  the  hope  of  increasing  the  power  of 
Germany,  William  II  had  abandoned  the  Czar  in 
the  time  of  his  weakness,  after  secretly  conspiring 
with  him  to  isolate  Great  Britain  and  attach  France 
to  a  Russo-German  alliance ;  and,  failing  in  this,  he 
had  endeavored  to  form  a  close  relation  with  Great 
Britain,  in  order  to  prevent  an  entente  with  France. 
We  shall  see  how,  a  little  later,  unable  even  with 
these  new  professions  of  friendship  for  the  "arch 
mischief-maker  of  Europe,"  as  he  had  called  Ed- 
ward VII,  to  prevent  the  growing  good  understand- 
ing with  France,  the  Kaiser  made  most  bitter 
accusations  of  hostility  against  Great  Britain, 
merely  because  the  King  was  endeavoring  to  be 
friendly  with  the  Czar. 

7  83 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

It  is,  perhaps,  an  inevitable  consequence  of  the 
system  that  has  long  prevailed  in  Europe  that  all 
general  understandings  are  in  danger  of  being  ren- 
dered impossible  by  the  assumption  that  friendship 
between  a  sovereign's  friends  signifies  hostility 
toward  himself.  So  long  as  the  friendship  of  na- 
tions is  based  on  the  conception  of  offensive  and 
defensive  alliances,  this  assumption  is  a  perfectly 
natural  one.  It  runs  through  the  entire  history  of 
European  diplomacy.  It  is  the  foundation  on  which 
the  whole  theory  of  the  balance  of  power  rests.  Too 
large  an  aggregate  of  mutually  friendly  nations 
has  always  created  the  suspicion  of  a  conspiracy 
among  them  against  the  others,  which  then  feel  it 
necessary  to  find  new  friends,  outside  the  combina- 
tion, in  order  to  hold  the  first  group  in  cheek.  As 
the  aggregation  broadens,  isolation  is  believed  to 
be  complete,  and  the  peril  is  felt  to  be  unendurable. 
So  long  as  secret  diplomacy  is  practised  these  con- 
ditions may  be  expected  to  prevail. 

It  would  be  agreeable  to  find  evidence  that  at  any 
time  since  the  beginning  of  his  reign  William  II 
had  in  mind  any  plan,  any  principle,  or  any  desire 
for  a  general  understanding  in  Europe  that  would 
relieve  the  nations  from  dependence  upon  armed 
force  for  their  safety. 

The  opportunity  had  been  twice  offered.  In 
1898,  the  Czar  of  Russia  had  proposed  a  limitation 
of  armament.  The  German  delegates  to  the  first 
Hague  Conference  were  instructed  to  take  no  part 
in  discussing  this  subject,  and  it  was  promptly 

84 


THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

dropped  from  the  program  at  Germany's  instiga- 
tion. The  English  and  American  delegates,  sup- 
ported by  Russia  and  France,  sought  to  establish 
international  institutions  that  would  enable  nations 
disposed  to  act  justly  to  solve  at  least  some  of  their 
problems  in  a  judicial  manner.  The  history  of 
that  effort  is  well  known.  The  German  first  dele- 
gate, Count  Minister,  dismissed  the  idea  of  arbi- 
tration as  ''humbug";  and  the  reason  he  gave  for 
this  opinion,  as  reported  by  the  American  first  dele- 
gate, was  that  "Germany  is  prepared  for  war  as 
no  other  country  is;  Germany  can  mobilize  her 
army  in  ten  days,  a  performance  that  could  not  be 
equaled  by  France  or  Russia  or  any  other  state. 
An  arbitration  court  would,  however,  give  an  enemy 
time  to  make  his  preparations.  Therefore  it  would 
only  place  Germany  at  a  disadvantage. ' '  x 

It  was  only  after  extraordinary  efforts  to  induce 
the  Emperor  to  see  that  this  attitude,  if  persisted 
in,  would  cause  him  and  his  country  to  be  dis- 
trusted, scorned,  and  hated  by  every  civilized  peo- 
ple, and  especially  by  millions  of  the  German  race 
in  America,  that  instructions  were  finally  issued 
from  Berlin  to  accept  some  kind  of  purely  volun- 
tary and  occasional  method  of  adjudicating  inter- 
national differences ;  but  without  the  least  promise 
to  resort  to  it,  even  in  the  case  of  strictly  legal 
questions. 


1  See  for  the  whole  Conference,  Andrew  D.  White's  Autobiog- 
raphy, 2  vols.,  New  York,  1905,  and  extracts  in  Illustrative  Docu- 
ment No.  II. 

85 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

The  second  Hague  Conference  offered  another 
opportunity.  It  was  treated  in  a  different  manner, 
but  with  almost  the  same  result.  Three  eminent 
German  jurists  were  sent  as  delegates.  Their  in- 
structions have  not  been  published,  as  those  of  the 
United  States  have  been;  but  it  was  given  out  by 
them  that,  while  the  limitation  of  armaments,  either 
on  land  or  sea,  could  not  even  be  considered,  Ger- 
many was  ready  for  arbitration  and  a  court  of 
international  justice,  and  was  prepared  to  work  for 
them.  This  time,  the  Kaiser,  although  he  had  mani- 
fested no  interest  in  this  Conference,  had  set  the 
stage  for  avoiding  the  error  his  delegates  had  made 
in  the  first. 

It  soon  became  evident,  however,  that  while  Ger- 
many, her  allies,  and  her  Balkan  satellites  were,  "in 
principle,''  ingeniously  professing  to  accept  every 
great  aim  of  peaceful  international  organization, 
they  were  blocking  every  practical  proposal  leading 
to  a  definitive  result. 

The  method  was  very  simple.  Unlike  the  par- 
liamentary bodies  of  a  single  nation,  in  which  de- 
cisions are  made  by  majorities,  an  international 
conference  requires,  because  of  the  complete  sover- 
eignty of  the  separate  states  composing  it,  entire 
unanimity  before  any  final  result  can  be  obtained. 
Playing  several  small  powers  as  mere  pawns  upon 
a  chess-board,  the  German  first  delegate  was  able, 
when  he  did  not  find  it  convenient  himself  to  raise 
objection,  to  prevent  unanimity  by  the  objection  of 
one  of  Germany's  allies  or  benevolent  colleagues. 

86 


THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

By  those  accustomed  to  trace  the  intricacies  of 
negotiation,  and  who  knew  the  affinities  that  were 
controlling  this  collusion,  often  quite  perplexing, 
the  procedure  was  from  the  beginning  perfectly 
comprehended ;  and,  months  before  the  termination 
of  the  Conference,  they  were  prepared  to  predict 
that,  notwithstanding  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieber- 
stein's  bland  and  plausible  assurances  that  Ger- 
many was  eager  for  a  court  of  arbitral  justice,  no 
such  court  would  ever  be  brought  to  completion  in 
that  Conference. 

Hardly  credited  at  first,  this  prediction  was  ex- 
tremely disappointing  to  the  American  delegation, 
which  throughout  toiled  bravely  on,  in  the  hope  that 
success  might  ultimately  prove  attainable.  - 

Whispered  from  time  to  time,  even  by  those  dele- 
gates who  sincerely  wished  for  a  good  result,  were 
the  words,  * '  Germany  must  not  be  isolated ! ' '  With 
the  support  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieberstein  was 
able  to  command,  the  danger  of  Germany's  isolation 
was  not  so  imminent  as  her  nervous  neighbors 
sometimes  feared.  If  Germany  were  isolated,  they 
knew  what  the  Imperial  wrath  would  be,  and  saw 
in  such  a  denouement  the  gathering  of  the  storm; 
for,  with  the  plans  that  were  then  in  contemplation, 
Germany  would  not  yield  to  the  decisions  of  a  Eu- 
ropean Areopagus.  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieber- 
stein knew  that  there  was  no  probability  of  Ger- 
many's isolation.  To  isolate  Germany  would  be 
to  defy  Germany;  and  it  was  felt,  even  by  the  most 
ardent  advocates  of  the  judicial  method  of  dealing 

87 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

with  international  controversies,  that  it  was  not  the 
part  of  wisdom  to  permit  a  convocation  called  in 
the  name  of  peace  to  become  the  occasion  of  pro- 
voking war. 

As  weeks  and  months  slipped  by,  the  intention  of 
Germany  became  so  evident  that  the  American  first 
delegate,  the  Honorable  Joseph  H.  Choate,  who  had 
toiled  like  a  giant  in  the  canse  of  effective  interna- 
tional justice  based  on  law,  had  the  courage,  with 
greater  regard  for  truth  than  for  diplomatic 
precedent,  to  say  of  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieber- 
stein,  the  German  first  delegate,  in  a  plenary  ses- 
sion of  the  Conference,  and  in  his  presence :  "Baron 
Marschall  von  Bieberstein  is  an  ardent  admirer  of 
the  abstract  principle  of  arbitration  and  even  of 
obligatory  arbitration,  and  even  of  general  arbi- 
tration between  those  he  chooses  to  act  with;  but 
when  it  comes  to  putting  this  idea  into  concrete 
form  and  practical  effect  he  appears  as  our  most 
formidable  adversary.  He  appears  like  one  who 
worships  a  divine  image  in  the  sky,  but  when  it 
touches  the  earth  it  loses  all  charm  for  him.  He 
sees  as  in  a  dream  a  celestial  apparition  which  ex- 
cites his  ardent  devotion,  but  when  he  wakes  and 
finds  her  by  his  side  he  turns  to  the  wall  and  will 
have  nothing  to  do  with  her.,,  1 

A  few  weeks  after  the  adjournment  of  the  Con- 
ference His  Majesty  the  Kaiser  visited  Holland  as 
the  guest  of  the  Queen.    He  spoke  with  fervor  of 


1  Deuxik'me    Conference   Internationale    de    la    paix,    Actes    et 
Documents,  Tome  II,  p.  72- 

88 


THE  KAISER  AS  A  STAGE-MANAGER 

the  relations  between  the  Houses  of  Orange  and 
Hohenzollern,  recalled  how  the  Great  Elector  had 
found  his  noble  spouse  in  Holland,  and  wished  the 
kingdom  "  prosperity  in  the  midst  of  the  benefits  of 
peace";  but  of  the  great  work  so  recently  under- 
taken there,  for  the  peace  of  the  whole  world  by 
representatives  of  all  civilized  nations — the  only 
universal  international  congress  that  ever  assem- 
bled— he  had  not  one  word  to  say. 

To  play  the  double  role  of  William  the  War  Lord 
and  William  the  Peacemaker  at  the  same  time,  even 
with  such  able  support  as  the  Kaiser  believed  him- 
self to  have  in  Count  Minister,  who  was  chosen  for 
his  "common  sense,"  and  Baron  Marschall  von 
Bieberstein,  who  was  chosen  because  in  Oriental 
diplomacy  he  had  out-Turked  the  Turk,  exceeded 
the  dramatic  talent  of  even  this  prodigy  in  his- 
trionic art.  Beneath  the  flowing  robe  of  the  peace- 
maker the  protruding  scabbard  of  the  sword  has 
always  trailed  across  the  stage,  and  it  has  rattled 
loudest  when  the  Kaiser  has  discoursed  most  vo- 
ciferously of  the  German  love  of  peace. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

Wf  HEN  my  official  relations  with  Kaiser  Will- 
**  iam  II  began  he  was  just  completing  the 
twentieth  year  of  his  reign.  He  had  attained  to  the 
prime  of  mature  manhood,  he  had  never  suffered 
any  serious  reverse,  and  he  was  fully  conscious  of 
his  unquestioned  power. 

Not  only  had  there  been  during  this  long  period 
no  European  war,  but  the  general  conditions  in 
Europe  were  favorable  for  the  organization  of  per- 
manent peace.  And  yet,  notwithstanding  serious 
efforts,  peace  had  not  been  organized.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  efforts  to  organize  it  had  terminated  in 
the  conclusion  at  The  Hague  of  a  series  of  general 
treaties  nearly  all  of  which  were  constructed  in 
open  anticipation  of  future  war,  being  composed 
chiefly  of  rules  intended,  if  possible,  to  render  war 
only  slightly  less  horrible  than  the  growth  of  mili- 
tary science  had  made  it  evident  that  it  probably 
would  be. 

There  was,  it  is  true,  no  reason  inherent  in  the 
social  order  why  war  should  then  be  regarded  as 
inevitable;  and  the  chief  ground  for  believing  it 

90 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

might  occur  was  the  evident  unwillingness  of  cer- 
tain powers  to  make  the  necessary  provisions  for 
averting  it.  If,  in  fact,  it  was  inevitable,  it  was 
owing  solely  to  ambitions  that  were  not  open  to  dis- 
cussion. 

At  that  time  the  German  Empire  had  taken  a 
place  in  Europe  which  made  its  action  of  the  high- 
est importance ;  for  no  international  question  could 
arise  without  suggesting  the  inquiry,  ''What  will 
Germany  do  about  it  ? "  And  the  answer  was  com- 
plicated by  the  fact  that  Berlin  was  an  enigma.  All 
depended  upon  the  uncertain  mood  of  Kaiser  Will- 
iam II. 

How  incalculable  a  factor  the  Kaiser  really  was 
the  year  1908  was  to  reveal  in  an  astonishing  man- 
ner. Not  only  was  it  a  critical  time  for  the  inter- 
national relations  of  Europe,  as  the  events  will 
show,  but  a  trying  time  for  the  theory  of  personal 
supremacy  that  underlies  the  conception  William 
II  had  formed  of  his  position  as  German  Emperor. 
His  pretensions,  his  purposes,  his  character,  and 
his  popularity  among  his  own  people  were  in 
that  crucial  period  to  be  subjected  to  unexpected 
tests. 

The  second  Hague  Conference  had  brought  into 
vivid  contrast  two  conflicting  conceptions  of  di- 
plomacy that  had  there  come  into  collision :  on  the 
one  hand  the  secret,  obstructive,  and  evasive  pro- 
cedure characteristic  of  personal  sovereignty;  on 
the  other  the  open,  constructive,  and  frankly 
avowed  statement  of  purposes  aimed  at  for  the 

91 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

common  good,  advocated  and  practised  by  the  great 
democracies. 

The  fact  that  the  new  American  ambassador,  who 
had  received  from  the  German  Emperor  his  agrc- 
ment  in  December,  1907,  but  was  not  actually 
transferred  from  The  Hague  to  Berlin  until  Juno, 
1908,  had  not  only  been  a  delegate  to  the  second 
Hague  Conference,  but  had  for  many  years  been 
closely  identified  with  the  movement  represented 
there  by  the  American  delegation,  did  not  add  to 
the  probability  of  his  being  persona  gratissima  at 
the  Court  of  the  Kaiser.  It  was,  in  fact,  understood 
that  the  government  of  the  United  States  intended 
to  accomplish,  if  possible,  by  separate  negotiation, 
what  it  had  failed  to  achieve  at  The  Hague.  It  was 
further  known  that  the  new  ambassador,  during  the 
winter  of  1908,  had  publicly  advocated  this  policy ; 
and  that  separate  treaties  were  to  be  made,  if 
possible,  with  each  of  the  great  powers,  by  which 
the  ground  would  be  prepared  for  a  better  inter- 
national organization.  It  was,  in  fact,  with  special 
reference  to  his  aiding  in  this  task  of  separate  ne- 
gotiation at  Berlin  that  the  new  ambassador  had 
been  selected. 

This  mission,  it  was  evident,  would  not  be  so  much 
an  affair  of  ceremony  as  a  sober  undertaking,  hav- 
ing in  view  the  establishment  of  the  future  relations 
of  the  two  countries  upon  a  basis  of  mutual  under- 
standing and  legal  engagements,  with  provision  for 
adjudicating  through  improved  treaty  arrange- 
ments future  difficulties  that  might  arise. 

92 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  many  of  the  German 
people,  as  well  as  the  American  people,  greatly 
desired  such  open  and  duly  legalized  relations,  but 
this  was  not  the  Kaiser's  personal  conception  of 
diplomacy.  In  such  a  system  the  personal  element 
would  be  practically  eliminated. 

Nothing  can  be  more  certain  than  that  William 
II  earnestly  desired  to  maintain  friendship  with  the 
United  States,  but  he  did  not  wish  the  American 
system  to  gain  a  foothold  in  Europe,  or  that  inter- 
national relations  should  be  made  to  rest  upon  a 
body  of  well-defined  law  and  a  tribunal  with  au- 
thority to  interpret  and  apply  it.  Such  a  system 
would  inevitably  in  time,  if  logically  carried  out, 
diminish  the  necessity  for  armies,  and  what  would 
then  become  of  the  War  Lord  ?  If  the  people — man- 
ufacturers, ship-owners,  and  traders,  doing  busi- 
ness internationally — could  carry  their  wrongs  to 
a  court  of  justice,  it  could  not  fail  to  affect  the 
status  of  kings  and  emperors  as  well  as  of  armies 
and  navies. 

What  the  Kaiser  wanted  of  America  was  peace, 
trade,  and  neutrality  so  far  as  Europe  was  con- 
cerned. For  these  he  looked  largely  to  the  racial 
loyalty  of  men  of  German  blood  living  in  the  United 
States.  With  this  support,  war  with  Germany 
would  always  be  difficult.  Disputes,  if  they  should 
arise,  could  be  dealt  with  as  occasion  might  require ; 
but  enlarged  treaty  arrangements  were  not,  he 
thought,  desirable.  They  would,  perhaps,  prove 
embarrassing  to  personal  government ;  and  if  made 

93 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

with  the  United  States,  other  nations  would  de- 
mand them  and  refusal  would  thereby  be  made  more 
difficult. 

It  was  perfectly  natural  for  the  Kaiser  to  take 
this  view.  It  was  a  necessary  corollary  of  his 
theory  of  personal  government.  For  twenty  years 
he  had  promoted  amities,  softened  asperities,  and 
kept  Germany  prosperous  by  a  regime  of  personal 
visits  to  other  sovereigns,  personal  telegrams  of 
felicitation  and  condolence,  secret  correspondence, 
and  casual  words  dropped  into  the  ears  of  ambas- 
sadors at  Berlin  which  he  knew  would  be  repeated 
to  their  sovereigns.  A  Europe  based  on  public 
treaties,  open,  known  of  all  men,  would  take  all  the 
charm  out  of  a  sovereign's  existence.  All  the  plot 
interest  of  diplomacy  would  be  gone.  Could  any- 
thing be  more  inartistic  than  playing  a  part  so 
commonplace  as  that  of  an  emperor  who  had  no 
secrets  and  in  case  of  controversy  would  be  required 
to  assent  to  the  decisions  of  a  court? 

To  the  Kaiser,  as  to  most  sovereigns  before  the 
constitutional  era,  the  essential  part  of  diplomacy 
is  the  quasi-social  intimacy  of  kings.  The  chief 
function  of  ambassadors,  upon  this  theory,  is  to 
bridge  distances  by  creating  a  common  court  life, 
where  personal  influence  can  be  made  to  count. 
An  embassy,  therefore,  is  from  this  point  of  view 
merely  an  extension  of  the  court  of  the  country  it 
represents,  and  should  be  constituted  and  main- 
tained for  the  performance  of  that  function. 

As  betwreen   personal   sovereigns,   there  is,   no 

94 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

doubt,  much  to  be  said  in  support  of  this  idea.  The 
ambassador  is  the  direct  and  authorized  representa- 
tive of  his  sovereign.  He  lives  in  his  sovereign's 
house,  receives  his  bread  from  his  sovereign's  hand, 
is  his  servitor,  keeps  his  secrets,  and  concerns  him- 
self only  with  his  sovereign's  interests. 

But  the  United  States  has  no  personal  sovereign ; 
and  the  Constitution  provides  for  no  personal  rep- 
resentation of  the  President,  who  has  no  court  and 
is  supposed  to  have  no  court  favorites.  There  be- 
ing no  power  in  a  constitutional  government  to  ex- 
change secret  understandings  between  the  heads  of 
states,  such  a  nation  must  base  its  international 
relations  on  its  treaty  engagements ;  and  these  must 
be  open,  public,  and  sufficient  to  safeguard  its  in- 
terests, regardless  of  personal  sentiments  or  per- 
sonal influences.  To  such  nations  diplomacy  means 
international  business,  a  very  serious  and  exacting 
business,  upon  the  proper  transaction  of  which  the 
most  important  interests  of  a  people,  and  even  life 
itself,  may  depend. 

However  widely  imperial  purposes  and  republi- 
can conceptions  of  international  relations  and  inter- 
course may  differ,  both  sides  must  admit  that 
between  sovereign  nations  a  basis  of  mutual  under- 
standing must  be  found.  The  amenities  of  life  are 
not  incompatible  with  the  serious  discussion  of 
business,  even  where  contradictory  views  are  held. 
On  the  contrary,  the  wider  the  chasm  of  differences 
the  more  essential  these  amenities  become. 

When,  therefore,  on  June  8, 1908,  the  new  Ameri- 

95 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

can  ambassador  made  his  appearance  at  Berlin,  it 
was  with  the  conviction  that,  whatever  the  chances 
for  the  success  of  his  mission,  he  would  receive  a 
cordial  welcome;  and  in  this  he  was  not  disap- 
pointed. 

The  provincial  Prussian  capital  of  other  days 
had  been  in  twenty  years  transformed  into  the  most 
modern  city  of  continental  Europe,  an  impressive 
symbol  of  the  wonderful  material  progress  of  the 
Empire.  From  a  sleepy  thoroughfare  Unter  den 
Linden  had  become  a  cosmopolitan  bazaar  with 
shops  of  unsurpassed  brilliancy  of  self-disclosure, 
as  if  to  challenge  comparison  with  their  rivals  in 
older  centers  of  merchandise.  Of  its  new  Hotel 
Adlon,  in  which  all  that  could  be  learned  of  sump- 
tuous hostelries  from  our  most  splendid  American 
experiments  had  been  embodied,  the  Kaiser,  who 
had  honored  the  opening  with  his  presence,  had  con- 
descended by  way  of  encouragement  to  say,  "Es 
ist  schoner  als  bei  tins."  The  Wilhelmstrasse, 
which  in  one 's  student  days  had  seemed  so  impene- 
trable and  mysterious,  now  flung  wide  its  doors  of 
welcome  to  cheerful  interiors,  where  the  amiable 
Baron  von  Schon  presided  over  the  Foreign  Office, 
and  Prince  von  Biilow,  affable,  courtly,  and  always 
adjusted  to  the  situation,  however  complicated,  sat 
in  the  chair  of  Bismarck  in  the  palace  of  the  Chan- 
cellor. 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  the  Kaiser's  personal 
rule,  the  machinery  of  government  is  very  much  in 
evidence  in  Berlin.    No  Foreign  Office  in  the  world 

96 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

is  better  organized  for  obtaining  information,  in- 
fluencing the  press,  or  handling  with  expert  knowl- 
edge every  question  affecting  the  political  or  eco- 
nomic interests  of  the  Empire.  When  treaties  are 
to  be  made,  there  are  at  hand  all  the  knowledge  and 
all  the  skill  for  making  them  prudently  and  to  the 
advantage  of  Germany;  and,  in  addition,  all  the 
agencies  for  the  accumulation  and  presentation  of 
obstacles  to  making  them,  when  impediments  are 
the  order  of  the  day.  And  when  it  is  deemed  de- 
sirable to  fix  a  policy  in  the  mind  of  the  country, 
the  Chancellor — especially  Prince  von  Biilow,  who 
was  a  past-master  in  the  art  of  public  statement — 
speaks  ex  cathedra  with  an  authority  hardly  known 
elsewhere. 

But  concealed  behind  all  this  complicated  ap- 
paratus of  bureaus  is  the  personality  of  the  Kaiser. 
From  the  Chancellor  down  to  the  humblest  assessor, 
all  are  obedient  to  his  will  when  they  know  it.  In 
order  to  know  what  you  can  or  cannot  do  in  Ger- 
many it  is  necessary  to  know  the  mind  of  Will- 
iam II. 

It  was  with  great  interest,  therefore,  that  the 
new  ambassador  looked  forward  to  his  first  audi- 
ence of  His  Majesty.  He  had  not  long  to  wait. 
With  unprecedented  promptness  the  notice  came 
that  on  the  Sunday  morning  following  his  arrival 
in  the  capital  he  would  be  received  at  the  Old  Palace 
in  Berlin. 

It  seemed  perfectly  natural  that  the  audience 
should  occur  in  the  open  air,  under  the  trees  in  the 

97 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

little  garden  of  the  Schloss.  The  seclusion  and  in- 
timacy of  such  a  meeting  gave  it  a  welcome  char- 
acter. The  three  flamboyant  court  carriages,  each 
drawn  by  six  horses,  with  bewigged  drivers,  pos- 
tilions, and  footmen  clinging  on  behind,  made  a 
spectacle  for  the  crowd  that  lined  the  way;  but 
neither  these  nor  the  red-breeched  lackeys  that 
formed  in  open  column  on  the  grand  staircase 
awakened  the  slightest  interest.  The  seventeen 
volleys  at  the  castle  gate  were  hardly  heard.  All 
this  was  the  old  story,  the  stage  trumpery  that  is 
supposed  to  enhance  "the  divinity  that  doth  hedge 
a  king,"  the  commonplaces  of  every  royal  court. 

Invited  by  the  Grand  Master  of  Ceremonies,  the 
Emperor 's  ever-faithful  servitor,  Count  Eulenberg, 
to  descend  alone  an  outer  flight  of  steps  into  the 
garden,  one  was  surprised  to  see,  standing  like  a 
statue,  perhaps  twenty  yards  away,  a  solitary  fig- 
ure, clad  in  white,  covered  with  a  silver  helmet 
bearing  on  its  crest  a  high-poised  eagle,  adding 
considerably  to  the  apparent  height  of  a  medium- 
sized  man.  Seen  in  the  coulisses  of  an  opera-house, 
this  apparition  might  have  been  taken  for  Lohen- 
grin waiting  for  his  cue.  It  was  the  Kaiser  in  the 
brilliant  uniform  of  an  officer  of  the  Garde  du 
Corps. 

From  the  embankments  of  the  Spree  outside  the 
garden  the  Sunday  promenaders,  of  whom  there 
were  many,  could  behold,  at  a  discreet  distance,  His 
Majesty  in  all  the  glory  of  his  warlike  panoply, 
and  the  black-coated  ambassador  approaching;  a 

98 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

picture  of  imperial  magnificence,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  republican  simplicity,  on  the  other,  in  which 
for  impressiveness  the  odds  were  far  from  even. 

Presently  the  statuesque  figure  moved,  the  shin- 
ing metal  flashing  radiantly  in  the  soft  June  sun- 
shine that  glinted  through  the  branches  of  the 
trees,  a  strong  right  hand  was  extended,  the  mask 
of  monumental  sternness  fell,  and  a  pleasant  smile 
lighted  up  the  well-browned  features  and  the  un- 
fathomable gray  eyes. 

Unimportant  what  was  said.  It  was  all  of  the 
friendship  that  should  exist  between  two  great  peo- 
ples, of  their  community  in  blood,  religion,  science, 
interest,  good- will,  and  a  common  civilization; 
spoken  on  the  Kaiser's  part  in  very  English  Eng- 
lish, fluently,  accurately,  expansively,  with  a  roll 
in  the  "r"  when  President  Roosevelt's  name  was 
mentioned  that  had  in  it  a  strong  suggestion  of  the 
North  Sea. 

It  seemed  like  a  real  personal  contact,  frank,  sin- 
cere, earnest,  and  honest.  One  could  not  question 
that,  and  it  was  the  beginning  of  other  contacts 
more  intimate  and  prolonged;  especially  at  Kiel, 
where  the  sportsman  put  aside  all  forms  of  court 
etiquette,  lying  flat  on  the  deck  of  the  Meteor  as  she 
scudded  under  heavy  sail  with  one  rail  under  water ; 
at  Eckernforde,  where  the  old  tars  came  into  the 
ancient  inn  in  the  evening  to  meet  their  Kaiser  and 
drink  to  His  Majesty's  health  a  glass  of  beer. 

1  'Did  you  ever  see  anything  more  democratic  in 
America?"  the  Kaiser  asked  gleefully,  one  time. 

8  99 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

"What  would  Roosevelt  think  of  this?"  he  in- 
quired, at  another. 

Hating  him,  as  many  millions  no  doubt  do,  it 
would  soften  their  hearts  to  hear  him  laugh  like 
a  child  at  a  good  story,  or  tell  one  himself.  Can  it 
be  f  Yes,  it  can  be.  There  is  such  a  wide  difference 
between  the  gentler  impulses  of  a  man  and  the  rude 
part  ambition  causes  him  to  play  in  life!  A  role 
partly  self-chosen,  it  is  true,  and  not  wholly  thrust 
upon  him.  A  soul  accursed  by  one  great  wrong 
idea,  and  the  purposes,  passions,  and  resolutions 
generated  by  it.  A  mind  distorted,  led  into  cap- 
tivity, and  condemned  to  crime  by  the  obsession  that 
God  has  but  one  people,  and  they  are  his  people; 
that  the  people  have  but  one  will,  and  that  is  his 
will;  that  God  has  but  one  purpose,  and  that  is  his 
purpose;  and,  being  responsible  only  to  the  God 
of  his  own  imagination,  a  purely  tribal  divinity,  the 
reflection  of  his  own  power-loving  nature,  that  he 
has  no  definite  responsibility  to  men. 

No  one  who  has  personally  met  the  Kaiser  in 
friendly  mood  has  failed  to  note  the  fascination  he 
is  capable  of  exerting  when  he  is  disposed  to  exer- 
cise his  talent  for  making  himself  agreeable.  The 
human  side  of  him,  when  he  consents  to  be  for  a 
moment  just  a  man,  is  undeniably  engaging.  It  is 
only  when  he  feels  called  upon  to  play  his  part  as 
Kaiser  that  one  sees  him  in  a  different  light.  Then 
he  becomes  a  wholly  different  character,  an  an- 
achronism in  an  age  of  liberal  thought. 

Undoubtedly  William  II  is  conscious  of  his  per- 

100 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

sonal  power  of  fascination,  and  he  uses  it  with 
consummate  art.  To  be  made  by  an  environment 
of  pomp  and  ceremony  to  feel  the  presence  of  maj- 
esty and  to  expect  at  most  a  stiff  and  formal  con- 
descension, and  then  suddenly  to  be  greeted  with 
an  outburst  of  human  qualities  that  causes  the  Kai- 
ser to  seem  like  an  old  friend  delighted  to  see  you 
— could  human  skill  devise  a  more  subtle  way  of 
drawing  a  doubtful  human  being  into  the  orbit  of 
a  sovereign's  interests  and  confidence?  It  seems 
to  say:  "At  last  you  have  broken  through  all  these 
stupid  barriers  that  my  people  employ  to  shut  you 
out,  and  me  in,  and  keep  the  crowd  away ;  but  here 
we  are  now,  at  last,  face  to  face.  Let  us  open  our 
hearts  to  each  other ! ' ' 

I  am  not  sure  that  this  often  happens,  but  it  has 
happened;  and  something  of  it  is  felt  by  every 
American  who  has  been  personally  presented  to  the 
Kaiser.  And  some,  once  drawn  into  that  orbit,  have 
always  remained  there.  And  it  is  not  the  meeting 
alone  that  binds.  Some  added  delicate  remem- 
brance ;  some  word  of  praise  or  approbation  spoken 
by  the  Kaiser  in  the  presence  of  a  courtier  or  a 
minister  designed  to  be  repeated  to  the  person  it 
concerns;  in  due  time  the  suggestion,  perhaps,  of 
a  decoration.  Such  things,  coming  from  His  Maj- 
esty, who  is  under  no  compulsion  to  do  them,  the 
recipient  naturally  reasons,  must  be  from  his  heart. 
And  in  this  he  may  be  right.  To  scorn  such  cour- 
tesies would  be  ungracious ;  but  to  overvalue  them, 
to  see  in  them  all  that  vanity  suggests,  to  forget 

101 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

that  these  attentions  are  the  warp  and  woof  of 
diplomacy,  would  be  to  fall  asleep  on  a  pillow  of 
illusion.  They  might  even  make  a  messenger  for- 
get the  errand  on  which  he  was  sent ! 

Although  my  main  mission  was  never  for  a  mo- 
ment forgotten,  and  notwithstanding  obstacles  was 
never  wholly  despaired  of,  the  chances  of  success 
seemed  to  grow  less  promising  as  time  passed  by. 
In  the  Foreign  Office  the  temperature  was  chilly 
when  the  arbitration  treaty  was  discussed.  The 
bankers  of  Frankfort  had  been  in  communication, 
and  out  of  dusty  drawers  had  been  recovered  musty 
papers  yellow  with  age,  old  securities,  probably 
bought  for  a  song  by  speculators,  but  represented 
by  their  owners  as  valid  debts  owed  by  some  of  the 
American  States.  One  lot  in  particular  was  made 
specially  impressive.  A  venal  legislature  had 
passed  a  bill  making  a  state  liable  for  the  payment 
of  an  issue  of  bonds  by  a  Southern  railroad.  The 
next  legislature,  placed  in  power  by  the  indignation 
of  the  taxpayers,  had  declared  the  indorsement  by 
the  state  to  be  illegal.  As  the  railroad  was  bank- 
rupt, the  bonds  were  found  to  be  worthless. 

Unless  the  government  of  the  United  States  was 
ready  to  assume  responsibility  for  these  "sacred 
obligations, "  an  arbitration  treaty,  it  was  held, 
would  be  regarded  as  valueless  in  Germany.  The 
Frankfort  bankers  would  condemn  such  a  treaty  if 
they  did  not  receive  full  payment.  What  they  ac- 
tually paid  for  these  bonds,  if  anything,  was  never 
disclosed;  but  I  should  have   a  new  opinion   of 

102 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

Frankfort  bankers  if  it  could  be  proved  that  they 
ever  really  paid  anything  for  them.  If  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  should  agree  to  be 
responsible  for  these  alleged  debts,  the  next  exhibit, 
I  suppose,  would  have  been  a  collection  of  Con- 
federate notes,  if  they  could  have  been  borrowed 
from  some  museum. 

Back  of  this  reluctance  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment to  make  an  obligatory  arbitration  treaty  was, 
of  course,  the  personal  aversion  of  the  Kaiser  to 
abridge  in  any  way  his  absolute  sovereignty.  It  is 
no  violation  of  confidence  to  say  that,  in  conversa- 
tions upon  this  subject,  William  II,  while  not  deny- 
ing that  monetary  matters  might,  perhaps,  in 
many  cases  be  properly  left  to  a  court — in  questions 
of  civil  rights  his  own  German  courts  have  some- 
times decided  against  him — has  declared  his  opin- 
ion that  nothing  of  political  importance  can  be 
subjected  to  the  judgment  of  an  international  tri- 
bunal ;  for  no  principle  of  law  can  be  permitted  to 
constrain  the  free  exercise  of  a  sovereign  will. 

On  the  social  side,  a  generous  hospitality  made 
life  at  Berlin  very  pleasant  for  the  new  American 
ambassador.  One  occasion,  soon  after  his  arrival, 
is  memorable  for  the  kindly  effort  made  to  point  out 
the  close  similarity  between  the  American  and  the 
German  systems  of  government! 

A  distinguished  company  of  men  was  assembled, 
as  a  token  of  welcome,  in  the  palace  of  the  Chan- 
cellor. After  dinner  it  was  found  agreeable  to 
spend  the  evening  in  the  open  air,  in  the  spacious 

103 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

garden  under  the  starlight  of  a  glorious  June  sky. 
It  was  the  gracious  host  himself,  Prince  von  Biilow, 
who  led  up  to  the  close  friendship  there  had  always 
existed  between  the  two  countries  since  Frederick 
the  Great  had  expressed  his  sympathy  with  the 
American  cause,  and  Franklin,  Jefferson,  and 
Adams  had  signed  the  unique  treaty  of  amity  with 
Prussia  in  1785.  But  these  were  not  the  only  bonds 
of  mutual  sympathy.  Both  countries  had  tri- 
umphed over  separatism  and  become  great  powers, 
America  by  preserving  the  union  of  the  states,  and 
Germany  by  the  formation  of  the  Empire;  which 
gave  the  ambassador  an  opportunity  to  remark 
upon  the  loyalty  to  the  Union  of  our  citizens  of 
German  origin  and  their  important  services  in  the 
War  of  Secession.  Into  the  minor  details  of 
the  method  by  which  national  unity  had  in  each 
case  been  accomplished,  and  especially  the  manner 
in  which  the  victors  had  treated  the  vanquished,  it 
did  not  seem  at  the  time  necessary  to  enter,  al- 
though they  could  hardly  have  failed  to  be  sug- 
gested to  the  mind  of  every  one  present.  The  really 
original  stroke,  however,  in  this  conversation  was 
the  statement  by  the  Chancellor  that  a  deeper  anal- 
ogy was  to  be  seen  in  the  fact  that  in  neither  form 
of  government  was  the  ministry  dependent  for  its 
continuance  upon  the  approval  of  the  parliament 
— a  point  which  he  considered  of  prime  importance 
to  the  continuity  of  public  policy.  " Besides,' '  he 
added,  "your  President  has  a  power  of  appoint- 
ment that  is  unsurpassed." 

104 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

I  was,  I  must  confess,  for  a  moment  slightly 
startled  by  this  sudden  identification  of  the  two 
systems,  which  I  had  thought  of  as  almost  diamet- 
rically contradictory.  I  could  not,  of  course,  deny 
the  verity  of  the  Chancellor's  statements;  but  I 
ventured  to  suggest  that,  although  the  President's 
Cabinet  could  not  be  changed  by  the  Congress  after 
the  members  had  once  been  installed,  except  by  im- 
peachment, they,  and  all  other  appointed  officers, 
must  be  confirmed  by  the  Senate ;  and  I  had  never 
known  important  public  duties  to  be  assigned  to 
persons  of  whose  fitness  the  Senate  had  not  had  at 
least  one  chance  to  judge.  As  for  permanence  of 
policy,  I  added  that  the  people  were  supposed  to 
frame  public  policies  in  their  party  platforms,  and 
reserved  the  right  to  choose  the  Chief  Executive 
every  four  years ;  so  that,  if  our  President  did  pos- 
sess certain  constitutional  powers  analogous  in 
some  respects  to  some  of  those  exercised  by  the  Em- 
peror, the  electors  could  at  intervals  withhold  or 
renew  their  mandate  as  they  thought  best. 

A  slight  almost  imperceptible  titter  of  laughter, 
emanating  from  the  shadows  where  some  of  the 
gentlemen  sat,  caused  me  to  wonder  if  I  had  been 
indiscreet.  Really,  there  had  been  no  intention  to 
reflect  upon  the  Kaiser;  but  the  suspicion  was  at 
once  formed  in  my  mind  that  perhaps  they  had  been 
thinking  of  him!  Of  this  there  is,  however,  no 
further  evidence.  The  subject  was  changed,  the 
conversation  followed  other  lines,  and  in  due  course 
a  pleasant  evening  came  to  an  end. 

105 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

The  annus  mirabilis  of  1908,  as  it  has  been  called, 
brought  sore  trials  to  the  Kaiser.  In  the  twenty- 
years  of  his  reign  he  had  never  attempted  so  much', 
never  succeeded  in  so  little,  and  was  never  so  dis- 
trusted. It  began  with  a  private  letter,  written  by 
him  on  February  17th,  to  Lord  Tweedmouth,  First 
Lord  of  the  British  Admiralty,  the  letter  being 
supposed  to  contain  a  defense  of  Germany's  naval 
policy  and  a  criticism  of  Great  Britain's  attitude 
toward  it. 

The  letter  had  not  been  published,  and  its  full  con- 
tents were  not  publicly  known,  but  the  mere  fact  of 
its  existence  raised  a  storm  of  objection  in  Germany 
and  created  resentment  in  England.  In  the  British 
press  it  was  represented  that  the  design  of  the 
communication  was  ' '  to  make  it  more  easy  for  Ger- 
man preparations  to  overtake  our  own."  In  Ger- 
many the  fear  was  that  it  had  contained  some 
indiscretion  compromising  to  Germany's  position. 
So  long  as  the  letter  was  not  published  its  contents 
were  open  to  almost  any  interpretation,  and  even 
the  most  extravagant  theory  could  boast  that  silence 
left  it  uncontradicted.  The  really  important  utter- 
ance concerning  it  was  that  of  Lord  Lansdowne, 
who  said  in  the  House  of  Commons,  "Such  a  com- 
munication as  that  in  question  must  not  be  allowed 
to  create  a  diplomatic  situation  different  from  that 
which  has  been  established  through  official  channels 
and  documents." 

This  was  statesman-like,  but  it  assumed  that  a 
distinction   existed  between   official   acts   and  the 

106 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

utterances  of  the  Kaiser.  Obviously,  this  was  not 
in  accordance  with  the  Kaiser's  own  theory  of  gov- 
ernment; for,  being  the  highest  authority  in  the 
state,  what  he  said  was  more  than  ordinarily  offi- 
cial: it  was  final.  He  could  not,  in  any  circum- 
stances, disavow  himself. 

"When,  in  March,  Prince  von  Bulow  was  obliged 
to  express  himself  upon  the  subject,  he  also  had 
to  oppose  the  Kaiser's  theory.  The  letter  being  a 
" private"  one,  he  said,  he  could  not  lay  it  before 
the  Reichstag.  That  its  contents  were  political,  he 
frankly  confessed;  but  he  held  that  "the  letter  of 
a  sovereign,  an  Imperial  letter,  does  not,  from  the 
fact  that  it  deals  with  political  questions,  become 
an  act  of  state.'* 

Here  then  was  distinctly  posed  the  question, 
How  far  does  the  political  authority  of  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  extend,  and  how  must  it  be  exercised  I 
Would  a  secret  treaty,  "signed  before  God"  with 
another  sovereign,  but  without  the  presence  or 
knowledge  of  public  ministers,  be  considered  a 
binding  official  act?  The  Kaiser  undoubtedly 
thought  it  would.  The  Chancellor  and  the  Reichs- 
tag evidently  thought  it  would  not.  The  differ- 
ence of  views  was  very  wide  indeed.  The  whole 
theory  of  personal  government  was  suddenly  chal- 
lenged. To  the  Kaiser  it  was,  unquestionably,  a 
shock.  But  this  was  only  the  beginning  of  the  issue. 
The  year  had  still  more  serious  differences  in  store. 

Personally,  William  II  was  mute  during  this  con- 
troversy, and  wisely  so ;  for  a  storm  was  brewing 

107 


IMPRESSIONS   OF   THE   KAISER 

in  the  nation.  The  people  were  faithful  to  the 
Kaiser,  but  they  felt  that  they  could  not  intrust 
their  foreign  affairs  to  his  personal  direction,  and 
this  the  Emperor  comprehended. 

Silent,  but  not  without  resentment  over  the 
Tweedmouth  episode,  he  turned  his  attention  to 
other  matters.  Suddenly,  in  June,  a  new  setting  of 
the  stage  seemed  desirable.  On  the  14th  of  that 
month  the  meeting  of  Edward  VII  with  Nicholas 
II,  at  Reval,  was  interpreted  as  marking  the  conclu- 
sion of  an  Anglo-Russian  entente;  but  "William  II 
could  not  tolerate  friendly  relations  between  his 
friends.  Immediately  the  cry  of  "  encirclement " 
was  raised.  That  France  and  England  had  become 
friendly  was  of  itself  objectionable,  but  that  Great 
Britain  and  Russia,  the  ally  of  France,  should  at  the 
same  time  abolish  their  differences  was  too  much  to 
be  borne.  At  the  conclusion  of  an  inspection  of 
cavalry  at  Doberitz,  while  King  Edward  VII  was 
still  at  Reval,  the  Kaiser  said  to  his  assembled  offi- 
cers :  "It  seems,  in  truth,  that  they  wish  to  encircle 
and  provoke  us.  We  shall  be  able  to  support  it. 
The  German  has  never  fought  better  than  when  he 
had  to  defend  himself  on  all  sides.  Let  them  come 
on  against  us,  then.  We  shall  be  ready!"  A  visit 
to  the  Court  of  Sweden — traditionally  the  enemy  of 
Russia — immediately  followed,  and  the  remainder 
of  the  month  was  occupied  with  military  reviews 
and  a  visit  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  where  the  inhabi- 
tants were  reminded  of  what  their  union  with  the 
German  Empire  had  done  for  their  prosperity. 

108 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

" Peace  is  assured,' '  the  Kaiser  concluded,  "by  our 
military  forces  on  land  and  sea,  by  the  German 
people  in  arms." 

It  was  the  Kaiser 's  way  of  making  himself  seem 
essential  to  his  own  people.  He  knew  he  could 
count  upon  the  army.  He  knew  that,  if  Germany 
were  in  danger,  the  German  people  would  follow 
him  to  the  death.  A  military  situation  was  needed 
by  him,  and  he  knew  how  to  create  it. 

But  his  rattling  of  the  saber  did  not  end  with 
this  challenge,  which  had  sent  a  thrill  through 
Europe  and  caused  a  profound  sensation  in  Ger- 
many. To  add  to  the  effect,  on  September  11th  he 
proceeded  in  person  to  approach  within  one  kilo- 
meter of  the  French  frontier,  where  he  passed  the 
night  and  made  a  proposal  to  ascend  the  Hohneck 
from  French  territory.  Had  the  French  refused  to 
permit  this,  or  shown  any  discourtesy,  it  would,  per- 
haps, have  furnished  occasion  for  another  Ems  tele- 
gram ;  for,  had  there  been  an  excuse  for  it,  Germany 
was  ready  for  a  short,  swift  war.  But,  with  perfect 
politeness,  the  French  officers  offered  to  furnish  the 
Kaiser  with  a  body-guard  to  accompany  him  during 
his  ascent;  whereupon  the  project  was  suddenly 
abandoned  and  he  announced  that  he  was  expected 
at  Colmar. 

During  all  these  occurrences,  a  very  marked  in- 
terest was  manifested  in  strengthening  the  ties  of 
friendship  with  America ;  but  progress  toward  the 
realization  of  America's  great  desire,  the  improve- 
ment in  international   organization,   was  merely 

109 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

marking'  time.  While  the  law  officers  of  the  Foreign 
Office  were  unearthing  impossible  claims  from  the 
dust  of  previous  centuries  as  questions  that  must 
first  be  settled  if  arbitration  was  to  become  the 
order  of  the  day,  the  Kaiser  did  not  conceal  his  per- 
sonal opinion — which  was,  of  course,  his  official 
opinion — that  what  had  been  done  at  The  Hague 
was  a  futility  that  did  not  deserve  further  encour- 
agement. 

But  the  reaction  against  Edward  VII 's  friendly 
visit  with  the  Czar  of  Russia  having  in  a  measure 
served  its  purpose,  he  evidently  perceived  that,  as 
upon  some  former  occasions,  he  had  overplayed  his 
part  as  the  testy  War  Lord.  It  is  difficult  otherwise 
to  account  for  the  publication,  on  October  28th,  of 
the  since  famous  interview  that  appeared  as  com- 
ing direct  from  the  Kaiser  in  the  London  Daily 
Telegraph.1 

The  whole  detailed  history  of  this  extraordinary 
performance  has  never  yet  transpired,  but  the  main 
facts  may  be  stated  with  entire  confidence. 

A  lover  of  peace  and  a  friend  of  both  Germany 
and  England,  as  he  represented  himself  to  be,  pre- 
pared a  paper,  composed  of  statements  made  to  him 
by  the  Emperor  in  the  interest  of  a  good  under- 
standing between  those  countries,  which  with  the 
Imperial  sanction  was  published  as  being  in  sub- 
stance an  interview  with  William  II  by  an  "unim- 
peachable authority." 


1  The  full  text  of  this  interview  may  be  found  in  Shaw,  William 
of  Germany,  London,  1913,  pp.  304,  308,  and  is  reprinted  as  Illus- 
trative Document  No.  Ill,  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 

110 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

The  veracity  of  the  interviewer  has  never  been 
called  in  question,  but  the  commotion  raised  by  the 
report  of  what  the  Kaiser  had  said  to  him  was  inde- 
scribable. "You  English,"  William  II  had  begun, 
"are  mad,  mad  as  March  hares.  What  has  come 
over  you  that  you  are  so  completely  given  over  to 
suspicions  quite  unworthy  of  a  great  nation?" 
Personally,  at  least,  he  said,  he  had  not  deserved 
such  misjudgment  as  he  had  received.  "My  task  is 
not  of  the  easiest,"  he  continued.  "The  prevailing 
sentiment  among  large  sections  of  the  middle  and 
lower  classes  of  my  own  people  is  not  friendly  to 
England.  ...  I  strive  without  ceasing  to  improve 
relations,  and  you  retort  that  I  am  your  arch- 
enemy. ' ' 

Then  followed  statements  that  those  in  Germany 
who  had  approved  intervention  in  Morocco  were 
"mischief-makers";  that,  although  German  senti- 
ment was  hostile  to  England  during  the  South 
African  War,  he  had  refused  to  receive  President 
Kruger  when  Holland  and  France  were  feting  him ; 
that  France  and  Russia  had  invited  his  government 
"to  join  them  in  calling  upon  England  to  put  an 
end  to  the  war,"  as  the  moment  had  come  "to  hu- 
miliate England  to  the  dust";  that  he  had  pre- 
pared, with  the  aid  of  his  General  Staff,  a  plan  of 
campaign  against  the  Boers  which  Lord  Roberts 
had  practically  followed;  and  that  Germany's  navy 
would  some  day,  owing  to  the  rise  of  Japan,  be  nec- 
essary to  England  in  the  great  debates  of  the 

future. 

111 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Great  Britain  was  amazed,  but  Germany  was  ex- 
asperated. The  Kaiser,  then,  according  to  his  own 
public  statement,  had  been  all  the  time  a  secret  ally 
and  helper  of  England,  and  an  enemy  of  the  Boers 
with  whom  the  Germans  had  sympathized!  His 
attitude  toward  Morocco  had  been  a  sham  and  a 
pretense.  He  had  held  his  own  people  up  to  repro- 
bation as  enemies  of  England,  and  called  himself 
England's  devoted  friend.  And  this  was  their 
Kaiser ! 

A  stranger  might  easily  have  inferred  from  the 
tide  of  public  feeling  that  swept  over  the  Empire 
that  William  II  was  about  to  be  deposed.  The  seri- 
ous journals  were  loud  in  their  protests.  The  comic 
papers  were  remorseless  in  their  caricatures.  One 
would  have  supposed  that  there  was  no  law  in  Ger- 
many against  lese-majeste. 

What  added  most  to  the  bitterness  of  public  feel- 
ing was  the  apparently  perfect  insouciance  of  the 
Kaiser,  who,  during  the  climax  of  the  storm,  from 
November  4th  to  7th,  was  hunting  with  the  Heredi- 
tary Prince  of  Austria,  and  from  November  7th  to 
16th  was  with  Prince  Fiirstenberg,  at  Donaueschin- 
gen,  being  constantly  amused  with  vaudeville  enter- 
tainments reported  to  be  of  a  character  utterly  in- 
harmonious with  the  serious  time  he  had  brought 
upon  his  Empire. 

Most  incredible  to  relate,  the  manuscript  of  the 
interview  had  been  submitted  before  publication  to 
the  Chancellor;  but  Prince  von  Bulow  confessed 
that  he  had  never  taken  the  trouble  to  read  it,  and 

112 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

the  subalterns  at  the  Foreign  Office  had  turned  it 
over  to  its  author  without  criticism. 

This,  to  some  extent,  relieved  the  Kaiser  from 
reproach,  but  only  slightly;  for  when  the  Chancel- 
lor, humbly  taking  upon  himself  blame  for  his  own 
negligence,  offered  his  resignation,  the  Kaiser,  who 
needed  him  as  a  defender  before  the  Reichstag,  re- 
fused to  accept  it ;  and  Prince  von  Biilow,  thus  vir- 
tually absolved,  stood  up  in  the  tribune,  not  to 
excuse  William  II  as  really  innocent  of  wrong- 
doing, but,  after  as  much  as  possible  attenuating 
his  master's  error  by  skilfully  commenting  on  cer- 
tain points,  he  in  effect  threw  the  whole  burden  on 
the  Kaiser  by  pledging  that,  while  he  remained 
Chancellor,  such  personal  interference  in  the  con- 
duct of  foreign  affairs  should  not  be  allowed  to 
occur  again ! 

This,  in  fact,  was  the  real  issue.  The  Germans 
did  not  wish  to  depose  the  Emperor,  but  they  were 
weary  of  the  indiscretions  of  William  II.  They  did 
not  in  their  hearts  believe  in  his  personal  govern- 
ment, but  they  had  never  dared  to  oppose  it.  Now 
all  parties  were  among  the  protestants.  The 
Kaiser  was  obliged  to  bow  before  the  storm.  He 
had  deeply  humiliated  his  people  before  the  world. 
They  resented  it.  They  were  at  the  same  time 
ashamed  of  his  conduct  and  indignant  with  him. 
When  he  came  back  to  Potsdam  he  was  a  chastened 
man.  He  felt  that  he  had  been  scourged,  and  pub- 
licly. If  he  had  humiliated  his  people,  they  in  their 
turn  had  humbled  him.    No  doubt  he  was  resentful, 

113 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

but  he  was  passive.  He  made  no  reply.  Had  he 
claimed  all  that  he  thought  to  be  his  right,  had  he 
insisted  that  what  he  had  said  in  the  interview  had 
been  sincerely  said  and  was  the  truth;  above  all, 
had  he  attempted  to  end  the  public  criticisms  in  the 
Reichstag  and  the  press  by  dissolving  the  parlia- 
ment and  suppressing  newspapers,  there  would 
have  been  a  revolution.  He  did  none  of  these 
things.    He  simply  let  the  storm  pass  by. 

Just  what  occurred  between  the  Emperor  and  his 
Chancellor  at  Potsdam  we  do  not  know.  Some  were 
certain  that  he  had  shown  violent  anger.  But  the 
result  was  submission  on  the  point  at  issue.  He 
did  not  accept  the  Chancellor's  proffered  resigna- 
tion ;  and  he  promised  to  recognize,  as  Prince  von 
Billow's  interpretation  of  the  Imperial  Constitution 
required,  the  constitutional  "responsibility"  of  the 
Chancellor  for  official  acts  relating  to  foreign 
affairs. 

"His  Majesty,"  stated  the  Official  Gazette, 
"while  unaffected  b}'  public  criticism  which  he  re- 
gards as  exaggerated,  considers  his  most  honorable 
Imperial  task  to  consist  in  securing  the  stability  of 
the  policy  of  the  Empire  while  adhering  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  constitutional  responsibility.  The  Kaiser 
accordingly  indorses  the  statements  of  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  in  the  Reichstag,  and  assures  Prince  von 
Biilow  of  his  continued  confidence." 

The  words  of  the  Chancellor  which  the  Kaiser 
indorsed  were:  "The  perception  that  the  publica- 
tion of  these  conversations  in  England  has  not  had 

114 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

the  effect  the  Kaiser  wished,  and  in  our  own  conn- 
try  has  caused  profound  agitation  and  painful  re- 
gret, will — this  firm  conviction  I  have  acquired  dur- 
ing these  anxious  days — lead  the  Kaiser  for  the 
future,  in  private  conversation  also,  to  maintain  the 
reserve  that  is  equally  indispensable  in  the  interest 
of  a  uniform  policy  and  for  the  authority  of  the 
Crown.  If  it  were  not  so,  I  could  not,  nor  could  my 
successor,  bear  the  responsibility."1 

In  the  mean  time,  another  Imperial  indiscretion 
was  discovered  and  suppressed  before  it  had  dis- 
turbed the  public  mind.  The  Kaiser  had  given  a 
private  interview  to  an  American  journalist  during 
his  voyage  in  the  Baltic.  This  also  had  been  sub- 
mitted to  the  Foreign  Office  and  passed  out  for  pub- 
lication; and,  already  printed,  it  was  to  appear  in 
an  early  number  of  an  American  magazine.  The 
Foreign  Office  was  in  terror.  Money  was  hastily 
cabled  to  New  York,  the  whole  edition  of  the  article 
was  withheld  and  paid  for,  and  to  obliterate  the 
incident  the  printed  pages  were  taken  out  to  sea  on 
a  German  war-ship  and  used  to  stoke  the  furnaces. 

For  the  moment  it  seemed  in  December  that  the 
German  people  had  successfully  asserted  their 
claim  to  a  responsible  government,  and  that  the 
disaster  to  which  the  Kaiser's  personal  diplomacy 
had  exposed  them  would  never  be  repeated.  But  it 
was,  in  fact,  the  Kaiser's  triumph.     The  Chan- 


1  The  text  of  Prince  von  Billow's  speech  in  the  Reichstag  may 
be  found  in  Shaw,  pp.  311,  315,  and  is  reprinted  as  Illustrative 
Document  No.  IV. 

q  115 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

collor  was  in  future  to  administer  foreign  affairs, 
and  the  Kaiser's  task  would  ''consist  in  securing 
the  stability  of  the  policy  of  the  Empire  while  ad- 
hering to  the  principle  of  constitutional  responsi- 
bility " — to  himself! 

There  could  be  no  mistake  about  the  meaning  of 
this  apparent  concession.  There  was  in  the  Impe- 
rial Constitution  no  " responsibility"  to  any  one 
except  the  Emperor.  There  was  none  to  the  Reichs- 
tag on  the  part  of  the  Emperor.  The  chance  to 
place  in  the  Constitution  responsibility  to  the  parlia- 
ment of  the  people  was  allowed  to  slip  by  without 
decisive  action.  The  Kaiser  was  left  with  the  same 
supreme  authority  that  he  possessed  before;  and, 
nine  years  afterward,  in  1917,  when  the  Reichstag, 
by  a  large  majority,  declared,  "We  are  driven  by 
no  lust  of  conquest,"  and  professed  to  repudiate 
"forced  acquisitions  of  territory  and  political,  eco- 
nomic, and  financial  violations,"  the  Chancellor  of 
the  Empire,  Doctor  Michaelis,  was  able  to  announce 
from  the  tribune,  ' '  The  constitutional  rights  of  the 
head  of  the  Empire  must  not  be  endangered,  and  I 
am  not  willing  to  permit  any  one  to  take  the  reins 
out  of  my  hands. ' ' 

Thus,  without  a  serious  effort  on  the  part  of  the 
people  to  prevent  it,  the  German  Empire  permitted 
itself  to  be  effectively  and  definitely  Prussianized. 
In  the  Empire,  as  in  Prussia,  the  Emperor  is  with- 
out legal  responsibility  to  the  people.  There  were 
presented,  as  we  shall  see  later,  still  other  opportu- 
nities for  securing  a  truly  responsible  government ; 

116 


THE  KAISER  UNDER  FIRE 

but  there  was  none  when  the  public  mind  was  so 
completely  aroused  from  its  lethargy  and  so  fully 
awake  to  the  danger  that  the  Emperor's  personal 
system  had  incurred.  Thenceforth,  Kaiser  William 
had  only  to  sound  the  tocsin  of  alarm  in  order  to 
recall  to  the  nation  that,  having  chosen  submission 
to  a  War  Lord,  it  must  abide  by  the  consequences  of 
its  act. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  KAISER'S  REVERSION  TO  TYPE 

T7"AISER  WILLIAM  II  had  been  deeply  chas- 
*■■  tened  by  the  experience  of  1908,  but  it  had  not 
made  him  penitent.  He  felt  that  he  had  been 
wronged  by  his  own  people,  as  well  as  misunder- 
stood abroad.  Although  Prince  von  Biilow  had 
conjured  the  storm  and  averted  a  revision  of  the 
Imperial  Constitution,  there  was  no  reason  why  the 
Kaiser  should  love  him  overmuch.  After  all,  he 
had  allowed  his  master  to  seem  the  real  delinquent 
in  the  Daily  Telegraph  interview,  when  as  a  faithful 
servitor  the  Chancellor  might  have  declared  that 
the  Kaiser,  who  had  not  failed  to  submit  his  lan- 
guage to  him  before  publication,  had  taken  every 
proper  precaution  to  prevent  misjudgment.  The 
Chancellor  had,  in  fact,  neglected  a  public  duty  of 
great  importance,  and  yet  he  continued  to  hold  his 
high  office,  with  the  understanding  that  neither  he 
nor  any  successor  could  serve  a  master  who  should 
act  as  the  Kaiser  had  acted !  As  in  Bismarck's  day, 
William  II  was,  for  the  time,  made  to  appear  so 
distrusted  by  his  own  people  as  to  require  the 
guardianship  of  his  own  minister.    A  Hohenzollern 

118 


THE  KAISER'S  REVERSION  TO  TYPE 

could  not  be  expected  to  endure  for  a  long  time  an 
imputation  so  offensive. 

No  one  understood  better  than  William  II  how 
to  evade  this  consequence.  "While  his  future  status 
was  still  equivocal,  in  the  midst  of  the  public  dis- 
cussion of  his  " indiscretion,"  the  Kaiser  paid  a 
visit  to  the  home  of  Count  Zeppelin,  who  was  at  the 
moment  in  great  public  favor  because  of  the  suc- 
cess he  had  attained,  after  long  experiments  and 
many  failures,  in  the  construction  of  an  air-ship 
capable  of  sailing  long  distances  and  carrying  a 
heavy  charge  of  explosives.  The  military  had  taken 
a  great  interest  in  the  enterprise,  and  the  general 
public  also;  for  here,  it  was  believed,  was  a  new 
instrument  of  warfare  that  could  place  the  cities 
of  Great  Britain  at  the  mercy  of  an  easy  and  effec- 
tive German  invasion. 

On  November  10,  1908,  the  very  day  of  the  inter- 
pellation in  the  Reichstag  regarding  the  unfortu- 
nate interview,  the  Kaiser  conferred  in  person  the 
Order  of  the  Black  Eagle  upon  Count  Zeppelin,  em- 
bracing him  publicly  three  times,  and  praising  him 
in  an  address,  in  which  he  said : 

"The  monarch  and  the  country  may  well  be  proud 
to  possess  such  a  son,  the  greatest  German  of  the 
twentieth  century,  who,  by  his  invention,  has  led  the 
human  race  to  a  turning-point  in  its  history.  It 
would  not  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  we  are 
to-day  passing  one  of  the  most  important  moments 
in  the  history  of  civilization.  May  it  be  given  to  us 
to  be  able  to  say,  upon  our  last  day  of  life,  that 

119 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

we  have  served  our  dear  country  with  as  much 
success  as  you." 

Here  was  no  warlike  word,  but  the  speech  was 
well  understood.  Whatever  the  errors  of  the  past, 
William  II  was  still  German  at  heart,  he  was  still 
essential  to  the  Empire,  he  was  still  the  Kaiser! 
Even  during  those  darkest  days  of  national  humili- 
ation, the  question  arose  in  the  minds  of  every  Ger- 
man, What  would  become  of  German  hopes,  and 
dreams,  and  aspirations,  without  the  Kaiser*? 

In  the  following  January,  when  the  storm  of 
November  had  completely  passed,  the  Kaiser  read 
to  the  generals  who  came  to  offer  him  their  New 
Year's  greetings  portions  of  an  article  by  General 
Schlieffen  on  modern  warfare,  and  expressed  his 
entire  personal  approval  of  its  arguments.  This 
fact  having  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  public 
through  some  one's  unguarded  loquacity,  a  few 
newspapers  inquired  if  this  was  not  a  new  indis- 
cretion, and,  in  fact,  a  violation  of  the  Kaiser 's  en- 
gagement to  be  cautious  in  his  utterances.  But  who 
in  Germany  could  ever  arraign  the  German  Em- 
peror for  speaking  his  mind  about  war,  or  the  meth- 
ods of  conducting  it!  Was  not  war  a  part  of  the 
Kaiser's  recognized  business?  This  time  no  par- 
ticular foreign  nation  was  threatened  by  him,  and 
the  incipient  criticism  not  only  fell  dead,  but  the 
Kaiser's  words  assured  the  army  that  its  occupa- 
tion with  military  science  was  dear  to  the  heart  of 
the  Emperor. 

Although  the  position  of  William  II  had  been 

120 


THE  KAISER'S  REVERSION  TO  TYPE 

» 

apparently  thus  quickly  re-established  in  the  minds 
of  his  own  people,  the  relations  of  Germany  and 
Great  Britain  had  been  left  in  very  bad  form  by  the 
Kaiser's  mistaken  effort  to  improve  them.  The 
conspicuous  honors  bestowed  upon  Count  Zeppelin 
were  not  calculated  to  produce  the  same  effect  in 
England  that  they  had  caused  in  the  German  Em- 
pire, and  had  no  tendency  to  inspire  confidence  in 
Germany's  peaceful  intentions.  The  Zeppelin  air- 
ship was  obviously  a  military  and  not  a  commercial 
venture. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  England  and  France  by 
the  agreement  of  1904,  and  now  England  and  Russia 
by  the  agreement  of  1907,  had  secured  a  peaceful 
and  honorable  modus  vivendi,  which  had  ripened 
into  a  virtual  compact  for  peace,  the  time  was  not 
opportune  for  war  on  the  part  of  Germany  with 
either  of  those  nations ;  for,  if  it  touched  their  com- 
mon interests,  they  would  probably  stand  together. 
Until  they  could  be  in  some  fashion  disunited,  or  a 
case  should  arise  in  which  at  least  one  of  them 
should  have  no  great  interest  at  stake,  peace  was 
practically  guaranteed  by  the  Anglo-Franco-Rus- 
sian Entente. 

But  there  were  other  reasons  why,  in  1909,  Ger- 
many was  desirous  of  avoiding  immediate  conflict. 
The  domestic  situation  was  perturbed  by  the  finan- 
cial state  of  the  Empire.  Unless  some  reform  of 
the  budget  could  be  devised,  the  growing  expenses 
of  the  army  and  navy  foreshadowed  eventual  Impe- 
rial bankruptcy.    Experts  were  making  very  close 

121 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

calculations,  but  saw  no  prospect  of  national  sol- 
vency without  greatly  increased  taxation,  which 
nobody  wanted  to  bear. 

It  was  a  time  extremely  propitious  for  a  radical 
international  understanding  which  would  justify  a 
relaxation  in  the  cost  of  armament.  Proposals  of 
this  kind  were  made,  but  they  were  not  well  re- 
ceived by  the  dominant  caste  in  Germany.  The 
army  and  navy  were  institutions  which  had  their 
well-understood  purposes,  and  there  was  no  dispo- 
sition to  diminish  them.  On  the  ground  that  they 
were  " purely  defensive"  and  "the  necessary  guar- 
antees of  peace,"  it  was,  on  the  contrary,  urged  that 
they  must  be  increased.  No  one  could  furnish  any 
evidence  of  a  probable  attack,  since  all  the  nations 
were  seeking  peace;  but,  it  was  alleged,  "there  is 
always  danger."  And  so,  neither  arbitration  nor 
limitation  of  armaments  seemed  in  Germany  to 
make  any  appeal  to  the  official  mind.  The  only 
solution,  it  was  thought,  was  to  be  found  in  new 
taxes ;  and  new  taxes  were  the  unsteady  steed  upon 
which  Prince  von  Biilow — whose  days  as  Chancellor 
were  in  reality  already  numbered — was  traveling 
toward  the  end  of  an  uncomfortable  road. 

There  were  other  and  pressing  reasons,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  heavy  cost  of  armament,  why  the  inter- 
national situation  was  disturbing.  In  October,  1908, 
Austria-Hungary  had  announced  the  formal  annex- 
ation of  the  Slav  provinces  Bosnia  and  Herzego- 
vina. Belonging  originally  to  Turkey,  they  had 
thirty  years  before  been  placed  under  temporary 

122 


THE  KAISER'S  REVERSION  TO  TYPE 

Austrian  administration  by  the  Congress  of  Berlin; 
but,  for  racial  and  geographic  reasons,  they  were 
claimed  by  Serbia  as  a  part  of  her  eventual  national 
heritage.  Serbia,  supported  by  Russia,  and  in  part 
by  France  and  England,  opposed  the  annexation  of 
these  provinces  by  Austria-Hungary  as  a  violation 
of  the  Treaty  of  1878,  which  was  universally  recog- 
nized as  still  in  force.  Such  a  step,  it  was  held, 
should  not  be  taken  without  referring  the  action  to 
the  decision  of  a  general  European  conference ;  but 
Germany,  in  tones  that  were  unequivocal,  answered, 
1 '  No. ' '  At  St.  Petersburg  the  Kaiser  had  given  the 
Czar  to  understand  that  an  attempt  on  his  part  to 
dispute  Austria-Hungary's  action,  either  by  arms 
or  by  insistence  upon  a  conference,  would  be  met 
by  the  vigorous  opposition  of  Germany.  In  brief, 
it  was  submission  or  war. 

We  who  lived  through  those  days  at  Berlin  and 
knew  the  attitude  of  the  German  Foreign  Office  on 
the  subject  of  a  conference,  perfectly  understood 
what  was  implied;  and,  two  years  afterward,  the 
Kaiser  himself,  in  a  speech  at  Vienna,  confirmed 
the  interpretation  of  that  time,  by  referring  to  him- 
self as  "an  ally  who  had  taken  his  stand  in  shining 
armor  at  a  grave  moment  by  the  side  of  Austria's 
most  gracious  sovereign,"  and  plainly  intimated 
that  Austria-Hungary  should  remember  the  indebt- 
edness. 

But  those  who  were  aware  of  the  full  significance 
of  that  transaction  could  not  fail  to  comprehend 
that  Germany  was  not  acting  for  Austria  alone  or 

123 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

to  understand  that  at  some  future  time,  probably 
not  very  remote,  the  Teuton  and  the  Slav  would 
contend  in  a  desperate  struggle  for  predominance 
in  the  disintegrated  Ottoman  Empire,  to  which 
these  provinces  had  once  belonged,  and  had  come 
to  form  the  key  that  could  open  to  Germany  the 
door  of  the  land  route  to  the  Far  East,  with  free 
access  to  all  the  southern  seas. 

There  were,  of  course,  vast  imperial  interests  at 
stake.    In  truth,  the  whole  future  of  Europe  was 
wrapped  up  in  the  ultimate  solution  of  the  Balkan 
question.    What  the  peace  of  Europe  required  was 
that  there  should  be  no  imperial  contest  for  the 
domination  of  the  Balkan  peninsula.     The  only 
effective  means  of  preventing  this  disaster  was  an 
agreement  on  the  part  of  the  great  powers,  espe- 
cially Austria,  Russia,  and  Germany,  to  promote 
and  protect  the  development  of  independent  nations 
in  this  area,  on  the  basis  of  just  racial  and  eco- 
nomic considerations.    What  the  case  imperatively 
called  for  was  a  European  concert,  actuated  not  by 
purely  national  covetousness,  but  by  regard  for 
the  maintenance  of  future  peace. 

The  situation  was  at  best  a  difficult  one,  and  it  is 
uncertain  what  benefits  might  have  immediately  re- 
sulted from  a  conference  of  the  powers,  if  it  had 
been  convoked  to  examine  the  needs  which  thirty 
years  of  arrested  international  development  had 
produced  in  the  Near  East.  It  is  not  just  to  say 
that  Germany  alone  is  responsible  for  a  failure  to 
reorganize  the  Balkan  peninsula  and  to  secure  to 

124 


THE  KAISER'S  REVERSION  TO  TYPE 

those  regions  perpetual  peace ;  for  it  is  by  no  means 
certain  that  a  general  conference  would,  or  could, 
have  imposed  a  just  and  permanent  order  of  exist- 
ence upon  that  ferment  of  struggling  nationalities. 
But  Germany  cannot  escape  responsibility  for  de- 
feating any  solution  of  the  problem  that  may  have 
been  possible,  by  refusing  to  permit  such  a  con- 
ference to  be  convoked. 

Looking  back  over  all  the  events  from  1908  to 
1914,  the  whole  world  now  understands  the  motive 
of  German  opposition  to  a  Balkan  settlement  upon 
national  lines,  with  the  general  approbation  of  the 
rest  of  Europe.  That  motive  was  to  prevent  the 
placing  of  obstacles  in  the  path  of  Austria's  ex- 
pansion in  the  Balkan  peninsula,  of  which  Germany 
was  to  be  the  beneficiary  when  Austria  should  be 
ultimately  incorporated  in  the  German  Empire, 
thus  enabling  the  Kaiser  to  hem  in  Russia  and  pre- 
vent her  becoming  a  maritime  power  by  control  of 
the  Balkans  and  the  Bosporus.  Hence  the  close 
relations  of  the  Kaiser  with  the  Ottoman  Empire 
and  the  apathy  of  Germany  toward  Italy,  her  own 
ally,  in  the  Turco-Italian  "War.  Hence  also  the  aid 
furnished  to  Austria  in  forcing  through  the  con- 
ference of  ambassadors  at  London,  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  Balkan  War,  the  establishment  of  the 
kingdom  of  Albania  under  a  German  prince,  in  or- 
der to  shut  Serbia  off  from  the  Adriatic  Sea,  thus 
creating  a  new  cause  of  conflict,  from  which  Austria 
would  profit  for  Germany's  ultimate  benefit. 

To  keep  the  Turco-Balkan  situation  in  troubled 

125 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

waters  until  the  favorable  occasion  for  forceful 
intervention  should  arise,  when  Germany  could 
carry  out  the  project  of  control  from  Hamburg  to 
Bagdad— that  was  the  Kaiser 's  policy.  To  prevent 
the  permanent  settlement  of  conflicts  and  disturb- 
ances by  the  concerted  action  of  Europe — that  was 
the  means  by  which  that  policy  was  to  be  realized. 
To  beguile  each  of  the  great  powers  with  courteous 
attentions,  to  hold  them,  as  far  as  possible,  in  secret 
co-operation  with  Germany,  and  to  prevent  their 
union  for  any  general  purpose  whatever — that  was 
the  method  by  which  these  means  were  to  be 
applied. 

No  general  conference,  no  general  treaties,  no 
general  understanding;  troubled  waters,  profes- 
sions of  peace,  increase  of  the  German  army  and 
navy,  personal  diplomacy — this  is  the  Hohenzollern 
tradition,  and  it  was  William  IPs  program  for  in- 
creasing his  hold  on  Austria  and  his  control  of 
Turkey. 

Accordingly,  in  1909,  Austria  made  a  private 
agreement  with  Turkey,  by  the  payment  of  some 
money  in  purchase  of  the  provinces,  and  Germany 
proved  her  devotion  as  an  ally  by  obtaining  from 
the  other  powers  interested  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 
their  consent  to  this  transaction.  Russia  was  too 
much  intimidated  to  object  alone ;  and  Serbia,  thus 
deserted,  was  obliged  to  sign  a  pledge  to  abandon 
her  attitude  of  protest  against  the  annexation  of 
the  provinces  by  her  already  too  powerful  neighbor. 

So  far  as  a  permanent  European  understanding 

126 


THE  KAISER'S  REVERSION  TO  TYPE 

is  concerned,  nothing  could  more  effectively  dem- 
onstrate the  utter  futility  of  the  Kaiser's  system 
than  the  inconsequence  of  the  royal  visits  that  oc- 
curred during  this  period,  each  one  of  which  was 
looked  forward  to  and  commented  upon  at  the  time 
as  an  important  international  event,  in  the  vain 
hope  that  these  personal  contacts  of  royalty  might 
improve  the  international  situation. 

On  February  9,  1909,  King  Edward  VII,  accom- 
panied by  the  Queen,  visited  Berlin,  and  they  were 
entertained  at  the  royal  castle.  The  occasion  was 
celebrated  by  splendid  fetes,  and  at  the  gala  dinner 
the  usual  complimentary  toasts  were  pronounced. 
At  a  reception  in  the  city  hall,  King  Edward  made 
a  specially  favorable  impression  upon  the  city  fa- 
thers of  Berlin.  His  simplicity,  his  good  humor, 
and  his  straightforwardness  were  remarked  upon. 
At  the  luncheon  offered  to  the  diplomatic  body  at 
the  British  Embassy,  the  King  was  especially  happy 
in  his  kindly  words  to  the  representatives  of  dif- 
ferent countries  as  they  were  presented  to  him.  To 
the  American  ambassador  he  expressed  his  deep 
interest  in  the  work  of  the  Hague  Conferences,  with 
the  details  of  which  he  proved  to  be  unexpectedly 
familiar. 

Socially,  the  visit  of  the  British  sovereigns,  made 
in  winter,  and  at  considerable  inconvenience,  was  a 
pleasant  event ;  but,  politically,  it  may  be  doubted 
if  it  was  of  the  slightest  value.  Knowing  what 
King  Edward  VII  and  "William  II  really  thought  of 
each  other,  and  how  little  mutual  sympathy  there 

127 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

was  between  them,  the  fact  that  they  were  for  a 
few  days  in  each  other's  presence,  sat  at  the  same 
table,  and  could  make  pleasant  ceremonial  speeches 
did  not  produce  the  conviction  that  the  visit  had 
accomplished  any  lasting  good.  The  utmost  that 
can  ever  be  deduced  from  such  an  exchange  of  cour- 
tesies is  that  ceremonial  intercourse  is  still  possible 
and  that  neither  side  is  ready  for  a  total  estrange- 
ment. On  the  other  hand,  such  apparently  innocent 
encounters  not  infrequently  create  alarm  in  other 
nations.  The  real  motives  for  the  meeting  are  not 
disclosed;  and  future  intentions,  which  are  seldom 
openly  declared  except  in  the  vaguest  possible 
terms,  remain  as  obscure  as  if  no  visit  had  been 
made.  Almost  invariably  there  is  a  disquieting 
suspicion  that  secret  engagements  have  been  en- 
tered into  that  may  involve  disadvantages  to  other 
countries.  As  soon  as  the  ceremonies  are  over,  the 
press  in  the  different  countries  puts  its  own  inter- 
pretation upon  the  occasion,  and  the  conflicting 
views  end  either  in  no  result  whatever  or  in  more 
or  less  embittered  controversies. 

Whenever  the  visit  of  King  Edward  VII  to  Ber- 
lin in  1909  is  referred  to  by  the  diplomats  who  were 
present,  the  most  memorable  incident  seems  to  be 
the  fact  that  the  King  had  so  completely  outgrown 
his  Prussian  field-marshal's  uniform  since  he  had 
last  worn  it  that  he  was  threatened  with  strangula- 
tion, until  an  intrepid  princess,  who  sat  nearest  to 
him,  dexterously  unhooked  the  standing  collar  that 
was  choking  him. 

128 


THE  KAISER'S  REVERSION  TO  TYPE 

In  the  Kaiser's  speech  upon  this  occasion  there 
was  no  "indiscretion,"  which  made  it  a  subject  of 
remark.  In  substance  it  simply  recalled  "unforget- 
able  hospitality"  at  Windsor  Castle,  wished  Their 
Majesties  a  pleasant  sojourn  in  Berlin,  thanked  the 
Queen  for  her  "amiable  presence,"  and  ended  by 
seeing  in  the  visit  "a  new  guarantee  of  the  continu- 
ation and  development  of  the  friendly  and  peaceful 
relations  which  unite  the  two  countries."  But 
what  "new  guarantee"  had  been  exchanged?  So 
far  as  the  two  nations  knew,  beyond  the  mere  fact 
of  the  visit  there  was  none. 

But  this  was,  in  truth,  all  that  the  Kaiser  desired 
to  give,  or  needed  to  receive.  There  were  numer- 
ous questions  at  issue,  but  none  was  settled.  A  few 
decorations  were  distributed,  but  no  principle,  so 
far  as  the  public  knew,  had  been  laid  down  and 
agreed  upon.  No  cause  of  future  hostility  had  been 
removed.  Happily,  no  new  cause  of  offense  had 
been  given ;  for  the  Kaiser  was  able  to  say,  "I  know 
how  much  our  wishes  are  in  accord  in  that  which 
concerns  the  maintenance  and  consolidation  of 
peace."  The  angry  charge  of  "encirclement"  was 
apparently  withdrawn.  At  least,  if  any  encircle- 
ment existed,  it  was  not  of  a  nature  to  disturb  the 
peace.  And  yet  there  was  the  same  basis  as  before 
for  asserting  its  existence.  The  problem  of  raising 
new  taxes  for  the  enlargement  of  the  army  and 
navy  was  still  unsolved,  but  the  urgency  of  it  was 
in  no  degree  diminished.  On  March  1st  William  II 
was  celebrating  the  centenary  of  the  Prussian  Min- 

129 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

istry  of  War,  in  a  speech  of  intense  warlike  fervor, 
in  which  he  invoked  "the  divine  benediction "  upon 
the  work  of  that  Ministry,  whose  "task  had  been  so 
fruitful,"  he  declared,  and  would  assure  to  Ger- 
many "a  triumph  over  all  the  tempests  which  the 
decisions  of  Providence  may  call  forth";  as  if  war 
were  a  part  of  the  divine  purpose,  and  not  a  human 
crime. 

Next  to  the  German  army  and  navy,  the  mainstay 
of  peace  in  Europe,  according  to  the  Kaiser,  was 
the  Triple  Alliance.  Having  demonstrated  in  his 
favorite  manner  by  the  royal  visit  at  Berlin  the 
friendly  relations  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain, 
in  May  he  received  the  King  of  Italy  on  board  the 
Hohenzollem  at  Brindisi ;  and  the  next  evening,  at  a 
gala  dinner  at  Vienna,  he  assured  the  venerable 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  of  the  "benediction  that 
would  rest  upon  the  alliance,"  declaring  that  "the 
whole  world  knows  already  with  what  effectiveness 
that  alliance  has  contributed,  even  in  the  last  few 
months,  to  the  peace  of  all  Europe." 

What  then  had  threatened  the  peace  of  all  Europe 
in  the  preceding  months?  Absolutely  nothing  but 
the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, in  violation  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin, 
with  the  determination  of  the  Kaiser  that  the  other 
powers  who  had  framed  and  signed  that  treaty 
should  have  nothing  to  say  about  it,  and  should  not 
even  be  allowed  to  meet  in  a  general  conference  to 
discuss  it. 

With  Great  Britain  in  a  peaceful  mood  and  the 

130 


THE  KAISER'S  REVERSION  TO  TYPE 

Triple  Alliance,  as  the  Kaiser  contended,  invincibly 
strong,  where  were  the  disturbing  elements  that 
had  menaced  the  peace  of  Europe?  Evidently, 
Russia  was  considered  the  guilty  culprit.  But  of 
what  was  Russia  guilty?  Nicholas  II  had  commit- 
ted the  flagrant  crime  of  having  sent  Mr.  Isvolsky 
on  a  circular  mission  to  sound  the  other  govern- 
ments on  the  necessity  of  convoking  a  general  con- 
ference to  define  or  amend  the  Treaty  of  Berlin. 
The  mission  had  resulted  in  a  declaration  for  peace 
so  emphatic  that  the  right  of  appeal  to  a  general 
conference  was  not  insisted  upon,  and  not  even 
asked  for,  unless  the  Triple  Alliance  would  freely 
consent  to  it.  And  so,  when,  on  June  17th,  the 
Kaiser  was  received  by  Nicholas  II  on  board  the 
Czar's  yacht  Standart,  at  Reval,  William  II  said 
to  his  host : 

"I  see  with  joy  in  this  reception  a  new  and  pre- 
cious confirmation  of  the  close  and  sincere  friend- 
ship which  unites  our  persons  and  our  Houses  .  .  . 
and  the  absolutely  pacific  sentiments  of  our  two 
countries." 

At  last,  if  William  IPs  system  of  personal  diplo- 
macy could  be  relied  upon,  Europe  was  finally  as- 
sured of  peace.  So  long  as  all  conformed  to  the 
Kaiser's  will,  there  would  be  no  war.  The  War 
Lord,  on  this  theory,  was  in  truth  the  guarantor  of 
general  peace.  This  role  gave  him  infinite  pleasure, 
which  he  did  not  hesitate  to  confess.  On  Septem- 
ber 15th,  at  Karlsruhe,  he  said  to  his  troops : 

"We  Germans  like  to  bear  arms  and  we  love  the 

10  131 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

play  of  war.  Our  equipment  weighs  upon  us  but 
little,  and  we  gladly  carry  it  because  we  know  that 
it  will  keep  the  peace,  in  the  midst  of  which  our 
work  can  be  accomplished.  ...  As  long  as  there 
are  men  there  will  be  enemies,  .  .  .  and  as  long  as 
wars  are  possible  our  army  will  form  a  rock  of 
bronze  on  which  peace  will  be  supported. ' ' 

Subjected  to  analysis,  what  is  the  meaning  of  this 
theory?  Nothing  can  be  simpler.  Germany  having 
already  attained  the  hegemony  of  Europe,  the 
Kaiser  could  keep  Europe  at  peace,  because  he  be- 
lieved himself  too  formidable  to  be  opposed.  But 
he  could  also  at  any  time  destroy  peace  if  his  will 
was  not  obeyed. 

What,  then,  were  his  intentions?  Was  he  satis- 
fied with  this  hegemony?  If  so,  why  burden  his 
people  with  new  taxes  that  no  one  wished  to  bear, 
in  order  to  increase  the  military  strength  of  Ger- 
many? And  yet  an  increased  budget  for  war  pur- 
poses was  exacted  of  the  people.  Prince  von 
Biilow,  the  most  skilful  virtuoso  Germany  had  ever 
possessed  as  a  parliamentary  leader,  unable  to  hold 
his  bloc  together  in  the  Reichstag,  had,  in  the  mean 
time,  failed  to  coax  the  deputies  to  provide  for  the 
funds  demanded;  and  on  July  14,  1909,  he  had 
resigned. 

Measures  of  financial  reform — the  most  favorable 
Biilow  could  secure,  but  far  below  the  Kaiser's  de- 
mands— were  adopted;  and  there  was,  therefore, 
no  reason  why  the  Chancellor  should  abdicate,  had 
it  not  been,  as  was  at  the  time  generally  believed 

132 


THE  KAISER'S  REVERSION  TO  TYPE 

in  Germany,  that  William  II  preferred  in  that  office 
a  person  whose  opinions  were  inspired  solely  by 
[the  Imperial  will.  The  new  Chancellor,  Herr  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  was  a  minister  likely  to  play 
successfully  his  appointed  part.  A  Prussian  of  un- 
questioned patriotism,  broken  to  administrative 
routine  by  the  service  of  a  lifetime,  in  no  sense  a 
cosmopolitan,  as  Prince  von  Biilow  was,  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  entered  upon  his  office  with  no  experience 
in  foreign  affairs  and  little  knowledge  of  foreign 
countries.  Neither  a  great  orator  nor  an  experi- 
enced negotiator,  in  Billow's  sense,  he  was  an  hon- 
est-seeming man,  who  suggested  by  his  appearance 
and  manner  that  he  was  a  well-seasoned  provincial 
governor  rather  than  the  Chancellor  of  an  Empire, 
a  type  admirably  adapted  to  execute  the  Kaiser's 
will  without  flinching  and  with  the  approval  of  a 
conscience  subject  to  the  authority  of  a  superior. 

The  time  was  now  ripe  for  the  Kaiser  to  show 
himself  once  more  to  his  own  people  as  a  Hohen- 
zollern.  On  August  21,  1910,  at  Konigsberg,  his 
great  coup  d'etat  was  made.  He  had  waited  pa- 
tiently for  the  opportunity  to  wipe  out  the  humilia- 
tion the  nation  had  imposed  upon  him  regarding 
ministerial  responsibility. 

"It  is  here,"  said  the  Kaiser,  "that  the  Great 
Elector  declared  himself  sovereign  duke  of  Prussia, 
of  his  own  right ;  it  is  here  that  his  son  placed  the 
crown  on  his  own  head ;  here  Frederick  William  I 
established  his  authority  'like  a  rock  of  bronze'; 
under  Frederick  the  Great,  the  province  partook  of 

133 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

the  joys  and  sorrows  of  his  reign;  ...  it  is  here 
that  my  grandfather,  of  his  own  right,  placed  the 
crown  of  the  King  of  Prussia  on  his  head,  showing 
once  again,  in  a  precise  manner,  that  it  was  ac- 
corded to  him  by  the  grace  of  God  alone,  and  not 
by  parliaments,  national  assemblies,  or  popular 
votes,  in  such  a  manner  that  he  regarded  himself 
as  the  chosen  instrument  of  Heaven,  and  as  such 
accomplished  his  duties  as  regent  and  sovereign. 
Adorned  with  this  crown,  forty  years  ago,  he  rode 
forth  to  battle  to  win  the  Imperial  crown  also.  .  .  . 
Looking  upon  myself  as  the  instrument  of  the  Lord, 
without  regard  for  the  opinions  and  intentions  of 
the  day,  I  go  my  way,  which  is  devoted  solely  to 
the  welfare  and  peaceful  development  of  the 
Fatherland."1 

There  was  nothing  new  in  this  utterance,  which 
was  simply  a  reaffirmation  of  what  William  II  had 
repeatedly  said  before;  but  it  was  regarded  by 
many  Germans  as  a  violation  of  the  compact  made 
in  1908,  and  the  subject  was  brought  up  for  con- 
sideration in  the  Reichstag. 

This  time  the  Kaiser  was  prepared  squarely  to 
meet  the  issue,  and  had  at  hand  a  Chancellor  upon 
whom  he  could  rely. 

On  November  26,  1910,  Herr  Bethmann-Hollweg, 
rising  in  the  Reichstag  to  defend  his  master,  an- 
nounced that  there  was  nothing  in  the  Konigsberg 
speech  that  was  not  reconcilable  with  the  Constitu- 
tion.   It  was  merely  a  strong  affirmation  of  the 


1  Shaw,  William  of  Germany,  p.  332. 

134 


THE  KAISER'S  REVERSION  TO  TYPE 

monarchical  principle  which  is  the  foundation  of  the 
right  of  the  Prussian  state,  as  well  as  an  expression 
of  profound  religious  convictions  shared  by  numer- 
ous classes  of  the  people.  In  the  historical  develop- 
ment of  Prussia,  it  was  not  the  Prussian  people  who 
had  created  royalty,  but  the  great  monarchs  of  the 
House  of  Hohenzollern,  who  had  created  the  Prus- 
sian nation  and  the  Prussian  state.  For  this  reason 
the  kings  of  Prussia,  in  relation  to  their  own  people, 
are  kings  of  their  own  right.  If,  in  our  days,  there 
is  a  temptation,  in  the  interest  of  democracy,  to 
consider  more  decidedly  than  in  other  times  that  the 
King  of  Prussia  is  a  dignitary  named  by  the  people, 
"one  should  not  be  astonished  that  the  King  asserts 
vigorously  the  consciousness  he  possesses  of  being 
subject  to  no  sovereignty  of  the  people.''  And  he 
concluded  with  the  positive  statement : 

"Personal  irresponsibility  of  the  King,  inde- 
pendence and  original  existence  of  his  monarchical 
right — here  are  the  fundamental  ideas  of  our  state 
life,  which  remain  alive  in  the  period  of  constitu- 
tional development. ' ' 1 

Historically,  the  Chancellor  stated  the  precise 
truth.  William  II,  as  King  of  Prussia,  claimed 
nothing  which  had  not  from  the  beginning  been  held 
by  his  predecessors.  William  I,  in  1861,  had  explic- 
itly declared : 

"The  sovereigns  of  Prussia  receive  their  crown 


1  A  report  of  this  speech  may  be  found  in  the  Official  Gazette 
of  that  date.  A  good  abstract  is  given  in  Arren,  Guillaume  II, 
pp.  219,  220.    See  Illustrative  Document  No.  V. 

135 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

from  God.  To-morrow  I  shall  take  the  crown  from 
God's  altar  and  I  shall  place  it  upon  my  head. 
There  is  the  meaning  of  royalty  by  divine  right, 
and  in  that  resides  the  sanctity  of  the  crown  which 
is  indestructible." 

William  I  had  been  opposed  by  the  people,  and 
the  Prussian  parliament  had  refused  to  vote  the 
budget,  but  the  people  and  the  parliament  had  been 
overcome.  He  had  passed  through  more  sorrowful 
days  than  William  II  had  ever  known.  In  1849,  as 
a  royal  prince,  he  had  fled  to  England.  In  1862, 
the  opposition  to  the  reorganization  of  the  army 
was  so  bitter  that  he  expected  to  fail,  and  even  to 
perish  on  the  scaffold.  And  yet  he  had  triumphed. 
The  events  from  1864  to  1871  had  not  only  securely 
established  the  Prussian  monarchy,  but  had  created 
the  Empire,  with  William  I  at  its  head.  No  part 
of  this  work  had  been  done  by  the  will  of  the  Ger- 
man people  or  the  German  princes.  It  was  the  wort 
of  the  army  under  the  political  guidance  of  Bis- 
marck. Every  German  historian  admits  this,  and 
Prince  von  Biilow  himself  tells  the  story  with  pride 
and  even  with  boastfulness. x 

William  II  does  not  hesitate  to  carry  his  preroga- 

1  Von  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  says :  "The  opposition  in  Ger- 
many itself  (to  the  founding  of  the  Empire)  could  hardly  be 
overcome  except  by  such  a  struggle  (as  the  Franco-Prussian  War). 
By  this  means  the  national  policy  was  interwoven  with  interna- 
tional policy;  with  incomparable  audacity  and  constructive  states- 
manship, in  consummating  the  work  of  uniting  Germany,  he 
(Bismarck)  left  out  of  play  the  political  capabilities  of  the  Ger- 
mans, in  which  they  have  never  excelled,  while  he  called  into 
action  their  fighting  powers,  which  have  always  been  their  strong- 
est point." 

136 


THE  KAISER'S  REVERSION  TO  TYPE 

tives  as  King  of  Prussia  into  the  administration  of 
the  entire  German  Empire.  It  is  because  he  is 
King  of  Prussia  that  he  has  become  German  Em- 
peror, and  he  could  not  consent  to  be  less  as  Em- 
peror than  he  claims  to  be  as  King.  So  long  as  the 
army  is  at  his  back,  who  will  undertake  to  limit  his 
constitutional  rights  ?  It  is  as  a  Hohenzollern  that 
he  reigns. 

As  understood  by  William  II,  and  practised  by 
his  predecessors  in  the  creation  of  the  Prussian 
Kingdom,  sovereign  right  is  an  inherent  supremacy 
divinely  bestowed  upon  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty. 
The  right  to  rule  is  not  derived  from  the  consent 
of  any  people.  In  consequence,  it  is  not  restrained 
by  any  geographical  limitations.  It  is  not,  in  prin- 
ciple, in  any  sense  territorial.  It  applies  wherever 
it  can  be  applied — that  is,  wherever  conquest  can 
extend  the  Hohenzollern  rule. 

William  II  has  expressed  this  idea  as  clearly  as 
it  can  be  stated.  ' '  In  our  House, ' '  he  said,  on  April 
1,  1890,  at  Bremen,  "we  consider  ourselves  ap- 
pointed by  God  to  direct  and  lead  the  nations  over 
which  it  has  been  given  us  to  rule  to  a  higher  state 
of  well-being,  to  the  improvement  of  their  material 
and  spiritual  interests.,,  Hohenzollernism  is, 
therefore,  not  a  limited  authority,  or  confined  to  a 
limited  area;  it  is  a  universal  mission;  and  it  ex- 
tends, regardless  of  peoples  and  parliaments  and 
temporary  boundaries,  to  "the  nations "  over  which 
the  Hohenzollern  dynasty  may  at  any  time  be  able 
to  rule.    It  is,  in  substance,  Dante's  conception  of 

137 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

universal  empire,  the  authority  for  which  is  not  to 
be  sought  in  the  consent  of  peoples,  but  arises  from 
the  intrinsic  excellence  of  imperial  rule  itself. 

There  is  nothing  in  any  utterance  of  William  II, 
so  far  as  I  am  aware,  to  indicate  that,  in  his  mind, 
there  is  any  difference  in  the  nature  of  his  author- 
ity wherever  it  may  be  exercised.  To  admit  such  a 
difference  would  be  to  disavow  the  inherent  su- 
premacy of  his  dynasty,  and  to  rest  its  authority 
upon  some  external  ground,  such  as  the  will  of  the 
people  or  a  constitutional  prerogative.  "William  II 
has  nowhere  admitted  the  right  of  any  people  to 
contradict  his  inherent  authority  to  rule  over  them, 
provided  he  has  the  power  to  do  so.  Being  of 
divine  origin,  nothing  of  human  origin  can  stand  in 
its  way. 

If  there  is  coherence  in  the  Hohenzollern  theory 
as  stated  by  William  II,  it  has  no  relation  to  any 
particular  race  or  any  definite  area.  It  would  have 
been  quite  the  same  to  this  dynasty  if  it  had  started 
in  Russia  or  in  Turkey.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it 
started  in  Poland.  At  just  what  moment,  it  may 
be  asked,  was  the  House  of  Hohenzollern  "ap- 
pointed by  God ' '  ?  Was  it  when  Albert  of  Branden- 
burg, Grand  Master  of  the  Teutonic  Order,  in  1525, 
seized  its  territories,  claiming  them  as  his  own,  re- 
nounced the  Catholic  religion,  embraced  Lutheran- 
ism,  and  was  acknowledged  Duke  of  East  Prussia 
by  the  King  of  Poland,  from  whom  he  then  held  the 
duchy  as  a  fief?  Or  was  it  when,  in  1656,  the  Duchy 
of  Prussia  was  detached  from  the  Kingdom  of 

138 


THE  KAISER'S  REVERSION  TO  TYPE 

Poland  by  Frederick  William,  the  Great  Elector, 
who  then  passed  into  temporary  vassalage  to  the 
King  of  Sweden?  Or,  finally,  was  it  only  after 
Brandenburg-Prussia  had  been  increased  by  in- 
heritance and  conquest,  when  Frederick  III,  Duke 
of  Prussia,  having  previously  obtained  from  Em- 
peror Leopold  I,  of  the  House  of  Hapsburg,  by  a 
treaty  of  November  16,  1700,  in  exchange  for  an 
alliance  in  a  time  of  need,  the  reluctant  pledge  to 
permit  Prussia  to  become  a  kingdom,  on  January 
18, 1701,  despite  the  opposition  of  the  other  German 
princes,  set  the  royal  crown  upon  his  own  head  at 
Konigsberg  and  declared  himself  "King  of  Prus- 
sia" as  Frederick  II 

It  is  not  unimportant  to  note  that  the  original 
Hohenzollern  kingship  was  not  assumed  without 
previous  negotiation  with  a  Hapsburg  Emperor, 
and  that  the  permission  was  given  in  exchange  for 
a  promised  service. 

Upon  "William  IPs  theory  of  divine  appointment, 
any  form  of  success,  however  won,  whether  by  war 
or  diplomacy,  may  be  construed  as  a  special  divine 
recognition.  Wherever  the  Kaiser's  armies  and 
navy  may  establish  his  power,  there,  according  to 
his  claim,  he  is  "appointed  by  God"  to  direct  and 
lead  and  rule.  This  is  just  as  applicable  to  Bel- 
gium, or  Poland,  or  northwestern  France,  or  to  the 
whole  of  Russia,  as  it  was  to  East  Prussia,  or 
Silesia,  or  Hanover,  or  any  country  that  has  ever 
been  brought  under  the  control  of  Prussia.  It  is, 
in  brief,  in  the  simplest  terms,  merely  the  dogmatic 

139 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

assertion  of  the  divine  right  of  conquest.  If  the 
Kaiser's  armies  should  extend  his  sway  over  the 
whole  of  Europe,  and  if  his  navy  should  carry  his 
rule  over  distant  seas,  wherever  his  standard  was 
set  up,  there  he  might  crown  himself  at  will  and 
claim  divine  appointment  with  the  same  justifica- 
tion and  the  same  evidence  of  divine  right  as  can 
be  put  forward  for  the  like  performances  at 
Konigsberg. 

The  Kaiser's  religious  mysticism  offers  a  very 
inadequate  shield  for  his  conception  of  personal 
sovereignty.  A  mystic  he  often  seems  to  be,  but  in 
practice  he  is  a  realist  and  an  opportunist  of  the 
most  strenuous  type.  In  Turkey  he  wears  the 
dress  and  utters  the  speech  of  a  sincere  Moham- 
medan. At  Rome  he  visits  the  Pope  and  sends  gifts 
to  him  as  if  he  were  a  fervent  Catholic,  professing 
to  admire  greatly  the  authority  and  discipline  of 
the  Roman  Church.  Ex  officio  he  is  a  Lutheran,  and 
urges  all  to  help  him  "maintain  religion  in  the 
people." 

' 'Whoever,"  has  said,  "does  not  establish 
his  whole  life  on  the  foundation  of  religion  is 
lost." 

But  to  William  II  religion  has  never  meant 
either  a  definite  code  of  ethics  or  a  principle  of  self- 
subordination  to  a  reign  of  law.  It  has  meant  to 
him  that  a  directing  force  in  nature,  which  he  occa- 
sionally calls  "Providence,"  has  laid  out  a  great 
future  for  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty;  a  faith  that 
is  comparable  to  the  confidence  of  Napoleon  I  in  his 

140 


THE   KAISER'S   REVERSION    TO   TYPE 

' '  star. ' '  In  this  he  is  no  more  religious,  in  the  ordi- 
nary sense  of  the  word,  than  was  Frederick  II  in 
trying  to  convince  his  people  that  he  was  divinely 
appointed  to  complete,  by  the  seizure  of  Silesia,  the 
Prussian  Kingdom  which  his  ancestors  had  pieced 
together  from  the  heritage  of  Brandenburg  and  the 
spoils  of  Poland,  Sweden,  and  other  enfeebled 
powers — a  mosaic  so  extended  and  yet  so  frag- 
mentary that  it  seemed  as  if  it  were  in  fact  a  pre- 
liminary sketch  of  a  formidable  kingdom.  The  peo- 
ple might  well  believe,  being  piously  inclined,  that 
it  was  a  work  of  Providence  to  which  their  King 
was  called.  For  what  reason  had  his  provident 
father,  Frederick  William  I,  gathered  and  stored 
up  treasure  and  disciplined  troops?  Obviously, 
Providence  had  given  him  this  wisdom,  in  order 
that  his  son  should  use  these  resources  for  the  aug- 
mentation of  the  state ! 

It  is,  however,  success,  and  not  any  moral  prin- 
ciple, that  in  such  matters  is  taken  as  the  test  of 
divine  intention.  When  Frederick's  minister, 
Podewils,  timidly  reminded  him  that  any  rights 
which  Prussia  might  ever  have  had  in  Silesia  had 
already  been  renounced  by  treaties,  the  King  re- 
plied : 

"The  matter  of  right  is  an  affair  of  the  ministers. 

...  It  is  time  to  work  in  secret,  for  the  orders  to 

the  troops  have  been  given." * 

i  That  which  William  II  has  throughout  his  reign 

most  emphasized  regarding  religion  is  its  utility. 


iPolitische  Correspondent,  Friedrichs  des  Grossen,  I,  p.  91. 

141 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

It  makes  good  subjects,  good  soldiers,  a  united 
people.  "When  speaking  of  religion,  the  Kaiser 
expressly  says  he  does  not  take  it  in  its  narrow, 
ecclesiastical  sense,  but  in  its  larger,  practical  ap- 
plication to  human  life. 

In  a  letter  to  Admiral  Hollmann,  William  II  has 
stated  very  explicitly  his  views  regarding  Chris- 
tianity. *  God,  he  says,  has  eternally  revealed  Him- 
self to  mankind,  "now  in  the  person  of  this,  now  of 
that  great  wise  man,  whether  pagan,  Jew,  or  Chris- 
tian. Hammurabi  was  one  of  these,  Moses,  Abra- 
ham, Homer,  Charlemagne,  Luther,  Shakespeare, 
Goethe,  Kant,  Kaiser  William  the  Great"!  Bis- 
marck is  not  honored  by  him  with  a  place  among  the 
"great  wise." 

Of  Christian  morality  he  says  nothing.  Of 
Jesus  he  declares :  "He  spurs  us  on " ;  " He  allures 
us  " ; "  His  fire  burns  us  " ;  "  His  sympathy  strength- 
ens us";  "His  displeasure  annihilates  us";  and 
"His  care  saves  us."  Finally,  "He  leads  to  vic- 
tory." 

Nowhere  is  the  Kaiser  more  mystical  than  when 
he  tries  to  speak  on  the  true  nature  of  religion.  He 
thinks  "the  act  of  legislation  on  Sinai  only  sym- 
bolically inspired  of  God."  Moses  may  have  had  it 
from  Hammurabi.  Still,  "Our  good  Professor 
Delitzsch,"  he  says,  "would  do  well  to  avoid  treat- 
ing of  religion  as  such."  "Never,"  he  concludes, 
"was  religion  a  result  of  science,  but  a  gushing  out 


1  This  letter  is  printed  in  full  in  Noussanne,  The  Kaiser  as  He 
Is,  New  York,  1905.     See  also  Illustrative  Document  No.  VI. 

142 


THE  KAISER'S  REVERSION  TO  TYPE 

of  the  heart  and  being  of  mankind,  springing  from 
its  intercourse  with  God." 

And  so  the  Hohenzollern  prerogatives,  which 
obtain  bnt  little  comfort  from  science,  seek  their 
safe  asylum  in  the  mysteries  of  religion ! 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  KAISER  AND  HIS  PEOPLE 

'T^HE  question  is  often  asked  in  America,  How  is 
■*■  it  possible  for  the  people  of  Germany,  so  in- 
telligent in  many  directions,  so  material  and  so 
logical  in  their  habits  of  thought,  and  so  little  given 
to  mysticism,  to  endure,  and  even  to  seem  to  re- 
spect, the  pretensions  of  the  Kaiser? 

A  complete  answer  to  this  question  would  re- 
quire a  careful  analysis  of  the  population  of  the 
German  Empire  into  its  different  classes  and  their 
relations  to  one  another,  an  account  of  the  condi- 
tions in  which  German  society  has  developed,  an 
explanation  of  the  special  reasons  why  the  tradi- 
tions of  the  past  have  such  a  strong  hold  upon  the 
people,  and  an  examination  of  the  prevailing  state 
of  mind  resulting  from  the  whole  complex  of  in- 
fluences that  have  determined  the  national  psy- 
chology. 

Without  undertaking  to  touch  upon  all  the  points 
which  an  elaborate  inquiry  would  suggest,  a  few 
observations  may  prove  sufficient  to  explain  what 
at  first  sight  seems  difficult  of  comprehension. 

144 


THE  KAISER  AND  HIS  PEOPLE 

In  no  country  of  Europe  has  the  feudal  system 
continued  to  affect  the  social  organization  to  the 
extent  it  has  in  Germany.  When  the  French  were 
proclaiming  the  " Rights  of  Man"  as  axioms  of  the 
human  mind,  German  princes  were  selling  their 
subjects  as  foreign  mercenaries  in  the  same  spirit 
as  they  would  enter  upon  a  transaction  for  the 
shipment  of  cattle ;  and  there  was  no  suggestion  of 
revolt.  The  subject  went  where  he-  was  ordered  to 
go,  to  fight  for  whatever  cause  the  new  master  di- 
rected, and  with  the  moral  nature  or  effect  of  his 
activities  the  soldier  had  no  concern.  The  prince 
took  the  money  and  used  it  as  he  pleased.  No  one 
disputed  his  right  to  treat  his  subjects  as  his 
property. 

This  relation  of  sovereign  and  subject,  when  not 
the  direct  result  of  conquest,  had  grown  out  of  the 
subject's  need  of  protection,  in  an  age  when  near 
neighbors  were  dangerous  enemies,  and  the  sove- 
reign's ability  as  a  leader  and  organizer  of  his  de- 
pendents to  afford  the  protection  they  required.  To 
widen  his  frontiers  and  to  strengthen  his  realm  was 
the  first  preoccupation  of  the  prince.  As  a  Chris- 
tian— for,  after  his  kind,  he  was  a  believer  in  the 
Christian  faith — he  often  had  a  lofty  conception  of 
his  mission  and  of  his  personal  responsibility  to 
God.  Usually,  in  the  medieval  time,  he  held  cour- 
age, justice,  and  mercy,  as  he  conceived  them,  to  be 
duties  which  were  imposed  upon  him  by  his  relig- 
ion; the  performance  of  which  required,  however, 
that  he  should  be  his  own  judge,  free  from  the 

145 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

restraint  of  others,  and  with  authority  to  require 
his  subjects  to  aid  him  in  his  divinely  appointed 
task. 

From  all  this,  made  real  in  times  of  storm  and 
stress,  it  resulted  that  society  in  Germany  came 
to  be  regarded,  not  as  a  co-ordination  of  equals,  but 
as  a  hierarchy  of  classes;  a  system  consisting  of 
superimposed  strata  running  through  ascending 
grades  of  superiority  from  the  lowest  and  most 
dependent  until  the  person  of  the  prince  was 
reached.  All  were  directly  responsible  in  their  re- 
spective stations  to  those  who  stood  immediately 
above  them;  and,  by  inclusion,  to  the  prince,  who 
stood  at  the  apex  of  the  social  organization.  He,  in 
turn,  by  the  theory,  was  responsible  to  God  for  his 
conduct  as  a  prince.  Duties  to  those  below  him  he 
undoubtedly  had  and  recognized,  but  not  account- 
ability. 

So  universal  and  persistent  was  this  conception 
of  society  in  Germany  that,  when  the  Wars  of  Re- 
ligion were  ended  by  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  it 
was  considered  a  sufficient  concession  to  the  relig- 
ious differences  of  the  German  people  that  they 
should  all  follow  the  religion  of  the  particular 
prince  that  happened  to  rule  over  them,  Catholic, 
Calvinist,  or  Lutheran,  as  the  case  might  be.  Cujus 
regio  ejus  religio,  summed  up  the  conclusion  at 
which  the  settlement  had  arrived. 

All  the  more  logically,  in  the  light  of  this  con- 
clusion, the  prince  was  held  to  be  nearest  to  God; 
and  by  this  fact  authorized  to  prescribe  to  his  peo- 

146 


THE  KAISER  AND  HIS  PEOPLE 

pie  the  way  to  eternal  blessedness.  "What  the  prince 
did  or  decreed  might  not  always  be  comprehensible, 
but  obedience  to  him  always  seemed  dutiful;  for 
who  could  fathom  the  decisions  of  Providence? 
Having  been  appointed  by  God  to  rule,  whatever 
the  prince  did  must  be  right ;  for  was  he  not  divinely 
guided? 

In  the  secularization  of  German  society,  a  large 
degree  of  religious  toleration  has  been  recognized 
and  much  irreligion  has  developed ;  but  this  conces- 
sion to  the  individual's  inner  convictions  has  not 
affected  his  status  in  society,  or  gone  to  the  length 
of  permitting  him  to  claim  for  himself  any  inherent 
political  rights,  not  to  speak  of  a  share  in  the  right 
of  sovereignty.  He  remains  a  "subject"  still,  and 
whatever  civil  rights  he  may  be  permitted  to  enjoy 
they  are  in  theory  granted  to  him  as  an  act  of 
sovereign  grace. 

To  the  average  German  subject  there  is  nothing 
unnatural  in  this  order  of  things.  First  of  all,  this 
system  is  a  fact,  and,  as  such,  is  indisputable.  It 
has  become  a  fact,  he  thinks,  through  the  operation 
of  a  historic  process ;  and,  therefore,  must  be  nat- 
ural. The  professors  of  jurisprudence  and  political 
philosophy  in  the  universities,  as  servants  of  the 
state,  have  worked  out  a  theory,  in  their  own  meta- 
physical way,  which  supports  and  apparently  jus- 
tifies the  German  system.  From  Hegel  down  to  the 
latest  doctor  of  philosophy,  with  few  exceptions, 
the  state  is  represented  as  a  superior  entity,  for 
whose  power,  glory,  and  aggrandizement  the  indi- 

11  147 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

vidual  person  exists.  All  that  he  is  he  owes  to  the 
state,  and  in  return  he  should  offer  it  absolute  and 
unconditional  obedience.  Government  does  not 
proceed  from  the  will  or  even  from  the  reason  of 
the  people.  It  emanates  from  superior  authority. 
The  state  has  been  realized  through  the  work  of 
dynasties,  which  by  conquest  have  obtained  the 
right  to  command.  Thus  has  been  established  a 
mold  into  which  newly  acquired  subjects  are  to  be 
forced  as  plastic  material  until  they  are  conformed 
to  its  established  contours.  Only  thus  do  they 
become  a  part  of  the  nation.  Poles,  Alsatians,  and 
all  others  who  may  be  subjected  to  Imperial  control 
are  to  be  treated  as  conquered  peoples  until  they 
thus  conform.  As  the  state  can  acquire  complete 
unity  only  through  monarchy,  the  monarch  is  the 
rightful  head  of  the  state.  Such  unity  promotes 
efficiency,  for  it  ends  debate  and  renders  authority 
absolute.  The  strength  and  security  of  the  state 
are  derived  from  the  nation  in  arms — that  is,  the 
organized  army,  of  which  the  monarch  is  the  head. 
It  is  he  whom  the  army  must  obey  and  to  whom  it 
owes  fealty.  His  person  is  sacred.  He  cannot  be 
made  subject  to  contradiction.  His  decision  is  law. 
In  such  a  system,  it  is  the  army  that  forms  the 
substantial  framework  of  the  nation.  It  is,  of  ne- 
cessity, a  system  of  superimposed  classes.  The 
whole  of  society  is  modeled  upon  it,  as  it  was  in  the 
feudal  organization.  In  France,  every  man,  from 
the  President  down  to  the  humblest  laborer,  is 
Monsieur.    In  Germany,  one  gives  offense  if  the 

143 


THE  KAISER  AND  HIS  PEOPLE 

correct  title  is  not  employed,  even  in  familiar  ad- 
dress. Majestat,  Hoheit,  Durchlaucht ,  Excellent, 
Herr  Gelieimrat,  Herr  Professor,  Herr  Doktor,  and 
so  on  down  the  scale,  must  be  properly  attributed. 
A  married  woman  expects  to  be  called  by  her  hus- 
band's title,  and  takes  her  place  on  the  sofa  in  the 
order  of  her  rank,  as  Fran  Gelieimrat,  Frau  Pro- 
fessor, etc.  And  to  each  of  these  grades  belong  cer- 
tain prerogatives  which  it  would  be  disloyal  to  the 
system  to  disregard.  In  the  army,  and  to  some  ex- 
tent in  civil  life,  it  is  a  recognized  privilege  to  neg- 
lect or  to  abuse  with  impunity  a  person  of  a  lower 
rank.  On  the  other  hand,  inattention  on  the  part  of 
a  subordinate,  or  an  inferior  in  the  social  scale,  is 
considered  as  a  serious  offense  and  deserving  of 
punishment.  As  between  the  military  and  the  civil 
population,  he  who  walks  in  "the  King's  coat"  has 
always  the  right  of  way.  So  paralyzing  is  the  spell 
cast  by  a  military  uniform  in  Germany  that  a  com- 
mon shoemaker,  arrayed  in  the  stolen  costume  of  an 
officer,  was  able  unresisted  to  sack  the  treasury  of 
the  little  town  of  Kopenick,  near  Berlin,  in  broad 
daylight,  and  in  the  presence  of  its  custodians. 

It  is  not  astonishing  that  the  pretensions  of  the 
Kaiser  seem  in  no  way  preposterous  to  a  German 
subject  who  has  spent  his  life  in  the  midst  of  these 
feudal  and  military  traditions.  So  long  as  no  par- 
ticular offense  is  committed  against  himself,  he  is 
likely  to  think  the  whole  system  excellent.  If  he 
also  is,  or  is  likely  to  become,  in  some  degree,  a 
dispenser  of  authority,  as  a  member  of  the  nobility, 

149 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

as  an  officer,  or  an  agent  of  government,  he  con- 
siders the  system  altogether  necessary.  And  it 
must  not  be  overlooked  that,  in  practice,  the  Kaiser 
is  not  an  oppressor  of  his  people.  His  station  is  so 
high  and  his  person  is  so  remote  from  the  ordinary 
subject  that  whatever  hardships  the  system  may 
impose  do  not  seem  to  originate  with  him.  On 
the  contrary,  he  is  regarded  as  the  friend  of  the 
people  and  the  promoter  of  their  prosperity.  If 
the  laws  do  not  always  seem  equitable,  the  fault  is 
not  attributed  to  the  Kaiser,  who,  in  fact,  does  not 
meddle  with  civil  rights.  On  the  other  hand,  he  has 
often  and  very  urgently  advocated  better  treatment 
of  working-men.  He  is  interested  in  every  new 
enterprise  that  is  proposed  in  the  Empire.  He 
gives  encouragement  to  all  the  leaders  in  industry, 
commerce,  and  finance.  He  is  neither  idle,  nor 
dissipated,  nor  neglectful  of  the  increase  of  his 
realm.  Virtually  all,  during  peace,  have  prospered 
under  the  Empire,  and  the  Kaiser  is  to  them  the 
living  symbol  of  the  long-yearned-for  unity  and 
power  of  the  German  nation.  Those  who  know 
Germany  best  understand  how  difficult  it  is  for  a 
German  to  dispute  the  Kaiser's  supremacy  or  re- 
nounce his  authority. 

There  is  another  feature  of  German  life  that 
must  be  taken  into  account  in  any  serious  attempt 
to  comprehend  the  position  of  the  German  people 
with  regard  to  government.  If  the  traditions  of 
feudalism  are  strong,  they  are  in  a  certain  sense 
intensified  by  what  is  most  modern  in  social  organi- 

150 


THE  KAISER  AND  HIS  PEOPLE 

zation,  the  idea  of  a  minute  division  of  labor.  No- 
where in  the  world  has  this  idea  been  carried  to 
such  lengths  as  in  Germany.  The  instinct  for  thor- 
oughness is  strong  in  the  Teutonic  race.  In  educa- 
tion, in  science,  and  in  every  form  of  practice,  the 
Germans  have  resolved  every  inquiry  and  every 
performance  into  its  elements,  and  have  portioned 
these  out  in  such  a  manner  as  to  produce  by  means 
of  specific  training  a  nation  of  skilful  experts. 
Their  success  has  been  so  great  that  before  the 
present  war  no  form  of  higher  or  technical  educa- 
tion was  regarded  in  other  countries  as  quite  com- 
plete until  the  German  professor  had  been  heard. 
The  gift  of  the  German  universities  and  technical 
schools  to  the  world  has,  however,  not  been  so  much 
a  contribution  of  original  and  creative  thought  as 
the  result  of  studious  method  and  detailed  research. 
But  for  this  excellence  a  heavy  price  has  been  paid. 
The  narrow  specialist  who  has  concentrated  his 
attention  upon  a  limited  field  of  investigation  is, 
for  that  reason,  necessarily  deprived  of  the  broader 
vision  and  the  more  generous  culture  which  are  in- 
spired by  wider  interests.  In  this  respect  there  has 
been  a  noticeable  change  in  Germany  even  in  a 
quarter  of  a  century.  The  volume  of  knowledge  has 
vastly  increased,  and  in  the  use  of  it  there  has  been 
increasing  co-operation;  but  it  has  not  anywhere 
promoted  the  broadest  personal  development  of  in- 
telligence. It  has  produced  a  highly  differentiated 
social  mechanism,  but  it  has  at  the  same  time  mech- 
anized the  German  mind.    National  efficiency  has, 

151 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

no  doubt,  been  greatly  augmented,  for  all  the  talent 
of  the  country  has  been  organized  for  the  service  of 
the  state.  This  has,  however,  been  accompanied 
by  an  almost  complete  loss  of  personal  initiative  in 
matters  of  government  and  by  a  diminished  sense 
of  individual  responsibility  for  the  policies  of  the 
nation. 

The  idea  that  each  person  is  competent  only  in 
that  which  he  has  made  his  Fach,  as  the  Germans 
call  it,  and  consequently  is  exempt  from  thinking 
seriously  of  everything  that  does  not  pertain  to  it, 
is  of  obvious  consequence  for  the  politics  of  a  coun- 
try. Logically  carried  out — and  the  German  is  apt 
to  be  logical — it  would  leave  the  affairs  of  govern- 
ment entirely  in  the  hands  of  bureaucrats  and  ad- 
ministrative officers.  A  thinking  man  in  America 
or  in  England  considers  it  a  part  of  his  duty  to 
reflect  upon  the  public  policies  of  his  country,  for- 
eign as  well  as  domestic,  to  obtain  information  con- 
cerning them,  and  to  form  and  express  opinions 
about  them.  Except  in  very  limited  circles,  this 
habit  of  mind  does  not  exist  in  Germany.  It  is 
only  when  some  personal  interest  is  affected,  or 
some  national  danger  is  incurred,  that  public  at- 
tention is  given  to  such  matters,  with  the  result 
that  there  is,  outside  the  decisions  of  the  govern- 
ment itself,  no  systematic  formulation  of  political 
doctrine,  in  the  sense  of  the  great  party  platforms 
of  other  countries.  The  various  political  parties, 
which  are  so  numerous  that  they  are  generally  re- 
ferred to  as  "fractions,"  are  based  on  groups  of 

152 


THE  KAISER  AND  HIS  PEOPLE 

more  or  less  personal  interests  or  points  of  view; 
the  Conservatives  being  devoted  to  the  agrarian  in- 
terests of  the  landholding  class,  the  National  Lib- 
erals to  industrial  and  commercial  interests,  the 
Social  Democrats  to  the  interests  of  the  working 
class  mainly  in  the  large  towns,  the  Centrum,  or 
Catholic  party,  to  the  interests  of  the  Roman  Cath- 
olic Church  in  the  Empire,  etc. 

The  business  of  administration  being  left  to  the 
bureaucrats,  legislation  becomes  a  matter  of  trans- 
action between  the  different  groups.  These  com- 
promises are  negotiated  by  the  government  through 
the  Chancellor,  who  takes  the  legislation  proposed 
in  the  Bundesrat — itself  a  diplomatic  rather  than 
a  legislative  body — and  gets  it  ratified  by  a  major- 
ity in  the  Reichstag,  by  means  of  concessions  of 
various  kinds  to  the  powerful  groups,  and  exhorta- 
tion and  menace  to  the  smaller  ones;  so  that,  in 
the  end,  the  various  interests  are,  if  not  reconciled, 
at  least  either  pacified  or  subjugated.  Of  course, 
it  is  the  great  ones  that  triumph.  The  little  ones 
have  acquired  the  habit  of  waiting.  It  is  essen- 
tially a  system  of  organized  privilege. 

In  all  of  this  procedure  there  is  no  clear  asser- 
tion of  principle,  and  no  real  element  of  democracy, 
because  there  is  no  frank  recognition  of  inherent 
individual  rights  or  of  any  kind  of  equality  between 
persons  which  government  is  bound  to  respect.  By 
this  theory  " rights"  are  such  privileges  as  the 
power  of  the  group  is  able  to  extort  from  the  gov- 
ernment.   If  the  group  is  feeble  and  alone,  it  will 

153 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

obtain  little.  If  it  is  strong  and  a  good  trader,  it 
will  obtain  much. 

Beyond  mere  living  conditions,  classes,  in  this 
system,  fare  well  or  ill  according  to  their  fighting 
strength.  When  it  comes  to  the  ' '  All-Highest, ' '  he 
is,  theoretically,  for  everybody ;  which  enables  him 
to  be  in  practice  pre-eminently  for  himself  and  his 
dynasty.  He  commands  the  army,  which  owes 
fealty  to  him  and  to  him  alone.  He  is,  therefore, 
it  is  assumed,  in  a  position  to  see  that  justice  is 
done  to  all.  If  the  lawmakers  do  not  make  what 
he  considers  just  laws  he  can  send  a  regiment  of 
cavalry  to  close  the  Reichstag. 

There  has  always  been  something  very  fascinat- 
ing to  the  human  mind  in  this  concentration  of 
power  in  the  hand  of  one  man  who  can  use  it  in  the 
interest  of  all  and  maintain  against  the  opposition 
of  many  the  right  of  one.  Given  purity  of  motive, 
clearness  of  intelligence,  and  courage  to  enforce 
righteousness,  great  masses  of  men  may  feel  that 
they  can  have  no  better  guarantee  that  all  their 
rights  mil  be  respected  than  by  committing  them 
all,  without  reserve,  to  such  a  supreme  trustee. 

This  is  the  boast  and  the  promise  of  imperial- 
ism. All  Germans  born  in  Germany  since  1870 
have  lived  all  their  lives  under  the  influence  of  this 
faith,  and  have  from  childhood  been  dedicated  to 
this  imperial  cult. 

Personally,  Kaiser  William  II  has  been  variously 
esteemed  at  different  times.  As  the  ' '  All-Highest ' ' 
he  is  exempt  in  Germany  from  the  public  scrutiny 

154 


THE  KAISER  AND  HIS  PEOPLE 

and  criticism  which  are  applied  to  the  heads  of 
state  in  democratic  countries.  Some  bold  minds 
have,  however,  privately  expressed  the  view  that 
it  would  be  better  if  the  Kaiser  were  more  of  a 
specialist  in  whatever  specifically  belongs  to  the 
Fetch  of  being  Kaiser,  less  versatile,  less  given  to 
the  assumption  of  omniscience.  They  think  he 
would  be  even  more  the  Kaiser  if  he  did  not  dabble 
in  music,  painting,  the  drama,  architecture,  etc. 
William  I,  they  argue,  did  none  of  these  things,  and 
yet  he  was  an  excellent  Kaiser. 

But,  on  the  whole,  on  the  principle  that  the  spe- 
cialist knows  best,  who — not  being  himself  Kaiser 
— has  the  "  authority/ '  taking  the  word  in  its 
strictly  scientific  sense,  to  say  what  the  Kaiser 
should  do?  A  logical  application  of  the  division 
of  labor,  and  of  thereby  creating  experts,  would 
require  that  the  Kaiser,  being  Kaiser — and  espe- 
cially having  been  Kaiser  now  for  thirty  years — 
should  seem  to  the  German  mind  to  understand  his 
business  better  than  any  one  else !  And  thus,  that 
which  is  most  modern  in  German  social  organiza- 
tion seems  to  confirm  that  which  is  most  ancient; 
and  the  Kaiser,  whose  whole  regime  rests  on  a  union 
of  medieval  conceptions  with  modern  methods,  be- 
comes the  beneficiary  of  both. 

No  one  can  rightly  comprehend  the  psychology 
of  modern  Germany  who  does  not  carefully  con- 
sider the  effect  of  this  union  of  the  feudal  spirit 
and  modern  industrialism.  The  feudal  motive  was 
protective  organization  under  a  military  leader. 

155 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

It  was  not  difficult,  therefore,  to  graft  upon  the 
dying  stock  of  feudalism  the  new  protective  organi- 
zation of  industry  under  the  shadow  of  the  im- 
perial sword.  To  the  German  tribes  the  outside 
world  had  always  seemed  a  group  of  enemies 
against  whose  hostile  designs  the  state  was  a  neces- 
sary provision  of  defense.  To  increase  the  forces 
of  this  defense  was  in  every  kingdom  and  princi- 
pality of  Germany  a  common  aim.  The  war  with 
France,  by  uniting  the  princes  in  common  action, 
revealed  the  possibility  of  a  vastly  extended  de- 
fensive organization,  and  the  present  German  Em- 
pire was  the  fulfilment  of  this  general  desire. 
Alone,  it  has  been  represented,  no  one  of  the  Ger- 
man kingdoms  and  principalities,  not  even  Prussia, 
could  have  entered  into  economic  competition  with 
the  great  powers  of  Europe.  Together,  they 
constitute  a  formidable  phalanx  of  economic 
strength. 

Again  and  again  Kaiser  William  II  has  pro- 
claimed in  his  public  utterances  the  necessity  of 
military  protection  on  land  and  sea  for  the  prog- 
ress of  German  industry  and  commerce.  The  Ger- 
mans understood  him  as  no  other  people  could.  All 
their  feudal  habits  of  mind  gave  confirmation  to 
his  exhortations.  To  them  the  real  significance 
of  the  Kaiser  was  that  he  was  their  War  Lord, 
their  powerful  protector.  While  they  worked  their 
Emperor  would  guard. 

In  every  provincial  German  mind  there  was  a 
traditional  picture  that  spoke  for  the  Kaiser — the 

156 


THE  KAISER  AND  HIS  PEOPLE 

image  of  the  watchful  sentinel  keeping  guard  be- 
hind the  turrets  of  the  castle  wall,  overlooking  the 
fields,  the  vineyards,  and  the  village  nestling  at  the 
castle's  foot,  where  in  the  medieval  time  their  an- 
cestors, looking  up  from  tilling  their  fields  or  tend- 
ing their  herds,  awaited  the  blast  of  the  bugle  that 
called  them  to  arms  when  the  spears  of  an  advanc- 
ing foe  glinted  over  the  hill-tops. 

To-day  the  picture  is  amplified  to  imperial  di- 
mensions; but  the  quality  of  the  emotion  in  the 
breast  of  the  German  is  quite  the  same  when  the 
coming  of  the  Kaiser's  automobile  is  heralded  by 
the  three  silvery  notes  from  the  chasseur's  horn,  or 
the  blue  and  white  imperial  special  train  speeds 
along  the  iron  highway.  With  bowed  heads,  the 
simple  peasants  line  the  way,  when  the  advent  of 
the  Emperor  is  announced,  and  whisper,  as  if  in  the 
presence  of  a  sacred  epiphany,  "Er  kommt,  der 
Kaiser!'7 

Let  us  clearly  understand  that  the  deep  longing 
of  the  German  heart  has  never  been  for  individual 
liberty,  in  the  English  or  American  sense.  Its  crav- 
ing is  for  exemption  from  solicitude.  To  the  Ger- 
man, who  even  when  in  bondage  can  believe  he  is 
free,  "freedom"  means  being  free  from  want  and 
misery.    He  demands  no  other  liberty. 

Here  is  the  secret  of  his  attachment  to  the  Em- 
pire.   It  is  for  him  ein  feste  Burg. 

What  Germans  have  longed  and  hoped  for  has 
never  been  the  liberty  of  democracy,  but  the  pro- 
tection of  a  strong  man  capable  of  giving  them 

157 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

material  security  and  prosperity.  Even  the  con- 
stitutionalists of  1848  were  ready  to  accept  a  Prus- 
sian king,  if  he  would  only  grant  them  written 
guarantees.  What  they  were  seeking  was,  as  the 
poet  Geibel  has  expressed  it,  "a  successor  to  Bar- 
barossa." 

"0  Destiny,"  he  exclaims,  " grant  us  a  man,  only 
a  man.  ...  A  man  is  necessary  to  us,  a  descend- 
ant of  the  Nibelungen. "  "War,  war!"  he  cries. 
* '  Give  us  war,  to  replace  the  quarrels  which  dry  up 
for  us  the  marrow  in  our  bones." 

The  ideal  War  Lord,  God's  vicar  on  earth,  wise, 
majestic,  fearless,  and  strong — that  is  the  German 
idea  of  government.  Rights  of  man,  constitutions, 
votes,  what  are  these  but  pretense  and  confusion? 
Why  should  any  one  vote,  when  wisdom  has  al- 
ready decided?  For  what  should  one  vote!  For 
taxes  1  But,  alas !  they  would  have  to  be  paid  out 
of  hard  earnings.  In  Mecklenburg  the  people  have 
never  wished  either  for  a  constitution  or  a  repre- 
sentative parliament.  They  leave  everything  to 
the  Grand  Dukes. 

This  persistent  craving  for  a  ruler,  this  instinct 
of  personal  fealty  to  a  superior,  this  readiness  to 
fight  at  a  word  of  command — these  are  the  racial 
qualities  of  the  German  people  that  have  made  them 
as  clay  in  the  hands  of  their  Nibelung  Kaiser. 

But  there  is  more  than  romanticism  in  this  state 
of  mind.  Among  the  characteristics  of  the  feudal 
time  was  the  increase  of  strength,  the  constant 
pushing  back  of  the  frontiers,  the  absorption  of 

158 


THE  KAISER  AND  HIS  PEOPLE 

neighbors,  and  the  extension  of  the  realm.  The 
feudal  habit  has  become  an  instinct  in  the  German 
race.  As  an  individual  and  as  a  nation,  no  hesi- 
tation is  felt  by  the  Teuton  to  take  wherever  he 
can.  No  opportunity  is  to  be  neglected,  and  no  ad- 
vantage gained  is  to  be  surrendered.  In  private 
life  acquisition  is  esteemed  a  virtue,  and  is  called 
thrift.  In  national  development  it  is  conquest,  and 
is  claimed  as  a  rightful  exercise  of  superior 
strength.  What  is  surprising  to  those  who  reflect  on 
it  is  that  the  moral  obligations  which  the  very  ex- 
istence of  society  renders  necessary  in  civil  life 
are  held  to  have  no  existence  as  between  states  and 
nations. 

It  is  anomalous  that  in  the  present  advanced  con- 
dition of  the  world  such  sentiments  should  prevail 
in  Germany.  The  Germans — even  the  Kaiser  him- 
self— refer  with  pride  to  the  lofty  ethical  teachings 
of  their  great  philosophers,  and  particularly  to  the 
"categorical  imperative "  of  Immanuel  Kant. 
What  is  this  famous  precept?  The  Kaiser,  who 
publicly  applauds  it,  seems  to  have  forgotten  its 
meaning  and  to  remember  only  the  name.  The 
very  essence  of  the  categorical  imperative  is  the 
universal  application  of  a  moral  judgment.  "So 
act  that  thy  action  could  be  made  universal, ' '  is  the 
formula  which,  according  to  Kant,  the  conscience 
categorically  imposes.  It  excludes  all  merely  per- 
sonal expediency.  If  the  universal  application  of  a 
judgment  would  be  a  human  good,  then  it  is  right. 
If  it  would  be  an  evil,  then  it  is  wrong. 

159 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

How  then  can  it  be  held  that  morality  ends  with 
national  frontiers?  Should  falsehood,  bad  faith, 
hatred,  barbarity,  the  taking  of  life  for  the  posses- 
sion of  another's  goods,  be  made  universal?  If 
not,  and  Kant  is  to  be  followed,  they  are  categoric- 
ally prohibited.  They  are  as  wrong  between  groups 
of  men  as  they  are  between  individual  persons. 
And  the  philosopher  of  Konigsberg  himself  draws 
from  his  general  principle  all  its  logical  conse- 
quences. He  most  hotly  condemns  war,  and  par- 
ticularly dynastic  wars.  There  must,  he  declares, 
be  perfect  honesty  in  international  dealings  and 
good  faith  in  the  interpretation  of  treaties.  Every 
state,  he  contends,  should  have  a  republican  consti- 
tution, by  which  he  means  a  constitution  based 
directly  and  solely  on  the  individual  rights  of  citi- 
zens. When  the  Kaiser  and  his  apologists  appeal 
to  the  world  to  respect  Germany  because  Germany 
believes  in  and  follows  Kant's  high  morality,  they 
forget  that  the  great  philosopher  had  no  love  for 
Prussia,  because  Prussianism  meant  to  him  the 
exact  reversal  of  all  his  ethical  maxims. 

" Looking  beyond  Prussia  to  America,  in  whose 
struggle  for  independence  he  took  a  keen  interest, 
and  looking  to  France,  where  the  old  dynastic  mon- 
archy had  been  succeeded  by  a  republican  state," 
writes  one  of  his  commentators,  "Kant  seemed  to 
see  the  signs  of  a  coming  democratization  of  the 
old  monarchical  society  of  Europe.  In  this  growing 
influence  on  the  state  of  the  mass  of  the  people, 
who  had  everything  to  lose  in  war  and  little  to 

160 


THE  KAISER  AND  HIS  PEOPLE 

gain  by  victory,  he  saw  the  guarantee  of  a  future 
perpetual  peace. "  * 

The  truth  is  that  with  the  growth  of  material  in- 
terests in  Germany  the  ethical  sense,  which  was 
once  so  strong  in  the  German  character,  has  given 
place  to  mere  political  expediency.  The  influential 
writers  of  contemporary  Germany  boast  loudly  of 
German  virtue,  but  they  repudiate  the  sanctity  of 
international  obligations. 

I  have  sought  diligently  to  find  one  contemporary 
Prussian  writer  of  wide  influence  who  insists  upon 
the  binding  nature  of  moral  obligations  upon  gov- 
ernments. Forster  of  Munich  has,  indeed,  written 
caustic  criticisms  of  Bismarckian  diplomacy,  and 
Schucking  of  Marburg  has  bravely  advocated  in- 
ternational organization  on  a  juristic  basis,  but  they 
have  few  followers  and  stand  almost  alone  in  Ger- 
many. I  have  hoped  that  some  Prussian  jurist 
might  have  the  courage  to  declare  that  not  all  Prus- 
sians hold  with  the  Bernhardis,  the  Lassons,  and 
the  Kohlers,  that  force  is  the  only  measure  of  in- 
ternational justice.  In  my  search  I  turned  quite 
naturally  toward  my  personal  acquaintances  in 
Berlin,  and  decided  that  this  might  be  expected 
from  Professor  Otto  von  Gierke,  an  erudite  jurist 


1  Campbell  Smith's  introduction  to  his  translation  of  Kant's 
essay  on  Perpetual  Peace,  London,  1915.  Since  the  present  war 
some  writers  have  included  Kant  among  the  absolutists  as  regards 
the  nature  of  the  state.  Passages  may  be  cited  from  his  Philoso- 
phy of  Law  to  support  this  view,  but  the  inference  that  he  was 
an  absolute  monarchist  is  unfair  to  Kant.  His  views,  as  con- 
trasted with  those  of  Hegel,  are  referred  to  in  the  present  writer's 
Rebttilding  of  Europe,  New  York,  1917,  pp.  14,  43-50,  176.  Prac- 
tically, at  the  end  of  his  life,  Immanuel  Kant  was  a  republican. 

161 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

who  has  advocated  with  great  ability  the  corporate 
rights  of  communities  and  revived  interest  in  the 
ethical  conception  of  sovereignty  entertained  by 
Althusius;  and  this,  I  find,  is  his  position: 

"Foreigners  do  not  realize  that  war  fulfils  the 
world-historic  task  of  pitilessly  destroying  decay- 
ing culture,  worn-out  law,  degenerate  freedom,  in 
order,  with  native  strength,  to  breed  rejuvenated 
culture,  a  juster  law,  and  a  more  genuine  freedom. 
They  cannot  understand  that  military  power  has 
the  right  to  decide  the  life  or  death  of  nations  or 
states."1 

I  confess  that  I  do  not  comprehend  why  my  es- 
teemed friend  regards  it  as  a  national  distinction 
that  Germans  alone  " understand"  this  "right"; 
nor  do  I  feel  that  it  is  a  reproach  to  be  of  those 
who  do  not  understand  it.  Wherein  does  military 
power  reveal  its  "right"  to  decide  the  life  or  death 
of  nations?  Whence  is  it  derived?  How,  unsup- 
ported by  a  just  cause,  can  it  constitute  a  right? 
It  may  be  employed  either  for  a  good  or  a  bad  pur- 
pose, but  is  it  not  new  doctrine  to  be  told  that  mili- 
tary power  in  itself  has  the  "right"  to  decide  the 
life  or  death  of  nations?  Being  a  new  doctrine,  it 
requires  new  proofs.  Are  they  to  be  found  in  the 
mere  fact  that  Germany  has  destroyed  the  life  of 
Belgium  by  the  murder  and  deportation  of  its  in- 
nocent citizens  and  the  expropriation  of  their  pos- 
sessions? 

There  is,  it  seems,  a  "right"  for  Germany  that 


1  Gierke,  Unscre  Fricdcnsziclc,  Berlin,  1917. 

162 


THE  KAISER  AND  HIS  PEOPLE 

exists  for  no  other  nation.  "Peace,"  says  Profes- 
sor Gierke,  writing  as  a  jurist  and  in  the  name  of 
what  he  considers  equity — "peace  must  bring  us 
an  extension  of  power  in  East  and  West,  in  Europe 
and  beyond  the  seas — extension  through  closer 
contact  with  our  allies,  but  also  by  securing  better 
protected  frontiers,  and,  further,  by  retaining  a 
firm  control  in  the  conquered  enemy  territory,  by 
winning  equal  sea-power  on  seas  freed  from  Eng- 
lish tyranny,  and  thus,  at  the  same  time,  an  unre- 
stricted share  in  world-trade;  and,  finally,  by 
increasing  our  oversea  colonial  possessions  and  ac- 
quiring strategic  points  such  as  will  secure  their 
connection  with  the  home  country.  Nor  do  we  in- 
tend to  renounce  an  indemnity  for  the  huge 
sacrifices  which  we  have  made,  and  we  expect  in  the 
East  the  cession  of  ample  land  for  colonization  in 
place  of  cash  payment." 

"What  has  become  of  the  Kantian  faith  in  the 
future  of  international  equity,  when  accredited 
jurists  speak  like  this?  Is  this  the  final  result  of 
the  imperial  subjugation  of  the  universities,  or  is  it 
a  moral  degeneration  produced  by  a  decay  of  men- 
tality? 

But  the  disappointment  in  not  finding  a  correc- 
tive to  irresponsible  imperialism,  pursuing  its  quest 
for  territory,  and  colonies,  and  strategic  points,  to 
be  wrested  by  the  right  of  military  power  from 
mutilated  nations,  is  deepened  by  the  fact  that  there 
are  left  remaining  no  sacred  obligations  even  be- 
tween   sovereigns.      Treaties — the    only    possible 

12  163 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

basis  for  international  organization — says  Gierke, 
may  be  set  aside  at  will;  for  "the  clause  rebus  sic 
stantibus  can  always  be  invoked!"  "The  decision 
as  to  whether  there  has  been  a  breach  of  a  treaty  is, 
in  the  end,  a  naked  question  of  power." 

All  government,  then,  is,  in  reality,  "a  naked 
question  of  power."  Peoples  have  no  rights,  ex- 
cept what  military  power  grants.  Everywhere,  in 
the  state  where  the  conquered  become  subjects,  and 
between  states,  military  power  has  the  decision  of 
life  and  death.  And  thus,  with  one  blow,  this 
learned  jurist  destroys  utterly  the  whole  science 
of  jurisprudence,  to  which  he  has  devoted  a  long 
and  laborious  life,  and  reduces  the  whole  problem 
of  justice  to  a  naked  question  of  power. 

But  Professor  Gierke  destroys  more  than  the 
idea  of  justice,  he  robs  the  sovereign  of  the  senti- 
ment of  honor.  Not  only  where  there  has  been  an 
actual  change  of  relations  may  the  clause  rebus  sic 
stantibus  be  invoked,  but  it  may,  he  says,  "always 
be  invoked." 

But  this  is  old  doctrine  in  Prussia.  Frederick 
the  Great  advised  his  nephew:  "Never  blush  for 
making  alliances  with  a  view  to  your  being  the  only 
one  to  draw  advantage  from  them.  Do  not  make 
the  stupid  mistake  of  not  abandoning  them  when- 
ever you  believe  that  your  interests  are  at  stake, 
and  especially  maintain  vigorously  this  maxim, 
that  to  despoil  your  neighbors  is  to  take  away  from 
them  the  means  of  doing  you  an  injury!" * 


1  Frederick  the  Great,  Politische  Correspondent,  Vol.  I,  p.  244. 

164 


THE  KAISER  AND  HIS  PEOPLE 

1  And  now,  I  ask,  how  is  it  that  Kaiser  William  II 
has  made  this  Prussian  creed  also  a  German  doc- 
trine? 

There  are  two  answers  to  this  question:  He  has 
extended  to  the  Empire  the  Hohenzollern  concep- 
tion of  absolute  personal  authority,  the  divine  right 
to  impose  a  supreme  will;  and  he  has  appealed  to 
Deutschtum,  of  which  he  claims  to  be  the  divinely 
appointed  head,  to  become  its  instrument. 

It  is  will,  not  reason,  which,  in  this  conception, 
is  the  source  of  authority.  There  is  no  reference 
to  principles,  no  definition  of  rights,  no  invocation 
of  collective  judgment.  The  right  to  rule  consists 
in  the  power  to  compel. 

The  appeal  to  Deutschtum  is  an  invitation  to 
partnership  in  the  results  of  this  system.  He  says 
to  the  German  aspiration  for  a  War  Lord : 

"Behold  me,  I  am  he,  the  anointed  of  our  old 
German  God ;  I  offer  you  protection,  I  will  enlarge 
your  borders,  I  will  aid  you  to  rule,  as  the  superi- 
ority of  Deutschtum  entitles  you  to  rule,  over  many 
nations. ' '  He  has  called  to  the  deep,  and  the  deep 
has  answered  him. 

What,  then,  is  the  spirit  of  Deutschtum  to  which 
the  Kaiser  has  appealed? 

Being  a  sentiment,  rather  than  an  idea,  Deutsch- 
tum is  not  easily  comprehended  by  one  who  does 
not  entertain  this  form  of  feeling ;  for,  while  ideas 
may  be  shared  by  all  races  through  their  intelli- 
gence, a  sentiment  is  incommunicable  by  definition. 
Deutschtum  is,  therefore,  incapable  of  rational  ex- 

165 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

planation.  It  may  be  described  as  a  complex  state 
of  exaggerated  feeling,  composed  of  a  sense  of 
racial  superiority,  intense  love  for  a  traditional 
mode  of  life,  a  lust  for  power  and  possession,  and 
a  disposition  to  fight  for  domination  over  whatever 
offers  opposition  to  this  supreme  embodiment  of 
human  excellence.  It  can  be  classed  only  as  an 
orgasm. 

If  Deutschtum  were  really  an  idea,  or  capable  of 
statement  as  an  assemblage  of  ideas,  it  would  not 
be  necessary  to  fight  for  it;  it  could,  in  that  case, 
be  reasoned  about,  and  logically  defended.  But  no 
German  has  ever  thought  of  extending  it  by  reason- 
ing or  argumentative  persuasion.  He  cannot  even 
prove  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  German  Empire 
are  really  of  one  race,  to  say  nothing  of  intrinsic 
superiority.  He  cannot  name  any  excellence  of 
modern  civilization  that  is  of  purely  Germanic  ori- 
gin. He  cannot  deny  that  Germany  has  borrowed 
from  non-German  sources  nearly  everything  that 
distinguishes  a  highly  civilized  from  a  rudely  prim- 
itive state  of  society.  He  despises  the  Latin  race, 
as  he  does  the  Slav,  and  yet  all  that  is  most  valuable 
in  German  Kultur  has  been  absorbed  from  Latin 
sources.  The  German  Empire  is  itself  a  Teutonic 
imitation  of  the  Eoman.  There  would  be  no  "Kai- 
ser ' '  if  there  had  not  been  a  ' '  Caesar. ' ' 

There  remains  only  the  assumption  of  German 
superiority,  which,  when  analyzed,  in  the  main, 
comes  down  to  superiority  in  physical  strength. 
The    Prussian    test    of    superiority    is    war,    the 

166 


THE  KAISER  AND  HIS  PEOPLE 

art  and  science  of  imposing  one's  will  by  armed 
force. 

Starting  from  this  postulate,  logical  procedure  is 
quite  simple.  "Rights,"  as  known  and  accorded 
in  Germany,  are  the  trophies  of  strength.  They 
have  been  won  by  fighting,  or  by  threatening  to 
fight.  War  settled  the  status  of  the  Germanic 
tribes,  it  created  the  Prussian  state,  and  the  Prus- 
sian state  has  created  the  German  Empire.  The 
German  classes  do  not  all  love  one  another,  but 
each  one  takes  its  place  in  the  social  scale  according 
to  its  fighting  capacities. 

In  like  manner,  runs  the  Prussian  argument,  na- 
tions should  take  their  places.  Since  might  makes 
right,  and  Germany  is  strong,  it  is  right  for  Ger- 
many to  conquer  and  to  rule  other  peoples.  The 
Kaiser's  doctrine  has  become,  in  effect,  the  German 
people's  doctrine.  Their  great  teachers  have  sup- 
ported it.  He  has  never  been  rebuked  by  the  ruling 
classes  for  asserting  it.  To  dispute  him  would 
undermine  the  whole  present  German  system.  If 
it  were  once  conceded  that  human  beings,  as  such, 
possess  inherent  and  inalienable  rights,  the  whole 
imperial  organization  and  claim  to  expansion  would 
receive  its  logical  death-blow.  It  is,  in  truth,  in 
the  tragic  moments  when  William  II  makes  the 
whole  question  of  the  world's  peace  turn  upon  the 
power  of  the  sword  held  in  German  hands  that  he 
seems  to  his  admirers  most  transcendently  the 
Kaiser. 


CHAPTER  Vn 

THE  KAISER'S  ATTITUDE  TOWARD  WAR 
AND  PEACE 

T  T  should  never  be  forgotten  that,  as  Kaiser,  the 
■*•  main  personal  interest  of  William  II  is  to  be 
esteemed  an  efficient  War  Lord.  For  Prussia  war 
has  in  the  past  been  the  principal  industry.  The 
kingdom  has  been  created  by  war.  It  is  war  that 
made  the  King  of  Prussia  German  Emperor.  No 
one  who  in  the  last  twenty-five  years  has  lived  in 
Germany  has  any  doubt  that  war  is  relied  upon  as 
a  means  of  maintaining  and  increasing  the  Prus- 
sian domination.  Nothing  in  Prussian  life,  history, 
philosophy,  or  literature  points  toward  the  con- 
clusion that  military  power  has  fully  accomplished 
its  task  in  extending  the  limits  of  the  German  Em- 
pire. No  one  of  wide  public  influence  in  Germany 
has  ventured  to  assert  that  war  is  a  scourge  that 
should,  if  possible,  be  prevented.  On  the  contrary, 
war  is  generally  believed  in  as  a  divine  institution, 
as  a  biological  necessity,  and  as  an  essential  moral 
discipline.  The  subject  of  legally  organized  peace 
is  rarely  discussed  in  Germany.  The  necessity  of 
war  is  regarded,  as  the  Germans  say,  as  an  estab- 
lished   standpoint.      As    much    as    eating    and 

168 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR  AND   PEACE 

drinking,  war  is  considered  a  natural  phenomenon.1 
To  speak  in  Germany  of  ending  war  altogether  by 
a  voluntary  compact  between  nations  is  to  expose 
oneself  to  ridicule  as  a  visionary.  When  in  other 
countries  plans  are  proposed  for  an  enduring  inter- 
national peace,  the  suggestion  is  considered  in  Ger- 
many either  as  a  sign  of  degeneration  and  a  mark 
of  effeminacy,  or  more  generally  as  an  example  of 
hypocrisy,  having  for  its  ultimate  purpose  the 
weakening  of  the  Teutonic  defenses.  Thus  it  was 
widely  held  in  Germany  that  the  Czar's  proposal 
to  limit  armaments  "was  secretly  intended  to  place 
Germany  at  the  mercy  of  her  powerful  neighbors ' ' ; 
and  the  English  desire  to  fix  a  limit  to  the  building 
of  war-ships  was  taken  to  be  a  sign  of  economic 
weakness  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain. 

Like  any  other  business,  from  the  German  point 
of  view,  war  is  not  to  be  undertaken  or  conducted 
in  a  reckless  or  hazardous  spirit,  but  prudently  and 
scientifically.  It  requires  preparation  both  material 
and  moral,  and  the  time  for  action  must,  if  possible, 
be  chosen  with  foresight.  Being  an  affair  of  the 
state,  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  individual  morality ; 
for  the  state  knows  no  law  but  the  will  of  the  sov- 
ereign, whose  end  is  the  augmentation  of  power  by 
means  of  armed  force.  When  the  sovereign  calls, 
the  subject's  duty  is  to  answer  and  obey.  The  sov- 
ereign alone  can  know  what  the  hour  demands; 


1  One  cannot  help  recalling  Luther's  statement  that  war  "an 
ihm  selbst  gottlich  und  dcr  Welt  so  notig  und  nutzlich  set,  zme 
Essen  und  Trinken  oder  sonst  ein  ander  Werk." 

169 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

and  he  should,  therefore,  not  be  embarrassed  by 
hesitation  or  questioning.    Delay  may  mean  defeat. 

In  so  far  as  such  a  state  of  mind  is  believed  to 
require  justification  to  conscience  and  intelligence, 
this  is  found  in  the  belief  that  other  nations,  espe- 
cially those  previously  defeated  in  war,  intend  at 
the  first  favorable  opportunity  to  renew  the  con- 
flict. Peace,  upon  this  supposition,  is  only  a  tem- 
porary suspension  of  armed  hostility,  and  war  is 
the  normal  and  permanent  reality.  When  active 
hostilities  will  actually  break  out  is,  therefore,  only 
a  question  of  time  and  opportunity.  It  is,  how- 
ever, certain  and  inevitable.  Wisdom,  therefore, 
consists  in  being  always  ready  and  always  stronger 
than  any  possible  adversary. 

It  is  an  error  to  suppose  that  this  doctrine  is  held 
only  by  occasional  writers,  like  Clausewitz  and 
Bernhardi.  It  has  been  so  long  inculcated  in  Prus- 
sia and  diffused  through  the  whole  German  Empire 
that  it  has  become  virtually  the  national  German 
creed. 

To  those  foreigners  who  had  never  heard  of 
Bernhardi 's  doctrines  the  sudden  revelation  of  their 
existence  was  a  surprise,  and  it  was  believed  that 
this  defense  and  glorification  of  deliberately 
planned  war  was  something  new.  In  Germany  this 
literature  produced  no  shock,  and  did  not  even  give 
rise  to  controversy;  for  the  postulates  underlying 
Bernhardi 's  whole  scheme  of  thought  were  already 
accepted  by  the  greater  number  of  persons  who  had 
any  interest  in  the  subject.    To  the  military  pro- 

170 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR  AND   PEACE 

fession  in  Germany  the  teachings  of  Bernhardi 
were  mere  commonplaces. 

There  is  nothing  in  these  views  regarding  war 
that  cannot  be  found  implicitly,  at  least,  in  the  doc- 
trines of  Prince  von  Bismarck.  He  not  only  acted 
upon  them,  but  glorified  and  proclaimed  them  with 
a  cynicism  and  in  a  spirit  of  opportunism  that  is 
unparalleled.  With  him  wars  were  enterprises  to 
be  deliberately  planned  and  executed,  but  he  was 
careful  not  to  provoke  too  many  enemies  at  once. 
In  the  Danish  war,  he  says,  "from  the  moment 
when  our  troops  crossed  the  Eider,  I  was  ready 
each  week  to  see  the  European  Council  of  Elders 
interfere  in  this  Danish  affair,  and  you  will  agree 
with  me  that  this  was  highly  probable."  Only  "a 
circumspect  use  of  events,"  he  declares,  enabled  us 
to  ward  off  the  existing  danger  of  turning  the  duel 
between  Prussia  and  Austria  in  1866  into  a  general 
European  war,  but  France  and  Russia  were  skil- 
fully kept  neutral.  When  in  1867  the  Luxemburg 
problem  arose,  "only  a  somewhat  firmer  reply  was 
needed,"  he  affirms,  "to  bring  about  the  great 
French  war  in  that  year — and  we  might  have  given 
it  if  we  had  been  so  strong  that  we  could  have 
counted  on  success."  As  it  was,  France  was  kept 
in  a  state  of  negotiation  with  Prussia  because  of 
the  fear  that  Italy  and  Austria  would  make  common 
cause  with  her;  but  the  purpose  to  isolate  France 
and  then  defeat  her  was  steadily  held  in  mind  until 
1870,  when  the  occasion  seemed  opportune.  In  the 
mean  time  the  apprehension  of  war  was  so  great  in 

171 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Prussia  that,  as  Bismarck  informs  us,  he  received 
calls  from  merchants  and  manufacturers  who  said : 
"The  uncertainty  is  unbearable.  Why  don't  you 
strike  the  first  blow?  War  is  preferable  to  this 
continued  damper  on  all  business ! ' '  And  he  adds, 
"We  waited  quietly  until  we  were  struck,  and  I 
believe  we  did  well  to  arrange  matters  so  that  we 
were  the  nation  which  was  assailed  and  were  not 
ourselves  the  assailants."  x 

We  now  know  how  matters  were  "arranged"  by 
the  alteration  of  the  Ems  telegram.  When  Moltke 
had  assured  him  that  it  would  be  advantageous  to 
Prussian  arms  for  hostilities  to  begin  at  once,  Bis- 
marck prepared  and  read  to  Moltke  and  Roon,  with 
whom  he  had  been  dining,  the  revised  telegram,  add- 
ing: "If,  in  execution  of  the  orders  of  His  Majesty, 
I  communicate  this  telegram  as  I  have  worded  it  to 
the  newspapers,  and  if  I  have  it  at  once  telegraphed 
to  our  different  embassies,  it  will  be  known  in  Paris 
before  midnight.  It  will  have  the  effect  of  a  red 
flag  upon  a  Gallic  bull.  Success  depends  entirely 
on  the  first  impressions  that  the  origin  of  the  war 
will  produce  at  home  and  abroad.  It  is  most  im- 
portant that  we  should  appear  as  the  attacked 
party. ' ' 2 

It  is  in  this  school  of  ruthless  opportunism  that 
Kaiser  William  II  learned  his  first  lessons  in  the 
art  of  statesmanship.    To  him  also  merchants  and 


1  Bismarck's  speech  in  the  Reichstag  of  February  6,  1888,  made 
famous  by  his  sentence,  "We  Germans  fear  God  and  naught  else 
in  the  world." 

2  Bismarck,  Gedanken  and  Erinncrungen,  Vol.  I,  p.  446. 

172 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR  AND   PEACE 

manufacturers  have  come  with  their  demands  that 
the  military  and  naval  power  of  Germany  should  be 
employed  for  territorial  and  especially  colonial  ac- 
quisitions. With  these  annexationists  and  expan- 
sionists to  impress  the  business  world,  and  the 
army  and  navy  ever  ready  for  action,  Kaiser  Will- 
iam has  looked  upon  war,  not  as  a  misfortune  to  be 
always  avoided,  but  as  a  part  of  his  mission  in  the 
task  of  increasing  the  power  and  might  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire. 

Temperamentally,  more  than  any  other  Hohen- 
zollern  except,  perhaps,  the  present  Crown  Prince 
— who  is  said  to  have  expressed  his  hope  that  there 
would  be  war  "for  the  fun  of  the  thing" — the  Kai- 
ser is  susceptible  to  appreciation  of  the  romantic 
side  of  war,  simply  as  an  interesting  contest.    The 
agony  and  horror  of  it  seem  never  to  have  im- 
pressed his  imagination.     It  is,  in  itself,  for  him 
something ' ' glorious. ' '    The  moral  element  does  not 
seem  to  be  in  any  way  associated  with  war  in  his 
mind.    It  is  a  great  game.    What  other  ruler,  for 
example,  would  have  deemed  it  appropriate  to  send 
a  high  decoration,  the  "Ordre  Pour  le  Merite,"  at 
the  same  time  to  the  Russian  General  Stossel  for 
the  brave  defense  of  Port  Arthur  and  to  the  Jap- 
anese General  Nogi  for  his  heroic  attack  upon  that 
fortress?    And,  strange  to  say,  it  is  not  personal 
bravery  that  he  most  highly  commends.     At  the 
battle  of  Moukden,  he  declares,  General  Kouropat- 
kin  was  gravely  at  fault  for  leading  his  men  in  per- 
son, and  General  Oyama  was  far  more  to  be  com- 

173 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

mended,  lie  thinks,  for  conducting  the  battle  by 
telegraph  from  a  post  in  the  rear  of  his  army. 
' 'He  was  as  calm  as  a  chess  player  who  moves  his 
pieces,"  the  Kaiser  has  said. 

To  William  II  war  is  merely  a  problem  of  power. 
Here  lies  the  seat  of  his  interest.  I  cannot  believe 
that  he  is  constitutionally  a  ferocious  and  blood- 
thirsty man.  I  do  not  doubt  that  he  would  rather 
alleviate  intense  bodily  or  mental  suffering  than 
inflict  it.  But  the  idea  of  power,  especially  his  own 
personal  power,  seems  to  induce  an  actual  hyper- 
trophy in  his  brain  when  he  is  opposed.  He  claims 
to  be  a  sportsman,  but  he  does  not  tranquilly  bear 
defeat.  Those  who  sail  against  him  in  the  races,  I 
think,  really  prefer  that  he  should  win.  The  whole 
course  of  his  life  has  encouraged  this  impatience 
with  even  minor  opposition.  He  cannot  endure  it. 
He  would  rather  sacrifice  a  million  lives  than  lose 
a  battle.  " Calais  must  be  taken,"  he  proclaimed 
in  this  war;  and  when  it  was  demonstrated  that 
Calais  could  not  be  taken  with  the  forces  at  dis- 
posal, his  indignation  with  General  von  Kluck,  to 
whom  he  had  assigned  the  task,  was  reported  as 
violent. 

As  an  example  of  the  Kaiser's  "furor  Teuton- 
icus,"  his  address  to  the  troops  of  the  punitive 
expedition  that  in  1900  was  sent  to  China  to  aid 
in  suppressing  the  Boxer  Rebellion  has  often  been 
cited.  The  German  Minister,  Von  Ketteler,  had  in 
the  uprising  been  murdered,  and  there  was  just 
cause  for  indignation ;  but  it  was  expressed  in  terms 

174 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR  AND   PEACE 

that  breathed  such  a  spirit  of  vengeance  that  Von 
Biilow  thought  it  necessary  to  revise  the  phrase- 
ology officially  given  out.  He  was,  however, 
too  late  to  suppress  the  verbatim  report  in  the 
Bremen  newspapers,  which  was  as  follows:  "You 
know  well  that  you  are  to  fight  a  cunning,  fearless, 
well-armed  and  cruel  foe.  When  you  meet  him, 
understand  pardon  will  not  be  given,  prisoners  will 
not  be  taken.  Whoever  falls  in  your  hands  is 
doomed.  As  a  thousand  years  ago  the  Huns  under 
King  Etzel  made  a  name  for  themselves  which  ren- 
ders them  still  terrible  in  tradition  and  story,  in 
like  manner  may  the  name  'German'  in  China 
through  you  be  so  famed  that  for  a  thousand  years 
to  come  no  Chinese  may  venture  to  look  askance  at 
a  German."1 

The  troops  did  not  fail  to  execute  to  the  limit  the 
command  of  their  master.  Innocent  peasants  were 
treated  as  Boxers,  and  in  resentment  of  these  cruel- 
ties whole  provinces  that  had  been  peaceful  rose 
in  revolt.  Rich  spoils  were  plundered  and  taken 
to  Germany,  and  a  heavy  indemnity  was  exacted. 
If  the  Kaiser  coveted  the  name  of  "Hun,"  the  con- 
duct of  his  troops  in  China  was  not  disappointing. 
There,  as  later  in  Belgium  and  elsewhere,  they  suc- 
ceeded in  earning  it  by  the  deliberate  practice  of 
f rightfulness,  and  the  honor  to  which  the  Kaiser 
aspired  has  been  accorded  to  him  in  every  civilized 
country. 


1  The  attempt  to  alter  the  words  of  the  Kaiser's  speech  is  de- 
tailed by  Zurlinden,  Der  Weltkrieg,  Zurich,  1917.    I,  p.  315. 

175 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

When  the  time  for  Chinese  atonement  came, 
Kaiser  William  determined  to  inflict  a  disciplinary 
humiliation  that  brought  upon  him  ridicule,  even  in 
Germany.  Prince  Chun,  a  relative  of  the  Emperor 
of  China,  was  sent  to  Germany  to  make  amends  for 
the  action  of  the  Boxers.  Having  arrived  in  Swit- 
zerland, in  September,  1901,  the  Prince  was  in- 
formed that  he  would  be  required  by  the  Kaiser  to 
appear  before  him  at  Potsdam;  and  the  Kaiser, 
being  seated  on  a  throne,  his  marshal's  baton  in 
his  hand,  Prince  Chun  was  to  kotow  before  him 
three  times,  in  the  ancient  manner  of  the  Chinese 
court.  As  this  act  implied  absolute  degradation, 
the  Prince  declined  to  render  this  homage,  which 
was  afterward  compromised  to  three  deep  bows  as 
the  envoy  approached  the  throne.  The  ceremony 
then  proceeded  as  ordained. 

The  style  of  the  speech  delivered  in  reply  to  the 
expression  of  the  sincere  and  deep  regret  of  the 
Emperor  of  China  for  the  murder  of  Von  Ketteler 
by  a  Chinese  soldier  betrays  the  official  hand  of  the 
Protocol,  and  is  lacking  in  the  Kaiser's  fervid  elo- 
quence. While  exculpating  the  Emperor  of  China, 
it  emphasizes  the  guilt  of  his  advisers  and  his  gov- 
ernment. 

"Let  them  not  deceive  themselves,"  runs  the 
speech  from  the  throne,  "by  supposing  that  they  can 
make  atonement  and  receive  pardon  for  their  crime 
through  this  mission  alone,  and  not  through  their 
subsequent  conduct  in  the  light  of  the  prescriptions 
of  international  law  and  the  moral  principles  of 

176 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR  AND   PEACE 

civilized  peoples."  Conditioned  on  " directing  the 
government  of  his  great  Empire  in  the  spirit  of 
these  ordinances,"  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of 
China  was  in  the  end  assured  of  "peaceful  and 
friendly  relations ' '  with  Germany. 1 

The  ground  for  discerning  the  hand  of  the  Proto- 
col in  this  formal  speech  is,  that  in  the  Kaiser's  own 
personal  addresses  he  never  refers  to  "the  pre- 
scriptions of  international  law,"  or  to  "principles" 
of  any  kind.  It  is  one  of  the  marked  idiosyncrasies 
of  the  Kaiser's  mind  that  he  never  seems  to  think 
in  abstract  terms  upon  any  subject.  His  intelli- 
gence is  intuitive,  not  reflective.  Neither  war  nor 
peace  appears  to  him  a  matter  of  principle.  His 
favorite  expressions  reveal  this  semi-mystical  state 
of  consciousness.  "We  shall  remain  closely  at- 
tached," he  said  in  his  first  address  to  the  army, 
"whether  God  gives  us  peace  or  storm";  as  if  it 
were  all  a  matter  of  contingency,  in  which  the  hu- 
man will  has  no  part  and  consequently  no  respon- 
sibility. 

There  is  something  Oriental  in  the  Kaiser's  man- 
ner of  dealing  with  great  questions,  which  suggests 
to  the  mind  the  primitive  despotisms  of  Assyria  or 
Babylonia.  He  speaks  as  if  he  were  a  Tiglath-Pi- 
leser  or  a  Nabopolassar.  Nothing  appears  to  him 
subject  to  law.  All  is  personal,  and  is  adjudged 
meritorious  or  culpable,  according  as  it  favors  or 
embarrasses  his  plans  and  purposes.    Not  only  so, 


1  Shaw,  William  of  Germany,  relates  the  story  of  the  penitential 
pilgrimage  of  Prince  Chun. 

177 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

but  occurrences  having  primarily  no  relation  to 
himself  are  imagined  to  be  maliciously  directed 
against  him.  If  two  nations  harmonize  their  poli- 
cies and  abolish  their  antagonisms,  it  seems  to  the 
Kaiser's  mind  that  they  have  combined  against 
him.  If  Edward  VII  shows  friendship  for  France, 
he  is  set  down  as  a  "mischief-maker."  If  he  has 
a  friendly  visit  with  the  Czar  of  Russia,  he  is  plot- 
ting an  "  encirclement. "  If  the  United  States  of 
America  exercises  its  rights  of  neutrality  in  ac- 
cordance with  definite  principles  of  international 
law  which  have  not  previously  been  challenged,  and 
which  the  German  Empire  has  upon  occasion  itself 
regarded  as  properly  regulative  of  neutral  conduct, 
the  Kaiser  informs  the  ambassador  that  he  "will 
stand  no  nonsense  after  this  war,"  and  that  "Amer- 
ica had  better  look  out." 

The  truth  is,  nearly  all  international  matters  are 
considered  by  William  II  merely  as  questions  of 
power  and  not  as  questions  of  right  in  any  abstract 
and  universal  sense.  They  are  not  only  questions 
of  power,  but  questions  to  be  settled  by  will  and  not 
by  reason.  "Sic  volo,  sic  jubeo,"  he  wrote  on  a 
portrait  presented  to  one  of  his  ministers  in  1890. 
It  is  the  key  to  the  Kaiser's  character.  He  himself 
has  asserted  it. 

"Every  prince  of  the  house  of  Hohenzollern, " 
he  said,  at  the  inauguration  of  a  statue  of  the  Great 
Elector  at  Bielfeld,  "has  always  a  consciousness 
that  he  is  only  a  mandatory  on  the  earth,  that  he 
must  render  an  account  of  his  labor  to  a  supreme 

178 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR  AND   PEACE 

King  and  Master,  and  that  he  should  faithfully  ac- 
complish the  task  that  has  been  committed  to  him 
by  an  order  from  on  high.  Thence  comes  that  con- 
viction, firm  as  a  rock,  that  all  my  ancestors  have 
had  of  their  mission.  Thence  their  inflexible  will 
to  accomplish  that  which  they  have  once  pro- 
posed. ...  In  spite  of  all  resistance,  I  shall  always 
invariably  continue  in  the  way  winch  I  shall  once 
have  recognized  to  be  good.', 

But  this  declaration  of  inflexibility  of  will  throws 
no  new  light  on  the  real  basis  of  judgment.  Plainly 
it  is  merely  personal,  with  a  chance  that  it  is  chiefly 
emotional.  Whence  come  these  orders  from  on 
high  f  And  in  what  form  1  Evidently  they  are  mere 
subjective  impulses.  They  have  no  substantial  au- 
thority. They  are  derived  neither  from  experience 
~ior  from  reasoning.  They  base  government,  in  so 
far  as  the  Kaiser  is  concerned,  squarely  upon  per- 
sonal inspiration. 

The  fatal  element  in  this  method  of  treating  great 
matters  is,  that  when  a  decision  is  once  made  it 
becomes  an  act  of  God.  The  Kaiser  conceives  of 
himself  as  an  "instrument"  under  divine  direction. 
If  success  follows,  he  seems  to  have  a  new  evidence 
of  the  soundness  of  his  theory.  If  failure  follows, 
it  is  merely  a  divine  "delay";  or,  perhaps,  a  "les- 
son" needed  by  his  people !  That  there  is  anything 
essentially  "wrong,"  or  that  there  is  any  personal 
"guilt,"  in  a  decision  made  in  this  manner  the 
Kaiser's  theory  does  not  admit.  He  is  without 
responsibility  to  men,  for  he  acts  as  God's  instru- 

13  179 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

ment.  Even  his  responsibility  to  God,  on  the  inspir- 
ational theory,  is  limited;  for  his  duty  consists 
merely  in  carrying  into  execution  what  God  puts 
into  his  mind !  That  millions  of  men  should  perish, 
that  millions  of  homes  should  be  made  desolate,  that 
faith  in  solemn  public  promises  should  be  rendered 
impossible  in  the  future,  are  matters  with  which,  on 
William  II 's  theory,  it  is  unnecessary  to  concern 
ourselves.  Whatever  happens  is  God's  will,  and 
God's  will  must  be  right! 

This  total  effacement  of  all  moral  distinctions 
that  can  be  subjected  to  any  intelligent  test  renders 
impossible  any  form  of  international  security.  I 
would  not  be  understood  as  affirming  that  the  Kai- 
ser alone,  or  even  the  Kaiser  and  his  adherents,  are 
the  only  obstructions  to  the  world's  peace;  but  I 
venture  to  affirm  that  the  theory  of  international 
relations  which  the  Kaiser  holds  and  inculcates,  and 
especially  his  unwillingness  to  permit  great  deci- 
sions to  be  openly  and  frankly  discussed  in  a  ju- 
dicial spirit,  has  prolonged  the  anarchy  from  which 
civilization  has  been  trying  to  emerge  and  has 
finally  plunged  the  world  into  the  most  terrific  war 
known  to  history.  He  treats  the  grave  issues  of 
war  and  peace  as  they  were  treated  by  the  primi- 
tive despots  of  the  early  Oriental  monarchies.  To 
him  they  are  merely  questions  of  power,  which  can 
be  settled  only  by  war,  and  not  questions  of  right, 
which  are  susceptible  of  being  regulated  by  law. 

With  Germany  always  in  a  warlike  mood  and  the 
Kaiser's  hand  always  on  the  hilt  of  his  sword,  in 

180 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR   AND   PEACE 

spite  of  repeated  professions  of  peace,  defensive 
preparation  for  war  by  other  European  nations  has 
been  made  necessary ;  and  yet,  as  we  now  know,  it 
has  not  been  sufficient  to  secure  immunity  from  Ger- 
many's predatory  designs.  Since  1908,  to  those 
familiar  with  the  military  spirit  which  William  II 
has  developed  among  his  people,  it  has  seemed 
highly  probable  that,  at  some  well-chosen  moment, 
without  previous  intimation,  without  parliamentary 
consideration,  and  without  sufficient  cause  of  ac- 
tion, the  Kaiser  would  surprise  the  world  with  a 
sudden  declaration  of  war  and  an  immediate  attack 
upon  one  or  more  of  his  neighbors. 

Behind  the  fortification  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
Germany  has  never  for  a  moment  had  reason  to 
fear  an  assault.  No  coalition  has  ever  been  formed 
against  her.  France,  it  is  true,  has  never  forgiven 
the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  by  Germany,  and 
the  enforced  Treaty  of  Frankfort  has  always  been 
felt  as  a  humiliation ;  but,  by  1908,  the  French  had 
settled  down  to  a  state  of  passive  endurance  of 
what  seemed  to  be  an  irretrievable  loss.  Although 
the  cause  of  resentment  could  at  any  time  have  been 
wholly  removed  by  the  restoration  of  these  prov- 
inces torn  from  the  bleeding  heart  of  France,  it  is 
doubtful  if  William  II  or  any  considerable  portion 
of  the  German  people  ever  for  a  moment  seriously 
considered  this  solution  of  the  Alsatian  problem. 
The  pretense  that  Alsace-Lorraine  is  really  Ger- 
man, or  can  ever  be  made  so,  is  too  transparent  to 
produce  conviction.    The  inhabitants  of  those  prov- 

181 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

inces  have  never  ceased  to  protest  against  German 
rule.  After  forty-five  years  of  strenuous  efforts  at 
Germanization,  it  has  recently  been  admitted  by 
the  late  Paul  Laband,  the  eminent  professor  of  con- 
stitutional law  in  the  University  of  Strasburg,  that 
the  natives  are  still  loyally  French,  and  that  it 
would  long  be  necessary  to  employ  compulsion  in 
these  conquered  provinces.  The  reason  of  this  per- 
sistent devotion  to  France  is  not  difficult  to  compre- 
hend. Until  the  vivisection  of  the  Republic  by  the 
excision  of  these  organic  parts,  the  inhabitants  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  had  participated  in  all  the  revo- 
lutions of  France  and  had  become  flesh  of  her  flesh. 
They  felt  that  they  had  never  possessed  any  other 
freely  accepted  country.  It  was  not  even  pretended 
at  the  time  of  annexation  that  the  inhabitants  were 
really  German.  The  fact  that  German  was  spoken 
in  Alsace  was  no  better  proof  of  the  provinces  be- 
ing natural  parts  of  Prusso-Germany  than  that  the 
German-speaking  cantons  of  Switzerland  or  the 
city  of  Milwaukee  naturally  belong  to  the  German 
Empire.  The  reason  for  the  annexation  was 
frankly  confessed  by  Bismarck  and  by  William  I. 
It  was  purely  and  solely  a  question  of  military  ad- 
vantage on  the  part  of  the  conqueror.  For  this 
reason  the  guns  of  Metz  were  directed  against 
France,  and  they  have  offered  a  perpetual  challenge 
to  Frenchmen  to  reclaim  their  lost  territory. 

As  for  Russia,  there  was  never  any  reason  to 
believe  that  the  Czar  would  begin  an  aggressive  war 
upon   Germany.    With   singular   abstention,   suc- 

182 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD    WAR   AND   PEACE 

cessive  rulers  of  that  Empire  have  passively  per- 
mitted Prussia  to  expand  her  frontiers.  They  re- 
mained complacently  neutral  during  the  acquisition 
of  Schleswig-Holstein,  the  defeat  of  Austria,  and 
the  Franco-Prussian  War.  Bismarck  was  so  con- 
fident of  Russia's  inertia,  unless  actually  attacked, 
that  he  assured  the  Reichstag,  "Russia  cannot  in- 
tend to  conquer  any  Prussian  provinces,  nor,  I 
believe,  any  Austrian  provinces."  And  he  added, 
"I  even  go  so  far  in  my  confidence  as  to  be  con- 
vinced that  a  Russian  war  would  not  ensue  if  we 
should  become  involved  in  a  French  war  because  of 
some  explosive  happenings  in  France.' '  Even  in 
the  doubtful  case  of  a  Franco-Russian  combined 
attack  on  Germany,  which  there  has  never  been  any 
sufficient  reason  to  expect,  the  alliance  with  Aus- 
tria-Hungary would  have  afforded  adequate  pro- 
tection to  Germany  without  relying  upon  aid  from 
Italy. 

The  conclusive  proof  of  these  statements  is  found 
in  the  fact  that  when,  in  1908,  Austria-Hungary,  in 
violation  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  annexed  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina,  Kaiser  William  II,  as  he  has  publicly 
boasted,  openly  defied  all  the  Slav  nations  at  once, 
and  in  fact  all  Europe,  by  opposing  the  calling  of 
a  conference  to  consider  the  subject,  and  threatened 
Russia  with  his  appearance  "in  shining  armor"  if 
she  did  not  yield. 

For  a  decade  the  people  of  Germany  have  been 
taught  that  a  revengeful  France,  a  barbaric  and 
jealous  Russia,  and  an  envious  Britain  were  the 

183 


IMrilESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

real  cause  of  German  military  preparations.  But 
no  one  who  has  lived  in  Germany,  who  has  con- 
versed with  German  officers,  and  who  has  read  the 
brutal  and  inflammatory  Pan-German  literature, 
can  believe  that  the  purposes  of  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment have  been  merely  defensive.  On  the  con- 
trary, all  the  evidence  shows  that  the  German 
intentions  were  not  only  aggressive,  but  included 
detailed  plans  for  the  invasion,  occupation,  and 
retention  of  inoffensive  countries,  with  which  Ger- 
many had  no  prospect  of  a  quarrel.  Even  the  most 
moderate  German  writers  on  foreign  politics  have 
urged  the  propagation  of  what  they  call  "the  Ger- 
man idea,"  whatever  that  may  mean,  in  countries 
with  which  Germany  was  at  peace.  The  German 
spy  system  and  the  German  war  plans  have  literally 
benetted  the  globe. 

In  no  other  country  has  there  ever  been  published 
such  a  mass  of  literature,  ranging  from  cheap 
brochures  to  voluminous  treatises,  containing  defi- 
nite proposals  for  the  conquest  and  annexation  of 
other  countries.  Until  war  revealed  it,  the  world 
at  large  was  wholly  ignorant  of  this  Pan-German 
movement,  which  took  shape  in  1895  and  broadened 
out  immeasurably  in  1911. 

Although  the  vigilance  of  the  police  is  very  alert 
in  Germany  and  the  censorship  of  what  is  offensive 
to  the  Imperial  Government  is  extremely  strict, 
this  literature,  as  far  as  I  can  discover,  has  never 
been  suppressed  or  even  officially  condemned.  In 
Gross  Deutschland,  for  example,  by  Otto  Richard 

184 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR  AND   PEACE 

Tannenberg,  published  at  Leipzig  in  1911,  we  have 
large  portions  of  Europe,  Asia,  Africa,  and  Amer- 
ica marked  on  the  map  for  future  acquisition  by 
Germany. 

"We  wish  to  inaugurate  a  new  era  in  a  new  em- 
pire," it  is  announced,  "the  supreme  law  of  which 
will  be  the  following :  The  essential  end  of  Greater 
Germany  is  the  profit  of  Germans.  All  special  laws 
are  only  the  application  of  that  fundamental 
law."  .  .  .  "The  word 'peace*  is  a  detestable  word; 
peace  between  Germans  and  Slavs  is  like  a  treaty 
made  on  paper  between  water  and  fire. "  .  .  .  "The 
time  of  preparation  has  lasted  long  enough — forty 
years  of  toil  on  land  and  sea — the  end  constantly 
in  view.  The  need  now  is  to  begin  the  battle,  to 
vanquish,  and  to  conquer;  to  gain  new  territories — 
lands  for  colonization  for  the  German  peasants, 
fathers  of  future  warriors,  and  for  the  future  con- 
quests. ' ' 

Was  the  task  regarded  as  difficult?  Was  Russia 
an  enemy  to  be  feared? 

Here  is  Tannenberg 's  answer:  "We  find  our- 
selves face  to  face  with  the  definitive  dissolution 
of  the  power  of  the  Czar.  Siberia  will  become  Jap- 
anese as  far  as  the  Ural.  .  .  .  Western  Russia, 
which  in  other  times  was  called  the  country  of  the 
Knights  of  the  Sword,  and  Great  Lithuania  will 
revolt  and  seek  aid  and  protection  toward  the  West, 
toward  Germany.  The  time  has  come  for  us  to 
familiarize  ourselves  with  the  facts  that  are  devel- 
oping, for  fear  that  some  day  we  shall  be  surprised 

185 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

by  events.  .  .  .  The  honor  of  entering  into  the  Ger- 
man Empire,  and  into  its  customs  union,  which 
dominates  our  whole  life,  should  be  paid  for.  Al- 
sace-Lorraine has  brought  us  a  dot  of  four  milliards 
of  marks.  That  was  very  pretty,  assuredly,  but 
twenty-live  milliards  would  have  been  better  still. 
There  is  no  money  to  take  in  the  East,  but  there  is 
something  of  greater  value  than  cash;  there  are 
lands,  lands  for  colonization  by  new  German  peas- 
ants. "  The  writer  then  goes  on  to  speak  of  the 
extent  and  adaption  for  immigration  of  Courland, 
Livonia,  and  Esthonia;  as  large  as  Bavaria  and 
Wiirtemberg  together,  but  with  only  one-fourth 
their  population. 

Holland,  Belgium,  Luxemburg,  and  Switzerland 
are  all,  in  due  time,  according  to  Tannenberg,  to 
be  brought  within  the  limits  of  the  Empire — an  easy 
task  when  France  is  beaten  and  Russia  disinte- 
grated. 

As  for  Great  Britain,  her  colonies,  this  author 
thinks,  are  destined  to  desert  her ;  and  when,  finally, 
her  sea-power  is  destroyed,  her  possessions,  espe- 
cially her  Indian  Empire,  and  all  others  that  Ger- 
many desires,  will  fall  to  the  lot  of  Germany.  To 
accomplish  this  result,  the  Mohammedan  world 
must  be  utilized  by  Germany  through  uprisings  and 
attacks.  In  the  end,  Germany  is  to  dominate  the 
earth ! 

The  means  for  beginning  this  vast  expansion, 
says  this  writer,  will  be  a  war  with  Russia  and 
France.    With  astonishing  clairvoyance,  the  desire 

186 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR   AND   PEACE 

of  Serbia  to  unite  her  Slav  kindred  in  Herzegovina 
and  neighboring  lands  is  pointed  out.  Then  Aus- 
tria mobilizes  her  troops.    What  will  happen  then? 

The  answer  is  given  thus:  "Germany  has  only- 
one  part  to  take :  to  send  two  army  corps  to  occupy 
Bohemia,  Austrian  Silesia,  and  Moravia.  .  .  .  The 
occupation  of  Prague  by  the  Germans  is  followed 
by  a  declaration  of  war  by  France,  and  the  same 
day  Russia  declares  mobilization.  England  holds 
herself  in  an  expectant  mood.  Business  has  never 
gone  better  in  England  than  when  the  powers  of 
the  European  continent  engage  in  war.  England 
will  not  go  in  to  lose,  by  declaring  for  one  or  the 
other,  an  occasion  to  increase  her  wealth ! ' ' 

A  marvelous  prophecy,  indeed ;  but  with  a  char- 
acteristic miscalculation,  later  to  be  shared  by  oth- 
ers who  should  have  been  better  informed  than  this 
writer.  And  yet,  listen  to  this  prediction:  "Ger- 
many sends  against  Russia  an  army  of  a  million 
of  soldiers.  The  struggle  unfolds  itself  along  the 
Baltic  provinces,  Great  Lithuania  and  the  regions 
of  the  Memel,  of  the  Duna,  of  the  Embach,  and  of 
the  Dnieper.  The  Russians  abandon  little  by  little 
these  territories,  which,  by  their  population,  are 
strangers  to  them,  and  retire  to  Moscow.  .  .  .  But 
the  German  armies  do  not  follow  them  into  the  for- 
ests and  swamps  of  Russia ;  they  content  themselves 
with  occupying  territories  the  acquisition  of  which 
we  can  foresee." 

"It  is  on  the  West,"  he  continues,  "that  Germany 
sends  the  bulk  of  her  forces.    Eight  days  after  the 

187 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

declaration  of  war  by  France,  four  millions  of  Ger- 
man soldiers  cross  that  which  has  been  the  eastern 
frontier  of  that  country.  .  .  .  The  Russian  revolu- 
tion, which  raises  its  head  anew,  destroys  among 
the  French  the  elan  of  which  they  gave  evidence  in 
1870.  .  .  .  The  fortresses  of  which  the  French  ex- 
pect so  much  can  do  nothing  against  the  attacks  of 
the  German  air-ships.  They  are  only  bomb-catch- 
ers for  the  poor  Frenchmen  who  are  buried  in 
them.  .  .  .  Paris  does  not  even  try  to  defend  it- 
self. .  .  .  England  and  America  speak  of  business, 
but  do  not  offer  battles.  .  .  .  The  Germans  besiege 
St.  Petersburg  and  proclaim  the  annexation  of  the 
regions  of  the  Niemen,  of  the  Duna,  and  of  the 
Embach.  The  Germans  have  occupied  Paris  and 
advance  toward  the  line  of  the  Loire.  Holland  and 
Belgium  have  asked  to  be  admitted  into  the  German 
Empire  as  confederated  states,  with  all  their  colo- 
nies. The  offer  is  accepted  with  reserves.  Who 
would  think  of  hindering  a  victorious  Germany 
from  declaring  these  countries  territories  of  the 
Empire  without  conditions?  Questions  of  detail 
regarding  their  admission  will  furnish  matter  for 
further  discussion  at  Berlin.  One  thing  is  certain, 
that  the  colonies  of  the  two  states,  for  motives  of 
public  law,  should  not  be  the  private  property  of 
a  confederated  state,  but  a  colonial  territory  of  the 
whole  Empire.' ' 

Such  was  the  Pan-German  program  for  the  Ger- 
man war  of  expansion  in  1911.  Even  the  treaties 
of  peace  that  were  to  conclude  the  war  were  care- 

188 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR   AND   PEACE 

fully  drawn  up  at  that  time.  By  the  imaginary 
treaty  of  Brussels,  France  cedes  to  Germany  the 
Vosges,  with  Epinal;  Moselle  and  Meuse,  with 
Nancy  and  Luneville ;  the  town  of  Verdun ;  and  the 
Ardennes,  with  Sedan.  France  further  gives  asy- 
lum to  the  inhabitants  of  this  territory,  and 
establishes  them  elsewhere  within  her  own  bor- 
ders, in  order  to  make  room  for  German  settlers; 
declares  its  assent  to  the  incorporation  of  Belgium, 
Holland,  Luxemburg,  and  Switzerland  into  the  Ger- 
man Empire;  cedes  to  Germany  the  twelve  mill- 
iards of  francs  lent  to  Russia;  renounces  all  colo- 
nies; and  pays  to  Germany  a  cash  indemnity  of 
thirty-five  milliards  of  marks.  By  the  suppositi- 
tious Treaty  of  Riga,  Russia  cedes  vast  territories 
to  Germany;  creates  a  kingdom  of  Poland  on  its 
own  soil,  where  the  Prussian  Poles,  to  be  expelled 
from  Prussian  Poland,  may  reside ;  and  accepts  the 
incorporation  of  Austria,  ceded  by  the  Hapsburgs 
to  the  Hohenzollerns,  into  the  German  Empire. 
As  an  inducement  to  Great  Britain  to  sanction  these 
proceedings,  the  French  and  Portuguese  colonies 
are  by  these  treaties  to  be  divided  between  the  two 
empires  on  the  assumption  that  British  neutrality 
would  be  thus  insured ! 

Was  the  Kaiser  ignorant  of  a  prediction  that 
dealt  so  exhaustively  with  the  future  of  Germany, 
contained  in  a  book  that  could  be  had  in  any  book- 
seller's shop  in  Germany  in  1911? 

In  principle  it  was  advocating  no  greater  crimes 
than  those  proposed  in  General  Bernhardi's  Ger- 

189 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

many  in  the  Next  War,  published  in  the  same  year, 
in  which  this  officer  said,  "We  can  secure  Ger- 
many's position  on  the  continent  of  Europe  only  if 
we  succeed  in  smashing  the  Triple  Entente  and  in 
humiliating  France  " ;  of  which  the  Kaiser  was  cer- 
tainly not  ignorant  and  which  he  did  not  condemn. 
Nor  is  it  as  merciless  as  Daniel  Frymann's  Wenn 
ich  der  Kaiser  ivare,  also  published  in  1911,  in 
which  the  author  advocated  the  annexation  of  for- 
eign territories,  "but  without  inhabitants!"  In 
truth,  Gross  DeutscJiland  differs  from  these  and 
many  other  Pan-German  publications  chiefly  in  be- 
ing more  learned,  more  detailed,  and  more  sug- 
gestive to  the  imagination.  In  brief,  of  all  the  books 
on  Germany's  future,  it  was  the  one  that  would 
be  the  most  interesting  to  the  Kaiser  as  a  program 
of  German  policy. 

Of  course,  the  Imperial  Government  assumed  no 
responsibility  for  any  of  this  literature,  and  could 
readily,  if  complaint  were  made,  have  disavowed  it. 
It  was,  however,  too  extravagantly  outrageous  to 
be  taken  seriously  in  1911  by  any  one  outside  of 
Germany.  But  at  the  present  time  one  may  not 
improperly  ask,  Is  there  anything  in  any  of  these 
publications  that  has  not,  since  1914,  been  equaled, 
and  even  surpassed,  in  boldness  of  purpose,  in  ar- 
rogance of  temper,  in  defiance  of  international 
law,  in  predatory  design,  or  in  brutality  of  pro- 
cedure? 

AYe  need  not  here  venture  upon  any  speculation 
regarding    the    real    origin    of    the    Tannenberg 

190 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR   AND   PEACE 

schemes,  which  it  was  easy  at  the  time  to  dismiss 
as  the  idle  lucubrations  of  an  irresponsible  and  pre- 
posterous dreamer.  But  events  compel  us  to  admit 
that  Kaiser  William  II  must  be  accepted  as  either 
the  master  or  the  pupil  in  this  school  of  predatory- 
enterprise  which  his  strident  appeals  to  the  in- 
herent right  of  power  had  called  into  being. 

With  a  singular  exactness  Tannenberg  has  out- 
lined for  us  the  actual  sequence  of  events  in  the 
Great  War.  The  chief  spoils  were  to  be  obtained 
from  the  downfall  of  a  disintegrating  Russia. 
The  starting-point  of  the  conflict  was  to  be  the  am- 
bition of  Serbia,  against  which  Austria-Hungary 
was  to  mobilize.  Russia  was  to  intervene,  Ger- 
many was  to  march  against  Russia,  and  France  was 
to  join  in  the  defense  of  Russia.  Great  Britain, 
however,  was  to  remain  neutral,  and  her  neutrality 
was  to  be  rewarded  with  a  share  of  the  colonial 
spoils  taken  from  other  nations ! 

With  the  exception  of  the  miscalculation  regard- 
ing the  neutrality  of  Great  Britain,  this  prognosti- 
cation has  been  literally  fulfilled.  And  here  we 
have  to  note  that,  in  the  mind  of  the  writer,  the 
success  of  the  entire  scheme  turns  on  the  expected 
disposition  of  England  to  let  Germany  have  her 
own  way  in  the  coming  war.  The  war  as  planned 
by  Tannenberg  is  precisely  the  kind  of  a  war  which 
Kaiser  William  II,  as  I  shall  later  prove,  admits 
that  he  desired  and  complains  that  he  was  pre- 
vented by  Great  Britain  from  being  allowed  to  wage, 
a  war  in  which  Russia  and  France,  unaided,  would 

191 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

be  placed  at  the  mercy  of  the  combined  powers  of 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 

Let  us,  therefore,  in  brief  outline,  consider  the 
events  which  in  1911  gave  reason  for  assigning  to 
Great  Britain  the  role  assigned  to  her  by  Tannen- 
berg,  and  also  the  events  which  afterward  rendered 
Great  Britain's  attitude  problematical  to  Germany. 

The  Act  of  Algeciras  of  1906  gave  to  France,  and 
in  a  minor  degree  to  Spain,  certain  rights  of  police 
supervision  in  Morocco.  In  order  to  quiet  the  com- 
plaints of  Germany  that  France  was  exercising  po- 
litical power  in  Morocco  in  excess  of  what  was  war- 
ranted by  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  on  February  9, 
1909,  by  a  private  agreement  made  at  Berlin,  to 
which  the  other  signatories  of  the  Act  of  Algeciras 
were  not  parties,  Germany  was  allowed  special 
commercial  privileges  in  Morocco  in  exchange  for 
the  recognition  by  Germany  of  "the  special  politi- 
cal interests  of  France"  in  that  country. 

This  separate  dealing  with  Germany,  while  no 
doubt  well  intended  by  France,  and  perhaps  con- 
sidered necessary  to  prevent  an  international  crisis, 
was  certainly  ill  advised ;  for  it  exposed  France  to 
the  alienation  of  British  support,  which  no  doubt 
was  the  ultimate  design  of  Germany.  Great  Brit- 
ain regarded  the  granting  of  special  advantages  to 
Germany  as  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  Act  of 
Algeciras;  and,  early  in  1911,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
protested  against  it  as  a  step  toward  a  joint  Ger- 
man and  French  economic  monopoly  in  Morocco. 
Had  the  protest  not  been  heeded,  a  rupture  of  the 

192 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR   AND   PEACE 

Franco-British  entente  would  no  doubt  have  fol- 
lowed. 

Here,  then,  is  the  German  ground  for  believing, 
early  in  1911,  that,  in  case  of  a  conflict  between  Ger- 
many and  Austria-Hungary,  on  the  one  side,  and 
France  and  Russia,  on  the  other,  Great  Britain 
could  be  juggled  into  neutrality.  But  from  this 
illusion  there  was  soon  to  be  a  rude  awakening. 

Revolution  in  Morocco  promptly  brought  about  a 
change  in  the  Franco-German  situation.  The  ef- 
forts of  the  French  to  restore  peace  and  order, 
particularly  the  march  of  a  French  army  to  Fez, 
aroused  the  suspicions  of  Berlin.  At  noon  on  July 
1,  1911,  the  German  ambassadors  were  instructed 
to  announce  simultaneously  to  all  the  powers,  by 
an  identic  note,  that  German  colonists  in  southern 
Morocco  "had  appealed  to  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment to  protect  their  interests,"  and  that  in  re- 
sponse the  war-ship  Panther  had  been  sent  to 
Agadir;  but  this  protective  mission  would  end  "as 
soon  as  the  state  of  affairs  in  Morocco  had  resumed 
its  former  quiet  aspect." 

In  Berlin  the  coup  at  Agadir  was  represented  as 
a  merely  temporary  act  of  self-protection,  but  at 
Paris  it  was  quite  otherwise  understood.  Incident- 
ally, in  the  course  of  a  libel  suit  in  Germany,  in 
which  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Herr  von 
Kiderlen-Wachter,  was  a  witness,  he  offered 
testimony  which  illustrates  the  insincerity  of  Wil- 
helmstrasse  in  this  incident.  He  said:  "The  Pan- 
German  demand  for  Morocco  is  absolutely  justified. 

193 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

You  can  rely  upon  it  that  the  government  will  stick 
to  Morocco.  M.  Cambon  is  wriggling  before  me 
like  a  worm.  The  German  government  is  in  a  splen- 
did position.  You  can  rely  upon  me,  and  you  will 
be  very  much  pleased  with  our  Morocco  policy.  I 
am  as  good  a  Pan-German  as  you  are."1 

On  July  1,  the  Under-secretary  of  State,  Herr 
Zimmermann,  said  to  a  Pan-German  visitor  at  the 
Foreign  Office:  "To-day  the  Panther  appears  be- 
fore Agadir,  and  at  this  very  moment  (twelve 
o'clock  midday)  the  foreign  cabinets  are  being 
informed  of  its  mission.  The  German  government 
has  sent  two  agents  provocateurs  to  Agadir,  and 
these  have  done  their  duty  very  well.  German  firms 
have  been  induced  to  make  complaints  and  to  call 
upon  the  government  in  Berlin  for  protection.  It 
is  the  government's  intention  to  seize  the  district, 
and  it  will  not  give  it  up  again.  The  German  peo- 
ple absolutely  require  a  settlement  colony.  .  .  . 
Possibly  France  will  offer  us  the  Congo.  However, 
the  German  government  does  not  want  compensa- 
tion elsewhere,  but  a  part  of  Morocco."2 

This,  then,  was  the  result  of  the  private  efforts 
of  France  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  Germany. 
Such  a  partnership  was  quickly  seen  to  be  impos- 
sible, and  the  entente  with  Great  Britain  was 
promptly  reinvigorated.  Although  the  parliament- 
ary situation  was  at  the  moment  very  critical  for 
the  Liberal  government  at  London,  on  July  21, 1911, 


1  Cited  by  J.  E.  Barker,  Fortnightly  Review,  March,  1912. 

2  The  same. 

194 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR  AND   PEACE 

at  a  public  banquet  at  the  Mansion  House,  David 
Lloyd  George  made  a  speech  that  cleared  the  air, 
in  the  course  of  which  he  said :  "I  would  make  great 
sacrifices  to  preserve  peace.  I  conceive  that  noth- 
ing would  justify  a  disturbance  of  international 
good-will  except  questions  of  the  gravest  moment. 
But  if  a  situation  were  to  be  forced  upon  us  in 
which  peace  could  only  be  preserved  by  the  sur- 
render of  the  great  and  beneficent  position  Britain 
has  won  by  centuries  of  heroism  and  achievement 
— by  allowing  Britain  to  be  treated,  where  her  in- 
terests are  vitally  affected,  as  if  she  were  of  no 
account  in  the  cabinet  of  nations — then  I  say  em- 
phatically that  peace  at  that  price  would  be  a 
humiliation  intolerable  for  a  great  country  like  ours 
to  endure. ' ' 2 

The  note  of  warning  was  sufficient.  After  this, 
Germany  could  not,  in  case  of  war  over  the  Mo- 
rocco question,  count  upon  British  neutrality. 

A  few  days  afterward,  on  July  27th,  the  Prime 
Minister,  Mr.  Asquith,  pointed  out  a  path  which 
Germany  might  pursue.  i '  The  question  of  Morocco 
itself,"  he  said,  "bristles  with  difficulties;  but  out- 
side Morocco,  in  other  parts  of  West  Africa,  we 
should  not  think  of  attempting  to  interfere  with 
territorial  arrangements  considered  reasonable  by 
those  who  are  more  directly  interested."1 

The  hint  was  plain  and  was  soon  acted  upon.  So 
far  as  Great  Britain  was  concerned,  Germany  and 


1  The  London  Times,  July  22,  191 1. 

2  The  same,  July  28,  1911. 

14  195 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

France  were  at  liberty  to  reconcile  their  differences 
at  the  expense  of  France  in  the  French  Congo,  if 
France  chose  to  pursue  that  course. 

The  effect  at  Berlin  was  immediate.     The  Im- 
perial Government  perceived  that  it  could  not  hope 
to  wage  a  successful  war  against  France  and  Russia 
unless  Great  Britain's  neutrality  could  be  assured. 
Until  the  completion  of  the  broadening  of  the  Kiel 
Canal  so  as  to  pass  the  largest  battleships — which 
would  not  be  until  the  summer  of  1914 — a  war  with 
France  and  Russia  that  would  involve  England's 
opposition  could  not  safely  be  risked  by  Germany. 
Other  influences  also  soon  came  to  be  felt.    As  the 
wTar  cloud  gathered,  French  bankers  began  to  call 
their  loans  in  Germany.    In  Berlin  a  financial  panic 
threatened  to  complicate  the  situation,  which  in- 
duced the  Imperial  Government  to  reconsider  its 
pressure  for  a  portion  of  Morocco.     The  Hohen- 
zollern  dynasty  could  not  afford  to  engage  in  an 
unpopular  war.    The  pretense  that  such  a  war  was 
one  of  ''defense,"  where  Germany  was  so  obviously 
the  aggressor,  wTould  not  satisfy  the  masses,  whose 
sons  might  be  called  upon  to  perish  in  battle  for 
a  slice  of  Moroccan  territory.    As  a  consequence, 
in  view  of  England's  attitude,  the  demands  of  Ger- 
many became  more  moderate. 

At  Paris,  on  the  other  hand,  the  gravity  of  the 
crisis  was  keenly  felt.  No  one  in  France  wanted 
war  with  Germany  over  the  Moroccan  situation, 
but  the  Imperial  Government,  in  order  to  save  its 
face  by  obtaining  from  France  some  concessions, 

196 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR   AND   PEACE 

was  exhibiting  signs  of  military  movement.  The 
solution,  therefore,  was  found,  as  Mr.  Asquith  had 
suggested  it  might  be,  in  "other  parts  of  Africa"; 
and,  on  November  4,  1911,  a  peaceful  agreement 
was  concluded  by  the  Congo  Convention,  in  which 
Morocco  virtually  became  a  French  protectorate, 
at  the  price  of  more  than  one  hundred  thousand 
square  miles  of  territory  ceded  to  Germany  in  the 
French  Congo,  with  a  guarantee  of  the  "open  door" 
to  German  commerce  in  Morocco. 

Neither  country  was  satisfied  with  the  bargain. 
The  French  felt  that  they  had  handed  over  a  purse 
to  a  highwayman,  and  the  government  was  severely 
criticized.  "We  possessed  an  empire,"  said  M. 
Hanotaux;  "they  have  left  us  corridors." 

In  Germany,  however,  the  dissatisfaction  was 
even  more  intense.  There  it  was  felt  that  the  Im- 
perial Government  had  suffered  a  humiliating  de- 
feat. It  had  rattled  the  saber  and  had  been  bribed 
to  sheathe  it.  By  the  Pan-German  party  and  the 
military  clique,  who  had  hoped  that  at  last  the 
General  Staff  was  to  show  the  results  of  its  train- 
ing, the  settlement  was  considered  a  disgrace.  The 
Chancellor  and  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs 
were  bitterly  attacked.  When  Bethmann-Hollweg 
declared  in  the  Reichstag  that  the  Panther  was  not 
sent  to  Agadir  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  terri- 
tory, and  that  southern  Morocco  was  not  really  a 
desirable  possession  for  Germany,  he  was  inter- 
rupted with  jeers  and  laughter.  Kiderlen-WTachter 
and  Zimmermann  were  left  in  a  worse  plight,  for 

197 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

they  had  said  the  contrary.  The  unfortunate  sec- 
retary— who  aped  Bismarck,  whom  he  slightly  re- 
sembled in  appearance  and  his  attentions  to  his 
dog — was  quite  broken  by  the  ferocity  of  the  attacks 
upon  him.  To  heighten  the  invective  of  the  war 
party,  even  Kiderlen-Wachter 's  little  dog  was  made 
an  object  of  caricature.  "An  imitation  Bismarck, 
and  even  the  dog  a  degenerate  !" 

The  reaction  from  disappointment  in  Germany 
left  the  Pan-German  party  in  a  fighting  mood. 
Somewhere,  somehow,  the  loss  of  German  prestige 
must  be  regained.  As  Baron  Beyens  has  well  ex- 
pressed it,  "To  dream  of  a  colony,  rich  in  natural 
resources  of  every  kind,  and  to  wake  up  amid  the 
swamps  of  the  Sanga  and  the  Oubanghi — what  a 
disillusion!"1 

It  was  excellent  soil  for  the  Bernhardis,  the  Fry- 
manns,  and  the  Tannenbergs. 

In  all  this  commotion  the  Kaiser  had  kept  in  the 
background.  He  had  taken  no  part  in  these  nego- 
tiations, and  as  "War  Lord  he  had  escaped  the  pub- 
lic wrath.  There  was,  however,  in  truth,  no  need 
to  speak  of  Germany's  regaining  political  prestige 
in  Europe ;  for,  after  all,  considering  the  territories 
extorted  from  France,  Germany's  reputation  for 
greed  was  not  seriously  impaired  in  the  chancel- 
leries of  her  neighbors.  But  in  Germany  itself  the 
war  spirit  had  been  raised  to  a  fever  heat,  and  it 
was  now  directed  toward  Great  Britain,  whose  at- 


1  Beyens,  Germany  Before  the  War,  London  and  New  York, 
1916,  p.  238. 

198 


ATTITUDE   TOWARD   WAR  AND   PEACE 

titude  had  prevented  the  desired  war.  The  Con- 
servative leader,  Herr  von  Heydebrandt — some- 
times referred  to  in  Prussia  as  "the  uncrowned 
king" — did  not  hesitate  to  proclaim  it  publicly  in 
the  Reichstag. 

"We  know  now,"  he  cried  out,  "when  we  wish 
to  expand  in  the  world,  when  we  wish  to  have  our 
place  in  the  sun,  who  it  is  that  lays  claim  to  world- 
wide domination.  We  shall  secure  peace,  not  by 
concessions,  but  with  the  German  sword."  * 

"Peace,"  as  here  comprehended,  is  a  condition 
in  which  Germany  does  what  she  pleases  without 
obstruction.  And  this  is  the  sense  in  which  Kaiser 
William  II  has  always  employed  this  word.  For 
him  "peace"  is  a  trophy  to  be  won  and  preserved 
by  the  German  sword. 


1  Cited   by   Holt   and    Chilton,    The   History   of  Europe,   New 
York,  1918,  p.  472. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

THE  KAISER'S  EFFORTS  FOR  BRITISH 
NEUTRALITY 

"VJOT  less  than  the  outspoken  Pan-German  lead- 
■*■  ^  ers,  like  Heydebrandt,  who  had  characterized 
Great  Britain  as  an  "enemy,"  Kaiser  William  II 
was  dissatisfied  with  the  outcome  of  the  Agadir 
adventure;  but  he,  with  greater  perspicacity,  re- 
solved to  disarm  the  "enemy"  by  offers  of  friend- 
ship. Until  a  more  opportune  moment  for  action 
should  arrive,  it  was,  in  his  opinion,  unwise  to 
imperil  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty  by  a  war  for 
German  expansion.  If  Great  Britain  could  be 
made  a  partner  in  some  new  understanding  with 
Germany,  it  might  be  possible,  he  thought,  at  the 
critical  moment  to  obtain  British  neutrality  in  a 
continental  war. 

Without  in  the  slightest  degree  modifying  his 
position  that  international  relations  should  be 
based  upon  force  alone,  he  felt  obliged  to  silence 
the  clamor  of  the  Pan-German  party,  while  he  de- 
voted himself  to  readjusting  the  European  balance 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  give  him  a  free  hand  for  the 
prosecution  of  his  plans  of  expansion. 

200 


EFFORTS    FOR    BRITISH   NEUTRALITY 

The  task  was  beset  by  grave  difficulties.  During 
nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century  lie  had  built  up,  at 
times  against  great  odds,  the  most  formidable  army 
in  the  world.  He  had  preached  the  gospel  of  the 
sword.  He  had  fanned  into  a  consuming  flame  the 
military  spirit.  He  had  boasted  of  the  Hohenzol- 
lern  conquests  that  had  created  Prussia  and  the 
Empire.  He  had  promised  to  lead  on  to  "greater 
things.' '  He  had  claimed  a  divine  vocation,  and 
he  had  construed  it  as  a  militant  mission  which 
only  new  conquests  could  fulfil.  He  had  crushed 
out  parliamentary  control  of  the  army.  He  had 
never  admitted  that  he  was  subject  to  the  will  of 
his  people.  On  the  contrary,  he  had  desired  an 
apotheosis  like  that  of  the  Roman  Cassars;  and, 
clothed  in  shining  armor,  he  had  come  to  be  looked 
upon  as  he  had  desired.  Having  evoked  and  stimu- 
lated to  the  fighting-point  the  aspirations  of  the 
German  people,  he  must  yet  sometime  work  his 
miracle  of  glorious  conquest  or  fall  into  disrepute, 
perhaps  even  before  death  would  claim  him,  as  a 
weakling  and  an  impostor,  overwhelmed  by  the 
fiery  waves  of  defection  and  distrust.  Having 
created  his  role,  he  must  play  it  to  the  end;  but, 
without  aggressive  action,  the  end  was  very  near. 

Against  France  and  Russia  alone  he  could  at  any 
time,  upon  a  pretext  that  German  rights  were  in 
jeopardy,  declare  and  prosecute  a  successful  war. 
But  if  Great  Britain  should  intervene,  close  the 
seas  to  his  ships,  and  furnish  to  his  enemies  the 
material  and  financial  aid  which  her  great  resources 

801 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

could  supply,  it  would  bo  a  doubtful  combat.  In 
the  Kaiser's  mind,  therefore,  a  policy  of  peace  was 
necessary  until  Great  Britain's  neutrality  in  a  fu- 
ture continental  war  could  be  secured,  thereby 
granting  to  Germany  full  liberty  of  action  in  the 
prosecution  of  territorial  expansion.  "When  the 
German  position  had  been  sufficiently  established 
on  the  Continent,  Great  Britain  could  perhaps  be 
successfully  challenged  on  the  sea. 

In  order  to  open  negotiations  in  the  intimate 
manner  for  which  William  II  has  a  predilection, 
early  in  1912,  the  Kaiser  sent,  through  a  personal 
friend  in  England,  a  private  message  to  one  of 
the  English  Ministers,  suggesting  a  conference  be- 
tween the  Cabinets  of  the  two  countries.    In  order 
to  meet  the  Kaiser's  wishes,  the  British  Cabinet 
selected  Lord  Haldane,  then  Lord  High  Chancellor 
— whose  knowledge  of  the  German  language,  per- 
sonal acquaintance  with  the  Emperor,  and  famil- 
iarity with  the  questions  to  be  discussed  fitted  him 
in  an  extraordinary  degree  for  the  mission — to  visit 
Berlin,  where  he  arrived  on  February  8,  1912.    He 
had  a  preliminary  conversation  at  the  British  Em- 
bassy with   the   Imperial   Chancellor,   Bethmann- 
Hollweg,  on  the  day  of  his  arrival,  and  on  the  next 
day  saw  both  the  Emperor  and  Admiral  von  Tir- 
pitz,  with  whom  he  conversed  in  each  other 's  pres- 
ence. 

In  the  course  of  the  conversations,  Lord  Haldane 
stated  frankly  that  the  Triple  Alliance  gave  to 
Germany  a  great  superiority  of  strength  on  the 

203 


EFFORTS    FOR    BRITISH   NEUTRALITY 

Continent,  and  that  its  military  preponderance 
created  a  serious  situation  for  the  other  powers. 
Attention  was  called  to  the  growth  of  the  German 
navy,  and  the  question  was  plainly  put  to  the 
Chancellor,  whether  he  thought  that  its  further 
increase  would  contribute  to  more  friendly  rela- 
tions. The  subject  of  Germany's  naval  program 
was  discussed  and  the  possibility  of  spreading  the 
proposed  increments  of  shipbuilding  over  a  num- 
ber of  years  was  suggested ;  but  the  main  issue  was 
the  future  action  of  the  two  countries  in  case  of  a 
continental  war.1 

The  proposal  of  Germany  was  the  absolute  neu- 
trality of  each  country  in  case  the  other  was  en- 
gaged in  war,  binding  them  not  to  enter  into  any 
combination  against  each  other,  but  granting  to 
each  perfect  freedom  of  action  regarding  all  other 
nations.  This  proposal,  if  agreed  to,  would  leave 
Germany  free  to  make  war  at  her  pleasure,  so  long 
as  it  was  in  no  way  directed  against  Great  Britain. 
It  accorded  to  Great  Britain  the  same  privilege, 
but  this  could  hardly  be  regarded  as  a  means  of 
insuring  a  general  European  peace. 

In  response,  Lord  Haldane  suggested  a  mutual 
understanding  by  both  countries  against  all  ag- 
gressive military  and  naval  combinations.     This 


1  An  official  statement  regarding  the  mission  of  Lord  Haldane 
was  issued  by  the  British  Government  on  August  31,  1915.  Lord 
Haldane's  full  report  of  his  mission  was  published  officially  in 
May,  1918.  Both  these  documents  may  be  found  in  The  New  York 
Times  Current  History,  for  July,  1918,  pp.  166,  170.  See  also  a 
statement  in  Obstacles  to  Peace,  Boston,  1917,  pp.  32,  33,  by  S.  S. 
McClure. 

203 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

would  have  excluded  all  plans  of  conquest,  but  this 
proposal  did  not  meet  with  the  Chancellor's 
approval. 

In  the  course  of  the  discussions,  Lord  Haldane 
pointed  out  that  no  arrangement  could  be  entered 
into  with  Germany  inconsistent  with  the  loyal  ob- 
servance of  the  peace  of  France  and  Russia.  He 
made  it  plain  that  Great  Britain  could  enter  into 
no  engagement  to  remain  neutral  if  France  were 
attacked  or  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  violated. 
He  also  said  that  if  Germany  insisted  upon  increas- 
ing her  navy,  Great  Britain  would  feel  obliged  to 
double  Germany's  naval  estimates. 

The  purpose  of  Germany  in  these  negotiations  is 
very  clearly  disclosed.    While  apparently  acting  in 
the  interest  of  peace,  the  neutrality  insisted  upon 
pointed  directly  to  a  coming  war.    The  promise  not 
"to  make  or  prepare  to  make  any  (unprovoked) 
attack  upon  the  other,  or  join  in  any  combination 
or  design  against  the  other  for  purposes  of  aggres- 
sion, or  become  party  to  any  plan  or  naval  or  mili- 
tary enterprise  alone  or  in  combination  with  any 
other  power  directed  to  such  end,"  seemed  per- 
fectly fair,  so  far  as  it  went.    It  was,  however,  ren- 
dered apparently  too  elaborately  virtuous  by  the 
proposed  engagement,  "If  either  of  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  becomes  entangled  in  a  war  with 
one  or  more  powers  in  which  it  cannot  be  said  to  be 
an  aggressor,  the  other  party  will  at  least  observe 
toward  the  power  so  entangled  a  benevolent  neu- 
trality!" 

204 


EFFORTS    FOR    BRITISH   NEUTRALITY 

How  easy  it  was  for  Germany  to  become  "  en- 
tangled" in  a  war  in  which  it  could  be  claimed  that 
it  was  not  "the  aggressor"  is  evident  from  what 
happened  in  1914,  when  Austria-Hungary  declared 
war  on  Serbia,  Russia  undertook  to  defend  Serbia 
from  subjugation  by  Austria,  and  Germany,  "en- 
tangled" by  the  treaty  with  Austria,  though  not 
technically  "the  aggressor,"  was  in  reality  the  vis 
a  tergo  of  the  war !    Read  in  the  light  of  subsequent 
events,  it  would  seem  that  precisely  such  a  case 
must  have  been  in  the  mind  of  the  ingenious  person 
who  devised  this  formula ;  which,  in  exactly  the  cir- 
cumstances that  actually  occurred  in  1914,  would 
bind  Great  Britain  to  maintain  toward  Germany 
"a  benevolent  neutrality,"  even  after  Belgium  and 
France  had  been  invaded.    France,  bound  by  the 
terms  of  her  alliance  with  Russia,  would  have  been 
inevitably  drawn  into  the  contest ;  but  Great  Brit- 
ain, having  no  similar  alliance  with  France,  would 
be  morally  and  legally  held  by  a  one-sided  engage- 
ment with  Germany! 

I  do  not  doubt  that,  personally,  Bethmann-Holl- 
weg  sincerely  desired  a  peaceful  arrangement  with 
Great  Britain ;  but  the  hand  that  wrote  the  German 
formula  of  engagement  to  neutrality  was  directed 
by  a  mind  that  was  preparing  for  war.  The  project 
aimed  at  bound  Great  Britain  to  "benevolent 
neutrality,"  while  leaving  Germany  free  to  carry 
out  her  schemes  of  aggression.  An  innocent  mind 
would  not  seek  such  provisions. 

When  afterward  the  negotiations  were  trans- 

205 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

ferred  to  London,  and  came  under  the  precaution- 
ary vision  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  the  British 
Foreign  Office,  the  "entangled"  nature  of  the  Ger- 
man proposals  was  too  transparent  for  acceptance. 
Germany  still  insisted  on  complete  neutrality,  and 
would  make  no  agreement  without  it.  Grey,  on  the 
other  hand,  would  not  commit  Great  Britain  to  this 
disloyal  attitude  toward  the  other  European  pow- 
ers. His  attitude  was  expressed  in  the  formula: 
"England  declares  that  she  will  neither  make  nor 
join  in  any  provoked  attack  upon  Germany.  Ag- 
gression upon  Germany  forms  no  part  of  any 
treaty,  understanding  or  combination  to  which  Eng- 
land is  now  a  party,  nor  will  she  become  a  party  to 
anything  which  has  such  an  object."  x 

If  Germany  really  wanted  a  permanent  peace, 
here  was  the  opportunity  to  offer  a  similar  pledge, 
and  to  join  in  Lord  Haldane's  suggestion  of  a 
mutual  undertaking  against  "all  aggressive  mili- 
tary and  naval  combinations,"  which  would  have 
the  effect  of  excluding  all  plans  of  aggression. 

The  obstruction  to  this  agreement  was  that  a 
military  party  existed  in  Germany  which  desired 
Great  Britain's  pledge  of  neutrality,  in  order  that 
the  Pan-Germanist  plans  regarding  France  and 
Russia  might,  at  an  opportune  moment,  be  success- 
fully carried  into  execution.  In  the  eyes  of  this 
party,  England  was  an  obstacle  in  Germany's  path- 
way which  in  some  manner  must  be  removed. 

"England,"  Bernhardi,  who  expressed  the  aims 


1  See  Report  of  1915,  above  referred  to,  p.  170. 

206 


EFFORTS   FOR   BRITISH   NEUTRALITY 

of  this  party,  maintained,  "would  have  to  give 
Germany  an  absolutely  free  hand  in  all  questions 
touching  European  politics,  and  agree  beforehand 
to  any  increase  of  Germany's  power  on  the  con- 
tinent of  Europe  which  may  ensue  from  the  forma- 
tion of  a  Central  European  Union  of  Powers,  or 
from  a  German  war  with  France.  England  would 
have  to  agree  that  she  would  no  longer  strive  to 
prevent  by  her  diplomacy  the  expansion  of  Ger- 
many's colonial  empire  as  long  as  such  develop- 
ment would  not  take  place  at  England's  cost.  .  .  . 
England  would,  further,  have  to  bind  herself  that 
she  would  not  hinder  Austria's  expansion  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula.  She  would  have  to  offer  no  op- 
position to  Germany's  economic  expansion  in  Asia 
Minor,  and  she  would  have  to  make  up  her  mind 
that  she  would  no  longer  oppose  the  development 
of  Germany's  sea-power  by  the  acquisition  of  coal- 
ing-stations. ...  If  England  in  this  way  ap- 
proaches the  Triple  Alliance,"  he  affirms,  "Euro- 
pean peace  would  be  assured,  and  a  powerful 
counterpoise  would  be  created  to  the  growing  in- 
fluence of  the  United  States." x 

It  would  imply  a  condition  of  utter  blindness  to 
the  meaning  of  diplomatic  purpose  not  to  see  that 
the  results  just  enumerated  were  the  objects  aimed 
at  in  the  Kaiser's  efforts  to  secure  British  neutral- 
ity. With  Great  Britain  neutral,  Germany  might 
easily  carry  out  the  Pan-German  plans.    Whether 


1  Bernhardi's    Britain   as    Germany's    Vassal,    London,    1914 ;    a 
translation  of  Unsere  Zukunft,  Stuttgart,  1912. 

207 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

they  were  originally  the  Kaiser 's  own  plans  or  not, 
they  were  the  natural  fruits  of  his  military  ambi- 
tions; and  they  were  the  mainspring  of  Imperial 
German  diplomacy  in  the  conduct  of  these  negotia- 
tions for  British  neutrality. 

During  the  progress  of  these  conversations  just 
enough  of  them  was  publicly  known  to  create  the 
impression  in  many  minds  that  William  II  was  en- 
gaged in  a  noble  effort  to  promote  permanent  peace. 
It  was  at  this  time  that  Herr  Alfred  H.  Fried  was 
publishing  his  book  on  The  German  Emperor  and 
the  World  Peace,  in  which  he  proclaimed  that  the 
Kaiser  was  the  most  pacific  of  all  sovereigns. 

"Why,"  he  asked,  "is  the  Emperor  not  being 
supported  in  attaining  his  ends?  Why  is  he  not 
receiving  the  cordial  assistance  of  public  opinion 
which  even  an  Emperor  needs  when  he  wishes  to 
convert  ideas  into  deeds?"1  But,  to  Herr  Fried 's 
disgust,  as  he  complains,  "Some  German  news- 
papers recently  characterized  as  an  'impudent  cal- 
umny '  a  statement  made  by  the  late  W.  T.  Stead  to 
the  effect  that  His  Majestp  was  ambitious  of  be- 
queathing to  his  subjects  the  memory  of  a  reign 
which  was  not  stained  by  a  single  war." 

At  this  time  numerous  pilgrimages  by  groups  of 
clergymen,  journalists,  and  members  of  Parliament 
were  made  to  Berlin,  in  the  hope  of  proving  by  this 
manifestation  of  interest  the  devotion  of  English- 
men to  a  general  peace  and  the  disposition  in  Eng- 


1  Fried,  The  German  Emperor  and  the  World  Peace,  London, 
etc.,  1912. 

208 


EFFORTS    FOR   BRITISH   NEUTRALITY 

land  for  a  real  friendship  with  Germany.  These 
messengers,  of  whom  it  could  be  truly  said  that 
' 'their  feet  were  shod  with  the  preparation  of 
peace,"  were  courteously  received  in  Germany,  and 
there  were  even  feeble  responses  in  kind;  but  an 
impartial  observer  could  not  refrain  from  the  con- 
viction that  the  newspapers  referred  to  by  Herr 
Fried  as  resenting  the  imputation  of  pacifism  to  the 
Kaiser  had  more  intimate  knowledge  than  this 
writer  of  the  real  mental  attitude  of  William  II. 
A  rapprochement  with  Great  Britain  the  Kaiser, 
for  reasons  already  stated,  no  doubt  desired ;  but  in 
all  this  period  of  faith  and  expectation  on  the  part 
of  the  workers  for  a  permanent  organization  of 
peace,  not  one  word  was  spoken  by  the  Kaiser  to 
indicate  that  he  was  in  sympathy  with  any  general 
plan  for  this  purpose,  or  even  disposed  to  consider 
in  any  manner  the  substitution  of  general  legal  en- 
gagements for  military  domination.  For  him  the 
only  guarantee  of  peace  was  still  the  superior 
power  of  the  German  sword. 

The  general  situation  in  Europe  in  1912,  no  doubt, 
confirmed  the  Kaiser  in  his  resolution  to  keep  his 
military  force  intact.  Aside  from  the  Moroccan 
question,  there  were  other  intimate  relations  be- 
tween Germany  and  the  Mohammedan  world.  By 
dexterous  diplomacy  the  German  ambassador  at 
Constantinople,  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieberstein, 
had  managed,  at  the  time  of  the  Young  Turk  revo- 
lution in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  in  1909,  to  establish 
with  the  new  leaders  the  same  kind  of  close  friend- 

209 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

ship  which  Germany  had  long  enjoyed  with  the 
deposed  Sultan,  Abdul-Hamid.  In  October,  1911, 
Italy  had  begun  a  long-meditated  war  with  Turkey 
by  the  occupation  of  Tripoli  for  the  enforcement 
of  long-delayed  reforms  which  implied  the  con- 
quest of  the  country.  By  this  conflict  between 
Italy,  Germany's  ally,  and  Turkey,  of  whom  the 
Kaiser  was  posing  as  the  friend  and  protector, 
Germany  was  placed  in  a  position  of  extreme  em- 
barrassment. The  situation  was  further  compli- 
cated by  Italy's  decision,  since  she  could  not  end 
the  war  definitively  in  Tripoli,  on  account  of  the 
Arab  methods  of  warfare,  to  risk  the  intervention 
of  Europe,  by  extending  the  war  to  the  Turkish 
islands,  and  even  blockading  the  coast  of  Syria. 
At  the  same  time,  Europe  was  taken  by  surprise 
by  the  formation  of  the  Balkan  League,  which 
threatened  the  total  expulsion  of  the  Ottoman 
regime  from  Europe  and  foreboded  the  establish- 
ment of  a  Balkan  Confederation  that  would  for- 
ever bar  the  progress  of  Austro-German  control  in 
the  peninsula.  For  Germany  to  oppose  by  force  the 
procedure  of  Italy,  however,  would  be  to  destroy  the 
Triple  Alliance.  To  aid  her  against  Turkey,  on  the 
other  hand,  would  be  to  lose  the  friendship  of  the 
Turks,  on  which  the  Kaiser  was  relying,  not  only  for 
the  completion  and  control  of  the  Bagdad  Railway 
scheme,  which  was  intended  to  connect  Hamburg 
with  the  Persian  Gulf,  but  for  the  military  aid 
which  Prince  von  Biilow  has  informed  us  Germany 
was  then  counting  on  in  the  next  European  war. 

210 


EFFORTS    FOR   BRITISH   NEUTRALITY 

For  every  reason,  therefore,  it  was  Germany's 
policy  to  remain  inactive,  while  awaiting  that  dis- 
position of  affairs  which  would  render  opportune 
the  execution  of  the  Pan-German  plans. 

This  situation  was,  in  effect,  continued,  even 
after  the  Peace  of  Lausanne,  of  October  18,  1912, 
between  Italy  and  Turkey — brought  about  through 
the  influence  of  Germany  in  her  anxiety  to  end  the 
conflict  before  the  destiny  of  the  iEgean  islands 
might  call  for  the  intervention  of  the  other  Euro- 
pean powers.  The  cause  of  this  continuation  was 
the  breaking  out  of  the  first  Balkan  War. 

As  early  as  February,  1912,  a  league  had  been 
formed  between  Bulgaria,  Greece,  Montenegro, 
and  Serbia  for  the  expulsion  of  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire from  Europe  and  the  reorganization  of  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  upon  national  lines. 

As  such  a  division  of  the  territory  intermediate 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey  in  Asia 
would  frustrate  the  Austro-German  schemes  of 
territorial  and  economic  development,  a  joint 
effort  was  put  forth  to  prevent  "any  modification 
of  the  territorial  status  quo  in  European  Turkey''; 
but  the  proclamation  of  this  purpose,  by  agreement 
of  the  powers,  on  October  8,  1912,  was  too  late. 
War  between  the  Confederation  and  Turkey,  begun 
on  that  same  day  by  Montenegro,  on  the  15th  had 
been  declared  by  all  the  confederated  states. 

If  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  had  entered 
into  that  war  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  Turkish 
dominion  in  Europe,  they  would  have  encountered 

15  211 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

the  opposition  of  Russia,  as  well  as  of  the  Balkan 
states,  and  other  powers  might  have  been  drawn 
into  the  conflict.  Under  these  circumstances  the 
occasion  was  not  promising  for  Austro-German 
success,  for  all  the  Balkan  powers,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Rumania,  were  in  the  league.  How  formid- 
able and  how  unexpected  this  Balkan  combination 
was  is  shown  by  the  surprise  which  the  activity  of 
the  new  Confederation  created  at  Berlin. 

"I  dined  at  Kiderlen-Wachter's,"  writes  the 
Belgian  Minister  in  Berlin,  "on  the  evening  when 
news  was  brought  him  of  the  Turkish  defeat  at 
Kirk-Kilisseh.  No  words  of  mine  can  paint  his 
amazement.  He  almost  refused  to  believe  that  a 
fortified  position,  held  by  excellent  troops,  should 
have  been  carried  in  a  few  hours  by  an  army  of 
peasants."1 

Before  the  opportune  moment  for  German  action 
in  the  Balkans  could  arrive,  it  was  evidently  neces- 
sary to  divide  the  Confederation  and  win  over  to 
the  Austro-German  interests  a  part  at  least  of  the 
Balkan  states. 

In  the  beginning  there  had  been  no  doubt  in  Ger- 
many that  the  Balkan  War  would  be  of  short  dura- 
tion and  result  in  the  defeat  and  dissolution  of  the 
Confederates.  The  ground  of  this  belief  was  the 
fact  that  the  Turkish  army  had  been  trained  and 
reorganized  by  German  officers  and  liberally  sup- 
plied with  German  equipment,  while  the  army  of 
the  Confederation  consisted  in  levies  of  untrained 

1  Beyens,  Germany  Before  the  War,  London,  etc.,  1916,  p.  250. 

212 


EFFORTS    FOR    BRITISH   NEUTRALITY 

men.  It  was  a  surprise,  however,  when  it  was 
ascertained  that  its  combined  forces  numbered 
650,000  men,  animated  by  a  resolute  determination 
to  emancipate  their  fellow-Christians  from  Turkish 
rule  and  to  organize  the  Balkan  Peninsula  on  the 
basis  of  nationality.  Before  the  month  of  October 
had  ended  the  great  battles  of  the  war  had  been 
fought  and  won  by  the  allied  armies,  and  the  Turks 
had  been  driven  within  a  small  area  near  Con- 
stantinople. 

At  this  point  the  Turkish  government  appealed 
to  the  great  powers  for  mediation,  and  on  Decem- 
ber 12,  1912,  the  ambassadors  of  these  powers 
united  in  a  conference  at  London  for  this  purpose, 
while  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  belligerents  at 
the  same  time  assembled  to  begin  negotiations  for 
peace  under  their  auspices.  The  Balkan  uprising 
had  then  become  a  European  question,  in  which  all 
the  great  powers  had  an  interest. 

The  danger  of  a  general  European  conflict  over 
the  settlement  was  serious.  An  opportunity  was 
presented  to  solve  permanently  the  Balkan  prob- 
lem by  organizing  on  just  lines  this  turbulent  area 
of  national  rivalries,  but  this  required  the  assent 
of  all  the  powers.  A  just  reorganization  could  be 
accomplished  only  by  giving  to  each  of  the  rival 
nationalities  such  frontiers  and  such  access  to  the 
great  international  waterways  as  its  future  eco- 
nomic prosperity  demanded.  In  brief,  what  was 
needed  was  a  peace  based  upon  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  justice,  and  not  upon  the  will  and  ambi- 

213 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

tions  of  the  great  powers  called  upon  to  outline 
the  conditions  of  peace. 

Serbia  had  taken  possession  of  Durazzo,  which 
gave  her  access  to  the  sea,  and  she  declined  to  sur- 
render it.  To  the  retention  of  this  seaport  by 
Serbia  Austria-Hungary  stoutly  objected,  and  be- 
gan the  mobilization  of  her  troops.  "A  territorial 
increase  of  Serbia  represents  an  immediate  danger 
to  Austria-Hungary,''  it  had  been  declared,  ''and 
the  monarchy  must  hinder  it."  If  Serbia  should 
bar  the  way  to  the  future  southward  expansion  of 
the  Dual  Monarchy  by  a  continuous  extension  of 
territory,  including  a  port  on  the  Adriatic,  the 
Austro-German  plans  for  the  future  would  thereby 
be  frustrated. 

The  complete  solidarity  of  Germany  and  Austria 
regarding  the  Balkan  question  soon  became  evi- 
dent. Any  permanent  settlement  that  would  bar 
the  Austro-German  plans  for  future  southward  ex- 
pansion would  be  opposed.  While  Austria-Hun- 
gary was  mobilizing  an  army  to  prevent  the  Ser- 
bian retention  of  Durazzo,  Germany,  through 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  announced  that  if  a  third 
power  undertook  to  prevent  a  member  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  from  defending  its  interests,  Germany 
would  support  her  ally.  With  this  aid  Austria- 
Hungary  carried  her  point  in  the  conference,  the 
tribesmen  of  Albania  were  constituted  into  a  sepa- 
rate state,  with  a  German  prince  as  sovereign,  and 
Serbia  was  shut  off  on  every  side  from  the  sea. 
Here  was  planted  the  seed  of  another  war.    The 

214 


EFFORTS   FOR   BRITISH   NEUTRALITY 

original  Balkan  alliance  had  assured  Durazzo  to 
Serbia,  for  which  she  had  agreed  to  surrender 
Macedonia  to  Bulgaria ;  but,  now  that  Durazzo  was 
denied  her,  a  quarrel  with  her  neighbor  arose  over 
the  assignment  of  territory,  and  before  the  Treaty 
of  London  was  signed,  on  May  30,  1913,  the  Bul- 
garians, Serbs,  and  Greeks  were  contesting  the  di- 
vision of  territory.  Rumania  now  entered  upon  the 
scene  and  demanded  territorial  compensation.  On 
August  10,  1913,  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  was  con- 
cluded, by  which  Rumania  acquired  the  territory 
she  desired  at  the  expense  of  Bulgaria,  Greece  ob- 
tained Salonika,  and  Serbia  preserved  the  part  of 
Macedonia  she  had  claimed.  In  the  mean  time, 
Turkey  had  taken  advantage  of  the  situation  to 
win  back  from  Bulgaria  about  twice  what  the 
Treaty  of  London  had  assigned  her.  The  great 
powers,  fearing  to  precipitate  further  conflict, 
withheld  their  hand,  and  the  Balkan  Peninsula  was 
left  nominally  at  peace,  but  in  reality  as  a  fertile 
seed-plot  for  future  strife.  As  we  now  know  from 
the  revelations  of  the  Italian  Prime  Minister  of 
that  time,  Signor  Giolitti,  when  the  Treaty  of 
Bucharest  was  signed,  in  1913,  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Foreign  Office  invited  Italy  to  be  a  party 
to  an  attack  on  Serbia. x  Italy  refused ;  but  the  mo- 
ment for  executing  this  project  only  awaited  a  fa- 
vorable opportunity. 


1  Statement  of  Signor  Giolitti  on  December  5,  1914,  in  the 
Italian  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The  text  is  given  in  Gauvin,  Les 
Origines  de  la  Guerre  Europeenne,  Paris,  1915.  Also  in  Scott,  A 
Survey  of  International  Relations,  etc.,  New  York,  1917,  p.  42. 

215 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

In  the  mean  time,  the  Balkan  situation  having 
been  glided  over  without  a  European  conflict,  the 
policy  of  preparing  for  a  German  Avar  of  expan- 
sion by  securing  the  assurance  of  British  neutral- 
ity went  steadily  on. 

Unable  to  obtain  a  free  hand  to  carry  on  war, 
with  the  assurance  of  non-intervention  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain,  which  the  Kaiser  had  sought  to 
procure  at  the  time  of  Lord  Haldane  's  mission,  the 
aim  of  Germany  now  was,  not  to  secure  a  perma- 
nent general  European  understanding,  in  which  all 
should  participate,  but  by  a  process  of  private  bar- 
gaining to  obtain  the  acquiescence  of  Great  Britain 
in  Germany's  predominance  in  continental  affairs. 

The  plans  of  operation  were  skilfully  devised.  In 
1912,  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieberstein,  who  had  so 
ably  carried  out  the  policy  of  Germany  at  Con- 
stantinople, was  transferred  as  ambassador  to 
London;  but,  after  a  few  months'  residence,  he 
died  on  September  24th  of  that  year. 

The  reputation  of  Von  Bieberstein  as  a  crafty 
opponent  of  British  interests  in  the  East  was  well 
known  in  London,  and  the  British  Foreign  Office 
was  proportionately  wary  of  his  procedure.  Not 
improbably  the  German  Foreign  Office  became  con- 
scious of  this  disadvantage ;  at  all  events,  in  select- 
ing his  successor  the  choice  fell  upon  a  man  of  an 
entirely  different  stamp.  If  Baron  Marschall  has 
left  memoirs,  it  is  not  impossible  that  the  world 
may  some  day  know  under  what  instructions  he  was 
acting  during  his  short  residence  in  London.     In 

216 


EFFORTS   FOR   BRITISH   NEUTRALITY 

the  case  of  Prince  Lichnowsky,  however,  who  suc- 
ceeded him,  confidential  records,  designed  only  for 
his  family  archives,  have  been  made  public,  and 
we  have  from  this  authentic  German  source  an 
explicit  statement,  not  only  regarding  the  manner 
in  which  his  mission  was  conducted  and  the  spirit 
in  which  it  was  received  on  the  part  of  the  British 
officials,  but  of  the  disillusionment  he  experienced 
when  he  finally  discovered  the  real  purposes  of  his 
own  government,  of  which  he  had  been  made  the 
unconscious  instrument. x  The  story  of  the  ambas- 
sador pours  a  stream  of  white  light  upon  the  Ger- 
man preparations  for  the  Great  War  which  dissi- 
pates completely  the  obscurity  in  which  well-known 
facts,  otherwise  indisputably  established,  were  par- 
tially enshrouded  until  this  unexpected  revelation 
of  the  Kaiser's  secret  diplomacy  made  them  clear. 
Baron  Marschall,  Prince  Lichnowsky  affirms,  had 
employed  his  declining  strength  in  trying  ' '  to  con- 
vince the  English  of  the  harmless  character  of  our 
fleet,  efforts  which  naturally  had  no  result  except 
to  strengthen  an  entirely  opposite  impression." 
What  was  needed  at  London,  the  Imperial  Foreign 


1  The  memorandum  of  Prince  Lichnowsky  and  the  reply  to  it 
issued  by  Herr  von  Jagow,  Imperial  German  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  have  been  published  in  the  United  States, 
first  in  the  New  York  Times  and  its  Current  History  for  May 
and  June,  1918,  and  subsequently  in  book  form  under  the  titles, 
The  Guilt  of  Germany,  Putnam's,  New  York,  1918;  My  Mission 
to  London,  with  preface  by  Gilbert  Murray,  Doran,  New  York, 
1918;  and  The  Disclosures  from  Germany,  American  Association 
for  International  Conciliation,  New  York,  1918.  This  last  con- 
tains the  German  text,  with  a  translation  on  the  opposite  page  by 
Professor  Monroe  Smith,  with  an  introduction  and  notes  by  Mon- 
roe Smith  and  Henry  F.  Monroe. 

217 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Office  apparently  saw,  was  British  faith  in  German 
sincerity.  To  secure  it,  Prince  Lichnowsky,  a 
country  gentleman  who  had  been  quietly  living  on 
his  estates  in  Silesia  for  eight  years  since  he  had 
held  office  in  the  diplomatic  service,  and  was  wholly 
ignorant  of  the  Kaiser's  secret  purposes,  was  sent 
to  London.  This  highly  honorable  and  chivalrous 
gentleman,  whose  acquaintance  I  made  during  his 
brief  visits  to  Berlin  in  the  court  season,  came  to 
his  new  task  with  an  innocent  mind  and  all  good 
intentions.  Gentle  and  kindly  in  his  character,  he 
was  precisely  the  man  to  represent  in  good  faith 
Germany's  desire  for  a  loyal  rapprochement  with 
Great  Britain.  Personally  he  desired  it  and  firmly 
believed  in  its  possibility.  Knowing  nothing  of 
ulterior  designs,  he  could  not  do  otherwise  than 
impress  the  British  Government  with  the  sincere 
friendliness  which  he  personally  felt,  and  which  it 
was  his  mission  to  create. 

"When  I  came  to  London  in  November,  1912," 
says  the  Prince,  "anxiety  regarding  Morocco  had 
subsided,  for  in  Berlin,  in  the  mean  time,  an  agree- 
ment had  been  reached  with  France.  Haldane's 
mission  had  indeed  failed,  because  we  demanded  a 
promise  of  neutrality  instead  of  contenting  our- 
selves with  a  treaty  which  was  to  insure  us  against 
British  attacks  and  attacks  with  British  support. 

"Sir  Edward  Grey,  however,  had  not  given  up 
the  idea  of  coming  to  an  understanding  with  us, 
and  made  such  an  attempt  first  in  the  colonial  and 
economic  fields.  .  .  . 

218 


EFFORTS    FOR   BRITISH   NEUTRALITY 

"The  moment  was  undoubtedly  favorable  for  a 
new  effort  to  establish  better  relations  with  Eng- 
land. Our  enigmatic  policy  in  Morocco  had  repeat- 
edly shaken  confidence  in  our  peaceful  intentions; 
it  had  at  least  aroused  the  suspicion  that  we  did 
not  quite  know  what  we  wanted  or  that  our  purpose 
was  to  keep  Europe  on  edge  and,  on  occasion,  to 
humiliate  the  French.  An  Austrian  colleague,  who 
had  been  long  in  Paris,  said  to  me :  *  If  the  French 
begin  to  forget  la  revanche,  you  regularly  remind 
them  of  it  by  a  good  hard  kick  or  two.'  "  * 

With  Germany  speaking  at  London  in  concilia- 
tory tones  through  Prince  Lichnowsky,  it  must  have 
appeared  to  the  British  Government  that  Germany 
was  almost  penitent  for  the  rudeness  of  its  past. 
As  regards  Balkan  affairs  also,  the  honest  inde- 
pendence of  the  ambassador  must  have  inspired 
confidence  in  the  Kaiser's  Eastern  policy. 

"At  that  time,,,  he  writes,  "the  first  Balkan 
War  had  led  to  the  collapse  of  Turkey  and,  conse- 
quently, to  a  defeat  of  our  policy,  which  for  years 
had  tied  itself  up  with  the  Turks.  Now  that  Euro- 
pean Turkey  was  past  saving,  two  possible  courses 
were  open  to  us  as  regarded  the  settlement  of  its 
estate.  Either  we  declared  that  we  were  in  no  wise 
interested  in  the  determination  of  boundaries  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula,  and  left  their  adjustment  to  the 
Balkan  peoples,  or  we  supported  our  allies,  pur- 
sued a  Triple  Alliance  policy  in  the  East,  and  thus 
abandoned  the  role  of  mediator.  .  .  . 


1  Monroe  Smith's  translation,  pp.  27,  33. 

219 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

"The  salient  point  was  the  Albanian  question. 
Our  allies  desired  the  establishment  of  an  inde- 
pendent state  of  Albania,  because  Austria  was  un- 
willing to  permit  the  Serbs  to  gain  access  to  the 
Adriatic,  and  Italy  did  not  wish  the  Greeks  to  push 
their  boundary  to  Valona,  or  even  to  the  north  of 
Corfu.  On  the  other  hand,  Russia,  as  is  known, 
favored  the  Serbian,  and  France  the  Greek,  desires. 

"My  advice  was  to  consider  this  question  as  one 
lying  outside  the  alliance,  and  to  support  neither 
the  Austrian  nor  the  Italian  desires.  Without  our 
support,  however,  the  Albanian  state,  whose  inca- 
pacity to  exist  might  have  been  foreseen,  could  not 
possibly  have  been  established.  Serbia  would  have 
pushed  forward  to  the  sea,  and  the  present  world 
war  would  have  been  avoided.' ' x 

How  little  the  ambassador  understood  the  ulti- 
mate purposes  of  the  Kaiser,  as  since  revealed,  this 
passage  most  clearly  demonstrates.  It  was,  per- 
haps, not  intended  that  he  should  know  more  than 
was  sufficient  for  the  special  part  he  was  to  play, 
namely,  to  obtain  an  entirely  free  hand  for  Germany 
on  the  Continent  by  winning  the  entire  confidence  of 
Great  Britain.  In  this  a  knowledge  of  the  Kaiser's 
real  designs  would  be  only  an  embarrassment. 

"I  was  kept  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  most 
important  matters,"  he  writes,  "and  I  was  restrict- 
ed to  sending  unimportant  and  tiresome  reports." 

How  well  all  this  served  the  designs  of  the  Impe- 
rial German  Government,  in  the  conferences  of  the 


1  Monroe  Smith's  translation,  pp.  35,  37. 

220 


EFFORTS    FOR   BRITISH   NEUTRALITY 

ambassadors  in  London  during  the  progress  of  the 
Balkan  Wars,  is  evident.  Under  the  mask  of  Lich- 
nowsky's  good- will  and  unconscious  ignorance  of 
the  collusion  between  Germany  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary, the  Kaiser's  aims  were  completely  concealed. 
And  the  Prince  has  recorded  his  amazement  when, 
later,  he  discovered  that  avoiding  a  war  with  Russia 
was  not  the  aim  of  German  policy ! 

Prince  Lichnowsky's  account  of  the  part  he 
played  in  the  general  conferences  of  the  ambassa- 
dors in  London  during  the  Balkan  commotions  is 
most  enlightening.  What  renders  it  of  the  highest 
importance  is  that  it  was  exactly  the  role  he  was 
apparently  intended  to  play  by  his  own  government. 
Incidentally,  moreover,  he  pays  a  high  tribute  to 
the  good  faith  and  conciliatory  conduct  of  the 
British  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Sir 
Edward  Grey. 

"Soon  after  my  arrival  in  London/ '  he  writes, 
"at  the  close  of  the  year  1912,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
suggested  an  informal  discussion  to  prevent  a 
European  war  from  growing  out  of  the  Balkan 
War.  We  had,  unfortunately,  already  declined  the 
request  of  the  French  government,  made  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  to  join  in  a  declaration  of 
disinterestedness.  From  the  outset  the  British 
statesman  took  the  position  that  England  had  no 
interest  in  Albania  and  therefore  did  not  mean  to 
let  war  come  on  this  issue.  It  was  his  purpose  sim- 
ply to  act  as  a  mediator,  an  l honest  broker,'  be- 
tween the  two  groups,  and  to  try  to  smooth  away 

221 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

difficulties.  Accordingly,  he  by  no  means  placed 
himself  on  the  side  of  his  Entente  associates ;  and 
during  the  negotiations,  which  lasted  some  eight 
months,  by  force  of  his  good-will  and  his  controlling 
influence,  he  made  no  slight  contributions  to  an  un- 
derstanding. Instead  of  taking  a  position  like  the 
English,  we  invariably  defended  the  point  of  view 
which  was  prescribed  to  us  by  Vienna.  Count 
Mensdorff  led  the  Triple  Alliance  in  London,  I  was 
his  second.  My  task  was  to  support  his  proposals. 
In  Berlin  it  was  the  shrewd  and  experienced  Count 
Szogyenyi  who  ran  the  affair.  His  refrain  was: 
'Here  the  casus  foederis  comes  in';  and  when,  on 
one  occasion,  I  ventured  to  dispute  the  correctness 
of  this  conclusion,  I  received  a  serious  warning  on 
the  ground  of  my  'Austrophobia.'  It  was  also 
asserted,  alluding  to  my  father,  that  I  was  under 
an  '  hereditary  burden. ' 

"On  every  issue — Albania,  a  Serbian  harbor  on 
the  Adriatic,  Skutari,  and  in  drawing  the  boundaries 
of  Albania — we  took  the  point  of  view  of  Austria 
and  of  Italy,  while  Sir  Edward  Grey  almost  never 
supported  that  of  France  or  of  Russia.  On  the 
contrary,  in  most  instances  he  lent  his  support  to 
our  group,  in  order  to  give  no  pretext  for  war,  such 
as  was  subsequently  furnished  by  a  dead  archduke. 
It  was  thus  with  his  help  that  we  succeeded  in  coax- 
ing King  Nicholas  out  of  Skutari.  Otherwise  the 
World  War  might  have  been  started  on  this  ques- 
tion, since  we  surely  would  not  have  ventured  to 
urge  our  ally  to  make  any  concession. 


EFFORTS   FOR   BRITISH   NEUTRALITY 

"Sir  Edward  Grey  conducted  the  negotiations 
with  prudence,  calmness,  and  tact.  As  often  as  a 
question  threatened  to  become  complicated,  he  sug- 
gested a  formula  of  agreement  that  met  the  case 
and  was  invariably  accepted.  His  personality  won 
him  equal  confidence  among  all  who  took  part  in 
the  conference. ' ' x 

1  Monroe  Smith's  translation,  pp.  47,  49. 


CHAPTER  IX 
THE    KAISER'S   DOUBLE    DIPLOMACY 

'T^HERE  were  between  Germany  and  Great 
A  Britain  several  concrete  causes  of  misunder- 
standing which  it  was  well  to  remove  by  frank 
negotiation.  This  was,  in  fact,  a  necessary  prelimi- 
nary to  any  real  friendship.  With  perfect  sincer- 
ity, just  as  disputes  with  France  had  been  ended 
in  1904,  and  with  Russia  in  1907,  the  British  Gov- 
ernment was  ready  to  meet  the  demands  of  Ger- 
many, and  thus  widen  the  circle  of  the  Entente  by 
including  Germany  in  it. 

There  were  three  matters  regarding  which  the 
relations  of  the  two  countries  needed  adjustment. 
First  of  all,  Germany,  considering  herself,  as  a 
great  power,  entitled  to  colonies,  desired  to  have 
a  free  hand  in  acquiring  them.  Secondly,  in  pur- 
suing her  program  of  economic  expansion  in  the 
East  she  had  obtained  valuable  concessions  from 
Turkey,  not  only  for  the  building  of  the  Bagdad 
Railway,  but  for  special  industrial  and  commercial 
advantages  which  Great  Britain  considered  too  ex- 
clusive. Thirdly,  in  order  to  carry  out  her  colonial 
and  economic  projects  regardless  of  the  opposition 

224 


THE  KAISER'S  DOUBLE  DIPLOMACY 

of  Great  Britain,  Germany  had  enlarged  her  navy 
to  an  extent  that  created  anxiety  in  England. 

Seeing  in  these  aspirations  a  formidable  rival 
to  British  interests,  Great  Britain  in  1912  had  come 
to  regard  the  German  Empire  with  suspicion,  if 
not  with  sentiments  of  hostility,  for  which  the  occa- 
sional bellicose  prommciamentos  of  the  Kaiser  and 
Germany's  growing  military  and  naval  prepara- 
tions seemed  to  offer  justification.  To  Germany, 
on  the  other  hand,  Great  Britain  appeared  to  pre- 
sent an  obstacle  to  the  realization  of  her  ambition 
for  expansion;  and  the  reconciliation  of  British 
with  French  and  Russian  interests  was  interpreted, 
not  as  progress  toward  a  general  European  under- 
standing and  peaceful  relations,  but,  in  effect,  as  a 
menace  and  an  ''encirclement." 

When,  therefore,  the  Kaiser  showed  an  inclina- 
tion to  consider  with  the  British  Government  what 
measures  could  be  adopted  as  means  of  a  rap- 
prochement, this  step  was  welcomed  and  applauded 
in  England  as  evidence  of  a  changed  intention  on 
the  part  of  Germany.  For  a  time  it  appeared  as 
if  a  bridge  between  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the 
Triple  Entente  was  about  to  be  constructed  which 
might  ultimately  lead  to  a  general  result  of  immense 
importance. 

The  spirit  in  which  these  negotiations  were  con- 
ducted by  the  British  Government  is  thus  described 
by  Prince  Lichnowsky: 

"The  object  of  the  negotiations  between  us  and 
England,  which  had  begun  before  my  arrival,  was 

225 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

to  revise  and  amend  our  treaty  of  1898,  which  con- 
tained a  number  of  impracticable  provisions,  even 
as  regarded  geographical  delimitation.  Thanks  to 
the  conciliatory  attitude  of  the  British  Government, 
I  succeeded  in  giving  to  the  new  treaty  a  form 
which  entirely  corresponded  to  our  wishes  and  in- 
terests. All  Angola,  as  far  as  the  20th  degree  of 
longitude,  was  assigned  to  us,  so  that  we  reached 
the  Congo  territory  from  the  south.  Moreover,  the 
valuable  islands  of  San  Thome  and  Principe,  which 
lie  north  of  the  equator  and  therefore  really  be- 
longed to  the  French  sphere  of  interest,  were  al- 
lotted to  us — a  fact  which  caused  my  French 
colleague  to  enter  energetic  but  unavailing  pro- 
tests. 

"Further,  we  obtained  the  northern  part  of  Mo- 
zambique ;  the  Licango  formed  the  boundary. 

"The  British  Government  showed  the  utmost 
readiness  to  meet  our  interests  and  wishes.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  intended  to  prove  his  good-will  to 
us,  but  he  also  desired  to  promote  our  colonial 
development  as  a  whole,  because  England  hoped  to 
divert  the  German  output  of  energy  from  the 
North  Sea  and  Western  Europe  to  the  ocean  and  to 
Africa.  'We  don't  want  to  grudge  Germany  her 
colonial  development,'  a  member  of  the  Cabinet 
said  to  me.  .  .  . 

"The  treaty  was  substantially  complete  at  the 
time  of  the  King's  visit  to  Berlin  in  May,  1913. 
At  that  time  a  discussion  took  place  in  Berlin,  under 
the  presidency  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  in  which 

226 


THE  KAISER'S  DOUBLE  DIPLOMACY 

I  took  part,  and  at  which  some  further  desires  of 
ours  were  denned.  On  my  return  to  London  I  suc- 
ceeded, with  the  help  of  the  counselor  of  the  em- 
bassy, Herr  von  Kuhlmann,  who  was  working  with 
Mr.  Parker  upon  the  details  of  the  treaty,  in  put- 
ting through  our  last  proposals  also;  so  that  in 
August,  1913,  before  I  went  on  leave,  Sir  Edward 
Grey  and  I  were  able  to  paragraph  the  entire 
treaty. 

''At  this  point,  however,  new  difficulties  were  to 
arise,  which  prevented  the  signing  of  the  treaty; 
and  it  was  only  a  year  later,  shortly  before  the 
outbreak  of  war,  that  I  was  able  to  obtain  authori- 
zation for  its  definite  conclusion.  But  it  never 
reached  the  point  of  being  signed. ' ' 1 

A  double  reason  is  given  why  the  signature  of 
the  treaty  was  postponed.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the 
ambassador  reports,  was  unwilling  to  sign  unless 
the  treaty  was  published,  together  with  the  two  pre- 
vious treaties  of  1898  and  1899,  on  the  ground 
that  England  was  not  willing  to  conceal  her 
binding  engagements.  He  was,  however,  disposed 
to  sign  if  publication  were  not  deferred  beyond  one 
year. 

Objections  were  raised  by  the  Imperial  German 
Foreign  Office,  the  ambassador  affirms,  on  the 
ground  that  "the  publication  would  imperil  our 
interests  in  the  colonies."  This  excuse  having 
been  shown  to  be  unfounded,  a  new  one  was  in- 
vented, to  the  effect  that  the  publication  "might 


1  Monroe  Smith's  translation,  pp.  61,  65. 
16  227 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

jeopard  the  position  of  Herr  von  Bothmann-Holl- 
weg,  because  it  would  be  proof  of  British  hypocrisy 
and  perfidy!" 

Notwithstanding  "ever  fresh  proposals  concern- 
ing publication,' '  continues  Lichnowsky,  in  repeat- 
ed conversations  with  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  Berlin 
Foreign  Office  "remained  obstinate";  .  .  .  "so  the 
treaty,  which  gave  us  extraordinary  advantages, 
and  was  the  result  of  more  than  one  year's  work, 
perished,"  the  ambassador  concludes,  "because  it 
would  have  been  a  public  success  for  me." 

While  this  manifestation  of  personal  sensibility 
on  the  part  of  Prince  Lichnowsky  does  not  diminish 
the  substantial  value  of  his  account,  which  is  un- 
affected by  the  question  whether  the  true  reason 
for  Germany's  indifference  to  the  treaty  he  had 
elaborated  was  or  was  not  based  on  personal 
grounds,  there  is,  in  fact,  quite  a  different  inter- 
pretation, in  the  light  of  other  events,  to  be  placed 
upon  Germany's  hesitation  to  sign  the  treaty.  One 
thing  was  still  lacking  to  it ;  and  there  was,  there- 
fore, from  the  German  point  of  view,  reason  for 
further  negotiation,  namely,  to  obtain,  if  possible, 
as  the  crown  and  final  triumph  of  it  the  "benevolent 
neutrality"  of  Great  Britain,  in  case  of  continental 
complications.  In  the  mean  time,  as  we  shall  see, 
the  Kaiser  was  engaging  in  other  conversations  and 
was  forming  plans  not  yet  ripe  for  discussion, 
which  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain  might  pro- 
foundly affect. 

In  close  connection  with  the  African  question, 

228 


THE  KAISER'S  DOUBLE  DIPLOMACY 

that  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  also  was  being  dis- 
cussed at  London. 

"After  we  had  drawn  into  conference  a  repre- 
sentative of  Turkey,  Hakki  Pasha,  all  the  economic 
questions  connected  with  the  German  enterprises 
were  regulated,  in  substantial  accord  with  the  de- 
sires of  the  German  Bank.  The  most  important 
concession  made  to  me  personally  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey  was  the  prolongation  of  the  railway  to  Basra. 
This  particular  object  had  been  abandoned,  on  our 
part,  in  favor  of  a  connection  with  Alexandretta. 
Up  to  this  time  Bagdad  formed  the  terminus  of  the 
line.  Navigation  on  the  Shatt-el-Arab  was  to  be 
placed  under  an  international  commission.  We 
were  also  admitted  to  participation  in  the  Basra 
harbor  works  and,  in  addition,  we  obtained  rights 
in  the  navigation  of  the  Tigris,  which  had  been  pre- 
viously a  monopoly  of  the  firm  of  Lynch. 

"By  virtue  of  this  treaty  all  Mesopotamia  as 
far  as  Basra  became  our  sphere  of  interest,  with- 
out prejudice  to  older  British  rights  in  the  navi- 
gation of  the  Tigris  and  in  the  Wilcox  irriga- 
tion works.  Our  sphere  further  included  the 
whole  region  of  the  Bagdad  and  Anatolian  Rail- 
way. 

"The  British  economic  domain  was  to  include  the 
coasts  of  the  Persian  Gulf  and  the  Smyrna- Aidin 
line;  the  French,  Syria;  the  Russian,  Armenia. 
Had  these  two  treaties  been  executed  and  published, 
an  understanding  with  England  would  have  been 
reached  which  would  forever  have  dissipated  all 

229 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

doubts  as  to  the  possibility  of  an  Anglo-German 
co-operation."  x 

There  is,  indeed,  little  doubt  that,  if  this  treaty 
could  have  been  honorably  executed  and  strictly  ob- 
served, as  a  supplement  to  the  Anglo-French  and 
Anglo-Russian  understandings  of  a  like  character, 
Europe  would  have  entered  upon  a  period  of  reas- 
surance regarding  peace.  Russia  had  already,  in 
1910,  during  the  Czar's  visit  to  Potsdam,  shown  a 
favorable  disposition  by  withdrawing  previous  op- 
position to  the  Bagdad  Railway,  and  in  1911  had 
signed  an  agreement  in  which  Germany  had  recog- 
nized Russian  commercial  interests  in  Persia,  and 
Russia  had  arranged  to  connect  with  the  German 
railway  the  Russian  railroads  in  northern  Persia. 2 
The  causes  of  anxiety  regarding  naval  armament 
having  been  thus  to  a  great  degree  removed,  the 
prospect  of  overcoming  even  that  element  of  dis- 
cord was  considerably  improved.  In  the  early  sum- 
mer of  1914,  therefore,  all  the  surface  indications 
seemed  to  point  toward  an  era  of  good  under- 
standing. 

Did  Germany's  part  in  these  negotiations  mark 
the  final  abandonment  of  the  Pan-German  plans, 


1  Monroe  Smith's  translation,  pp.  71,  73.  For  the  provisions  of 
the  treaty  regarding  the  Bagdad  Railway  see  also  a  document  cor- 
rected and  approved  by  the  Imperial  German  Foreign  Office,  pub- 
lished by  McClure,  Obstacles  to  Peace,  pp.  41,  42.  He  cites  further 
from  the  speech  of  the  Chancellor,  December  2,  1914,  "This  under- 
standing was  to  lessen  every  possible  political  friction.  The  world 
is  wide.  There  is  room  enough  for  both  nations  to  measure  their 
strength  in  peaceful  rivalry  as  long  as  our  national  strength  is 
allowed  free  scope  for  development." 

2  See  Holt  and  Chilton,  History  of  Europe,  p.  535. 

230 


THE  KAISER'S  DOUBLE  DIPLOMACY 

or  was  it  intended,  by  a  rapprochement  with  Great 
Britain,  through  a  removal  of  outstanding  dis- 
agreements, to  secure  from  her,  when  all  differ- 
ences were  adjusted,  that  neutrality  in  a  future  war 
of  expansion  on  the  Continent  which  had  been 
sought  at  the  time  of  Lord  Haldane's  mission,  but 
which  Germany  had  then  failed  to  procure? 

The  true  answer  to  this  question  is  found  in  the 
fact  that  there  were  two  parties  in  Germany  pur- 
suing quite  opposite  policies.  One  of  these,  the  evi- 
dence seems  to  show,  hoped  to  win  for  Germany 
the  objects  of  her  ambition  in  the  colonial  and  eco- 
nomic sphere  through  diplomacy;  the  other  in- 
tended to  obtain  them  in  more  ample  measure 
through  military  action.  The  former  was  inspired 
by  the  more  moderate  views  and  pacific  tempera- 
ment of  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg  and  the  Foreign 
Office,  the  latter  by  Grand- Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  the 
military  caste,  and  the  Pan-Germanists. 

What,  then  was  the  attitude  of  Kaiser  Will- 
iam II? 

This  question  must  be  answered  by  the  evidence 
derived  from  the  course  of  events  and  the  testimony 
of  competent  persons  regarding  the  Kaiser's  part 
in  them.  It  is,  however,  important  to  remember 
that,  during  these  negotiations,  and  after  they  were 
concluded,  William  II  gave  no  indication  that  he 
had  even  for  a  moment  abandoned  his  lifelong 
theory  that  the  peace  of  Europe  depended  upon 
Germany's  readiness  for  war,  or  his  purpose  to 
secure  from  Great  Britain  her  "benevolent  neu- 

231 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

trality,"  in  case  war  should  develop  on  the  Con- 
tinent. On  the  contrary,  we  have,  as  we  shall  see, 
the  Kaiser's  own  written  complaint  that  Great 
Britain  did  not  finally  accord  to  him  the  neutrality 
he  had  expected,  and  which  up  to  the  very  moment 
when  war  was  declared  by  him  he  believed  he  had, 
in  effect,  secured. 

Upon  the  point  whether  or  not  William  II  was 
meditating  future  war  during  the  period  when  the 
negotiations  with  Great  Britain  were  peaceably 
proceeding,  we  could  hardly  expect  to  have  better 
evidence  than  that  derived  from  the  activity  of 
Germany  in  preparing  for  a  conflict  for  which  no 
reason  existed,  except  the  Pan-German  plans  of 
aggression  and  expansion,  which  had  never  been 
abandoned.  During  all  these  negotiations  the 
Kaiser  was  actively  preparing  for  war.  On  March 
18,  1913,  a  new  army  bill  was  submitted  to  the 
Reichstag.  The  reason  given  for  it  was  the  com- 
motion in  the  Balkans,  and  especially  the  successes 
of  the  Balkan  states;  but  it  had  been  long  before 
in  contemplation,  and  the  war  material  for  which 
this  new  appropriation  was  to  pay  had  already 
been  ordered  at  Krupp's.  When  the  French, 
alarmed  at  Germany's  increase  of  her  army,  with 
difficulty  passed  the  law  requiring  of  her  recruits 
three  years  of  service  instead  of  two,  an  attempt 
was  made  in  Germany,  through  the  press,  to  make 
the  German  people  believe  that  the  increase  in  the 
French  army  was  the  reason  for  the  German  army 
bill.    In  the  mean  time,  the  strategic  railroads  lead- 

232 


THE  KAISER'S  DOUBLE  DIPLOMACY 

ing  into  Luxemburg  and  Belgium  were  the  objects 
of  renewed  attention.  On  July  23,  1913,  the  new 
German  Imperial  and  state  citizenship  law — pro- 
viding that  Germans  might  retain  German  citizen- 
ship after  acquiring  citizenship  in  other  countries — 
was  proclaimed  by  the  Emperor  to  go  into  effect  on 
January  1,  1914,  simultaneously  with  a  revision  of 
the  Imperial  law  regarding  liability  to  military 
service.  On  August  9,  1913,  Austria-Hungary  was 
making  her  secrei  proposal  to  Italy  to  join  in  an 
attack  upon  Serbia,  and  received  Italy's  refusal  to 
recognize  the  casus  foederis.  It  is  incredible  that 
this  proposal  would  ever  have  been  made  without 
the  previous  assent  of  Germany. 

"  After  Agadir,"  writes  the  Belgian  Minister  to 
Germany,  "William  II  came  to  regard  a  war  with 
France  as  inexorably  decreed  by  Fate.  On  the 
5th  and  6th  of  November,  1913,  the  King  of  the 
Belgians  was  his  guest  at  Potsdam,  after  returning 
from  Liineburg,  where  he  had  paid  his  usual  cour- 
tesy visit  to  the  regiment  of  dragoons  of  which 
he  was  Colonel.  On  this  occasion  the  Emperor  told 
King  Albert  that  he  looked  upon  war  with  France 
as  "inevitable  and  close  at  hand.'  " * 

The  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  General  von 
Moltke,  is  reported  to  have  used  the  same  bluster- 
ing language  to  the  Belgian  military  attache.  "We 
must  throw  overboard, ' '  he  is  reported  to  have  said 
before  some  of  his  own  countrymen,  "all  the  stock 
commonplaces    about    the    responsibility    of    the 


1  Beyens,  Germany  Before  the  War,  pp.  36,  37. 

233 


mriiEssiONS  of  the  kaiser 

aggressor.  As  soon  as  there  is  a  ten-to-one  chance 
in  favor  of  war,  we  must  forestall  our  opponent, 
commence  hostilities  without  more  ado,  and  merci- 
lessly crush  all  resistance." 

Not  only  was  war  at  that  time  regarded  by  the 
Emperor  himself  as  "inevitable  and  close  at  hand," 
but  a  passage  through  Belgium  in  order  to  attack 
France  was  in  his  mind. 

"What  would  you  do,"  he  asked  of  King  Albert, 
upon  this  occasion,  "if  my  troops  entered  Bel- 
gium ? ' ' 

"I  would  do  my  duty,"  replied  the  King. x 

In  reporting  this  conversation  to  the  French 
Foreign  Office,  in  his  despatch  of  November  22, 
1913,  M.  Cambon,  the  French  ambassador  at  Berlin, 
writes:  "This  conversation,  it  appears,  has  made 
a  profound  impression  upon  King  Albert.  I  am  in 
no  way  surprised  at  the  impression  he  gathered, 
which  corresponds  with  what  I  have  myself  felt  for 
some  time.  Enmity  against  us  is  increasing,  and 
the  Emperor  has  ceased  to  be  a  friend  of  peace." 

In  December,  1913,  a  German  military  mission 
was  sent  to  Turkey,  and  its  head,  General  Liman 
von  Sanders,  was  named  commandant  of  the  army 
corps  at  Constantinople;  where,  in  spite  of  the 
protest  of  Kussia,  the  mission  remained.  Ke- 
garded  at  Constantinople  as  the  personal  repre- 
sentative  of   Kaiser  William,   Von   Sanders  was 


1  The  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  6 ;  in  Scott,  Diplomatic  Docu- 
ments  Relating   to   the  Outbreak   of  the  European  War,  Part  I, 

P-  554- 

234 


THE  KAISER'S  DOUBLE  DIPLOMACY 

ranked  socially  above  the  German  ambassador; 
while  Enver  Bey,  the  smart-appearing  young  Turk-^ 
ish  military  attache,  whom  I  knew  in  Berlin,  and 
who  was  in  effect  an  agent  of  Germany,  became  the 
Secretary  of  War  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

Not  suspecting  the  plot  that  was  forming  in  the 
East,  the  British  Government,  far  from  exciting 
Russian  resentment  of  this  movement  for  the  domi- 
nation of  Germany  at  Constantinople,  was  assidu- 
ously endeavoring  to  induce  calm  at  St.  Petersburg. 

"When,  after  a  lengthy  leave  of  absence, "  writes 
the  ambassador,  "I  returned  to  London  in  Decem- 
ber, 1913,  the  Liman  von  Sanders  question  had  led 
to  renewed  tension  in  our  relations  with  Russia. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  called  my  attention,  not  without 
anxiety  on  his  part,  to  the  widespread  agitation 
which  this  matter  had  aroused  in  St.  Petersburg, 
saying:    'I  have  never  seen  them  so  excited.' 

"I  received  instructions  from  Berlin  to  ask  the 
minister  to  work  in  favor  of  moderation  in  St. 
Petersburg  and  to  assist  us  in  settling  the  dispute. 
Sir  Edward  was  quite  willing  to  do  this,  and  his 
mediation  contributed  in  no  small  degree  to  smooth- 
ing the  matter  over."  x 

In  April,  1914,  the  Kaiser,  after  a  visit  to  Vienna, 
paid  a  visit  to  the  Austrian  Archduke  Francis 
Ferdinand  at  Miramar,  and  again  in  June  at  Kono- 
pischt,  in  Bohemia,  when  he  was  accompanied  by 


1  It  is  of  interest  to  note  that  Liman  von  Sanders  was  appointed 
commander-in-chief  of  the  Turkish  army  before  the  Ottoman 
Empire  had  entered  into  the  war  as  a  belligerent. 

235 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Grand-Admiral  von  Tirpitz  and  Yon  Moltke,  the 
Chief  of  Staff  of  the  army.  So  anxious  was 
William  II  about  the  effect  upon  foreign  opinion  of 
this  latter  visit,  with  such  a  retinue,  that  the  Ger- 
man ambassador  at  London  was  ordered  to  reas- 
sure the  government  by  asserting  that  the  sojourn 
with  the  Austrian  Crown  Prince  had  no  military 
object ! 

Immediate  military  activity  was  probably  not 
contemplated  during  these  visits  to  Francis  Ferdi- 
nand, although,  as  heir  to  the  Dual  Monarchy,  he 
had  acquired  great  influence  in  military  matters, 
to  which  the  aged  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  gave 
little  attention.  We  know,  however,  from  words 
subsequently  used  by  Kaiser  William,  that  at  these 
interviews  important  confidential  relations  were 
established  between  the  Imperial  guest  and  his 
host. 

"Did  they,  at  Konopischt,"  asks  Baron  Beyens, 
"remodel  the  map  of  Europe,  assign  the  mastery  of 
the  Mediterranean  to  the  Austro-German  squad- 
rons, fix  the  moment  of  the  great  upheaval?  The 
Archduke,  so  far  as  one  can  reach  into  the  soul  of 
this  inscrutable  prince,  seemed  to  be  most  eager 
for  war.  Yet,  by  a  decree  of  fate,  he  did  not  live 
to  see  the  accomplishment  of  the  plans  that  he  drew 
up  in  cold  blood  with  his  guests  amid  the  exquisite 
gardens  of  his  lordly  mansion."  x 

What  was  the  nature  of  these  plans?  There  is  at 
present  no  authoritative  answer  to  this  question. 


1  Beyens,  Germany  Before  the  War,  p.  268. 

236 


THE  KAISER'S  DOUBLE  DIPLOMACY 

The  Archduke,  personally  disliked  at  Vienna,  was 
understood  to  have  entertained  a  theory  that  the 
Dual  Monarchy  should  be  transformed  into  a  triple 
monarchy,  in  which  the  Slav  peoples  would  take 
their  place  as  a  constituent  member,  co-ordinate, 
with  Austria  and  Hungary.  A  clear  understanding 
with  Germany  would,  no  doubt,  be  necessary  to  the 
accomplishment  of  this  plan;  which,  with  certain 
advantages  to  Germany,  always  predominant  in 
every  partnership,  would  appeal  strongly  to  the 
imagination  of  William  II. 

On  Sunday,  June  28,  1914,  at  Sarajevo,  the  cap- 
ital of  Bosnia,  within  Austrian  jurisdiction,  Francis 
Ferdinand  was  assassinated,  with  his  morganatic 
wife,  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg.  The  crime  was 
committed  by  a  young  Serb  only  eighteen  years  of 
age,  a  native  of  Herzegovina,  after  a  previous  at- 
tempt by  another  intending  assassin  made  on  the 
same  day  had  failed — so  ineffective  was  the  Aus- 
trian police  protection  of  the  Crown  Prince.  The 
assassin,  having  recently,  it  is  asserted,  been  in 
Belgrade,  although  not  a  Serbian  subjeet,  was 
charged  with  executing  a  plot  originating  in  the 
Serbian  capital  and  inspired  by  public  officials 
there. 

AVhen  the  news  of  this  tragedy  reached  Germany 
the  Kaiser  was  at  Kiel.  Prince  Lichnowsky  informs 
us  that  he  was  sailing  with  him  on  his  yacht  the 
Meteor  when  he  first  learned  what  had  occurred. 

"His  Majesty  expressed  his  regrets,"  writes  the 
Prince,  "that  his  efforts  to  win  the  Archduke  over 

237 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

to  his  ideas  had  been  rendered  vain.  Whether  the 
plan  of  an  active  policy  against  Serbia  had  already 
been  decided  on  at  Konopischt  I  am  not  in  a  posi- 
tion to  know. 

"As  I  was  not  kept  posted  regarding  views  and 
proceedings  in  Vienna,  I  did  not  attach  very  great 
importance  to  this  event.  All  that  I  could  ascertain 
later  was  that  among  Austrian  aristocrats  a  feeling 
of  relief  outweighed  other  sentiments.  On  board 
the  Meteor,  also  as  a  guest  of  His  Majesty,  was  an 
Austrian,  Count  Felix  Thun.  In  spite  of  the  splen- 
did weather,  he  had  remained  in  his  cabin  all  the 
time,  suffering  from  seasickness.  After  receiving 
the  news,  however,  he  was  well.  Alarm  or  joy  had 
cured  him!"1 

Others  report  that  the  Kaiser  turned  pale  and 
was  heard  to  murmur,  "So  my  work  of  the  past 
twenty-five  years  will  have  to  be  started  all  over 
again!"  To  the  British  ambassador,  who  was  also 
at  Kiel,  he  is  reported  to  have  said,  "It  is  a  crime 
against  Deutschtum"  (Es  ist  ein  Verbrechen  gegen 
das  Deutschtum). 2 

Whatever  may  be  the  true  interpretation  of  these 
expressions,  it  is  certain  that  the  Kaiser  was  not 
only  deeply  moved  by  this  tragic  event,  but  that  it 
profoundly  touched  his  political  plans  in  the  Balkan 
Peninsula.  To  those  who  did  not  know  that  plans 
had  been  formed,  the  tragedy  did  not  seem  in  any 
intimate  way  an  affair  of  Germany. 


1  Monroe  Smith's  translation,  p.  99. 

2  Beyens,  p.  276. 

238 


THE  KAISER'S  DOUBLE  DIPLOMACY 

That  plans  of  some  kind  had  been  formed  with. 
Francis  Ferdinand  is  evident  from  the  Kaiser's 
expressions.  If  they  were  plans  for  the  peace  and 
self-rule  of  the  Balkan  nationalities,  the  publica- 
tion of  them  would  only  do  honor  to  the  Kaiser  and 
to  the  memory  of  his  friend.  Since  they  have  been 
kept  secret,  it  is  perhaps  not  unreasonable  to  infer 
that,  notwithstanding  the  death  of  Francis  Ferdi- 
nand, the  survivor,  who  had  wished  to  impress  his 
ideas  upon  the  Crown  Prince,  has  acted  as  nearly 
as  circumstances  permitted  in  conformity  with  such 
plans  as  they  had  formed. 

If  an  occasion  of  war  with  Serbia  was  a  part  of 
those  plans,  the  tragedy  of  the  assassination  itself 
seemed  to  furnish  it.  By  throwing  the  responsi- 
bility upon  the  Serbian  Government,  a  pretext  for 
Austria's  declaring  war  upon  that  country  could 
readily  be  found.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  plans 
in  question  contemplated  the  independence  of  the 
Balkan  states  and  justice  toward  Serbia,  the  way 
was  open  to  treat  the  occurrence,  not  as  an  occa- 
sion for  war,  but  as  a  matter  for  international  in- 
vestigation. Serbia,  as  a  sovereign  state,  had  a 
right  to  the  determination  of  her  guilt  or  innocence 
by  the  judgment  of  her  peers. 

This  position,  which  was  claimed  in  Serbia's  be- 
half by  other  powers,  was  not  the  one  taken  either 
by  Austria-Hungary  or  by  Germany.  Ostensibly, 
Germany's  position  was  that  the  whole  matter- 
was  to  be  left  to  Austria-Hungary  alone;  but  it 
was    known    from    the    beginning    that    Russia 

239 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

would  not  take  this  view.  It  was  known,  fur- 
ther, what  the  European  alliances  implied,  in 
case  Russia  were  drawn  into  war  with  Austria 
through  efforts  for  the  protection  of  the  small 
Slav  state.  Without  in  the  strict  sense  being 
the  "aggressor,"  it  was  evident  that  Germany 
might,  if  the  Kaiser  so  decided,  become  "entan- 
gled" in  a  continental  war,  precisely  as  had 
been  contemplated  when,  at  the  time  of  Lord 
Haldane's  mission,  Great  Britain's  "benevolent 
neutrality"  had  been  sought  if  such  a  case  should 
arise. 

If,  therefore,  there  was  to  be  any  prospect  of  ob- 
taining Great  Britain's  neutrality  as  the  climax  of 
the  treaty  still  waiting  to  be  signed,  Germany  must 
not  appear  as  the  "aggressor"  in  any  continental 
war  that  might  occur.  The  Kaiser  did  not  even  go 
to  Vienna  to  attend  the  "private"  funeral  of  his 
friend.  Instead,  as  if  entirely  detached  from  the 
consequences  of  the  tragedy  of  Sarajevo,  early  in 
July  he  soon  vanished  from  the  scene  for  his  usual 
summer  cruise  in  the  fiords  of  Norway;  but,  if  we 
accept  the  testimony  offered  by  those  who  claim 
to  know,  not  until  after  the  decision  had  been 
reached  to  invade  and  humiliate  Serbia  at  what- 
ever cost. 

Was  there,  before  the  Kaiser's  departure  for  his 
cruise,  as  has  been  asserted,  a  Crown  Council  held 
at  Potsdam,  on  July  5th,  at  which  he  decided  to 
pledge  the  military  support  of  Germany  to  Austria- 
Hungary  in  case  of  an  attempt  by  Russia  to  pro- 

240 


THE  KAISER'S  DOUBLE  DIPLOMACY 

tect  Serbia  from  subjugation,  under  the  pretext  of 
avenging  the  crime  of  Sarajevo? 

The  answer  to  this  question,  though  not  strictly 
vital  to  the  proof  of  Germany's  responsibility  for 
the  general  European  war,  is  of  great  interest. 
The  date  and  results  of  the  alleged  Crown  Council 
having  been  publicly  stated  in  the  Reichstag  by  the 
Socialist  deputy  Haase  in  a  criticism  of  the  govern- 
ment, his  statement  was  not  declared  to  be  false, 
but  "  inexact. "  It  is  of  interest,  however,  to  find 
that  Prince  Lichnowsky  confirms  Haase 's  state- 
ment, affirming  that  he  learned,  not  at  the  time,  but 
"subsequently,  that  at  the  decisive  conversation  at 
Potsdam,  on  July  5th,  the  Vienna  inquiry  received 
the  unqualified  assent  of  all  the  controlling  authori- 
ties, with  the  further  suggestion  that  it  would  not 
be  a  bad  thing  if  war  with  Russia  should  result. 
At  least  this  statement  was  made  in  the  Austrian 
protocol  which  Count  Mensdorff  [Austrian  ambas- 
sador at  London]  received  in  London."1  The 
American  ambassador  at  Constantinople  at  that 
time,  the  Honorable  Henry  Morgenthau,  has  af- 
firmed that  he  was  informed  of  this  Council  by  his 
colleague  at  Constantinople,  the  German  ambassa- 
dor, Baron  Wangenheim,  who  on  July  5th  was  pres- 
ent at  the  Council. 

"The  Kaiser  presided;  nearly  all  the  ambassa- 
dors attended ;  Wangenheim  came  to  tell  of  Turkey 
and  enlighten  his  associates  on  the  situation  in  Con- 
stantinople.   Moltke,  then  Chief  of  Staff,  was  there, 


1  Monroe  Smith's  translation,  p.  101. 

241 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

representing  the  army,  and  Admiral  von  Tirpitz 
spoke  for  the  navy.  The  great  bankers,  railroad 
directors,  and  the  captains  of  German  industry,  all 
of  whom  were  as  necessary  to  German  war  prepa- 
rations as  the  army  itself,  also  attended. 

* '  Wangenheim  now  told  me  that  the  Kaiser  sol- 
emnly put  the  question  to  each  man  in  turn :  Was 
he  ready  for  war?  All  replied  'Yes'  except  the 
financiers.  They  said  that  they  must  have  two 
weeks  to  sell  their  foreign  securities  and  to  make 
loans."1 

Still  more  recently  we  have  the  testimony  of 
Doctor  Wilhelm  Miihlon,  a  former  director  of  the 
Krupp  munition  works  at  Essen: 

"In  the  middle  of  July,  1914,  I  had,  as  I  fre- 
quently had,"  Doctor  Miihlon  writes,  "a  conversa- 
tion with  Doctor  Helfferich,  then  Director  of  the 
Deutsche  Bank  in  Berlin,  and  now  Vice-Chancellor. 
The  Deutsche  Bank  had  adopted  a  negative  attitude 
toward  certain  large  transactions  in  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey,  in  which  the  firm  of  Krupp,  for  business 
reasons — delivery  of  war  material — had  a  lively 
interest.  As  one  of  the  reasons  to  justify  the  atti- 
tude of  the  Deutsche  Bank,  Doctor  Helfferich  finally 
gave  me  the  following : 

"  '  The  political  situation  has  become  very  menac- 
ing. The  Deutsche  Bank  must  in  any  case  wait  be- 
fore entering  into  any  further  engagements  abroad. 
The  Austrians  have  just  been  with  the  Kaiser.    In 


1  Ambassador  Morgenthau  has  given  a  full  account  of  Baron 
Wangenheim's  conversation  with  him  in  The  World's  Work  for 
May  and  June,  1918. 

242 


THE  KAISER'S  DOUBLE  DIPLOMACY 

a  week's  time  Vienna  will  send  a  very  severe  ulti- 
matum to  Serbia,  with  a  very  short  interval  for 
the  answer.  The  ultimatum  will  contain  demands 
such  as  punishment  of  a  number  of  officers,  dissolu- 
tion of  political  associations,  criminal  investiga- 
tions in  Serbia  by  Austrian  officials,  and,  in  fact, 
a  whole  series  of  definite  satisfactions  will  be  de- 
manded at  once;  otherwise  Austria-Hungary  will 
declare  war  on  Serbia.' 

''Doctor  Helfferich  added  that  the  Kaiser  had  ex- 
pressed his  decided  approval  of  this  procedure  on 
the  part  of  Austria-Hungary. ' '  * 

Upon  his  return  to  Essen,  Doctor  Miihlon  relates, 
he  spoke  of  this  conversation  to  Doctor  Krupp  von 
Bohlen  und  Halbach,  the  head  of  the  Krupp  firm, 
who  was  much  disturbed  to  learn  that  others  knew 
of  the  Kaiser's  decisions;  but,  since  Doctor  Miihlon 
had  this  information,  Doctor  Krupp  did  not  hesitate 
to  state  that  he  personally  had  it  from  the  Kaiser 
"that  he  would  declare  war  immediately  if  Russia 
mobilized,  and  that  this  time  people  would  see  that 
he  did  not  turn  about.  The  Kaiser's  repeated  in- 
sistence that  this  time  nobody  would  be  able  to 
accuse  him  of  indecision  had,  he  said,  been  almost 
comic  in  its  effect." 2 


1  Dr.  Miihlon's  statements  were  first  printed  in  the  United 
States  in  The  New  York  Times,  and  may  be  found  in  Current 
History  for  May,  1918,  pp.  20,  22.  Dr.  Miihlon  has  since  pub- 
lished a  diary,  Die  Verheerung  Europas  (The  Devastation  of 
Europe),  Zurich,  1918.  An  English  translation  has  been  published 
in  New  York  by  Putnam's,  under  the  title,  The  Vandal  of  Europe. 
The  full  text  of  Dr.  Miihlon's  statement  in  the  Times  is  not  to  be 
found  in  the  diary. 

2  The  same. 

17  243 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

On  the  very  day  Helfferich  had  indicated,  July 
23d,  Doctor  Miihlon  proceeds,  the  Austrian  ulti- 
matum to  Serbia  appeared.  Being  again  at  this 
time  in  Berlin,  he  declared  to  Helfferich  that  the 
ultimatum — which  contained  ten  stringent  demands 
to  be  accepted  or  rejected  in  forty-eight  hours — was 
"monstrous." 

Helfferich  admitted,  Doctor  Miihlon  says,  that  the 
Austrians  did  not  expect  the  ultimatum  to  be  ac- 
cepted, and  were  "acting  rapidly  before  the  other 
powers  could  find  time  to  interfere. ' '  The  Deutsche 
Bank,  in  view  of  the  existing  situation,  was  paying 
out  no  gold.  The  Kaiser,  Helfferich  is  reported  to 
have  said,  "had  gone  on  his  northern  cruise  only 
as  a  'blind';  he  had  not  arranged  the  cruise  on  the 
usual  extensive  scale,  but  was  remaining  close  at 
hand  and  keeping  in  constant  touch. " 

The  official  defense  of  the  Imperial  German 
Government  against  the  imputations  of  these 
witnesses  may  be  summed  up  in  the  threat  to 
try  Prince  Lichnowsky  for  high  treason,  and  the 
allegation  that  Doctor  Miihlon  is  suffering  from 
"nerves." 

An  attempt  has  been  made  by  the  former  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  Germany,  Herr 
von  Jagow,  to  answer  the  criticisms  made  by  Prince 
Lichnowsky.  To  an  astonishing  degree,  this  reply 
confirms  the  ambassador's  assertions.  It  reveals 
clearly,  and  much  to  the  credit  of  Herr  von  Jagow, 
that  the  Foreign  Office,  until  it  was  interfered  with 
and  finally  overruled  by  military  decisions  on  the 

244 


THE  KAISER'S  DOUBLE  DIPLOMACY 

part  of  the  Emperor,  was  sincerely  endeavoring  to 
reach  a  good  understanding  with  Great  Britain,  and 
considered  that  Germany  had  been  most  fairly 
treated  by  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

In  this  document  Herr  von  Jagow  does  not  deny 
that  a  Council  was  held  at  Potsdam  on  July  5, 1914, 
and  made  a  decision  for  war.  He  merely  states, 
"On  July  5th,  I  was  absent  from  Berlin. "  As  re- 
gards the  Kaiser's  negotiations  with  the  Archduke 
Ferdinand,  he  says,  "At  Konopischt  no  plan  was 
laid  down  (festgelegt)  for  an  active  policy  against 
Serbia;"  but,  since  it  was  Von  Tirpitz  and  Von 
Moltke,  and  not  Von  Jagow,  who  were  invited  to 
participate  in  the  Konopischt  conferences,  his  tes- 
timony upon  this  point  is  of  little  value.  It  must 
not  be  forgotten  that  in  1913-14  there  were  two 
parties  and  two  policies  in  Germany :  one  of  which 
was  relying  upon  diplomatic  action,  the  other  upon 
military  action.  They  were,  in  reality,  as  the  evi- 
dence clearly  shows,  to  the  very  end  of  the  negotia- 
tions, and  even  after  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
antagonistic.  The  Kaiser,  whose  boast  is  that  he 
belongs  to  no  party,  made  use  of  both ;  but  it  was 
to  the  military  party  rather  than  to  the  diplomatic 
side  that  he  constantly  inclined.  The  Chancellor 
and  the  Foreign  Office  of  which  he  is  the  head  bent 
before  the  storm,  and  finally  employed  the  resources 
of  diplomacy  to  justify  the  policy  of  force  which 
they  had  ineffectually  endeavored  to  avoid.  Thus, 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  Jagow,  Zimmermann,  and  all 
the  adherents  of  the  diplomatic  method  of  securing 

245 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Germany's  prestige  were  finally  compelled  to  serve 
the  cause  they  had  opposed,  but  which  their  master 
had  made  his  own.  With  perfect  honesty,  Von 
Jagow  says,  in  commenting  upon  Lichnowsky's 
representations : 

''I  also  pursued  a  policy  which  aimed  at  an 
agreement  with  England,  because  I  was  of  the 
opinion  that  this  was  the  only  way  by  which  we 
could  get  out  of  the  unfavorable  situation  into  which 
the  unequal  distribution  of  strength  and  weakness 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  had  brought  us.  .  .  .  Our 
Morocco  policy  led  to  political  defeat.  Happily, 
this  had  been  avoided  in  the  Bosnian  crisis  and  at 
the  London  conference.  Fresh  diminution  of  our 
prestige  was  intolerable  for  our  position  in  Eu- 
rope and  in  the  world.  The  prosperity  of 
states  and  their  political  and  economic  successes 
depend  upon  the  prestige  which  they  enjoy  in  the 
world."1 

This  was  the  real  consideration  that  determined 
the  Kaiser's  mind  to  war.  It  was,  in  the  last  analy- 
sis, a  question  of  Germany 's  prestige.  This,  the  Kai- 
ser believed,  could  be  best  achieved  by  war — a  war 
that  would  prove  to  Europe,  and  to  all  the  world, 
that  Germany's  strength  could  sustain  the  will  of 
Germany's  Emperor.  It  was  not  war  for  its  own 
sake  that  was  wanted,  but  a  war  that  would  establish 
beyond  question  Germany's  predominance.  If  this 
could  be  accomplished  by  sustaining  Austria-Hun- 


1  See  the  Times  Current  History,  for  June,  1918,  pp.  541,  545, 
for  Von  Jagow's  reply. 

246 


THE  KAISER'S  DOUBLE  DIPLOMACY 

gary  in  subjugating  Serbia,  and  thus  imposing  Teu- 
tonic supremacy  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  that,  with 
the  alliance  of  Turkey,  would  bring  to  Germany 
greater  advantages  than  the  concessions  Great 
Britain  was  ready  to  make  regarding  economic 
privileges.  The  war  should,  therefore,  if  possible, 
be  confined  to  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia,  with 
the  Kaiser  dominating  the  situation  by  preventing 
any  interference.  If,  however,  as  was  probable, 
Russia  should  intervene  in  behalf  of  Serbia,  Ger- 
many would  appear ' '  in  shining  armor. ' '  If  Russia 
persisted,  and  France  supported  her  ally,  then  it 
would  be  a  war  between  Germany  and  France,  Aus- 
tria and  Russia.  Great  Britain  must,  if  possible, 
be  kept  neutral.  In  that  case,  of  which  the  rap- 
prochement already  accomplished  seemed  to  afford 
a  promise,  a  war  between  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  on  the  one  side  and  Russia  and  France  on 
the  other  would  bring  renown  to  Germany.  France 
was  esteemed  to  be  degenerate  and  on  the  point  of 
internal  revolt:  Russia  was  too  bulky  to  be  active, 
ill  prepared  for  war,  and  susceptible  to  revolu- 
tion. 

"At  Berlin,"  says  Baron  Beyens,  "the  theory 
that  Russia  was  incapable  of  facing  a  conflict 
reigned  supreme."  Herr  Krupp  von  Bohlen,  he 
informs  us,  who  sat  at  a  table  near  him  at  the  Hotel 
Bristol,  declared,  on  July  28th,  that  "the  Russian 
artillery  was  neither  efficient  nor  complete,  while 
that  of  the  German  army  had  never  before  been  so 
superior  to  all  its  rivals.    It  would  be  madness  on 

247 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Russia's  part,  he  inferred,  to  take  the  field  against 
Germany  and  Austria  under  these  conditions."1 

Yet  Russia  had  the  courage  to  protest  against  the 
subjugation  of  the  small  Slav  state.  Cautioned  to 
be  tractable,  Serbia  accepted,  within  the  forty- 
eight  hours  granted,  all  of  the  ten  demands  made  in 
the  Austrian  ultimatum,  except  two,  which  it  was 
impossible  for  any  state  to  accept  and  maintain  its 
independent  existence ;  but  even  these  were  not  im- 
pertinently rejected. 

1  'If  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  are  not 
satisfied  with  this  reply,"  concluded  the  Serbian 
response  to  the  ultimatum,  "the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment, considering  that  it  is  not  to  the  common 
interest  to  precipitate  the  solution  of  this  question, 
are  ready,  as  always,  to  accept  a  pacific  understand- 
ing, either  by  referring  this  question  to  the  decision 
of  the  International  Tribunal  of  The  Hague,  or  to 
the  great  powers  which  took  part  in  the  drawing 
up  of  the  declaration  made  by  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment on  the  18th  (31st)  of  March,  1909."  2 


1  Beyens,  Germany  Before  the  War,  p.  286. 

2  For  the  full  text  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ultimatum  of  July 
23,  and  of  the  Serbian  reply  of  July  25,  1914,  see  Scott,  Documents 
Relating  to  the  European  War,  Part  II,  pp.  1464,  1468,  and  pp. 
1472,  1476,  reprinted  from  the  Serbian  Blue  Book.  See  a  summary 
in  Illustrative  Document  No.  VII. 

In  his  book,  A  Scrap  of  Paper,  London  and  New  York,  1914, 
p.  76,  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon  affirms  that  the  German  Ambassador  at 
Vienna,  Tschirschky,  not  only  saw  the  text  of  the  ultimatum  sent 
to  Serbia  but  telegraphed  the  wording  to  the  Emperor.  He 
writes :  "I  advance  this  statement  with  full  Knowledge  of  what 
actually  took  place  ;"  and  adds  :  "The  versatile  monarch  suggested 
a  certain  amendment  to  the  time-limit,  the  alleged  object  of  which 
was  to  leave  no  room  for  evasion,  no  loophole  for  escape."  This 
is  in  keeping  with  the  Kaiser's  twelve-hour  time-limit  to  Russia. 

248 


THE  KAISER'S  DOUBLE  DIPLOMACY 

Without  further  exchange  of  views,  on  July  28th, 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  declared  war  on 
Serbia. 

What  was  Germany's  part  in  this  procedure? 

The  Imperial  German  ambassador  at  London 
gives  the  answer : 

"1.  We  encouraged  Count  Berchtold  [the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs]  to 
attack  Serbia,  although  no  German  interest  was  in- 
volved and  the  danger  of  a  World  War  must  have 
been  known  to  us.  Whether  we  were  acquainted 
with  the  wording  of  the  ultimatum  is  completely 
immaterial. 

"2.  During  the  period  between  the  23d  and  the 
30th  of  July,  1914,  when  M.  Sazonof  emphatically 
declared  that  he  could  not  tolerate  an  attack  on 
Serbia,  we  rejected  the  British  proposals  of  medi- 
ation, although  Serbia,  under  Eussian  and  British 
pressure,  had  accepted  almost  the  whole  of  the  ulti- 
matum, and  although  an  agreement  about  the  two 
points  at  issue  could  easily  have  been  reached  and 
Count  Berchtold  was  even  prepared  to  content  him- 
self with  the  Serbian  reply. 

"3.  On  the  30th  of  July,  when  Count  Berchtold 
showed  a  disposition  to  change  his  course,  we  sent 
an  ultimatum  to  St.  Petersburg  merely  because  of 
the  Russian  mobilization  and  though  Austria  had 


For  every  chance  of  peace  it  was  invariably  made  "too  late." 
"Events  had  marched  too  rapidly."  But  time  is  the  first  essential 
of  diplomacy.  War  can  be  declared  in  an  hour.  Peace  requires 
understanding,  which  demands  time  for  negotiation. 

249 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

not  been  attacked;  and  on  the  31st  of  July1  we 
declared  war  against  the  Russians,  although  the 
Czar  pledged  his  word  that  he  would  not  permit  a 
single  man  to  march  as  long  as  negotiations  were 
still  going  on.  Thus  we  deliberately  destroyed  the 
possibility  of  a  peaceful  settlement. 

"In  view  of  these  incontestable  facts,  it  is  no  won- 
der that  the  whole  civilized  world  outside  of  Ger- 
many places  the  sole  responsibility  for  the  World 
War  upon  our  shoulders."  2 


1  This  date  should  be,  of  course,  the  1st  of  August. 

2  Monroe  Smith's  translation,  pp.  101,  102. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  KAISER'S  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE 

WAR 

T  T  is  a  fact  deserving  of  more  consideration  than 
■■■  it  has  hitherto  received  that,  in  his  own  written 
justification  of  Germany's  action,  Kaiser  William 
II  does  not  contradict  any  one  of  his  ambassador's 
assertions  regarding  German  responsibility  for  the 
war.  On  the  contrary,  he  offers  no  defense  of  his 
own  procedure,  except  to  complain  that  Great 
Britain  complicated  his  plans  by  not  observing  the 
neutrality  which  he  had  desired  and  expected.  His 
chief  cause  of  resentment,  as  stated  by  himself,  is 
that,  instead  of  adhering  to  what  he  deemed  a 
pledge  to  remain  neutral,  while  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria, on  the  one  side,  and  Russia  and  France  on  the 
other,  contended  over  the  fate  of  Serbia,  England, 
after  trying  to  prevent  war  altogether,  had  decided 
to  oppose  Germany's  plans  of  attack. 

On  August  10, 1914,  in  reply  to  an  offer  of  medi- 
ation by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  William 
II  addressed  in  his  own  handwriting  a  personal 
communication  to  the  President  in  explanation  of 
his  position,  beginning  with  the  f  ollowing  statement : 

251 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

"1.  H.  R.  H.  Prince  Henry  was  received  by  His 
Majesty  King  George  V  in  London,  who  empowered 
him  to  transmit  to  me  verbally  that  England  would 
remain  neutral  if  war  broke  out  on  the  Continent  in- 
volving Germany  and  France,  Austria  and  Russia. 

"This  message  was  telegraphed  to  me  by  my 
brother  from  London  after  his  conversation  with 
H.  M.  the  King,  and  repeated  verbally  on  the 
twenty-ninth  of  July. ' ' x 

From  a  telegram  addressed  by  Prince  Henry  to 
King  George  V,  on  July  30th,  we  learn  that  it  was 
on  Sunday,  July  26th,  that  the  Prince  was  received 
and  had  his  conference  with  the  King  at  Bucking- 
ham Palace.2  At  that  time  there  was  no  sufficient 
reason,  apart  from  Germany's  ambitions,  for  be- 
lieving that  a  general  war  would  occur  on  the  Con- 
tinent, involving  Germany  and  France,  Austria  and 
Russia.  The  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  pre- 
sented on  July  23d,  was  not  answered  until  6:30 
p.  m.  of  the  25th.  Even  if  the  reply  was  known  in 
London  on  Sunday,  the  26th,  its  moderation  was 
such  that  it  could  hardly  cause  alarm.  The  attitude 
of  Austria-Hungary  regarding  it  had  not  been  an- 
nounced, and  there  was  no  reason  to  expect  that  it 
would  be  a  complete  rejection.     More  important 

1  Reproduced  in  facsimile  in  Gerard,  My  Four  Years  in  Ger- 
many, New  York,  1917,  p.  202. 

2  British  Blue  Book,  I,  Appendix  I,  II,  No.  1. 

The  various  publications  cited  in  this  chapter,  such  as  the  British 
Blue  Book,  German  White  Book,  Russian  Orange  Book,  etc.,  may 
be  found  in  Collected  Diplomatic  Documents  Relating  to  the  Out- 
break of  the  European  War,  London,  1915 ;  and  also,  with  addi- 
tions, in  Scott,  Diplomatic  Documents  Relating  to  the  Outbreak 
of  the  European  War,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1916. 

252 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

still,  Russia  had  not  declared  the  course  to  be  pur- 
sued regarding  Serbia.  Even  on  the  27th  Russia 
did  not  go  beyond  declaring,  "So  long  as  the  slight- 
est hope  exists  of  avoiding  bloodshed,  all  our  efforts 
must  be  directed  to  that  end ;  but  if,  in  spite  of  our 
earnest  wish,  we  are  not  successful,  Russia  will  in 
no  case  disinterest  herself  in  the  fate  of  Serbia.,,1 

"While  Russia  was  thus  eager  to  prevent  war  alto- 
gether, the  Kaiser  was  endeavoring  to  obtain  an 
assurance  of  England's  neutrality,  in  confident  ex- 
pectation of  a  war  in  which  he  anticipated  that  Ger- 
many and  France,  as  well  as  Austria  and  Russia, 
would  be  engaged.,  Of  the  possible  prevention  of  such 
a  war  there  is  in  his  communication  no  suggestion. 

It  is  hardly  conceivable  that  King  George,  as  a 
constitutional  monarch,  could  have  given  a  cate- 
gorical promise  that,  in  all  circumstances,  England 
would  remain  neutral  during  a  war  in  which  France 
should  be  involved.  Precisely  what  language  was 
employed  in  answer  to  Prince  Henry's  inquiry 
neither  the  Prince  nor  the  Kaiser  informs  us.  How 
much  of  the  Prince 's  report  was  mere  inference  we 
cannot,  therefore,  judge;  but,  whatever  it  was, 
Prince  Henry  in  his  telegram  tells  the  King, 
"William  was  very  thankful  to  receive  your  mes- 
sage."2 He  also  assures  King  George  that 
"William  is  inspired  by  the  greatest  sincerity  in 
his  efforts  for  the  maintenance  of  peace."  Why, 
then,  was  he  seeking  from  King  George  neutrality, 


1  Russian  Orange  Book,  I,  No.  40. 

2  British  Blue  Book,  I,  Appendix  II,  No. 

253 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

and  not  aid  in  promoting  peace?  There  is  no 
evidence  in  these  documents  that  such  aid  had  been 
requested.  It  was  neutrality,  not  aid  toward  peace, 
the  Kaiser  himself  asserts,  that  he  had  sought  and 
believed  he  had  been  promised.  "Was  it  for  this  that 
he  was  "very  thankful?"  Prince  Henry,  it  is  true, 
proposes  in  his  telegram  to  King  George  that  he 
should  use  his  "influence  on  France  and  also  on 
Eussia  that  they  should  remain  neutral,"  while 
Austria  proceeds  to  crush  Serbia.  This,  he  adds, 
"I  consider  a  certain  and,  perhaps,  the  only  pos- 
sible way  of  maintaining  the  peace  of  Europe." 
Evidently  Prince  Henry  knew  William  II 's  mind. 
Foreseeing  a  general  war  before  a  sufficient  cause 
for  its  occurrence  had  been  developed,  the  Kaiser, 
by  his  own  statement  of  the  case,  was  simply  en- 
deavoring to  obtain,  as  the  culmination  of  the  un- 
derstanding with  Great  Britain  that  had  been 
brought  about  by  Lichnowsky's  negotiations,  the 
neutrality  for  which  Germany  had  so  earnestly 
sought  at  the  time  of  Lord  Haldane's  mission. 

It  was  not,  however,  upon  the  assurance  of  Prince 
Henry  alone  that  William  II  based  the  hope  of 
securing  this  result. 

"2.  My  ambassador  in  London,"  he  continues, 
"transmitted  a  message  from  Sir  E.  Grey  to  Berlin 
saying  that  only  in  case  France  was  likely  to  be 
crushed  England  would  interfere."1 

In  making  this  statement  Prince  Lichnowsky  was 


1  Continuation  of  message  to  the  President.     See  also  Illustrative 
Document  No.  IX. 

254 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

amply  justified ;  for,  as  we  now  know,  on  July  25th, 
the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
had  said  to  the  British  ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg: "I  do  not  consider  that  public  opinion  here 
would  or  ought  to  sanction  our  going  to  war  over  a 
Serbian  quarrel.,,1 

With  alacrity,  on  Sunday,  July  26th,  as  soon  as 
Prince  Henry's  hypothetical  question  suggested  the 
possibility  of  a  continental  conflict,  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  taking  alarm  at  this  foreboding,  proposed  to 
Berlin,  Paris,  and  Eome  a  conference,  "to  meet 
immediately  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  an  issue 
which  would  prevent  complications. ' ' 2  The  Kus- 
sian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Sazonof,  wel- 
comed the  suggestion  and  thought  it  "necessary 
that  Great  Britain  should  take  instant  mediatory 
action."8 

What  at  this  moment  was  the  attitude  of  Berlin! 

On  July  27th,  when  the  British  ambassador,  Sir 
Edward  Goschen,  presented  Grey's  proposal,  the 
Imperial  German  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
Von  Jagow,  declared,  "The  conference  you  sug- 
gest would  practically  amount  to  a  court  of  arbitra- 
tion ; ' 9  and  he  could  not,  therefore,  * '  fall  in  with  it. ' ' 
When  the  ambassador  insisted  that  the  proposal 
"had  nothing  to  do  with  arbitration,  but  meant  that 
representatives  of  the  four  nations  not  directly  in- 
terested should  discuss  and  suggest  means  for 


1  British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  24. 

2  The  same,  No.  36. 

3  Russian  Orange  Book,  I,  No.  48. 

255 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

avoiding  a  dangerous  situation,"  without  denying 
this,  Von  Jagow  remained  hostile  to  the  plan  and 
declared  that  such  a  conference  was  "not  prac- 
ticable."1 The  Secretary  did  not  need  to  consult 
the  Emperor  upon  this  point;  he  already  under- 
stood his  views  and  his  purpose.  Lichnowsky,  how- 
ever, did  not  have  this  understanding.  He,  on  the 
contrary,  informed  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  the  Ger- 
man Government  accepted  "in  principle"  mediation 
between  Austria  and  Russia ; 2  whereupon  Sir 
Edward,  on  July  28th,  assuming  the  acceptance  of 
the  idea  of  a  conference,  informed  Goschen:  "I  am 
ready  to  propose  that  the  German  Secretary  of 
State  should  suggest  the  lines  on  which  this  prin- 
ciple should  be  applied."3  But  matters  had  by 
this  time  gone  too  far.  Austria  had  already  de- 
clared war  on  Serbia,  and  the  Imperial  German  Gov- 
ernment announced  its  position  that  there  must  be 
no  interference  from  outside. 

On  July  27th  the  Russian  charge  d'affaires  at 
Berlin  had  written  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  at  St.  Petersburg: 

"Before  my  visit  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  to-day  his  Excellency  had  received  the 
French  ambassador,  who  endeavored  to  induce  him 
to  accept  the  British  proposal  for  action  in  favor 
of  peace,  such  action  to  be  taken  simultaneously  at 
St.  Petersburg  and  at  Vienna  by  Great  Britain, 


1  British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  43. 

2  The  same,  No.  46. 

3  The  same,  No.  68. 

256 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

Germany,  Italy,  and  France.  Cambon  suggested 
that  these  powers  should  give  their  advice  to  Vienna 
in  the  f  ollowing  terms :  *  To  abstain  from  all  action 
which  might  aggravate  the  situation.  .  .  . '  Jagow 
refused  point  blank  to  accept  this  suggestion  in 
spite  of  the  entreaties  of  the  ambassador."1 

On  July  29th  the  British  ambassador  at  Berlin 
telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey: 

"I  was  sent  for  again  to-day  by  the  Imperial 
Chancellor,  who  told  me  that  he  regretted  to  state 
that  the  Austro-Hungarian  government,  to  whom 
he  had  at  once  communicated  your  opinion,  had 
answered  that  events  had  marched  too  rapidly  and 
that  it  was  therefore  too  late  to  act  upon  your  sug- 
gestion that  the  Serbian  reply  might  form  a  basis 
of  discussion."2 

Neither  the  Austrian  Red  Book  nor  the  German 
White  Book  contains  any  word  from  Vienna  to  this 
effect.  It  was  quite  unnecessary.  The  attitude  of 
Vienna  had  been  already  decreed  at  Berlin.  There 
is  no  concealment  of  this. 

"We  declared,''  says  the  German  White  Book, 
"in  regard  to  this  proposal,  that  we  could  not, 
however  much  we  approved  the  idea,  participate  in 
such  a  conference,  as  we  could  not  call  Austria  in 
her  dispute  before  a  European  tribunal.  Faithful 
to  our  principle  that  mediation  should  not  extend 
to  the  Austro-Serbian  conflict,  which  is  to  be  con- 
sidered as  a  purely  Austro-Hungarian  affair,  but 


1  Russian  Orange  Book,  I,  No.  39. 

2  British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  75- 

257 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

merely  to  the  relations  of  Austria-Hungary  and 
Russia,  we  continued  our  endeavors  to  bring  about 
an  understanding  between  these  two  powers,"1 
endeavors  which  consisted  in  assuring  Austria  of 
German  support,  and  threatening  Russia  with  Ger- 
man hostility  unless  her  efforts  to  obtain  justice 
for  Serbia  were  abandoned. 

Kaiser  William  II  was,  in  the  mean  time,  ceasing 
to  be  " thankful"  for  the  neutrality  he  had  be- 
lieved might  be  expected  from  Great  Britain.  The 
interest  of  the  British  Government  in  maintaining 
peace  was  annoying  to  him.  Why,  if  England  really 
meant  to  be  neutral,  was  Sir  Edward  Grey  so  solici- 
tous to  avoid  a  general  war?  William  II,  as  his 
message  to  the  President  implies,  was  growing 
indignant  about  it. 

Something,  therefore,  must  be  attempted  to  re- 
strain Great  Britain's  activities  for  peace.  How 
could  that  be  better  accomplished  than  by  Germany 
herself  taking  the  field  as  a  peacemaker?  The 
effect  of  this  move  in  Great  Britain  is  thus  de- 
scribed by  Sir  Edward  Grey  under  date  of  July 
29th,  in  a  telegram  to  the  British  ambassador  at 
Berlin: 

"The  German  ambassador  has  been  instructed  by 
the  German  Chancellor  to  inform  me  that  he  is  en- 
deavoring to  mediate  between  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburg,  and  he  hopes  with  good  success.  Aus- 
tria and  Russia  seem  to  be  in  constant  touch,  and 
he  is  endeavoring  to  make  Vienna  explain  in  a  satis- 


1  German  White  Book,  preliminary  statement. 

258 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

factory  form  at  St.  Petersburg  the  scope  and  ex- 
tension of  Austrian  proceedings  in  Serbia.  ...  I 
urged  that  the  German  Government  should  suggest 
any  method  by  which  the  influence  of  the  four  pow- 
ers could  be  used  together  to  prevent  war  between 
Austria  and  Russia.  France  agreed.  Italy  agreed. 
The  whole  idea  of  mediation  or  mediating  influence 
was  ready  to  be  put  into  operation  by  any  method 
that  Germany  could  suggest,  if  mine  was  not  ac- 
ceptable. In  fact,  mediation  was  ready  to  come 
into  operation  by  any  method  that  Germany  thought 
possible,  if  only  Germany  would  ' press  the  button' 
in  the  interests  of  peace."1 

We  shall  see  presently  how  Germany  pressed  the 
button ! 

The  subject  of  mediation  having  been  thus  passed 
over  to  Germany,  the  Imperial  German  Foreign 
Office  at  once  proceeded  to  take  soundings  on  the 
question  of  British  neutrality.  Would  Great  Britain 
stand  aside  and  permit  Germany  and  Austria  to 
fight  Russia  and  France  without  interference? 

This  effort  to  obtain  reassurance  for  the  Kaiser 
is  best  narrated  in  the  following  telegram  of  July 
29th,  from  Sir  Edward  Goschen: 

"I  was  asked  to  call  upon  the  Chancellor  to-night. 
His  Excellency  had  just  returned  from  Potsdam. 

"He  said  that,  should  Austria  be  attacked  by 
Russia,  a  European  conflagration  might,  he  feared, 
become  inevitable,  owing  to  Germany's  obligations 
as  Austria 's  ally,  in  spite  of  his  continued  efforts  to 


i  British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  84. 
18  259 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

maintain  peace.  He  then  proceeded  to  make  the 
following  strong  bid  for  British  neutrality.  He 
said  that  it  was  clear,  so  far  as  he  was  able  to  judge 
the  main  principle  which  governed  British  policy, 
that  Great  Britain  would  never  stand  by  and  allow 
France  to  be  crushed  in  any  conflict  there  might  be. 
That,  however,  was  not  the  object  at  which  Ger- 
many aimed.  Provided  that  the  neutrality  of  Great 
Britain  were  certain,  every  assurance  would  be 
given  to  the  British  Government  that  the  Imperial 
Government  aimed  at  no  territorial  acquisitions  at 
the  expense  of  France,  should  they  prove  victorious 
in  any  war  that  might  ensue. 

"I  questioned  his  Excellency  about  the  French 
colonies,  and  he  said  that  he  was  unable  to  give  a 
similar  undertaking  in  that  respect.  As  regards 
Holland,  however,  his  Excellency  said  that,  so  long 
as  Germany's  adversaries  respected  the  integrity 
and  neutrality  of  the  Netherlands,  Germany  was 
ready  to  give  his  Majesty's  government  an  assur- 
ance that  she  would  do  likewise.  It  depended  upon 
the  action  of  France  what  operations  Germany 
might  be  forced  to  enter  upon  in  Belgium,  but  when 
the  war  was  over,  Belgian  integrity  would  be  re- 
spected if  she  had  not  sided  against  Germany. 

"His  Excellency  ended  by  saying  that  ever  since 
he  had  been  Chancellor  the  object  of  his  policy  had 
been,  as  you  were  aware,  to  bring  about  an  under- 
standing with  England ;  he  trusted  that  these  assur- 
ances might  form  the  basis  of  that  understanding 
which  he  so  much  desired.    He  had  in  mind  a  gen- 

260 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

eral  neutrality  agreement  between  England  and 
Germany,  though  it  was  of  course  at  the  present 
moment  too  early  to  discuss  details,  and  an  assur- 
ance of  British  neutrality  in  the  conflict  which  the 
present  crisis  might  possibly  produce,  would  enable 
him  to  look  forward  to  realization  of  his  desire."1 

To  this  Sir  Edward  Grey  promptly  answered : 

"His  Majesty's  Government  cannot  for  a  mo- 
ment entertain  the  Chancellor 's  proposal  that  they 
should  bind  themselves  to  neutrality  on  such  terms. 
What  he  asks  us  in  effect  is  to  engage  to  stand  by 
while  French  colonies  are  taken  and  France  is 
beaten,  so  long  as  Germany  does  not  take  French 
territory  as  distinct  from  the  colonies.  ...  It 
would  be  a  disgrace  for  us  to  make  this  bargain 
with  Germany  at  the  expense  of  France,  a  disgrace 
from  which  the  good  name  of  this  country  would 
never  recover. ' ' 

On  July  29th,  William  II  had  received  the  follow- 
ing telegram  from  Czar  Nicholas : 

"I  am  glad  you  are  back  in  Germany.  In  this 
serious  moment  I  ask  you  earnestly  to  help  me.  An 
ignominious  war  has  been  declared  against  a  weak 
country,  and  in  Kussia  the  indignation,  which  I 
fully  share,  is  tremendous.  I  fear  that  very  soon 
I  shall  be  unable  to  resist  the  pressure  exercised 
upon  me  and  that  I  shall  be  forced  to  take  measures 
which  will  lead  to  war.  To  prevent  a  calamity,  as  a 
European  war  would  be,  I  urge  you  in  the  name  of 


1  British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  85.     See  Illustrative  Document  No. 
yill  for  Sir  Edward  Grey's  reply. 

261 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

our  old  friendship  to  do  all  in  your  power  to  re- 
strain your  ally  from  going  too  far."1 

Then  followed  the  exchange  of  telegrams  between 
the  Kaiser  and  the  Czar,  in  which  Nicholas  II 
pleaded  for  the  Kaiser's  mediation  with  Austria, 
and  William  II,  assuring  him  of  his  good  offices, 
menaced  him  with  war  if  he  resorted  to  military 
preparations  against  Austria.  This  correspond- 
ence was  published  in  full  in  the  German  White 
Book,  but  not  one  word  of  the  alleged  mediation 
which  the  Kaiser  professed  to  be  conducting  with 
Austria  was  made  public!  The  part  Austria  was 
to  play  had  been  already  arranged,  and  Germany's 
support  had  been  already  pledged.  There  is  no  doc- 
umentary evidence  that  any  mediation,  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  word,  was  undertaken  by  the  Kaiser. 

The  subject  of  British  neutrality  on  July  30th 
suddenly  assumed  a  definite  form.  The  Kaiser  him- 
self, in  his  communication  to  the  President  above 
referred  to,  states  how  he  understood  it. 

"On  the  30th,"  he  says,  "my  ambassador  in  Lon- 
don reported  that  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  course  of  a 

*  private'  conversation,  told  him  that  if  the  conflict 
remained  localized  between  Kussia — not  Serbia — 
and  Austria,  England  would  not  move,  but  if  we 

*  mixed'  in  the  fray  she  would  take  quick  decisions 
and  grave  measures,  i.e.,  if  I  left  my  ally,  Austria, 
in  the  lurch,  to  fight  alone,  England  would  not  touch 
me."2 


1  German  White  Book,  No.  21. 

2  Continuation   of   message   to   the   President.     See   Illustrative 
Document  No,  IX  for  Grey's  interview  with  Lichnowsky. 

263 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

Unwittingly,  the  Chancellor,  in  his  request  for 
neutrality,  had  lifted  the  veil  and  disclosed  to  Great 
Britain  the  predatory  designs  of  Germany.  The 
nature  of  the  war  William  II  had  anticipated  in  his 
hypothetical  question  to  King  George  was  now  bet- 
ter understood  at  London.  Bethmann-Hollweg  had 
been  unable  to  give  any  assurance  regarding  the 
French  colonies  when  France  had  been  weakened 
by  a  war  in  which  Germany  was  to  be  the  victor ! 
Belgium  and  Holland,  too,  were  subject  to  contin- 
gencies. It  was  for  such  exploits  that  British  neu- 
trality was  sought ! 

Continuing  to  unfold  his  mind  to  the  President, 
the  Kaiser  says : 

"This  communication  [the  German  ambassador's 
telegram  of  July  30th,  above  referred  to]  being 
directly  counter  to  the  King's  message  to  me,  I 
telegraphed  to  H.  M.  on  the  29th  and  30th,  thank- 
ing him  for  his  kind  messages  through  my  brother, 
and  begging  him  to  use  all  his  power  to  keep  France 
and  Russia,  his  allies,  from  making  any  warlike 
preparations  calculated  to  disturb  my  work  of  medi- 
ation, stating  that  I  was  in  constant  communication 
with  H.  M.  the  Czar.  In  the  evening  the  King 
kindly  answered  that  he  had  ordered  his  govern- 
ment to  use  every  possible  influence  with  his  allies 
to  refrain  from  taking  any  provocative  military 
measures.  At  the  same  time  H.  M.  asked  me  if  I 
would  transmit  to  Vienna  the  British  proposal  that 
Austria  was  to  take  Belgrade  and  a  few  other 
Serbian  towns,  and  a  strip  of  country,  as  a  'main 

263 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

mise'  to  make  sure  that  the  other  Serbian  promises 
on  paper  should  be  fulfilled  in  reality.  This  pro- 
posal was  in  the  same  moment  telegraphed  to  me 
from  Vienna  for  London,  quite  in  conjunction  with 
the  British  proposal.  Besides,  I  had  telegraphed  to 
H.  M.  the  Czar,  the  same  as  an  idea  of  mine,  before 
I  received  the  two  communications  from  Vienna  and 
London.  As  both  were  of  the  same  opinion,  I 
immediately  transmitted  the  telegrams  vice  versa, 
Vienna  and  London.  I  felt  that  I  was  able  to  tide 
the  question  over  and  was  happy  at  the  peaceful 
outlook."1 

Here  is  the  first  definite  statement  of  the  charac- 
ter of  the  advice  given  to  Austria.  Unfortunately, 
there  is  no  document,  although  the  exchanges  be- 
tween the  Kaiser  and  the  Czar  are  printed  in  the 
German  White  Book,  to  show  that  William  II  ever 
telegraphed  to  Nicholas  II  as  an  idea  of  his  own  the 
substance  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal.  Grey's 
message  was  never  publicly  referred  to  until  No- 
vember 9,  1916,  when  the  Chancellor,  Bethmann- 
Hollweg,  replying  to  a  charge  made  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  informed  the  Reichstag  that  on  July  30, 1914, 
he  had  sent  the  following  instructions  to  the  Ger- 
man ambassador  at  Vienna : 

"Should  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  re- 
fuse all  mediation,  we  are  confronted  with  a  con- 
flagration in  which  England  would  go  against  us, 
and  Italy  and  Rumania,  according  to  all  indications, 
would  not  be  with  us ;  so  that  with  Austria-Hungary 


1  The  message  to  the  President. 

264 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

we  should  confront  three  great  powers.  Germany, 
as  the  result  of  England's  hostility,  would  have 
to  bear  the  chief  brunt  of  the  fight.  The  political 
prestige  of  Austria-Hungary,  the  honor  of  her 
arms,  and  her  justified  claims  against  Serbia  can 
be  sufficiently  safeguarded  by  the  occupation  of 
Belgrade  or  other  places.  We  therefore  urgently 
and  emphatically  ask  the  Vienna  Cabinet  to  con- 
sider the  acceptance  of  mediation  on  the  proposed 
conditions.  Responsibility  for  the  consequences 
which  may  otherwise  arise  must  be  extraordinarily 
severe  for  Austria-Hungary  and  ourselves.*'1 

Is  it  possible  that  William  II  ever  sent  this  mes- 
sage to  the  Czar  as  his  own  idea?  The  Chancellor's 
statement  leaves  no  such  impression.  The  reason 
for  sending  this  message  was  a  wholly  new  one.  It 
was  that,  if  Austria-Hungary  made  no  concession 
beyond  what  they  had  previously  been  advised  to 
make,  the  Central  Powers  would  be  "  confronted 
with  a  conflagration"  in  which  England  would  go 
against  them! 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Government, "  the  Chan- 
cellor continues,  "acceded  to  our  urgent  repre- 
sentations by  giving  its  ambassador  in  Berlin  the 
following  instruction: 

"  'I  ask  your  Excellency  most  sincerely  to  thank 
Herr  von  Jagow,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  for  the  information  given  through  Herr 
von  Tschirschky,  and  to  declare  to  him  that,  despite 
the  change  in  the  situation  which  has  since  arisen 


1  Not  referred  to  in  the  German  White  Book. 

265 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

through  the  Russian  mobilization,  we  are  quite 
ready  to  consider  the  proposals  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey  for  a  settlement  between  us  and  Serbia.  A 
condition  of  our  acceptance  is,  of  course,  that  our 
military  action  against  Serbia  should  meanwhile 
proceed,  and  that  the  English  Cabinet  should  induce 
the  Russian  Government  to  bring  to  a  standstill  the 
Russian  mobilization  directed  against  us,  in  which 
case  also  we,  as  a  matter  of  course,  will  at  once 
cancel  our  defensive  countermeasures  forced  upon 
us  in  Galicia. ' ' '  * 

Evidently,  this  reply  is  not  an  unconditional  ac- 
ceptance of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal,  which 
was  that  Austrian  military  action  in  Serbia  should 
not  ''proceed,"  but  be  "suspended";  for,  as  he 
states,  "otherwise  a  mediation  would  only  drag  on 
matters,  and  give  Austria  time  to  crush  Serbia. ' ' 2 
Furthermore,  this  message  was  not  sent  from  Vi- 
enna until  July  31st. 3  If,  therefore,  the  Kaiser  is 
correct  in  his  statement,  "I  immediately  trans- 
mitted the  telegrams  vice  versa,  Vienna  and  Lon- 
don," and  these  telegrams  were,  as  he  says,  "quite 
in  conjunction,"  the  transmission  could  not  have 
occurred  until  late  in  the  day  on  the  31st  of  July. 
The  really  important  point,  however,  is  that  this 
alleged  agreement  for  a  conference,  which  Germany 
had  constantly  opposed,  but  which  is  here  repre- 
sented as  so  acceptable  that  the  Kaiser  could  say, 


1  Printed  in  substantially  the  same  terms  in  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Red  Book,  I,  No.  51.     See  Illustrative  Document  No.  X. 

2  British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  88. 

3  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book,  as  above. 

206 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

"I  felt  that  I  was  able  to  tide  the  question  over  and 
was  happy  at  the  peaceful  outlook,"  was  never  com- 
municated by  William  II  to  the  Czar!  If,  as  the 
Kaiser  thought,  there  was  an  open  door  of  peace, 
the  fact  was  not  communicated  to  Russia. 

"W7hile  I  was  preparing  a  note  to  H.  M.  the  Czar 
the  next  morning,"  the  Kaiser  continues  in  his 
message  to  the  President,  "to  inform  him  that 
Vienna,  London,  and  Berlin  were  agreed  about  the 
treatment  of  affairs,  I  received  the  telephones  from 
H.  E.  the  Chancellor  that  on  the  night  before  the 
Czar  had  given  the  order  to  mobilize  the  whole  of 
the  Russian  army,  which  was,  of  course,  also  meant 
against  Germany,  whereas  up  till  then  the  southern 
armies  had  been  mobilized  against  Austria. ' ' 

The  Kaiser  here  represents  that  in  the  morning 
of  July  31st,  while  preparing  a  note  to  the  Czar 
to  inform  him  that  "Vienna,  London,  and  Berlin 
were  agreed  about  the  treatment  of  affairs,"  he 
was  interrupted  by  telephone  messages  from  the 
Chancellor  that  "on  the  night  before"  the  Czar  had 
given  the  order  to  mobilize  the  whole  Russian 
Army.  In  his  telegram  of  July  31st  to  King  George, 
however,  he  says:  "Your  proposals  coincide  with 
my  ideas  and  with  the  communication  which  I  have 
this  evening  received  from  Vienna,  and  which  I 
have  passed  on  to  London.  I  have  just  heard  from 
the  Chancellor  that  intelligence  has  just  reached 
him  that  Nicholas  this  evening  has  ordered  the 
mobilization  of  his  entire  army  and  fleet. ' ' 1 


1  British  Blue  Book,  I,  Appendix  I,  II,  No.  3. 

267 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

The  contemporary  statement  undoubtedly  is  to 
be  preferred  to  that  made  from  memory.  It  was, 
therefore,  in  the  evening  of  July  31st  that  William 
II  received  the  reply  from  Vienna,  and  at  the  same 
time  learned  that  the  Czar  had  ordered  general 
mobilization.  The  German  White  Book  plainly 
states  that  the  general  Russian  mobilization  was 
ordered  "during  the  afternoon  of  the  31st  of 
July."  It  could  not,  therefore,  have  been  known 
by  William  II  in  the  morning  of  the  31st. 

On  that  same  date  he  received  from  Nicholas  II 
the  following  telegram: 

"I  thank  you  cordially  for  your  mediation,  which 
permits  the  hope  that  everything  may  yet  end 
peaceably.  It  is  technically  impossible  to  discon- 
tinue our  military  preparations,  which  have  been 
made  necessary  by  the  Austrian  mobilization.  It 
is  far  from  us  to  want  war.  As  long  as  the  nego- 
tiations between  Austria  and  Serbia  continue  my 
troops  will  undertake  ho  provocative  action.  I  give 
you  my  solemn  word  thereon.  I  confide  with  all 
my  faith  in  the  grace  of  God,  and  I  hope  for  success 
of  your  mediation  in  Vienna,  for  the  welfare  of  our 
countries,  and  the  peace  of  Europe."1 

To  this  the  Kaiser  replied  at  2  p.m.,  without  re- 
ferring to  any  general  mobilization — of  which  he 
was  not  yet  informed — saying:  "I  now  receive  au- 
thentic news  of  serious  preparations  for  war  on  my 
eastern  frontier;"  and  adding,  "The  responsibility 
for  the  disaster  which  is  now  threatening  the  whole 


1  German  White  Book,  no  number. 

268 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

civilized  world  will  not  be  laid  at  my  door.  In  this 
moment  it  still  lies  in  your  power  to  avert  it."1 

On  the  evening  of  July  31st  William  II  not  only 
held  in  his  possession  the  answer  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  alleging  its  modified  con- 
sent to  follow  the  suggestions  of  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
but  a  telegram  sent  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  For- 
eign Office  to  all  its  embassies  and  legations,  saying : 
"  Negotiations  dealing  with  the  situation  are  pro- 
ceeding between  the  Cabinets  at  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburg,  and  we  hope  that  they  may  lead  to  a 
general  understanding. ' ' 2 

At  the  same  time  he  had  in  hand  a  telegram  from 
Nicholas  II,  reading:  "It  would  be  right  to  give 
over  the  Austro-Serbian  problem  to  The  Hague 
Tribunal.  I  trust  in  your  wisdom  and  friend- 
ship."3 Not  only  this,  the  Kaiser  knew  that,  on 
July  31st,  Sazonof,  the  Eussian  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs,  had  handed  to  the  German  ambassa- 
dor at  St.  Petersburg  the  following  statement,  ac- 
cepting in  principle  the  proposal  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey: 

"If  Austria  consents  to  stay  the  march  of  her 
troops  on  Serbian  territory,  and  if,  recognizing 
that  the  Austro-Serbian  conflict  has  assumed  the 
character  of  a  question  of  European  interest,  she 
admits  that  the  great  powers  may  examine  the 
satisfaction  which  Serbia  can  accord  to  the  Austro- 

1  German  White  Book,  no  number. 

2  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book,  I,  No.  53. 

3  Published  in  the  Russian  press  on  January  31,  1915.  See 
Scott,  Documents,  Part  II,  p.  1029.  Not  printed  in  German  White 
Book,  and  afterward  explained  as  "unimportant." 

269 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Hungarian  Government  without  injury  to  her  rights 
as  a  sovereign  state  or  her  independence,  Russia 
undertakes  to  maintain  her  waiting  attitude.' '* 

Only  the  knowledge  by  Nicholas  II  of  the  fact  of 
Austria's  acceptance  and  Germany's  approval  were 
necessary  to  the  meeting  of  a  conference  for  a 
pacific  settlement  of  the  Austro-Serbian  contro- 
versy, yet  the  Kaiser  did  not  send  to  the  Czar  the 
note  he  says  he  was  preparing. 

In  these  circumstances,  on  the  evening  of  July 
31st,  upon  the  announcement  in  Berlin  of  a  Russian 
order  for  general  mobilization,  an  ultimatum  was 
telegraphed  to  St.  Petersburg  directing  the  Im- 
perial German  Ambassador  to  inform  the  Russian 
Government  that,  if  Russia  did  not  stop  every  meas- 
ure of  war  against  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
within  twelve  hours  and  notify  Germany  definitely 
to  that  effect,  German  mobilization  would  follow.2 
At  midnight  of  the  31st  this  ultimatum  was  deliv- 
ered. 

It  was  "mobilization,"  not  a  declaration  of  war 
that  was  to  follow  if  Russia  did  not  comply  with 
Germany's  demands.  Yet  at  12.52  p.m.  of  August 
1,  the  German  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  was 
instructed,  "In  case  the  Russian  Government  mako 
no  satisfactory  reply  to  our  demand,  your  Excel- 
lency will  please  transmit  this  afternoon,  five 
o'clock  (mid-European  time),  the  following  state- 
ment: 


1  Russian  Orange  Book,  I,  No.  67. 

2  German  White  Book,  No.  23. 

270 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

"His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  my  august  Sove- 
reign, in  the  name  of  the  Empire,  accepts  the 
challenge  and  considers  Himself  in  a  state  of  war 
with  Russia.  Please  wire,  urgent,  receipt  and 
time  of  carrying  out  this  instruction  by  Russian 
time."1 

Kaiser  William  LT  had  at  last  staged  the  tragedy 
for  which  his  whole  reign  had  been  a  preparation. 
Three  matters  of  importance  deserve  consider- 
ation in  this  connection. 

The  first  is  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain,  accused 
by  Germany  of  having  brought  on  the  war  by  a 
process  of  " encirclement.' '  On  July  30th  King 
George  V  telegraphed  to  Prince  Henry : 

"I  earnestly  desire  that  such  misfortune  as  a 
European  war — the  evil  of  which  could  not  be  reme- 
died— may  be  prevented.    My  government  is  doing 
the  utmost  possible  in  order  to  induce  Russia  and 
France  to  postpone  further  military  operations, 
provided  that  Austria   declares  herself   satisfied 
with  the  occupation  of  Belgrade  and  the  neighbor- 
ing Serbian  territory  as  a  pledge  of  a  satisfactory 
settlement  of  her  demands,  while  at  the  same  time 
the  other  countries  suspend  their  preparations  for 
war.    I  rely  on  William  applying  his  great  influence 
in  order  to  induce  Austria  to  accept  this  proposal. 
In  this  way  he  will  prove  that  Germany  and  Eng- 
land are  working  together  to  prevent  what  would 
be   an  international   catastrophe.     Please   assure 
William  that  I  am  doing  all  I  can,  and  will  continue 

1  German  White  Book,  No.  23. 

371 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

to  do  all  in  my  power  to  maintain  the  peace  of 
Europe."1 

On  July  31st,  Sir  Edward  Grey  declared  to  the 
German  ambassador : 

"If  Germany  could  get  any  reasonable  proposal 
put  forward  which  made  it  clear  that  Germany  and 
Austria  were  striving  to  preserve  European  peace 
and  that  Russia  and  France  would  be  unreasonable 
if  they  rejected  it,  I  would  support  it  at  St.  Peters- 
burg and  Paris,  and  go  to  the  length  of  saying  that 
if  Russia  and  France  would  not  accept  it  his  Maj- 
esty's Government  would  have  nothing  more  to  do 
with  the  consequences;  but,  otherwise,  I  told  the 
German  ambassador  that  if  France  became  involved 
we  should  be  drawn  in." 2 

If  William  II  was  sincere  in  his  mediation  for 
peace  between  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary,  why 
did  he  not  at  least  test  the  purpose  of  Russia  by 
presenting  to  the  Czar  the  note  he  says  he  was  pre- 
paring on  the  31st?  He  had  the  assurance  that  if 
Russia  rejected  a  reasonable  proposal  the  British 


1  British  Blue  Book,  I,  Appendix  I,  II,  No.  2. 

2  The  same,  No.  Hi. 

Every  utterance  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  tended  to  confirm  the  con- 
viction at  Berlin  that  Great  Britain  was  strongly  averse  to  war. 
"Over  and  over  again,"  writes  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon,  "I  heard  the 
chances  of  British  neutrality  discussed  by  statesmen  of  the  two 
military  empires,  and  the  odds  in  favor  of  our  holding  strictly  aloof 
from  hostilities  were  set  down  as  equivalent)  to  certainty.  The 
grounds  for  this  conviction  were  numerous,  and,  to  them,  con- 
vincing. .  .  .  British  neutrality  was  an  unquestioned  postulate 
which  lay  at  the  very  root  of  the  scheme  engineered  by  the  empire- 
builders  of  Berlin.  And  they  clung  to  it  throughout  with  the 
tenacity  of  drowning  men  holding  on  to  a  frozen  plank  in  Polar 
seas." — A  Scrap  of  Paper,  London  and  New  York,  1914,  pp.  140, 

141. 

272 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

Government  would  have  nothing  more  to  do  with 
the  consequences.  Considering  the  Austrian  con- 
cession reasonable,  as  he  claims  to  have  done,  he 
had  the  opportunity  to  throw  the  responsibility  for 
war  upon  Russia  in  a  sense  which  even  Great  Brit- 
ain would  be  bound  to  accept. 

But  what  if  Russia  should  conform  to  this  reason- 
able proposal?  Then,  of  course,  there  would  be  no 
war! 

Did  the  Kaiser  believe,  from  the  tone  of  Great 
Britain's  communication,  that  in  the  event  of  war 
her  neutrality  was  still  possible?  Nothing  seemed 
to  prevent  it  but  the  safety  of  France.  As  late  as 
August  1st,  the  date  on  which  Germany  declared 
war  on  Russia,  Prince  Lichnowsky  reopened  this 
subject  at  London. 

"He  asked  me,"  wrote  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  that 
day  to  Goschen,  "if  Germany  gave  a  promise  not 
to  violate  Belgian  neutrality,  we  would  engage  to 
remain  neutral.  He  even  suggested  that  the  integ- 
rity of  France  and  her  colonies  might  be  guaran- 
teed."1 

At  the  moment  of  the  German  resolve  to  declare 
immediate  war  on  Russia  there  was  evidently  a 
belief  in  Berlin  that  Great  Britain  was  not  only 
strongly  indisposed  to  engage  in  war,  but  wholly 
unprepared  to  offer  effective  aid  to  France.  Swift 
action,  it  was  believed  in  Berlin,  would  end  the  con- 
test before  Great  Britain  could  interpose. 

But  there  were  additional  reasons  on  August  1st 

1  British  Blue  Book,  I,  Appendix  I,  II,  No.  123.     See  Illustrative 
Document  No.  XI. 

273 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

for  concluding  at  Berlin  that  Great  Britain  was  not 
to  prove  an  obstruction  to  German  plans,  so  urgent, 
so  unexpected,  were  the  British  efforts  for  peace, 
as  reported  from  London  by  Lichnowsky.  Two 
telegrams  were  received  from  him  on  that  day,  both 
of  which  seemed  to  imply  an  extraordinary  effort 
on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  to  keep  out  of  war. 
The  first  one  read: 

* i  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  just  called  me  to  the  tele- 
phone and  has  asked  me  whether  I  thought  I  could 
declare  that  in  the  event  of  France  remaining 
neutral  in  a  German-Russian  war  we  would  not 
attack  the  French.  I  told  him  that  I  believed  that 
I  could  assume  responsibility  for  this."1 

The  second,  dated  August  1,  1.15  p.m.  : 

"...  Sir  Edward  Grey's  Private  Secretary  has 
just  been  to  see  me  in  order  to  say  that  the  Minister 
wishes  to  make  proposals  to  me  for  the  neutrality 
of  England,  even  in  the  case  that  we  had  war  with 
Russia  and  France.  I  see  Sir  Edward  Grey  this 
afternoon  and  will  communicate  at  once."2 

The  first  of  these  telegrams  does  not  indicate  the 
hour  when  it  was  sent,  but  its  substance  shows  that 
it  was  the  earlier  of  the  two,  and  in  his  memoran- 
dum Prince  Lichnowsky  definitely  says  the  conver- 
sation referred  to  occurred  in  the  morning. 

Disappointing  for  the  Kaiser  as  this  alleged 
prospect  of  British  neutrality  eventually  proved,  it 
would  appear  that,  on  August  1st,  there  seemed  to 


1  British  Blue  Book,  I,  Appendix  I,  II,  No.  5. 

2  Published  in  the  Norddcatsche  Allgemeine  Zcitung  of  Septem- 
ber 6,  1914. 

274 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

him  good  reason  for  the  belief  that  Great  Britain 
might  persuade  France  not  to  take  part  in  a  con- 
tinental war,  and  that  in  any  case  Great  Britain  was 
ready  to  negotiate  regarding  terms  of  neutrality. 

This  inference  was,  of  course,  an  error,  as  Lich- 
nowsky  explains  in  the  following  comment: 

''On  the  morning  of  August  1st,  Sir  William 
Tyrrell  called  on  me,  to  tell  me  that  his  chief  still 
hoped  to  find  a  way  out.  Would  we  remain  neutral 
in  case  France  did  the  same?  I  understood  that 
we  were  to  declare  ourselves  ready,  in  such  case,  to 
spare  France ;  but  his  meaning  was  that  we  should 
remain  altogether  neutral,  that  is,  toward  Russia 
also.  That  was  the  well-known  misunderstanding. 
Sir  Edward  had  an  appointment  with  me  for  that 
afternoon.  At  the  moment  he  was  at  a  meeting  of 
the  Cabinet,  and,  Sir  William  Tyrrell  having  hur- 
ried to  him  at  once,  he  called  me  up  on  the  tele- 
phone. In  the  afternoon,  he  talked  only  about  Bel- 
gian neutrality  and  the  possibility  that  we  and 
France  might  face  one  another  in  arms  without 
attacking."1 

The  important  point  is  that,  on  August  1st,  Will- 
iam II  understood  that  British  and  possibly  French 
neutrality  might  be  hoped  for ;  while  he,  in  company 
with  Austria-Hungary,  carried  on  a  war  with 
Russia  and  Serbia.  His  state  of  mind  while  labor- 
ing under  this  misapprehension  is  of  special  inter- 
est. 

Fortunately,  the  Kaiser  has  expressed  himself 


1  Monroe  Smith's  translation,  p.  ill. 
19  275 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

somewhat  explicitly  on  this  point  in  his  message  to 
the  President: 

"Ina  telegram  from  London  my  ambassador  in- 
formed me  he  understood  the  British  Government 
would  guarantee  the  neutrality  of  France  and 
wished  to  know  whether  Germany  would  refrain 
from  attack.  I  telegraphed  to  his  Majesty  the  King 
personally  that  mobilization,  being  already  carried 
out,  could  not  be  stopped,  but  if  H.  M.  could  guar- 
antee with  his  armed  forces  the  neutrality  of 
France  I  would  refrain  from  attacking  her,  leave 
her  alone,  and  employ  my  troops  elsewhere.  H.  M. 
answered  that  he  thought  my  offer  was  based  on  a 
misunderstanding,  and  as  far  as  I  can  make  out 
Sir  E.  Grey  never  took  my  offer  into  serious  con- 
sideration. He  never  answered  it.  Instead,  he  de- 
clared that  England  had  to  defend  Belgian  neu- 
trality, which  had  to  be  violated  by  Germany  on 
strategical  grounds,  news  having  been  received  that 
France  was  already  preparing  to  enter  Belgium 
and  the  King  of  the  Belgians  having  refused  my 
petition  for  a  passage  under  guarantee  of  his  coun- 
try's freedom.  I  am  most  grateful  for  the  Presi- 
dent's message." 

What  becomes  of  the  charge  of  " encirclement' ' 
when  the  inventor  of  this  catchword  could  seriously 
believe,  even  for  a  moment,  in  the  British  guaran- 
tee of  French  neutrality  while  Germany  subdued 
Russia?  Yet,  in  his  telegram  of  August  1st  to  King 
George  V,  William  II  is  more  explicit  even  than  he 
is  in  his  message  to  the  President.    He  says : 

276 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

"I  have  just  received  the  communication  of  your 
government  offering  French  neutrality  under  the 
guarantee  of  Great  Britain.  To  this  offer  there 
was  added  the  question  whether,  under  these  con- 
ditions, Germany  would  refrain  from  attacking 
France.  For  technical  reasons  the  mobilization 
which  I  have  already  ordered  this  afternoon  on  two 
fronts — east  and  west — must  proceed  according  to 
the  arrangements  made.  A  counter  order  cannot 
now  be  given,  as  your  telegram  unfortunately  came 
too  late,  but  if  France  offers  us  her  neutrality, 
which  must  be  guaranteed  by  the  English  army  and 
navy,  I  will  naturally  give  up  the  idea  of  an  attack 
on  France  and  employ  my  troops  elsewhere.  I 
hope  that  France  will  not  be  nervous.  The  troops 
on  my  frontier  are  at  this  moment  being  kept  back 
by  telegraph  and  by  telephone  from  crossing  the 
French  frontier. " x 

How  seriously  the  possibility  of  British  and  even 
French  neutrality  was  taken  at  Berlin  is  evident 
from  the  Imperial  German  Chancellor's  telegram 
of  August  1st  to  Prince  Lichnowsky,  stating  that, 
"in  the  event  of  England  guaranteeing  with  all  her 
forces  the  unconditional  neutrality  of  France  in  the 
conflict  between  Germany  and  Russia,' '  the  Ger- 
mans would  not  cross  the  French  frontier  before 
7  p.m.  of  August  3d. 

At  this  moment  the  Kaiser  was  proclaiming  in 
Berlin  that  the  sword  had  been  forced  into  his  hand 


1  British  Blue  Book,  I,  Appendix  I,  II,  No.  6.     See  Illustrative 
Document  No.  XII. 

277 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

by  a  coalition  of  hostile  powers,  and  that  he  was 
fighting  a  war  of  defense  to  preserve  Germany's 
existence;  while,  in  secret,  he  was  demanding  of 
France  an  "unconditional"  neutrality  and  of  Great 
Britain  that  all  her  armed  forces  should  be  em- 
ployed to  restrain  France  from  defending  herself, 
thus  actually  in  effect  proposing  the  violation  of 
the  very  principle  of  neutrality  by  utilizing  the 
whole  of  Great  Britain's  forces  in  Germany's  in- 
terest !  And  if,  in  forty-eight  hours,  all  this  were 
not  pledged,  William  II  would  not  give  up  the  idea 
of  an  attack  on  France — although,  to  avoid  col- 
lision, her  outposts  were  withdrawn  ten  kilometers 
from  her  frontier — and  would  not  leave  her  alone. 
During  this  interval  his  troops,  although  mobiliza- 
tion, it  was  represented,  had  been  only  just  ordered, 
were  being  kept  back  by  telegraph  and  by  telephone 
from  crossing  the  French  frontier.  What  if  a  mes- 
sage should  fail  to  reach  them?  He  hoped  that 
France  would  not  be  nervous ! 

All  this,  it  is  true,  was  dispelled  by  Lichnowsky's 
telegram  of  August  2d,  stating  that  "the  sug- 
gestions of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  based  on  the  desire 
of  creating  the  possibility  of  lasting  neutrality  on 
the  part  of  England,  were  made  without  any  pre- 
vious inquiry  of  France  and  without  knowledge  of 
the  mobilization,  and  have  been  given  up  as  quite 
impracticable."1  In  his  memorandum  he  adds: 
"There  was  no  proposal  at  all,  but  a  question  that 
carried  with  it  no  binding  engagement,  since  our 


i  British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  9- 

278 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

interview  was  to  take  place  soon  afterward.  Ber- 
lin, however,  without  waiting  for  an  interview, 
made  the  news  the  basis  of  far-reaching  activity."  x 
In  the  mean  time  France  and  Germany  had  been 
asked  if  they  would  respect  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium. The  reply  of  France  was  prompt  and  un- 
equivocal, that  of  Germany  was  withheld ;  but,  not- 
withstanding that,  on  May  2,  1913,  it  had  been 
stated  in  the  Keichstag  that  "the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium is  guaranteed  by  international  treaty,"  the 
evasion  of  the  Foreign  Office  rendered  it  evident 
that  Germany  did  not  intend  to  respect  it.  In  his 
message  to  the  President,  quite  as  frankly  as  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  in  his  announcement  to  the 
Reichstag  on  August  4th  that  "necessity  knows  no 
law,"  the  Kaiser  places  this  violation  of  a  treaty 
obligation  on  the  ground  of  military  strategy ;  but 
his  conscience  rebukes  him  in  the  midst  of  his  at- 
tempt at  self-justification.  In  his  autograph  mes- 
sage, as  the  facsimile  reveals,  he  had  written, 
"Knowledge  having  been  received  that  France  was 
already  preparing  to  enter  Belgium" ;  but  the  false- 
hood of  this  statement  was  too  glaring  and  too 
easily  refuted.  He,  therefore,  crossed  out  "knowl- 
edge" and  wrote  in  "news." 


1  Monroe  Smith's  translation,  p.  in.  It  is  deserving  of  note 
that,  on  July  30th,  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  said  to  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky : 

"And  I  will  say  this :  If  the  peace  of  Europe  can  be  preserved, 
and  the  present  crisis  safely  passed,  my  own  endeavor  will  be  to 
promote  some  arrangement  to  which  Germany  could  be  a  party, 
by  which  she  could  be  assured  that  no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy 
would  be  pursued  against  her  or  her  allies  by  France,  Russia,  and 
ourselves,  jointly  or  separately." — British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  101. 

279 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

"Mobilization,  having  been  already  ordered," 
William  II  wrote,  "could  not  be  stopped" — not 
even  against  a  neutral  France  without  the  British 
guarantee.  And  yet  it  was  the  simple  fact  of  Rus- 
sia's mobilization  that,  in  the  Kaiser's  mind,  con- 
stituted a  sufficient  reason  for  a  declaration  of  war. 
That  is  the  plea  put  forth  by  William  II  himself 
and  emphasized  by  his  Chancellor,  who  has  declared 
the  Russian  mobilization  to  be  the  cause  of  the  war. 

By  all  the  rules  and  precedents  of  modern  war- 
fare, the  proper  answer  to  mobilization  is  mobili- 
zation. It  increases  the  gravity  of  negotiation,  but 
it  does  not  necessarily  terminate  it ;  it  only  renders 
it  the  more  urgent.  Mobilization  does  not  neces- 
sarily mean  war ;  and  even  on  August  1,  1914,  the 
Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  was  assured 
by  the  German  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  that 
it  did  not.1  Before  war  was  actually  declared  by 
William  II  on  Russia,  in  a  telegram  dated  2  p.m. 
of  August  1st,  Nicholas  II  said  to  the  Kaiser : 

"I  comprehend  that  you  are  forced  to  mobilize, 
but  I  should  like  to  have  from  you,  viz.,  that  these 
measures  do  not  mean  war,  and  that  we  shall  con- 
tinue to  negotiate  for  the  welfare  of  our  two  coun- 
tries and  the  universal  peace  which  is  so  dear  to 
our  hearts.  With  the  aid  of  God  it  must  be  pos- 
sible to  our  long-tried  friendship  to  prevent  the 
shedding  of  blood.  I  expect  with  full  confidence 
your  urgent  reply."2 


1  Russian  Orange  Book,  I,  No.  70. 

2  German  White  Book — no  number.     See  Illustrative  Document 
No.  XIII. 

280 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE  WAR 

At  that  moment,  in  addition  to  the  assurances 
from  the  other  powers,  William  II  had  in  his  pos- 
session the  key,  as  he  believed,  to  the  door  of  peace 
in  Austria-Hungary's  acceptance  of  the  British  pro- 
posal. He  knew  also  that  Russia  and  Austria- 
Hungary  were  at  that  time  engaged  in  further 
negotiations.  Yet  at  7.10  p.m.  that  evening  the 
declaration  of  war  was  presented  at  St.  Petersburg, 
on  the  ground  that  the  Russian  Government  had  not 
answered  Germany's  demand  to  cease  mobilization 
within  twelve  hours. 

How  readily  the  Austro-Serbian  War  could  have 
been  terminated,  and  a  general  European  war 
averted  if  William  II  had  merely  withheld  his  dec- 
laration of  war  and  allowed  negotiations  to  pro- 
ceed, is  evident  from  the  telegram  sent  by  Nicholas 
II  to  George  V  on  August  1st,  immediately  after 
the  Kaiser's  sudden  and  unjustified  action  in  con- 
sidering mobilization  as  identical  with  war.  He 
says : 

"I  would  gladly  have  accepted  your  proposals 
had  not  the  German  ambassador  this  afternoon 
presented  a  note  to  my  government  declaring  war. 
Ever  since  presentation  of  the  ultimatum  at  Bel- 
grade, Russia  has  devoted  all  her  efforts  to  finding 
some  pacific  solution  of  the  question  raised  by 
Austria 's  action.  Object  of  that  action  was  to  crush 
Serbia  and  make  her  a  vassal  of  Austria.  Effect 
of  this  would  have  been  to  upset  balance  of  power 
in  Balkans,  which  is  of  such  vital  interest  to  my 
Empire.    Every  proposal,  including  that  of  your 

281 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

government,  was  rejected  by  Germany  and  Austria, 
and  it  was  only  when  favorable  moment  for  bring- 
ing pressure  to  bear  on  Austria  had  passed  that 
Germany  showed  any  disposition  to  mediate.  Even 
then  she  did  not  put  forward  any  precise  proposal. 
Austria's  declaration  of  war  on  Serbia  forced  me 
to  order  a  partial  mobilization,  though,  in  view  of 
threatening  situation,  my  military  advisers 
strongly  advised  a  general  mobilization,  owing  to 
quickness  with  which  Germany  can  mobilize  in  com- 
parison with  Russia.1  I  was  eventually  compelled 
to  take  this  course  in  consequence  of  complete  Aus- 
trian mobilization,  of  the  bombardment  of  Bel- 
grade, of  concentration  of  Austrian  troops  in 
Galicia,  and  of  secret  military  preparations  being 
made  in  Germany.  That  I  was  justified  in  doing  so 
is  proved  by  Germany's  sudden  declaration  of  war, 
which  was  quite  unexpected  by  me,  as  I  have  given 
most  categorical  assurances  to  the  Emperor 
William  that  my  troops  would  not  move  so  long  as 
mediation  negotiations  continued. 

"In  this  solemn  hour  I  wish  to  assure  you  once 
more  that  I  have  done  all  in  my  power  to  avert  war. 
Now  that  it  has  been  forced  on  me,  I  trust  your 


1  "To  realize  why  Russian  mobilization  must  be  slow,  one  has 
only  to  glance  at  the  Russian  railway  rolling  stock.  The  whole 
empire,  in  Europe  as  well  as  Asia,  owns  less  than  20,000  passenger 
coaches,  1,000  of  which  are  parlor  cars :  The  total  seating  capacity 
of  these  coaches  is  less  than  700,000,  while  the  German  seating 
capacity  is  four  times  as  great,  and  if  one  compares  the  distances 
in  Germany  with  those  in  Russia,  not  four  times,  but  more  nearly 
forty  times  as  great.  Russia  has  less  than  400,000  freight  cars, 
while  Germany  has  almost  600,000  freight  cars." — Von  Mach,  What 
Germany  Wants,  Boston,  1914,  following  statistics  published  in 
the  North  German  Gazette  of  August  23,  1914. 

283 


RESPONSIBILITY   FOR    THE    WAR 

country  will  not  fail  to  support  France  and  Russia. 
God  bless  and  protect  you."  * 

In  view  of  the  convincing  character  of  the  cumu- 
lative evidence  that  the  crime  of  causing  the  war 
rested  upon  the  military  designs  of  Germany,  it  is 
not  surprising  that  in  defending  itself  against  the 
accusation,  the  Imperial  German  Government  laid 
the  blame  alternately  upon  Russia,  England,  and 
France,  according  as  some  incident  seemed  for  the 
moment  to  serve  its  purpose. 

When,  in  September,  1917,  the  former  Russian 
Chief  of  Staff,  Soukhomlinof,  was  tried  for  treason, 
the  Imperial  German  Chancellor,  abandoning  the 
indictment  against  Great  Britain,  which  had  fur- 
nished the  chief  thesis  since  England's  entrance 
into  the  war,  after  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  claimed 
that  the  disclosures  made  in  the  trial  "would  force 
public  opinion  in  Europe  and  outside  of  Europe 
to  modify  its  judgment  concerning  Germany. ' ' 2 

General  Janouchkevitch  had  testified  that  when, 
on  July  29, 1914,  Soukhomlinof  assured  the  German 
military  attache  at  St.  Petersburg  that  no  order  of 
mobilization  had  been  issued,  he  had  at  that  time  a 
signed  order  in  his  pocket.  This  fact,  argued  the 
Chancellor,  furnished  a  positive  proof  that  Russia 
intended  war,  and  that  Germany  was,  therefore, 
justified  in  declaring  war  before  Russia  was  ready. 

He  took  occasion  to  go  further,  and  to  say  that 


1  British  Blue  Book,  I,  Appendix  I,  II,  No.  2. 

2  Interview  of  Doctor  Mantler  with  Chancellor  Michaelis,  pub- 
lished by  the  Wolf  Agency  at  Berlin. 

283 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Soukhomlinof  was  in  collusion  with  the  Chauvinist 
group  in  France,  and  even  to  utter  the  absurd  in- 
sinuation that  this  Russian  officer  "was  sent  to 
France  for  the  purpose  of  placing  M.  Poincare  at 
the  head  of  the  French  Republic. ' ' * 

Admitting  that  the  testimony  of  General  Janouch- 
kevitch  is  truthful,  it  is  not  surprising  that  General 
Soukhomlinof  carried  in  his  pocket,  on  July  29th, 
an  order  of  mobilization  which  was  not  issued  until 
July  31st.  The  surprise  is  that  it  was  not  issued 
earlier,  for  on  July  29th  Sazonof  telegraphed  to 
the  Russian  ambassador  at  Paris : 

"The  German  ambassador  to-day  informed  me  of 
the  decision  of  his  government  to  mobilize,  if  Rus- 
sia did  not  stop  her  military  preparations.  Now, 
in  point  of  fact,  we  only  began  these  preparations 
in  consequence  of  the  mobilization  already  under- 
taken by  Austria,  and  owing  to  her  evident  un- 
willingness to  accept  any  means  of  arriving  at  a 
peaceful  settlement  of  her  dispute  with  Serbia."2 

But  Russia's  right  to  contemplate  a  general  order 
of  mobilization,  and  to  have  it  ready  to  be  issued 
when  needed,  hardly  required  this  new  menace  from 
Germany.  Already,  on  July  5th,  the  Crown  Coun- 
cil at  Potsdam  had  decided  to  sustain  Austria- 
Hungary  in  the  subjugation  of  Serbia.  In  fact, 
even  overlooking  that  decision,  German  mobiliza- 
tion was  decided  upon  on  that  very  day — July  29th 
— by  a  Crown  Council  held  in  the  Neues  Palais. 


1  Interview  of  Doctor  Mantler  with  Chancellor  Michaelis. 

2  Russian  Orange  Book,  I,  No.  s8. 

284 


RESPONSIBILITY   FOR   THE   WAR 

On  July  30th,  the  Russian  ambassador  at  Berlin 
telegraphed  his  Minister : 

"I  learn  that  the  order  for  mobilization  of  the 
German  Army  and  Navy  has  just  been  issued."1 

A  newspaper  extra  containing  this  order  had 
been  published  in  Berlin,  but  was  at  once  sup- 
pressed as  premature.  Mobilization,  however,  had, 
in  fact,  been  decided  upon,  and  the  public  announce- 
ment of  it  had  been  printed,  but  publication  was 
withheld,  as  explained  by  the  French  ambassador 
in  the  following  despatch  of  July  30th : 

"Herr  von  Jagow  telephoned  to  me  at  two  o'clock 
that  the  news  of  the  German  mobilization  which  had 
spread  an  hour  before  was  false,  and  asked  me  to 
inform  you  of  this  urgently ;  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment is  confiscating  the  extra  editions  of  the  papers 
which  announced  it.  But  neither  this  communica- 
tion nor  these  steps  diminish  my  apprehension  with 
regard  to  the  plans  of  Germany. 

"It  seems  certain  that  the  Extraordinary  Council 
held  yesterday  evening  at  Potsdam  with  the  mili- 
tary authorities,  under  the  presidency  of  the  Em- 
peror, decided  on  mobilization,  and  this  explains  the 
preparation  of  the  special  editions  of  the  Lokal- 
Anzeiger,  but  that  from  various  causes  (the  decla- 
ration of  Great  Britain  that  she  reserved  her  entire 
liberty  of  action,  the  exchange  of  telegrams  be- 
tween the  Czar  and  "William  II)  the  serious  meas- 
ures which  had  been  decided  upon  were  suspended. 


2  Russian  Orange  Book,  I,  No.  60. 

285 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

'  'One  of  the  ambassadors  with  whom  I  have  very 
close  relations  saw  Herr  Zimmermann  at  two 
o'clock.  According  to  the  Under  Secretary  of 
State  the  military  authorities  are  very  anxious  that 
mobilization  should  be  ordered,  because  every  delay 
makes  Germany  lose  some  of  her  advantages. 
Nevertheless,  up  to  the  present,  the  haste  of  the 
General  Staff,  which  sees  war  in  mobilization,  had 
been  successfully  prevented.  In  any  case,  mobiliza- 
tion may  be  decided  upon  any  moment.  I  do  not 
know  who  had  issued  in  the  Lokal-Anzeiger,  a  paper 
which  is  usually  semi-official,  premature  news  cal- 
culated to  cause  excitement  in  France. 

"Further,  I  have  the  strongest  reasons  to  believe 
that  all  the  measures  for  mobilisation  which  can  be 
taken  before  the  publication  of  the  general  order  of 
mobilization  have  already  been  taken  here,  and  that 
they  are  anxious  "here  to  make  us  publish  our  mobil- 
isation first,  in  order  to  attribute  the  responsibility 
to  us."1 

With  the  knowledge  possessed  at  St.  Petersburg, 
and  especially  in  view  of  Germany's  greater  rapid- 
ity of  movement  and  readiness  for  war,  the  fact  that 
the  Russian  order  for  mobilization  was  withheld 
until  July  31st  is  clearly  good  evidence  that  Rus- 
sia was  still  hoping  for  a  peaceful  solution  of  the 
Austro-Serbian  problem,  which  was  the  only  excuse 
for  war.  "We  must  consider  also  that,  even  as  late 
as  August  1st,  Russian  mobilization  was  only  "or- 


1  French   Yellow   Book,    No.    105.    See   Illustrative    Document 
No.  XIV. 

286 


RESPONSIBILITY   FOR   THE   WAR 

dered,"  while  German  mobilization  was,  according 
to  the  Kaiser's  telegram  to  King  George,  already 
practically  accomplished.  Even  on  July  31st,  Pres- 
ident Poincare  had  telegraphed  to  King  George, 
whose  government  had  not  }Tet  promised  to  come  to 
the  aid  of  France : 

"The  military  preparations  which  are  being 
undertaken  by  the  Imperial  Government,  especially 
in  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  the  French  fron- 
tier, are  being  pushed  forward  every  day  with 
fresh  vigor  and  speed."1 

That  the  Czar's  order  for  general  mobilization 
was  promulgated  on  July  31st  affords  no  evidence, 
therefore,  in  view  of  his  solemn  avowal  to  the  con- 
trary, that  he  desired  war.  Indeed,  the  testimony 
in  the  trial  of  General  Soukhomlinof  furnishes 
conclusive  evidence  that  the  Czar  did  not  desire 
war.  General  Janouchkevitch  testified  that  "on 
July  29th,  the  Czar  consented  to  sign  the  Russian 
mobilization;  but,  in  the  night,  having  received  a 
telegram  from  William  II,  he  gave  an  order  to  sus- 


1  British  Blue  Book,  I,  Appendix  I,  V.  No.  r. 

Not  only  were  conversations  going  on  at  St.  Petersburg  and 
Vienna  between  the  representatives  of  Russia  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary, but,  "On  August  i,"  writes  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  British 
Ambassador  at  Vienna,  "I  was  informed  by  M.  Schebeko  [Russian 
Ambassador  at  Vienna]  that  Count  Szapary  [Austrian  Ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg]  had  at  last  conceded  the  main  point  at  issue  by 
announcing  to  M.  Sazonof  that  Austria  would  consent  to  submit 
to  mediation  the  points  in  the  Note  to  Serbia  which  seemed  incom- 
patible with  the  maintenance  of  Serbian  independence.  .  .  .  Aus- 
tria, in  fact,  had  finally  yielded,  and  that  she  herself  had  at  this 
point  good  hopes  of  a  peaceful  issue  is  shown  by  the  communica- 
tion made  on  August  1st  by  Count  Mensdorff,  to  the  effect  that 
Austria  had  neither  'banged  the  door'  on  compromise  nor  cut  off 
the  conversations." — British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  161. 

287 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

pend  that  ukase,"1  and  it  was  not  published  until 
the  31st. 

What  becomes,  then,  of  the  pretense  that  Russia 
plunged  Europe  into  war?  Within  forty-eight 
hours  of  the  Czar's  decision  to  arrest  military 
preparations,  if  this  testimony  be  accepted,  instead 
of  giving  time  for  diplomacy  to  do  its  work,  Will- 
iam II,  in  the  face  of  Nicholas  IPs  plea  for  peace, 
declared  war  on  Russia. 

There  is,  therefore,  no  solid  ground  for  the  claim 
that  Russian  mobilization  was  the  cause  of  the  war. 
Russian  mobilization  was  in  response  to  Austro- 
Hungarian  mobilization  and  a  declaration  of  war 
on  Serbia,  which  the  Imperial  German  Government 
had  abetted  and  approved,  if  it  had  not  even  sug- 
gested it. 

It  was,  in  fact,  only  as  an  ally  of  Austria-Hungary 
that  Germany  had  any  reason  to  arm  against  Rus- 
sia. Although  the  casus  foederis  did  not  come  into 
existence  unless  Austria-Hungary  was  actually 
attacked  by  Russia,  William  II  had,  from  the  be- 
ginning, treated  Russia  as  if  the  quarrel  with 
Serbia  were  principally  Germany's  affair.  As  re- 
garded from  Berlin,  the  whole  Balkan  question  was 
considered  Germany's  affair ;  for  William  II  did  not 
intend  that  there  should  be  in  the  Balkans  any 
barrier  to  the  Hamburg-Bagdad  extension  of  Ger- 
many's commercial  enterprise  and  supremacy. 
Besides,  the  Pan-Germans  who  were  influential  in 
the  military  plans  of  Germany  had,  as  we  have  seen, 


i  British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  159- 


RESPONSIBILITY   FOR   THE   WAR 

definite  designs  on  a  disintegrated  Russia.  The 
attack  on  France,  the  Kaiser  thought,  might  per- 
haps be  delayed,  under  Great  Britain's  guarantee; 
but  Russia  must  instantly  disarm  and  either  yield, 
without  battle,  to  German  predominance  in  the 
Balkans  and  to  a  German  hegemony  in  Europe,  or 
be  subdued  by  the  superiority  of  German  force. 
Even  in  case  of  entire  neutrality  in  the  West,  Will- 
iam II  declared  that,  if  he  left  France  alone,  he  in- 
tended to  use  his  troops  against  Russia. 

Accordingly,  although  Austria-Hungary  had 
announced  on  July  31st,  "Despite  the  change  in  the 
situation  which  has  resulted  from  Russia's  mobili- 
zation, we  are  quite  ready  to  consider  the  proposal 
of  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  mediate  between  us  and 
Serbia,"1  William  II  did  not  permit  this  proposal 
to  come  into  effect.  The  Austrians  were  hoping 
that  further  negotiations  would  "remove  disquie- 
tude," while  the  Kaiser  was  representing  that  his 
Empire  was  in  danger. 

In  truth,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  "the  decision 
reached  at  Berlin  ...  to  treat  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion as  an  act  of  war,  clearly  took  the  Austrian  For- 
eign Office  by  surprise."2 

Until  August  5th,  the  Foreign  Secretary  of  Aus- 
tria, Count  Berchtold,  remained  silent.  Germany 
alone,  during  that  interval,  was  at  war  with  Russia. 
And  when,  at  last,  Austria-Hungary  also  finally 
made  her  declaration,  it  was  based  mainly  on  the 


1  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book,  I,  No.  51. 

2  Monroe  Smith's  Militarism  and  Statecraft,  New  York,   1918, 

P-  94- 

289 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

action  and  representations  of  Germany.  Its  state- 
ment is : 

"In  view  of  the  threatening  attitude  assumed  by 
Russia  in  the  conflict  between  the  Austro-Hunga- 
rian  monarchy  and  Serbia,  and  in  view  of  the  fact 
that,  in  consequence  of  this  conflict,  and  according 
to  a  communication  of  the  Berlin  Cabinet, Russia  has 
considered  it  necessary  to  open  hostilities  against 
Germany ;  furthermore,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
latter  consequently  has  entered  into  a  state  of  war 
with  the  former  power,  Austria-Hungary  considers 
herself  equally  in  a  state  of  war  with  Russia." * 

No  attack  upon  Austria-Hungary  is  here  alleged, 
only  a  "threatening  attitude,"  on  the  part  of  Rus- 
sia. That  Russia  had  considered  it  necessary  to 
open  hostilities  against  Germany  is  not  alleged  as 
a  known  fact,  but  is  taken  on  the  authority  of  the 
Berlin  Cabinet. 

Finally,  it  is  "in  consequence"  of  Germany  hav- 
ing entered  into  a  state  of  war  with  Russia  that 
Austria-Hungary  considers  herself  "equally,"  al- 
though thus  tardily,  also  at  war  with  Russia. 

When  William  II  finally  interrupted  what 
promised  to  be  successful  efforts  for  peace  by  a 
declaration  of  war,  he  did  not  even  pretend  that 
he  did  this  in  vindication  of  Austrian  rights.  The 
war,  he  declared  to  the  German  people,  was  a  "war 
of  defense"  to  preserve  the  existence  of  his  Empire. 
He  said  this  when,  on  August  1st,  he  believed  that 
he  had  no  opponent  except  Russia ;  for,  as  we  have 


1  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book,  I,  No.  59. 

290 


RESPONSIBILITY   FOR   THE   WAR 

seen,  he  was  counting  at  that  time  on  British  and 
possibly  even  French  neutrality. 

A  telegram  to  Nicholas  II  accepting  the  Czar's 
entreaty  that  mobilization  might  not  be  considered 
as  equivalent  to  war,  and  that  negotiations  might 
proceed,  would  have  secured  the  peace  of  Europe. 

At  the  celebration  of  the  thirtieth  anniversary  of 
his  accession  to  the  throne,  on  June  8,  1918,  Will- 
iam II,  speaking  to  his  officers  of  the  General  Staff, 
in  a  moment  of  frankness,  has  revealed  to  the  world 
his  true  purpose  in  the  war.  Responding  to  the 
toast  of  Field-Marshal  Hindenburg,  after  referring 
to  the  twenty-six  years  of  "fruitful  work"  in  which 
he  had  occupied  himself  with  his  army  and  its  de- 
velopment, he  said: 

"At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  German  people 
were  not  clear  as  to  what  this  war  was  to  mean.  I 
knew  it  very  well.  For  that  reason,  even  the  first 
outburst  of  enthusiasm  did  not  deceive  me  or  cause 
any  change  in  my  aims  and  expectations,  I  knew 
very  well  what  it  was  all  about.  For  the  entry  of 
England  signified  the  world  struggle  between  two 
conceptions  of  the  world.  It  was  not  a  matter  of  a 
strategic  campaign.  It  was  a  matter  of  the  strug- 
gle between  two  conceptions  of  the  world.  Either 
the  Prussian-German-Germanic  world  conception 
...  or  the  Anglo-Saxon.' ' 

With  characteristic  sophistry,  Kaiser  William  II 
identifies  the  former  with  "right,  freedom,  honor, 
and  morals ";  the  latter  with  "the  idolatry  of 
money-getting. ' ' 

20  291 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

I  pass  over  in  silence  this  insinuation  coming 
from  one  who  can  speak  of  "my  army,"  "my 
navy,"  and  "my  Empire"  as  being  his  personal 
property,  and  who  has  failed  to  abolish  the  Prus- 
sian plutocratic  three-class  system  of  voting,  which 
proportions  political  rights  according  to  wealth 
and  the  ability  to  pay  taxes;  and  I  do  not  dwell 
upon  the  German  looting  of  French  chateaus,  the 
extortions  practised  in  Belgium,  Ukrania,  and  Ru- 
mania, and  the  whole  scheme  of  plunder  advocated 
by  the  Pan-German  party.  But  we  cannot  fail  to 
see  in  this  utterance  the  most  important  self-dis- 
closure which  the  Kaiser  has  yet  made.  Here  he 
frankly  abandons  the  idea  of  a  campaign  provoked 
by  French  revanche  or  Russian  mobilization. 

The  meaning  of  the  war,  which  the  Kaiser  says  he 
understood  from  the  beginning,  was  a  struggle  be- 
tween two  world  conceptions,  the  Prussian  and  the 
Anglo-Saxon.  During  all  the  time  when  he  was 
seeking  British  neutrality  he  was  aiming,  it  seems, 
only  to  divide  his  enemies,  to  allay  suspicion  of  his 
real  designs,  and,  by  the  immediate  subjugation  of 
France  and  Russia,  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  real 
struggle,  the  conflict  with  the  Anglo-Saxon  concep- 
tion, the  fight  for  world  domination,  and  the 
triumph  of  the  Prussian  idea.  Does  not  this  self- 
revelation  by  William  II  completely  verify  the  ex- 
position of  his  aims  and  policies  presented  in  these 
chapters? 

I  am  penning  these  concluding  words  on  the 
fourth  anniversary  of  England's  entrance  into  the 

292 


RESPONSIBILITY   FOR   THE   WAR 

war.  Why  did  England  enter  it?  Not  for  world 
power,  not  for  gain,  not  to  prevent  any  legitimate 
aspirations  of  Germany,  all  of  which  had  just  been 
cheerfully  conceded  in  treaties  awaiting  signature. 
On  August  4,  1914,  Sir  Edward  Grey  telegraphed 
to  the  British  ambassador  at  Berlin: 

"We  are  informed  that  Belgian  territory  has 
been  violated  at  Gemmenich.  In  these  circum- 
stances, and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Germany  de- 
clined to  give  the  same  assurance  respecting  Bel- 
gium as  France  gave  last  week  in  reply  to  our 
request  made  simultaneously  at  Berlin  and  Paris, 
we  must  repeat  that  request  and  ask  that  a  satis- 
factory reply  to  it  and  to  my  telegram  of  this  morn- 
ing be  received  here  by  twelve  o'clock  to-night.  If 
not,  you  are  instructed  to  ask  for  your  passports 
and  to  say  that  his  Majesty's  Government  feel 
bound  to  take  all  steps  in  their  power  to  uphold 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  the  observance  of  a 
treaty  to  which  Germany  is  as  much  a  party  as 
ourselves."1 

But  the  die  had  been  already  cast.  On  that  same 
day  the  Imperial  Chancellor  said  in  the  Reichstag : 

"Gentlemen,  we  are  now  acting  in  self-defense. 
Necessity  knows  no  law.  Our  troops  have  occu- 
pied Luxemburg  and  have  possibly  already  entered 
on  Belgian  soil.  Gentlemen,  that  is  a  breach  of 
international  law. 

"The  French  Government  has  notified  Brussels 
that  it  would  respect  Belgian  neutrality  as  long  as 


i  British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  159. 

293 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

the  adversary  respected  it.  But  we  know  that 
France  stood  ready  for  an  invasion.  France  could 
wait;  we  could  not.  A  French  invasion  on  our 
flank  and  the  lower  Rhine  might  have  been  disas- 
trous. Thus  we  were  forced  to  ignore  the  rightful 
protests  of  the  governments  of  Luxemburg  and 
Belgium.  The  injustice — I  speak  openly — the  in- 
justice we  thereby  commit  we  will  try  to  make  good 
as  soon  as  our  military  aims  have  been  attained. 
He  who  is  menaced  as  we  are  and  is  fighting  for  his 
all  can  only  consider  the  one  and  best  way  to 
strike."1 

In  the  interview  between  the  Chancellor  and  the 
British  ambassador  which  followed  began  what 
Kaiser  William  II  professes  to  have  understood 
from  the  beginning  to  be  the  real  meaning  of  the 
war — the  conflict  between  the  Prussian  and  the 
Anglo-Saxon  conceptions  of  the  world.  "Just  for 
a  word,  *  neutrality,'  a  word  which  in  war-time  has 
so  often  been  disregarded — just  for  a  scrap  of 
paper,"  complained  the  Chancellor,  "Great  Britain 
was  going  to  make  war  on  a  kindred  nation  who  de- 
sired nothing  better  than  to  be  friends  with  her!" 
"If  it  was  for  strategic  reasons  a  matter  of  life 
and  death  to  Germany,"  as  he  had  been  told,  replied 
the  ambassador,  "so  I  would  wish  him  to  under- 
stand that  it  was,  so  to  speak,  a  'matter  of  life  and 
death'  for  the  honor  of  Great  Britain  that  she 
should  keep  her  solemn  engagement  to  do  her  ut- 


1  The  London  Times,  August  1 1,  1914.     See  Illustrative  Docu- 
ment No.  XV. 

294 


RESPONSIBILITY   FOR   THE    WAR 

most  to  defend  Belgium's  neutrality  if  attacked. 
That  solemn  compact  simply  had  to  be  kept,  or  what 
confidence  could  any  one  have  in  engagements  given 
by  Great  Britain  in  the  future?"  To  which  the 
Chancellor  answered:  "But  at  what  price  will  that 
compact  have  been  kept  ?  Has  the  British  Govern- 
ment thought  of  that?" x 

"At  what  price!"  And  so,  when  it  comes  to 
action,  "right,  freedom,  honor,  and  morals" — the 
boasted  elements  of  the  Prussian  world  conception 
— turn  out  to  be  mere  idle  words. 

"At  what  price"  has  Germany  paid,  and  at  what 
price  must  she  yet  pay,  for  the  folly  and  the  mad- 
ness of  trying  to  impose  upon  mankind  the  Prus- 
sian world  conception  ?  No  one,  in  1914,  was  disposed 
to  disturb  the  peace  of  Germany.  Few  understood 
her  designs  and  ambitions.  But  the  brutal  assault 
upon  an  innocent  and  peaceful  neighbor,  trusting  in 
the  honor  of  the  great  and  powerful  nations  to  af- 
ford her  protection,  suddenly  disclosed  the  lust  for 
power,  the  predatory  designs,  the  espionage,  and  the 
world-wide  network  of  conspiracy  with  which  the 
Imperial  German  Government  has  enveloped  the 
earth.  It  was  the  morally  inevitable  culmination  of 
the  ambitions,  the  fantasies,  and  the  impetuosity  of 
Kaiser  "William  II,  unrestrained  by  a  responsible 
government  representing  the  permanent  interests  of 
the  German  people.  He  promised  them  gain  and 
glory.  He  has  covered  them  with  sackcloth  and  ashes. 


1  British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  160.    See  Illustrative  Document  No. 
XVI. 

295 


EPILOGUE 

T  N  recording  my  impressions  of  the  Kaiser  I  have 
•*■  tried  to  represent  him  as  I  believe  he  will  pass 
into  history  np  to  the  beginning  of  the  Great  War. 
Beyond  this  it  is  not  my  present  purpose  to  follow 
him.  Of  the  war  itself  and  of  his  part  in  it  there  is 
no  need  that  I  should  speak.  The  most  recent 
words  and  deeds  of  William  II  indicate  that  there 
is  no  break  in  the  continuity  of  his  aims  and  pur- 
poses. His  policies  and  his  convictions  thus  far 
remain  the  same.  Events  have  served  only  to  ren- 
der these  more  evident  and  more  emphatic. 

When  the  history  of  Europe  during  the  last  thirty 
years  comes  to  be  written,  there  will,  perhaps,  be  a 
wide  divergence  among  historians  regarding  tha 
position  and  responsibility  of  the  Kaiser.  The 
German  school  of  economic  determinists,  urging  the 
irresistible  tide  of  material  growth  in  Germany, 
will  endeavor  to  diminish  the  part  actually  played 
by  the  German  Emperor  and  will  tend  to  reduce  him 
to  virtual  efTacement.  He  may,  perhaps,  even  be 
held  up  to  the  sympathy  of  mankind  as  in  effect  a 
martyr,  the  helpless  victim  of  forces,  economic  and 
military,  over  which  he  had  no  control.  Already, 
legends  of  this  purport  have  made  their  appear- 

296 


EPILOGUE 

ance.  According  to  one  of  these,  at  the  moment  of 
signing  the  declaration  of  war  on  Russia  the  Em- 
peror is  represented  as  saying  to  the  military- 
officers  who  are  said  to  have  forced  his  hand :  ''Gen- 
tlemen, you  will  live  to  regret  this."1  According 
to  another  tale,  it  was  the  Crown  Prince  who,  pistol 
in  hand,  frightened  the  Emperor  into  a  decision  by 
the  threat  of  a  military  revolution  and  William  II 's 
deposition.2 

Such  episodes  as  these  do  not  harmonize  with  the 
recorded  utterances  of  William  II,  repeated  from 
the  beginning  of  his  reign  and  continued  after  the 
war  began.  While  it  is  probably  true  that,  for  a 
time,  he  hoped  to  achieve  his  ends  without  actual 
bloodshed,  it  is  undeniable  that  he  had  created  a 
situation  which  rendered  war  inevitable,  unless 
Russia,  as  well  as  Serbia,  should  prove  content  to 
undergo  the  deep  humiliation  which  the  Kaiser  had 
deliberately  and  insistently  endeavored  to  impose 
upon  Nicholas  II.    Having  prepared  for  war  with 


1  Mr.  A.  G.  Gardiner,  editor  of  the  London  Daily  News,  assured 
Mr.  S.  S.  McClure  that  he  had  "sure  sources  of  information" 
for  this  statement.     See  McClure,  Obstacles  to  Peace,  p.  73. 

2  The  influence  of  the  Crown  Prince  upon  William  II  has  been 
greatly  overestimated.  His  imprudence  has  often  been  reproved 
by  the  Kaiser,  who  has  too  high  an  opinion  of  himself  to  subordi- 
nate his  own  judgment  to  this  young  man  or  in  any  respect  to 
fear  him.  His  popularity  with  the  army,  which  the  Crown  Prince 
has  always  cultivated,  was  before  the  war  considerable ;  but  the 
test  of  war  has  not  developed  any  considerable  military  talent  in 
this  admirer  of  Napoleon  I.  According  to  Beyens,  "At  an  official 
dinner,  where  he  sat  next  to  the  wife  of  an  ambassador  from 
one  of  the  Entente  Powers,  he  could  not  think  of  anything  more 
clever  and  gallant  to  say  than  that  it  was  his  cherished  dream  to 
make  war  and  to  lead  a  charge  at  the  head  of  his  regiment." 
There  is  no  record  that  this  last-named  exploit  has  ever  been  per- 
formed by  him. — Germany  Before  the  War,  p.  63. 

297 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

elaborate  care,  and  resting  the  prestige  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire  on  its  military  superiority,  he  needed 
only  to  be  convinced  that  the  moment  was  favor- 
able to  German  success  to  lannch  the  fatal  thunder- 
bolt. That  conviction,  at  the  moment  of  declaring 
war,  as  we  have  seen,  was  confidently  entertained. 
It  was  not  until  Great  Britain's  entrance  into  the 
conflict  that  doubt  arose.  It  was  then  too  late  to 
retreat  without  loss  of  prestige,  as  well  as  the  re- 
nunciation of  all  plans  of  conquest.  Emboldened 
by  Great  Britain's  lack  of  preparation,  in  defiance 
of  "French's  contemptible  little  army,"  the  con- 
quest of  Belgium  and  the  assault  on  France  were 
pushed  with  ferocious  energy,  until  the  tide  was 
checked  by  the  battle  of  the  Marne. 

Notwithstanding  all  this,  and  even  dismissing  the 
illusion  that  beneath  his  "shining  armor"  William 
II  has  always  wished  and  labored  for  peace,  there 
are  those  who  will  endeavor  to  maintain  that 
neither  he  nor  any  other  man  who  might  happen 
to  be  the  German  Emperor  could  have  prevented 
the  European  conflict  which  broke  out  in  1914.  It 
was  caused,  it  will  be  contended,  by  the  inevitable 
development  of  forces  wholly  beyond  the  control 
of  man.  The  growth  of  population,  the  need  for 
new  territories  fit  for  German  occupation  and  ex- 
ploitation, the  necessity  of  controlling  tropical  and 
semi-tropical  lands  as  sources  of  raw  materials, 
were  irresistibly  pushing  the  German  nation  to- 
ward expansion  and  colonization.  Arrayed  against 
both   these   tendencies   were   powerful  neighbors, 

298 


EPILOGUE 

Russia  and  France  on  the  Continent,  Great  Britain 
on  the  sea.  Russia,  it  will  be  insisted,  was  pursuing 
a  secular  policy  of  driving  the  Turks  out  of  Europe 
and  taking  possession  of  Constantinople  as  a  gate- 
way to  the  maritime  world  and  as  a  barrier  to 
German  commerce  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  Asia 
Minor,  Syria,  and  Mesopotamia.  France  was  re- 
solved to  avail  herself  of  the  first  opportunity  to 
recover  her  lost  provinces,  Alsace  and  Lorraine; 
and,  therefore,  impatient  for  Russia  to  engage  in 
war  with  Germany,  which  would  furnish  an  occasion 
for  sustaining  her  ally  in  crushing  Germany.  Great 
Britain,  jealous  of  tha  commercial  development  of 
Germany,  and  especially  of  her  growing  navy,  had 
spread  her  Empire  over  the  whole  earth,  had  occu- 
pied the  most  vital  points  with  her  naval  stations, 
and  would  block  with  her  tremendous  sea-power 
the  plans  of  Germany  for  obtaining  like  advantages, 
thus  retaining  through  her  maritime  strength  a 
monopoly  of  the  sea.  To  give  all  this  array  of  ob- 
stacles to  German  expansion  a  dramatic  effect,  the 
legend  of  " encirclement"  will  perhaps  be  revived, 
by  which  the  peaceful  entente  between  Great  Brit- 
ain, France,  and  Russia  has  been  magnified  into  an 
organized  opposition  to  Germany  and  distorted  into 
a  malignant  and  aggressive  form  of  hostility. 

So  long  as  this  legend  receives  credence — as  it 
has  and  still  does  in  Germany — the  determinists 
will  seem  to  have  good  ground  for  their  contention. 
Given  all  these  factors  of  physical  necessity  and 
political  conspiracy,  it  would  seem  true  that  neither 

299 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

William  II  nor  any  possible  German  Emperor  could 
have  avoided  an  ultimate  collision. 

Unfortunately  for  this  theory,  it  cannot,  in  the 
light  of  demonstrable  facts,  be  maintained  that 
this  alleged  "encirclement"  was  real.  Great  Brit- 
ain, long  denounced  in  Germany  as  the  "real 
enemy,' '  has  clearly  manifested  a  disposition  to 
promote  satisfaction  of  the  legitimate  needs  of  the 
German  people  in  the  negotiation  of  the  Grey-Lich- 
nowsky  treaties,  and  this  fact  is  not  disputed.  Had 
Great  Britain,  with  her  extended  commerce,  closed 
her  ports  to  Germany,  or  made  them  virtually  in- 
accessible by  a  prohibitory  tariff,  there  might  have 
been  ground  for  the  accusation  that  England  had 
established  and  was  maintaining  a  monopoly  of 
foreign  trade;  but,  on  the  contrary,  all  England's 
ports  were  open  to  German  exports,  and  all  her 
colonies  were  for  Germany  unobstructed  sources  of 
raw  materials.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  a  dread  of 
German  procedure  and  its  consequences  has,  at 
times,  been  expressed  in  England,  and  remedies 
have  been  discussed,  it  was  the  natural  effect  of 
what  was  known  of  Germany's  confessed  aims  and 
purposes.  The  rapid  development  of  the  German 
navy  might  well  excite  apprehension  in  England 
when  German  ships  were  already  enjoying  not  only 
the  perfect  "freedom  of  the  seas,"  but  were  partici- 
pating with  British  ships  in  the  commerce  of  Great 
Britain  itself  in  her  home  ports  of  Plymouth  and 
Southampton.  The  military  interest  in  the  Zeppe- 
lin airships,  which  could  hardly  justify  enthusiasm 

300 


EPILOGUE 

as  auxiliaries  of  civil  life,  was,  perhaps,  an  even 
more  exciting  canse  of  British  apprehension. 
When  to  all  this  is  added  the  influence  of  the  volum- 
inous and  menacing  Pan-German  literature — un- 
equaled  in  brutal  projects  by  the  Chauvinism  of  any 
other  nation — circulating  freely  in  a  country  where 
a  rigid  surveillance  and  control  of  the  press  are 
customary,  there  was  ample  room  for  public  solici- 
tude on  the  part  of  neighboring  peoples  regarding 
the  intentions  of  a  power  that  not  only  was  pos- 
sessed of  the  greatest  military  strength  of  any 
nation  in  the  world,  but  whose  Emperor  on  every 
critical  occasion  was  openly  proclaiming  the  doc- 
trine that  the  only  guarantee  of  peace  is  the  sword. 
Subsequent  disclosures  have  demonstrated  how 
great  was  the  perversion  of  the  truth  in  the  German 
representation  of  the  aggressive  designs  of  the 
Entente  Powers.  No  evidence  of  the  existence  of 
a  treaty  of  actual  pre-war  alliance  between  these 
powers  has  ever  been  produced.  There  existed  at 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities  by  the  German  declara- 
tion of  war  no  written  compact  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  other  Entente  Powers.  Sir  Edward 
Grey  openly  avowed  that  if  war  developed  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Kussia,  England  would  not 
intervene.1  Even  on  August  1st,  after  Germany 
had  declared  war  on  Russia,  King  George  V,  in  an- 
swer to  President  Poincare  's  appeal  for  the  assur- 
ance of  British  aid,  replied,  without  defining  the 


1  British    Blue    Book,    I,    No.    25.     See    Illustrative    Document 
No.  XVIII. 

301 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

attitude  of  his  country  beyond  declaring  that  it  was 
open  to  discussion: 

"You  may  be  assured  that  the  present  situation 
in  Europe  has  been  the  cause  of  much  anxiety  and 
preoccupation  to  me,  and  I  am  glad  to  think  that 
our  two  governments  have  worked  so  amiably  to- 
gether in  endeavoring  to  find  a  peaceful  solution 
of  the  question  at  issue. 

"It  would  be  a  source  of  real  satisfaction  to  me 
if  our  united  efforts  were  to  meet  with  success,  and 
I  am  still  not  without  hope  that  the  terrible  events 
which  seem  so  near  may  be  averted." x 

Here  is  no  sign  of  a  hostile  compact  against  Ger- 
many. Strange  language  indeed  is  this  for  an 
arch-conspirator,  when  the  hour  had  come  to  strike ! 
And  yet  there  is  no  word  of  accusation  or  complaint 
on  the  part  of  France  or  Russia  in  response  to  this 
detached  manner  of  regarding  an  alleged  common 
warlike  undertaking.  No  prior  engagement  even 
of  mutual  defense  is  mentioned,  no  obligation  of 
England  is  insisted  upon,  either  by  France  or  Rus- 
sia. When  the  alleged  " conspiracy"  is  uncovered 
by  events,  there  is  disclosed  nothing  but  sincerity, 
dignity,  innocence,  and  a  striving  after  peace. 

How,  then,  shall  the  determinists  support  their 
thesis  ?  Shall  they  say  the  Kaiser  was  pushed  into 
war  by  German  necessities'?  In  what  category  are 
these  necessities  to  be  found?  The  German  people 
were  not  starving.  Their  industry  and  their  trade 
were  never  more  prosperous.    Their  ships  were  on 


1  British  Blue  Book,  I,  Appendix,  I,  V,  No.  2. 

302 


EPILOGUE 

every  sea — but  provided  with  a  secret  code  of  warn- 
ing to  seek  refuge  when  war  would  break  out — and 
their  goods  were  in  every  market.  Great  Britain 
was  their  best  customer. 

But  the  future,  it  will  be  said,  had  to  be  provided 
for.  Territory  for  expansion  and  colonies  for  raw 
material  were  needed  by  Germany. 

There  was  unquestionably  room  for  Germans  in 
other  parts  of  the  world.  They  were  already  to 
be  found  everywhere,  and  everywhere  were  among 
the  most  prosperous  inhabitants.  The  other  coun- 
tries were  not  refusing  German  industry  cotton, 
copper,  tropical  products;  in  short,  whatever  they 
needed  at  the  general  market  prices. 

But  these  facts,  I  am  told,  are  quite  irrelevant. 
What  Germany  wanted  was  that  these  things  should 
be  German,  that  they  should  belong  to  Germany, 
and  that  Germans  spreading  over  the  world  should 
not  cease  to  be  Germans.  They  must  still  belong 
to  the  Empire,  not  be  lost  by  absorption  in  other 
nations. 

We  come,  then,  in  the  end,  not  to  a  natural,  but 
only  to  a  political  necessity.  In  essence  it  is,  as  we 
shall  see,  merely  a  dynastic  ambition.  An  empire 
to  be  extended,  not  because  its  people  cannot  other- 
wise find  homes  and  prosperity  in  the  world,  but 
because  they  must  continue,  however  numerous  they 
may  become,  to  adhere  to  one  political  system  and 
furnish  additional  strength  to  one  particular  gov- 
ernment. They  are  needed  as  taxpayers  and  as 
soldiers.    Therefore  other  peoples  must  be  annexed 

303 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

to  the  German  Empire  in  order  that  Germans  may- 
remain  German  subjects. 

Regarding  Germans  for  a  moment  not  as  sub- 
jects of  a  government,  but  merely  as  human  beings, 
or  as  a  people,  these  alleged  ' 'necessities' '  wholly 
disappear.  It  is  only  when  contemplated  from  a 
governmental  point  of  view  that  new  territory  and 
new  colonies  are  ' '  necessities. ' '  They  are,  no  doubt, 
necessities  to  the  unlimited  growth  of  an  empire. 
In  truth,  they  will  always  be  thus  necessary,  no 
matter  how  great  an  empire  may  become.  Its  only 
ultimate  limit,  upon  this  theory,  is  the  whole  sur- 
face of  the  earth. 

Primarily,  therefore,  the  interest  in  imperialism 
is  dynastic.  It  is  the  natural  desire  of  the  sovereign 
to  enlarge  his  realm.  In  a  secondary  sense,  it  is 
true,  his  subjects  also  may,  to  a  certain  extent,  find 
an  interest  in  this  expansion.  Honors,  immunities, 
and  possessions  accompany  the  growth  of  empire. 
Those  to  whom  these  fall  become  partners  in  the 
enterprise.  But  it  is  none  the  less  a  predatory  ad- 
venture, in  the  spoils  of  which  only  a  few  partici- 
pate. That  the  people  as  a  whole  profit  by  such 
dynastic  conquests  is  an  illusion. 

However  we  regard  the  matter,  whether  from  the 
natural  or  the  political  point  of  view,  it  is  evident 
that  responsibility  for  the  World  War  cannot  be 
thrown  back  upon  purely  natural  causes.  The  de- 
cisions that  have  produced  it  are  acts  of  personal 
will. 

Who,  then,  is  to  be  held  accountable? 

304 


EPILOGUE 

When  a  conflagration  is  voluntarily  started  we 
cannot  throw  the  blame  for  the  occurrence  upon  the 
chemistry  of  combustion.  We  seek  the  incendiary. 
And  if  we  mean  that  other  conflagrations  shall  not 
occur,  we  render  it  impossible  for  him  to  repeat  his 
act. 

It  is  in  this  spirit  that  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  as  the  voice  of  the  American  people,  has 
addressed  the  people  of  Germany.  He  has  assumed 
that  Kaiser  William  II,  having  been  empowered 
by  the  German  people  to  declare  war,  and  by  doing 
so  having  automatically  brought  many  nations  into 
it,  is  responsible  for  the  consequences.  The  Ger- 
man people  have  decided  to  share  this  responsibil- 
ity ;  and  they,  in  turn,  must,  therefore,  be  regarded 
as  accountable. 

It  is  just  that  they  should  be  so  held ;  and,  in  the 
great  assize  that  is  to  be  faced  in  the  peace  con- 
ference, this  question  of  responsibility  must  be  met. 

The  German  nation  is  great  and  powerful.  To 
treat  it  as  a  criminal  is  not  an  easy  or  a  welcome 
task,  but  it  must  either  voluntarily  suppress  this 
menace  to  the  world's  peace  or  be  itself  regarded  as 
such  a  menace. 

The  German  people  have  thought  it  wise  to  link 
the  future  of  their  national  development  with  the 
power  of  the  army  and  navy  rather  than  to  base 
it  upon  understandings.  They  have  believed  that 
the  policy  that  has  made  Prussia  the  master  of 
Germany  could  make  Germany  the  master  of  Eu- 
rope, and  perhaps  of  the  world.    That  Prussia  was 

305 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

from  the  beginning  a  military  and  not  an  industrial 
and  commercial  state,  such  as  Germany  has  become, 
was  overlooked.  A  military  state  can  afford  to 
challenge  its  neighbors  and  browbeat  its  competi- 
tors. It  does  not  intend  to  make  bargains,  but  to 
take  what  it  wants  wherever  its  force  can  prevail. 
An  industrial  and  commercial  state,  however,  must 
retain  the  confidence  of  its  customers.  It  cannot 
win  them  by  superior  force. 

The  alliance  of  great  business  with  military  poli- 
cies in  the  German  Empire  has  proved  an  unfortu- 
nate form  of  enterprise.  The  preponderant  partner 
has  wrecked  German  business.  Conquest  has,  ap- 
parently, opened  new  fields  of  exploitation ;  but  the 
world-market  has  been  lost  because  the  world's 
confidence  has  been  forfeited.  Only  a  new  and 
reorganized  Germany  can  ever  regain  it. 

The  greatest  misfortune  of  the  German  people 
will  not  consist  in  a  military  defeat,  which  might 
be  to  their  own  advantage  in  the  future  through  a 
better  international  status,  or  even  the  enforced 
payment  of  indemnities  for  the  devastations 
wrought  by  the  invasion  of  other  countries.  The 
faith  of  mankind  in  Germany's  integrity  as  a  na- 
tion will  be  a  far  more  serious  loss.  However  much 
men  may  differ  regarding  matters  of  detail,  what- 
ever varying  interpretations  may  be  placed  upon 
diplomatic  or  other  documents,  whatever  light  may 
be  thrown  upon  the  beginning  or  the  conduct  of 
the  war  by  future  disclosures,  the  impartial  portion 
of  mankind  is  convinced  that  the  Great  War,  with 

306 


EPILOGUE 

all  its  horrors  and  sufferings,  could  have  been 
avoided  by  Germany,  and  by  Germany  alone,  with- 
out material  or  moral  loss. 

In  his  book  on  Der  Welthrieg,  the  Swiss  writer 
Zurlinden  has  pointed  out  four  possibilities  of  peace 
which  lay  before  Kaiser  William  II  in  July,  1914. 

"1.  Germany,"  he  says,  "declared  its  disinterest- 
edness in  the  Austro-Serbian  conflict.  The  Treaty 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  did  not  bind  Germany  to  fur- 
nish military  aid  to  her  ally  unless  attacked,  whereas 
Austria-Hungary  was  the  aggressor.  This  interpre- 
tation of  the  alliance  was  uncomplainingly  admitted 
by  Germany  when  Italy,  under  the  same  obligations 
as  Germany  to  Austria-Hungary,  declared  her  neu- 
trality. 

"2.  Germany  could  have  declared  that  Austria- 
Hungary  should  content  herself  with  the  extraor- 
dinary submission  consented  to  in  Serbia's  reply 
to  the  ultimatum,  and  that  there  should  be  no  war. 

"3.  The  Austro-Serbian  conflict,  in  so  far  as  it 
was  not  fully  conciliated  in  the  reply  to  the  ulti- 
matum, could  be  submitted  to  a  European  confer- 
ence; or 

'  '4.  To  the  International  Tribunal  at  The  Hague. " 

To  all  these  possibilities  the  Kaiser  had  opposed 
an  emphatic  "No,"  and  had  decided  upon  war.1 

1  Zurlinden,  Der  Weltkrieg,  I,  p.  385 ;  who  quotes  Naumann, 
Mitteleuropa,  pp.  168,  169,  as  follows :  "When  last  summer  the 
Austrian  Hereditary  Prince  and  his  wife  were  slain  by  a  young 
criminal,  there  was  in  the  terms  of  the  treaty  no  necessity  for 
the  German  Empire  to  trouble  itself  on  account  of  this  procedure. 
That  Kaiser  William  and  his  admirers  nevertheless  did  so  was 
more  than  a  treaty  obligation.  .  .  .  The  World  War  is,  therefore, 
more  than  a  war  resulting  from  a  casus  foederis  (Vertragskrieg), 
it  is  a  community  of  feeling  (Gesinnungsgcmeinschaft),  as  if  we 
were  already  grown  together."  See  also  Illustrative  Document 
No.  XVII.  307 

21 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

But  the  whole  fault  of  William  II  does  not  consist 
in  declining  to  embrace  any  of  these  possibilities 
of  peace.  A  basis  of  peace  had,  in  his  own  judg- 
ment, as  he  himself  declares  in  his  message  to  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  already  been  ac- 
cepted by  Austria-Hungary.  We  now  know  that, 
although  this  proposal  was  in  his  possession,  he  did 
not  even  communicate  it  to  Nicholas  II,  although  the 
Czar  implored  him  not  to  consider  mobilization  as 
equivalent  to  war.  Instead,  without  waiting  even 
a  day  for  negotiation,  he  suddenly  declared  war, 
when  he  had  in  his  twelve-hour  ultimatum  only 
threatened  mobilization ;  knowing,  at  the  time,  that 
unless  Russia  was  cowed  by  his  threat  into  sub- 
mission to  his  arbitrary  will,  this  resort  to  war  on 
Russia  would  involve  France  as  well — upon  whose 
unprotected  frontiers  his  troops  had  been  preparing 
to  advance — unless  Great  Britain  should  obtain 
French  neutrality. 

The  question  has  arisen,  and  has  been  discussed, 
Would  not  the  Imperial  German  Reichstag,  if  it 
had  the  sole  determination  of  the  issue,  have  decided 
precisely  as  the  Kaiser  did?  Hugo  Kramer  has 
expressed  the  opinion  that  it  would,  and  he  advances 
as  a  reason  for  this  conclusion  the  statement  that 
the  vote  of  credit  for  the  conduct  of  the  war  was 
equivalent  to  a  vote  of  approval  of  the  war.1 

There  is,  perhaps,  no  human  being  on  earth  so 
fiendish  as  consciously  to  have  willed  this  war,  as 
it  has  developed.    It  is  probably  true  that  every 

1  Quoted  by  Zurlinden,  p.  386. 

308 


EPILOGUE 

German,  and  William  II  first  of  all,  could  say  with 
perfect  honesty,  "I  did  not  will  this  war."  What 
was  willed  by  William  II  was  not  this  war,  but  a 
swift,  short,  victorious  war  which  would  secure 
large  indemnities,  add  some  coveted  territories  to 
Germany,  and  enable  the  German  Emperor,  when- 
ever he  pleased  to  do  so,  to  dictate  the  terms  of 
peace,  thus  placing  him  in  a  position  of  complete 
mastery  on  the  Continent  preparatory  to  another 
swift,  short  war  that  would  obtain  for  Germany 
the  desired  supremacy  on  the  sea. 

Even  reduced  to  the  lowest  terms,  the  resolution 
of  Kaiser  William  II  to  support  Austria-Hungary 
in  the  determination  to  crush  Serbia  and  obtain 
the  mastery  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  at  the  risk  of 
a  general  European  war  involves  a  great  re- 
sponsibility, and  reveals  the  spirit  in  which  war 
upon  Russia  was  declared.  Assuming  that  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  little  Slav  state  was  responsible  for 
efforts  to  frustrate  the  plans  of  Austria-Hungary, 
and  even  that  some  Serbian  officials  were  connected 
with  a  plot  to  assassinate  the  Archduke  Francis 
Ferdinand  and  his  wife — which  has  not  been  clearly 
established — and  that  chastisement,  even  severe 
chastisement,  was  deserved,  an  assault  upon  the 
Serbian  people  as  a  whole  without  a  trial,  or  even 
an  impartial  investigation,  was  not  a  civilized 
method  of  procedure.  It  was  a  condemnation  to 
death  of  the  innocent  along  with  the  guilty,  and 
made  no  distinction  between  them.  The  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality  by  armed  invasion  was  of  the 

309 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

same  moral  quality,  magnified  to  an  open  disregard 
of  a  solemn  pledge.  The  needless  resort  to  war  and 
the  disregard  of  a  binding  covenant,  in  order  to 
render  Avar  successful,  cannot  be  explained  away 
by  any  form  of  natural  determination  on  the  part 
of  the  nation.  They  were  not  " necessities,' '  they 
were  voluntary  national  crimes. 

Even  with  the  memory  of  Bismarck  and  his  pride 
in  the  alteration  of  the  Ems  telegram  in  mind,  we 
cannot  imagine  that,  in  1888,  the  German  people 
would  have  supported  the  German  Emperor  in  the 
course  pursued  by  him  in  1914.  In  1888,  when  Will- 
iam II  ascended  the  throne,  as  we  have  seen  in  the 
first  chapter  of  this  book,  such  an  exploit  as  was 
lightly  entered  into  in  1914  was  precisely  what  the 
German  people  contemplated  with  dread  and  aver- 
sion. But  in  the  intervening  thirty  years  the  char- 
acter of  Germany  has  changed.  It  has  been 
thoroughly  Prussianized.  A  hasty  plunge  into  a 
foreign  war  was  accepted  without  internal  obstruc- 
tion. The  nation  that  had  trembled  with  apprehen- 
sion for  what  the  impulsive  and  erratic  young  mon- 
arch might  do  ended  by  placing  its  destinies  entirely 
in  his  hands. 

It  did  this  with  perfect  comprehension  of  what 
it  was  doing.  William  II  never  concealed  his  am- 
bitions from  his  own  people.  What  he  did  was  to 
induce  the  nation  to  share  them.  A  different  kind 
of  an  emperor  would  have  produced  a  different 
Germany.  William  II  trained  his  people  to  war 
and  to  believe  in  war.    It  was  the  tradition  of  his 

310 


EPILOGUE 

House  and  the  foundation  of  his  throne.  An  indus- 
trial Germany,  a  commercial  Germany,  might  have 
been  developed  without  the  military  note  being  al- 
ways sounded.  The  inclinations  of  other  nations — 
"the  satisfied  nations"  if  one  chooses  to  name  them 
so — might  have  been  utilized  at  the  great  peace  con- 
ferences and  upon  the  occasions  when  similar  over- 
tures were  made,  and  sincerely  made ;  but  William 
II  was  never  disposed  to  accept  them.  It  was  not 
the  Prussian  idea. 

And  so,  more  and  more  as  the  years  went  by, 
Germany  came  to  link  its  future  development  with 
the  power  of  its  army  and  its  navy.  The  Reichstag 
in  1914  had  no  idea  that  the  question  of  peace  or 
war  was  within  its  jurisdiction.  The  subject  had 
been  placed  beyond  its  deliberation.  As  for  the 
people,  they  had  nothing  to  do  with  such  matters. 
They  were  not  concerned  with  the  equities,  or  the 
moralities,  or  the  expediency  of  war.  Their  duty 
was  simply  to  do  what  they  were  told  to  do.  They 
were  informed  that  there  was  a  hostile  conspiracy 
against  Germany,  that  an  attack  by  foreign  powers 
had  "forced  the  sword"  into  the  hands  of  their 
Emperor,  and  that  they  must  fight  for  their  exist- 
ence. This  they  believed,  and  upon  this  they 
obediently  acted.  The  All-Highest  had  spoken.  It 
was  enough. 

Clearly,  a  war-machine  thus  constructed  is  a 
menace  to  the  world.  No  nation  should  enter  upon 
a  war  without  knowing  why  war  is  necessary  and 
without  resort  to  all  available  means  of  avoiding 

311 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

it.  Dynastic  wars,  or  wars  primarily  actuated  by 
dynastic  motives,  cannot,  of  course,  be  publicly  de- 
bated beforehand,  but  all  issues  affecting  the  na- 
tional interests  can  be. 

In  the  past,  even  under  confessedly  dynastic 
rule,  Germans  of  independent  mind  have  thought 
thus,  and  have  believed  their  convictions  worth  ex- 
pressing. Immanuel  Kant,  for  example,  living 
under  a  Prussian  king,  had  the  courage  to  write: 

"A  state  should  be  so  internally  organized  that, 
not  the  head  of  the  state,  to  whom  war  (since  he 
carries  it  on  at  the  expense  of  another,  namely  the 
people)  costs  nothing,  but  the  people,  to  whom  he 
himself  is  a  charge,  should  have  the  determining 
voice  whether  war  should  or  should  not  be." 1 

And  in  another  place  he  adds  that,  under  a  con- 
stitution which  is  not  republican,  where  the  subject 
is  not  a  citizen,  the  case  is  the  most  unfortunate 
imaginable ;  because  the  ruler  is  not  a  fellow-citizen, 
but  the  proprietor  of  the  state,  and  is  in  no  way 
made  to  suffer  loss  with  regard  to  his  table,  his 
hunting,  his  pleasure  castles,  and  his  court  life,  and 
may  therefore  regard  war  as  a  kind  of  pastime  to 
be  undertaken  for  trivial  reasons,  the  justification 
of  which  may  be  left  without  anxiety  to  the  inge- 
nuity of  the  ever-ready  diplomatic  corps.2 

1  Kant,  Uber  den  Gemeinplatz:  Das  mag  in  dcr  Theorie  gut 
scin,  p.  396. 

2  Kant,  Von  Ewigen  Friendcn,  p.  436.  It  is  possible  that  Kant, 
in  writing  of  the  ingenuity  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps,  had  in  mind 
the  marginal  note  which  Frederick  the  Great  on  November  7, 
1749,  addressed  to  his  minister,  Podiwils,  saying  that  it  was  time 
in  secret  to  look  up  the  legal  claims  to  Silesia,  as  he  had  already 
given  his  orders  to  his  troops. 

312 


EPILOGUE 

Kant  may  not  have  realized  the  practical  difficul- 
ties involved  in  submitting  the  question  of  peace  or 
war  to  the  decision  of  the  whole  body  of  citizens; 
but  he  perceived  not  only  the  injustice  to  the  people 
of  a  state,  but  the  danger  to  the  peace  of  the  world, 
in  leaving  such  a  decision  to  the  arbitrary  will  of  a 
ruler.  While  no  rule  regarding  the  declaration  of 
war  can  be  enforced  upon  a  sovereign  state  other- 
wise than  by  war,  it  is  not  improbable  that  every 
free  people  will  eventually,  in  their  own  interest, 
place  the  war-machine  under  a  supervision  where 
war  cannot  be  determined  upon  at  the  pleasure  of 
a  single  person,  however  trustworthy,  by  a  mere 
exchange  of  telegrams,  without  public  knowledge 
of  the  circumstances  in  which  the  act  is  performed. 

If,  therefore,  it  be  true  that  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man Reichstag  would  have  taken  the  same  course 
as  that  followed  by  William  II,  who  had  deliberately 
determined,  according  to  Doctor  Miihlon,  to  run  the 
risk  of  a  general  European  war  if  Russia  mobilized, 
and  yet  for  weeks  kept  this  resolution  a  secret,  ex- 
cept from  his  circle  of  confidants,  the  Reichstag 
would  be  the  most  extraordinary  representative 
parliamentary  body  in  the  world. 

By  the  provision  of  the  Imperial  German  Consti- 
tution, the  Reichstag  has  nothing  to  do  with  deter- 
mining peace  or  war.  Article  LXIII  declares: 
"The  entire  land  force  of  the  Empire  will  form  a 
single  army,  which  in  war  and  peace  is  under  the 
command  of  the  Emperor. ' '  Article  LXIV  reads : 
"All  German  troops  are  bound  to  obey  the  com- 

313 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

mands  of  the  Emperor  unconditionally.  This  duty 
is  to  be  specified  in  the  Banner-oath.' '  This  article 
further  provides  that  the  Emperor  may  select  for 
appointments  in  the  Imperial  service  "from  the  of- 
ficers of  all  the  contingents  of  the  Imperial  army;" 
thus  empowering  him  to  place  Prussian  officers, 
"with  or  without  promotion,"  in  command  of  all 
the  troops.  Even  without  a  declaration  of  war, 
therefore,  the  Emperor  has  the  whole  military  force 
of  Germany  at  his  personal  disposition. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  mere  formal  dec- 
laration of  war  is  of  subordinate  importance.  By 
Article  LXVIII,  "the  Emperor  may,  when  public 
safety  is  threatened  in  the  Territories  of  the  Con- 
federation, declare  any  part  thereof  to  be  in  a  state 
of  war."  In  this  case,  "the  rules  of  the  Prussian 
law  of  June  4,  1851,  remain  in  force."  Whoever, 
therefore,  in  the  German  Empire  successfully  dis- 
putes the  authority  of  the  Emperor  has  first  to 
defeat  the  German  army. 

"The  Emperor,"  according  to  Article  XI,  "has 
to  represent  the  Empire  internationally,  to  declare 
war,  and  to  conclude  peace  in  the  name  of  the  Em- 
pire." When  it  comes  to  a  formal  declaration  of 
war  against  a  foreign  power,  "the  consent  of  the 
Bundesrat  is  necessary,  unless  an  attack  on  the 
territory  or  the  coast  of  the  Confederation  has 
taken  place." 

In  the  declaration  of  war  on  Russia  of  August  1, 
1914,  there  is  no  pretense  that  an  attack  had  been 
made  on  German  territory.    In  his  message  to  the 

314 


EPILOGUE 

President  of  the  United  States  of  August  10th, 
Kaiser  William  speaks  of  his  own  intention  to  "at- 
tack" France,  unless  Great  Britain  can  secure  and 
will  guarantee  her  neutrality,  but  makes  no  charge 
of  any  attack  made  by  France.  As  regards  Bel- 
gium, he  had  only  "news,"  not  "knowledge,"  of 
French  violation ;  and  the  reports  of  bombs  dropped 
upon  Nuremberg  and  other  German  cities  by 
French  aviators  have  been  proved  by  German  tes- 
timony to  have  been  pure  inventions.1 

Having  no  responsibility  for  the  declaration  of 
war,  it  is  not  remarkable  that  the  Imperial  German 
Reichstag,  upon  the  Kaiser's  mere  requisition,  and 
his  assertion  that  the  Empire  was  in  danger, 
promptly  voted  the  credits  necessary  for  conduct- 
ing the  war  without  inquiring  into  the  details  of 
the  international  situation.  In  this  all  parties  were 
united.  Even  the  Social  Democrats,  as  a  party, 
did  not  refuse  support.  There  could  be  no  justi- 
fiable dissent  on  a  question  of  national  defense. 
When  later  Germany,  with  her  own  soil  free  from 
invasion,  was  seen  to  be  fighting  an  aggressive  cam- 
paign on  the  territory  of  ten  other  nations,  the 
question  naturally  arose  how  this  could  be  called  a 
"war  of  defense. ' '  The  answer,  of  course,  was  that 
German  valor  and  military  efficiency  had  beaten 
back  the  waves  of  a  murderous  conspiracy! 

If,  however,  it  had  been  the  constitutional  duty  of 
the  Reichstag  to  examine  into  the  merits  of  the 


1  See  an  account  of  this  testimony  in  Illustrative  Document  No. 
XV. 

315 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

case,  and  to  boar  the  responsibility  of  choosing  be- 
tween peace  and  war,  is  it  conceivable  that  a 
representative  body,  charged  with  the  obligation  to 
consider  and  protect  all  the  varied  interests  of  the 
German  people,  would  have  pursued  the  course 
taken  by  Kaiser  William  II? 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  members  of  the  Reichstag 
were  for  the  most  part  ignorant  of  the  diplomatic 
proceedings  that  were  taking  place.  Although  the 
Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum  to  Serbia  was  known 
to  the  Kaiser,  and  had  been  personally  revised  and 
strengthened  by  him,  it  had  not  been  seen  before  it 
was  sent  even  by  the  Imperial  German  Foreign 
Office.  It  was  not  publicly  known  in  Germany  what 
unexampled  demands  had  been  made  upon  Serbia 
— demands  so  impossible  of  acceptance  that  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  who  was  not  sympathetic  toward 
Serbia,  said  he  "had  never  before  seen  one  state 
address  to  another  independent  state  a  document 
of  so  formidable  a  character.1  So  formidable,  in- 
deed, was  this  document  that  it  was  intended  to 
force  a  reply  of  non-compliance,  and  thus  to  furnish 
an  excuse  for  war  on  Serbia.2    The  reply  of  the 


1  British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  5. 

2  "From  the  first  inception  of  the  Austro-German  plan  of  con- 
certed action,"  says  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon,  who  was  at  Vienna  and  in 
close  contact  with  high  authorities,  "the  parts  of  each  of  the 
actors  were  assigned.  Serbia  was  to  be  stung  into  utterances  or 
action  which  would  warrant  resort  to  an  Austrian  punitive  expedi- 
tion. .  .  .  Although  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia  was  so 
worded  and  the  time  accorded  for  a  reply  so  limited  as  to  insure 
its  rejection,  misgivings  were,  as  we  saw,  felt  and  uttered  in 
Vienna  and  Budapest  that  Serbia  would  knuckle  down  and  execute 
the  humiliating  behests  of  the  Ballplatz.  For  this  was  a  con- 
summation which  was  deemed  highly  undesirable.  .  .  .  Hence  the 

316 


EPILOGUE 

Serbian  government,  bending  to  the  storm  and  ask- 
ing for  adjudication  on  two  points  only,  was  with- 
held from  public  knowledge  in  Germany  and  char- 
acterized in  the  German  press  merely  as  "wholly 
inacceptable. ' '  Five  days  after  the  reply  was  made 
the  Russian  charge  d'affaires  at  Berlin  reported  to 
his  government : 

"The  Wolff  Bureau  [the  official  news  agency] 
has  not  published  the  text  of  the  Serbian  reply, 
although  it  was  communicated  to  them.  Up  to  the 
present  this  note  has  not  appeared  in  extenso  in 
any  of  the  local  papers,  which,  to  all  appearances, 
do  not  wish  to  publish  it  in  their  columns,  being 
well  aware  of  the  calming  effect  which  it  would 
have  on  German  readers. ' ' x 

Having  in  hand  the  formula  of  peace,  needing 
only  Russia's  acceptance — which,  as  a  fact,  was  in 
substance  already  assured — would  the  Reichstag 
have  failed,  as  William  II  failed,  to  communicate 
it  to  the  Russian  Government  while  Nicholas  II  was 
solemnly  protesting  that  mobilization  did  not  mean 
war  ?  It  was  not  until  November  9, 1916,  more  than 
two  years  after  the  war  had  been  in  progress,  that 
Chancellor  Bethmann-Hollweg,  in  response  to   a 

exhaustive  precautions  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  provoking  a 
negative  answer  to  the  ultimatum  from  Belgrade." — A  Scrap  of 
Paper,  pp.  98,  99.  The  Serbian  reply  was  received  by  the  Aus- 
trian Minister  at  5.58  p.m.,  on  July  25th.  He  left  Belgrade  on  the 
regular  train  at  6.30  p.m.,  as  he  had  previously  informed  his 
government  he  would  do.  (Austrian  Red  Book,  I,  No.  22.)  He 
had,  therefore,  only  thirty-two  minutes,  after  receiving  the  reply, 
in  which  to  read  the  note  and  reach  the  train,  without  inquiring 
how  the  Austrian  Foreign  Office  would  regard  the  reply.  He 
had  no  need  to  make  that  inquiry. 
1  Russian  Orange  Book,  I,  No.  46. 

317 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

challenge  by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  stating  that  he  had 
received  from  Vienna  an  approval  of  this  formula, 
admitted  that  this  was  true ;  but  he  did  not  pretend 
that  it  had  ever  been  sent  by  the  Kaiser  or  by  him- 
self to  St.  Petersburg.  The  Russian  order  of 
mobilization,  he  claimed,  had  rendered  peace  im- 
possible. The  German  public  was  kept  in  complete 
ignorance  of  the  efforts  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  to 
preserve  peace  and  of  Germany's  virtual  rejection 
of  them.  Knowing  all  the  facts,  and  especially  the 
plea  of  Nicholas  II  for  further  negotiation,  would 
or  could  the  Reichstag  have  concealed  from  the  pub- 
lic this  possibility  of  peace,  and  thus  have  precipi- 
tated Europe  into  war? 

Analyze  the  situation  as  we  may,  we  are  al- 
ways brought  back  to  the  ' 'necessities"  created  by 
Kaiser  William  II 's  desire  for  prestige  and  the 
pressure  of  the  military  camarilla  of  which  he  was 
the  head. 

Into  the  Kaiser's  personal  psychology,  perhaps, 
we  have  no  right  as  foreigners  to  enter.  Every 
nation  must  be  permitted  to  choose  to  whose  hands 
it  will  confide  its  destinies.  The  question  of  Will- 
iam II  's  mental  balance  is  a  delicate  one  for  any 
one  to  touch  upon.  Whether  he  is  sane  or  not  is 
hardly  our  business.  Experts  have  differed  on  that 
subject.  There  is,  in  fact,  no  real  objective  stand- 
ard of  sanity.  The  same  conduct  may  be  counted 
sane  or  insane  in  different  circumstances  and  by 
different  persons.  As  a  rule,  actions  and  opinions 
that  are  violently  discordant  with  our  own  are  liable 

318 


EPILOGUE 

to  be  classed  as  wanting  in  sanity.  Most  excesses 
naturally  fall  under  this  judgment  in  well-balanced 
minds. 

A  distinguished  alienist,  Doctor  Charles  Mercier, 
offers  some  illuminating  comments  on  this  subject 
which  are  deserving  of  consideration.  In  forming 
an  estimate  of  the  Kaiser  he  says:  "We  must  take 
into  consideration  not  what  he  thinks  or  believes, 
which  we  can  only  conjecture,  but  what  he  does,  as 
to  which  we  have  more  or  less  trustworthy  informa- 
tion ;  and  in  estimating  his  conduct  we  must  never 
lose  sight  of  the  circumstances  in  which  he  acts  and 
never  fail  to  take  account  of  these  circumstances. 
The  dominating  circumstance  of  the  Kaiser's  life  is 
that  he  is  the  German  Emperor." x 

This  writer  does  well  to  insist  that  this  circum- 
stance, which  is  likely  to  be  overlooked,  should  be 
constantly  taken  into  account.  It  is  true  that,  when 
he  is  not  playing  the  part  of  the  Kaiser,  William 
II  is  an  agreeable  and  even  a  charming  man,  whose 
intense  human  interest  renders  him  fascinating  to 
those  who  are  subject  to  personal  influences. 

Applying  his  principle  to  the  German  Emperor, 
Doctor  Mercier  continues : 

"If  the  English  King-Emperor  were  to  act  as 
the  German  Emperor  acts ;  if  he  were  to  change  his 
dress  a  dozen  times  a  day;  if  he  were  forever 
boasting  and  bragging  and  calling  God  to  witness 


1  Article   in   Land  and   Water,   reprinted   in   The  Living  Age, 
No.  3,867, 

319 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

what  a  splendid  creature  lie  is ;  if  he  were  forever 
rattling  his  saber  and  blustering  about  mailed  fists 
and  shining  armor ;  if  he  were  to  order  his  soldiers 
to  give  no  quarter,  and  so  forth — we  might  well 
question  his  sanity ;  for  the  aim  of  a  King  must  be 
to  inspire  the  respect,  the  loyalty,  and  the  devotion 
of  his  subjects ;  and  if  a  King  of  England  were  to 
behave  thus,  he  would  inspire  only  dislike,  disgust, 
and  contempt.  But  the  Kaiser  is  not  King  of  Eng- 
land. He  is  German  Emperor,  and  the  Germans  like 
his  conduct.  It  suits  them.  The  more  he  brags  and 
postures  and  prances  before  them,  the  more  they  ad- 
mire him  and  the  more  loyal  and  devoted  they  become. 
There  is  no  evidence  of  madness,  then,  in  this." 

"While  exempting  the  Kaiser  from  madness,  Doc- 
tor Mercier  does  not  hesitate  to  assimilate  him  to 
another  type  of  mental  aberration.  "There  are," 
he  says,  "undoubtedly,  persons  who  are  born  with- 
out a  rudiment  of  the  moral  sense  and  who  grow 
up  without  its  ever  becoming  developed  in  them." 
The  Kaiser's  conduct,  this  writer  contends,  sug- 
gests that  he  belongs  to  this  class.  Certainly  being 
born  heir  to  a  throne  does  not  exempt  one  from  this 
classification,  but  it  greatly  enlarges  the  field  of 
action.  The  devastating  of  Belgium,  the  murder 
of  Miss  Cavell  and  Captain  Fryatt,  the  sinking  of 
the  Lusitania  and  neutral  ships  with  their  innocent 
non-combatant  passengers,  including  women  and 
children,  Doctor  Mercier  affirms,  are  regarded  by 
William  II  as  "quite  right  and  proper  and  justi- 

320 


EPILOGUE 

fiable,  and  in  conformity  with  moral  law  as  he 
understands  it;  but  the  reprisal  bombardment  of 
German  towns  is  a  scandalous  and  abominable  in- 
fraction of  the  laws  of  war."  "Other  well-recog- 
nized traits  of  the  instinctive  criminal  are,"  he 
continues,  "the  sentimentality  that  alternates  with 
cruelty,  colossal  egotism,  naive  and  clamorous  van- 
ity, and  a  craving  for  notoriety,  which  displays 
itself  in  a  passion  for  the  lime-light  and  histrionic 
display.  Moreover,  the  instinctive  criminal  is  very 
often  intensely  religious.  .  .  .  When  about  to  com- 
mit murder  he  will  go  to  mass  and  pray  for  a 
blessing  on  his  enterprise;  and  when  he  has  con- 
ducted a  successful  burglary  he  will  make  a  thank- 
offering  to  the  God  who  has  assisted  him  and  held 
him  scatheless." 

This  is  a  very  impressive  indictment ;  but  there 
is  a  qualification,  I  think,  which  in  the  interest  of 
scientific  accuracy  should  be  added.  William  II 
would  not  consider  any  of  the  enormities  ordered 
and  rewarded  by  him  as  right  and  justifiable  unless 
authorized  by  himself.  He  would  not,  as  a  private 
person,  perform  any  of  the  acts  referred  to  as  crim- 
inal, or  approve  of  any  private  person  performing 
them.  They  become  right  because  they  are  ordered 
by  the  German  Emperor. 

There  is  in  the  Kaiser's  mind  a  reason  for  this 
attitude.  It  is  based  upon  the  union  of  three  ele- 
ments: the  nature  of  the  state,  the  Hohenzollern 
tradition  of  divine  right,  and  the  Imperial  German 
Constitution. 

321 


IiMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

William  II  is,  in  the  strict  sense,  not  the  author 
of  any  of  these.  They  are  parts  of  the  inheritance 
which  forms  the  substance  of  his  obsession — the 
idea  of  the  German  Emperor's  mission  and  au- 
thority. 

Long  before  William  II  came  to  the  throne  the 
Prussian  conception  of  the  state  had  been  definitely 
formulated.  Hegel  had  furnished  its  metaphysical 
basis,  and  Lasson  had  depicted  its  essential  fea- 
tures. Its  substance  was  armed  force.  Says  Las- 
son: 

"Force  is  the  characteristic  feature  of  right.  In 
international  intercourse,  in  consequence,  there 
are,  and  can  be  no  laws.  .  .  .  Between  states  there 
can  be  no  thought  of  law  or  right.  .  .  .  There  is  no 
right  where  there  is  no  law,  no  judge,  no  superior 
compelling  force.  .  .  .  States  have  absolutely  no 
mutual  duties,  because,  as  between  them,  there  is 
no  law  or  right.  .  .  .  There  is  no  commandment  of 
right  to  observe  political  treaties.  .  .  .  Infraction 
of  the  right  by  force  is  a  crime  in  civil  life ;  a  state 
can  commit  no  crime.  .  .  .  The  state  when  at  peace 
is  no  real  state;  it  is  only  when  in  war  that  the 
state  reveals  its  full  significance.  .  .  .  Peace  or- 
ganization and  all  regulations  to  curb  impulse  are 
the  tomb  of  courage."  l 

The  Hohenzollern  tradition  gives  to  these  ab- 
stract statements  a  concrete  embodiment.  The 
head  of  the  state  rules  by  his  own  right  through 
divine  appointment.    The  Imperial  German  Consti- 

1  Lasson,  Das  Culturidcal  und  dcr  Kricg,  Berlin,  1868,  pp.  7,  15. 

322 


EPILOGUE 

tution  facilitates  the  exercise  of  this  right  by  mak- 
ing it  the  duty  of  the  army,  in  peace  and  in  war,  to 
obey  unconditionally  the  German  Emperor,  in 
whom  the  whole  system  centers. 

As  an  individual  person,  William  II  is  understood 
to  lead  a  virtuous  life.  As  German  Emperor,  he  is 
subject  to  no  law.  The  state,  for  which  he  acts,  is 
above  the  law.  Its  only  rule  of  action  springs  from 
its  "necessities."  The  key  to  the  contradictions  in 
the  conduct  of  William  II  is  found  in  Doctor  Mer- 
cier  's  statement, ' '  The  dominating  circumstance  of 
the  Kaiser's  life  is  that  he  is  the  German  Em- 
peror.' ' 

Through  the  impulsive  and  even  fanatical  tem- 
perament of  WTilliam  II  the  Prussian  inheritance 
has  been  brought  to  its  logical  conclusion.  His 
father,  Frederick  III,  who  probably  could  not  have 
lived  up  to  the  idea  of  a  German  Emperor  as  Will- 
iam II  has  conceived  it,  quite  certainly  would  not 
have  developed  all  its  latent  possibilities.  His 
grandfather,  William  I,  did  not,  in  fact,  live  up  to 
it.  He  gloried  in  being  King  of  Prussia,  but  he  was 
more  or  less  mystified  by  the  Empire,  which  in  his 
time  was  not  yet  Prussianized,  and  which,  never- 
theless, he  could  not  understand  as  being  anything 
else  than  an  extended  Prussia.  But  William  II  was 
from  the  beginning  both  Prussian  and  Imperial. 
He  took  the  role  of  German  Emperor  seriously. 

What  the  world  has  to  cope  with  in  dealing  with 
Germany  is  not  merely  William  II  as  a  person.  The 
accession  of  the  Crown-Prince  Frederick  William 

22  323 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

would  not  improve  the  international  situation.    So 
long  as  the  Prussian  doctrine  regarding  the  nature 
of  the  state  is  retained,  even  the  complete  democra- 
tization of  German  political  institutions  would  not 
restore  the  world's  confidence  in  the  purposes  and 
the  promises  of  the  German  Empire.    The  real  evil 
is  the  mystical,  non-moral  Prussian  conception  of 
the  state  as  an  entity  existing  solely  for  its  own  ag- 
grandizement, unrestrained  either  by  moral  or  con- 
ventional obligations.    So  long  as  it  is  believed  and 
taught  that  the  state  is  power  and  can  do  no  wrong 
there  can  be  no  international  security.     The  main 
advantage  of  democracy  over  autocracy  as  a  form 
of  human  government  is  that,  when  accorded  its 
true  representative  character,  it  renders  political 
power  responsible  to  those  who  must  bear  the  bur- 
dens which  the  existence  of  the  state  necessarily 
imposes.    It  brings  public  action  to  the  test  of  the 
public  conscience.     But  if  that  is  debased  by  the 
belief  that  in  its  outward  relations  the  state  is  above 
all  law  and  is  bound  by  no  duties,  then  a  democracy 
affords  no  safeguard  of  peace  or  of  justice.     It 
merely  exchanges  the  selfishness  of  the  mass  for  the 
egotism  of  a  monarch,  and  substitutes  for  the  va- 
garies of  a  single  autocrat  the  craving,  the  violence, 
and  the  irresponsibility  of  a  multitude. 

That  which  creates  our  interest  in  Kaiser  William 
II  is  not  any  merely  personal  qualities  that  mark 
him  as  a  man.  It  is  that  in  playing  the  part  of 
German  Emperor  he  has  exposed  to  the  view  of 
all  mankind  the  danger  that  inheres  in  the  Prussian 

324 


EPILOGUE 

doctrine  of  the  state.  His  personal  faith  and  teach- 
ing have  only  brought  to  maturity  its  deadly  fruit- 
age; for,  believing  himself  endowed  by  special 
divine  appointment  with  the  immunities  of  the  ir- 
responsible state,  in  lighting  the  torch  of  a  "World 
War  he  has  held  himself  without  accountability  to 
the  standards  and  judgments  of  civilized  men. 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

No.  I 

'T^HE  Royal  Order  of  September,  1852,  had  regu- 
-*■  lated  the  intercourse  between  the  Prussian 
Ministers  and  the  Crown.  It  provided  that  only  the 
Minister  President,  and  not  the  individual  Minis- 
ters, should  personally  consult  the  Emperor  regard- 
ing the  duties  of  their  office.  William  II,  knowing 
that  Bismarck  would  oppose  the  abrogation  of  this 
order,  nevertheless  determined  to  revoke  it.  Bis- 
marck's comments  on  this  subject  in  his  letter  of 
resignation  are  as  follows : 

If  each  individual  Minister  can  receive  commands  from 
his  Sovereign  without  previous  arrangements  with  his 
colleagues,  a  coherent  policy,  for  which  some  one  is  to  be 
responsible,  is  an  impossibility.  It  would  be  impossible 
for  any  of  the  Ministers  and  especially  for  the  Minister 
President,  to  bear  the  constitutional  responsibility  for  the 
Cabinet  as  a  whole.  Such  a  provision  as  that  contained 
in  the  Order  of  1852  could  be  dispensed  with  under  the 
absolute  monarchy  and  could  also  be  dispensed  with  to- 
day if  we  returned  to  absolutism  without  ministerial  re- 
sponsibility. But  according  to  the  constitutional  arrange- 
ments now  legally  in  force  the  control  of  the  Cabinet  by 
a  President  under  the  Order  of  1852  is  indispensable. 

326 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

No.  II 

The  first  delegate  of  the  United  States  to  the 
First  Hague  Peace  Conference,  which  met  on  May 
18,  1899,  was  the  Hon.  Andrew  D.  White,  at  that 
time  American  ambassador  at  Berlin.  The  fol- 
lowing extracts  from  his  account  of  the  Conference 
are  important,  as  throwing  a  clear  light  upon  the 
attitude  of  the  German  Empire  in  that  assembly. 
Under  date  of  May  24th,  Mr.  White  said : 

Meeting  Count  Miinster,  who,  after  M.  de  Staal  [Presi- 
dent of  the  Conference],  is  very  generally  considered  the 
most  important  personage  here,  we  discussed  the  subject 
of  arbitration.  To  my  great  regret,  I  found  him  entirely 
opposed  to  it,  or,  at  least,  entirely  opposed  to  any  well- 
developed  plan.  He  did  not  say  that  he  would  oppose 
a  moderate  plan  for  voluntary  arbitration,  but  he  insisted 
that  arbitration  must  be  injurious  to  Germany ;  that  Ger- 
many is  prepared  for  war  as  no  other  country  is  or  can 
be ;  that  she  can  mobilize  her  army  in  ten  days ;  and  that 
neither  France,  Russia,  nor  any  other  power  can  do  this. 
Arbitration,  he  said,  would  simply  give  rival  powers  time 
to  put  themselves  in  readiness,  and  would  therefore  be  a 
great  disadvantage  to  Germany. 

Under  date  of  June  9th,  he  wrote : 

It  now  appears  that  the  German  Emperor  is  determined 
to  oppose  the  whole  scheme  of  arbitration,  and  will  have 
nothing  to  do  with  any  plan  for  a  regular  tribunal, 
whether  as  given  in  the  British  or  the  American  scheme. 
This  news  comes  from  various  sources,  and  is  confirmed 
by  the  fact  that,  in  the  subcommittee,  one  of  the  German 
delegates,  Professor  Zorn  of  Konigsberg,  who  had  become 
very  earnest  in  behalf  of  arbitration,  now  says  that  he 
may  not  be  able  to  vote  for  it.  There  are  also  signs  that 
the  German  Emperor  is  influencing  the  minds  of  his 
allies— the  sovereigns  of  Austria,  Italy,  Turkey,  and  Rou- 
mania — leading  them  to  oppose  it. 

327 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

On  the  16th,  Mr.  White  made  this  entry  in  his 
diary : 

This  morning  Count  Minister  called  and  seemed  much 
excited  by  the  fact  that  he  had  received  a  despatch  from 
Berlin  in  which  the  German  Government — which,  of 
course,  means  the  Emperor — had  strongly  and  finally  de- 
clared against  everything  like  an  arbitration  tribunal.  He 
was  clearly  disconcerted  by  this  too  liberal  acceptance  of 
his  own  earlier  views,  and  said  that  he  had  sent  to  M.  do 
Staal  insisting  that  the  meeting  of  the  subcommittee  on 
arbitration,  which  had  been  appointed  for  this  day  (Fri- 
day) should  be  adjourned  on  some  pretext  until  next 
Monday ; ' '  for, ' '  said  he, ' '  if  the  session  takes  place  to-day, 
Zorn  must  make  the  declaration  in  behalf  of  Germany, 
which  these  new  instructions  order  him  to  make,  and  that 
would  be  a  misfortune. ' ' 

Later  it  was  agreed  that  Professor  Zorn,  of  the 
German  delegation,  and  Mr.  Holls,  secretary  of  the 
American  delegation,  be  sent  to  Berlin  to  procure 
a  change  in  the  German  instructions.  Mr.  White 
sent  to  Prince  von  Biilow,  then  Imperial  Secretary 
of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  a  personal  letter  in 
which  he  said : 

It  is  generally  said  here  that  Germany  is  opposed  to  the 
whole  thing,  that  she  is  utterly  hostile  to  anything  like 
arbitration,  and  that  she  will  do  all  in  her  power,  either 
alone  or  through  her  allies,  to  thwart  every  feasible  plan 
of  providing  for  a  tribunal  which  shall  give  some  hope  to 
the  world  of  settling  some  of  the  many  difficulties  between 
nations  otherwise  than  by  bloodshed. 

No  rational  man  here  expects  all  wars  to  be  ended  by 
anything  done  here;  no  one  proposes  to  submit  to  any 
such  tribunal  questions  involving  the  honor  of  any  nation 
or  the  inviolability  of  its  territory,  or  any  of  those  things 
which  nations  feel  instinctively  must  be  reserved  for  their 
own  decision.  Nor  does  any  thinking  man  here  propose 
obligatory   arbitration   in   any   case,   save,    possibly,    in 

328 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

sundry  petty  matters  where  such  arbitration  would  be  a 
help  to  the  ordinary  administration  of  all  governments; 
and,  even  as  to  these,  they  can  be  left  out  of  the  scheme 
if  your  Government  seriously  desires  it. 

The  great  thing  is  that  there  be  provision  made  for 
easily  calling  together  a  court  of  arbitration  which  shall 
be  seen  of  all  nations,  indicate  a  sincere  desire  to  promote 
peace,  and,  in  some  measure,  relieve  the  various  peoples 
of  the  fear  which  so  heavily  oppresses  them  all — the  dread 
of  an  outburst  of  war  at  any  moment. 

On  the  23d,  Mr.  White  makes  the  following  rec- 
ord: 

But  the  great  matter  of  the  day  was  the  news,  which 
has  not  yet  been  made  public,  that  Prince  Hohenlohe,  the 
German  Chancellor,  has  come  out  strongly  for  the  arbitra- 
tion tribunal,  and  has  sent  instructions  here  accordingly. 
This  is  a  great  gain,  and  seems  to  remove  one  of  the  worst 
stumbling-blocks.  But  we  will  have  to  pay  for  this  re- 
moval, probably,  by  giving  up  section  10  of  the  present 
plan,  which  includes  a  system  of  obligatory  arbitration 
in  various  minor  matters, — a  system  which  would  be  of 
use  to  the  world  in  many  ways. 

The  outcome  was,  as  Mr.  White  predicted,  that 
while  the  idea  of  a  purely  voluntary  tribunal  was 
accepted,  "the  Imperial  German  Government  in- 
sisted that  the  general  treaty  of  arbitration  should 
be  dropped  as  the  price  of  this  concession,  and  it 
was  so  dropped." — Scott's  Survey,  p.  321. 

No.  Ill 

The  complete  text  of  the  Daily  Telegraph  inter- 
view is  as  follows : 

We  have  received  the  following  communication  from  a 
source  of  such  unimpeachable  authority  that  we  can  with- 

329 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

out  hesitation  commend  the  obvious  message  which  it 
conveys  to  the  attention  of  the  public. 

Discretion  is  the  first  and  last  quality  requisite  in  a 
diplomatist,  and  should  still  be  observed  by  those  who, 
like  myself,  have  long  passed  from  public  into  private 
life.  Yet  moments  sometimes  occur  in  the  history  of 
nations  when  a  calculated  indiscretion  proves  of  the  high- 
est public  service,  and  it  is  for  that  reason  that  I  have 
decided  to  make  known  the  substance  of  a  lengthy  con- 
versation which  it  was  my  recent  privilege  to  have  with 
his  Majesty  the  German  Emperor.  I  do  so  in  the  hope 
that  it  may  help  to  remove  that  obstinate  misconception 
of  the  character  of  the  Kaiser's  feelings  towards  Eng- 
land which,  I  fear,  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  ordinary  Eng- 
lishman's breast.  It  is  the  Emperor's  sincere  wish  that  it 
should  be  eradicated.  He  has  given  repeated  proofs  of 
his  desire  by  word  and  deed.  But,  to  speak  frankly,  his 
patience  is  sorely  tried  now  that  he  finds  himself  so  con- 
tinually misrepresented,  and  has  so  often  experienced  the 
mortification  of  finding  that  any  momentary  improvement 
of  relations  is  followed  by  renewed  outbursts  of  preju- 
dice, and  a  prompt  return  to  the  old  attitude  of  suspicion. 

As  I  have  said,  his  Majesty  honored  me  with  a  long 
conversation,  and  spoke  with  impulsive  and  unusual 
frankness.  "You  English,"  he  said,  "are  mad,  mad 
as  March  hares!  What  has  come  over  you  that  you  are 
so  completely  given  over  to  suspicions  quite  unworthy  of 
a  great  nation?  What  more  can  I  do  than  I  have  done? 
I  declared  with  all  the  emphasis  at  my  command,  in  my 
speech  at  Guildhall,  that  my  heart  is  set  upon  peace,  and 
that  it  is  one  of  my  dearest  wishes  to  live  on  the  best  of 
terms  with  England.  Have  I  ever  been  false  to  my  word  ? 
Falsehood  and  prevarication  are  alien  to  my  nature.  My 
actions  ought  to  speak  for  themselves,  but  you  listen  not 
to  them  but  to  those  who  misinterpret  and  distort  them. 
That  is  a  personal  insult  which  I  feel  and  resent.  To  be 
forever  misjudged,  to  have  my  repeated  offers  of  friend- 
ship weighed  and  scrutinized  with  jealous,  mistrustful 
eyes,  taxes  my  patience  severely.  I  have  said  time  after 
time  that  I  am  a  friend  of  England,  and  your  Press — 
or,  at  least,  a  considerable  section  of  it — bids  the  people 

330 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

of  England  refuse  my  proffered  hand,  and  insinuates  that 
the  other  holds  a  dagger.  How  can  I  convince  a  nation 
against  its  will  ? 

"I  repeat,"  continued  his  Majesty,  "that  I  am  the 
friend  of  England,  but  you  make  things  difficult  for  me. 
My  task  is  not  of  the  easiest.  The  prevailing  sentiment 
among  large  sections  of  the  middle  and  lower  classes  of 
my  own  people  is  not  friendly  to  England.  I  am,  there- 
fore, so  to  speak,  in  a  minority  in  my  own  land,  but  it 
is  a  minority  of  the  best  elements,  just  as  it  is  in  England 
with  respect  to  Germany.  That  is  another  reason  why  I 
resent  your  refusal  to  accept  my  pledged  word  that  I  am 
the  friend  of  England.  I  strive  without  ceasing  to  im- 
prove relations,  and  you  retort  that  I  am  your  arch- 
enemy.   You  make  it  very  hard  for  me.    Why  is  it  ? " 

Thereupon  I  ventured  to  remind  his  Majesty  that  not 
England  alone,  but  the  whole  of  Europe  had  viewed  with 
disapproval  the  recent  action  of  Germany  in  allowing  the 
German  Consul  to  return  from  Tangier  to  Fez,  and  in 
anticipating  the  joint  action  of  France  and  Spain  by  sug- 
gesting to  the  Powers  that  the  time  had  come  for  Europe 
to  recognize  Muley  Hafid  as  the  new  Sultan  of  Morocco. 

His  Majesty  made  a  gesture  of  impatience.  "Yes,"  he 
said,  "that  is  an  excellent  example  of  the  way  in  which 
German  action  is  misrepresented.  First,  then,  as  regards 
the  journey  of  Dr.  Vassel.  The  German  Government,  in 
sending  Dr.  Vassel  back  to  his  post  at  Fez,  was  only 
guided  by  the  wish  that  he  should  look  after  the  private 
interests  of  German  subjects  in  that  city,  who  cried  for 
help  and  protection  after  the  long  absence  of  a  Consular 
representative.  And  why  not  send  him?  Are  those  who 
charge  Germany  with  having  stolen  a  march  on  the  other 
Powers  aware  that  the  French  Consular  representative 
had  already  been  in  Fez  for  several  months  when  Dr. 
Vassel  set  out?  Then,  as  to  the  recognition  of  Muley 
Hafid.  The  Press  of  Europe  has  complained  with  much 
acerbity  that  Germany  ought  not  to  have  suggested  his 
recognition  until  he  had  notified  to  Europe  his  full  accept- 
ance of  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  as  being  binding  upon  him 
as  Sultan  of  Morocco  and  successor  of  his  brother.  My 
answer  is  that  Muley  Hafid  notified  the  Powers  to  that 

331 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

effect  weeks  ago,  before  the  decisive  battle  was  fought. 
He  sent,  as  far  back  as  the  middle  of  last  July,  an  iden- 
tical communication  to  the  Governments  of  Germany, 
France,  and  Great  Britain,  containing  an  explicit  ac- 
knowledgment that  he  was  prepared  to  recognize  all  the 
obligations  towards  Europe  which  were  incurred  by  Abdul 
Aziz  during  his  Sultanate.  The  German  Government  in- 
terpreted that  communication  as  a  final  and  authoritative 
expression  of  Muley  Hafid's  intentions,  and  therefore  they 
considered  that  there  was  no  reason  to  wait  until  he  had 
sent  a  second  communication,  before  recognizing  him  as 
the  de  facto  Sultan  of  Morocco,  who  had  succeeded  to  his 
brother's  throne  by  right  of  victory  in  the  field." 

I  suggested  to  his  Majesty  that  an  important  and  influ- 
ential section  of  the  German  Press  had  placed  a  very  dif- 
ferent interpretation  upon  the  action  of  the  German 
Government,  and,  in  fact,  had  given  it  their  effusive  ap- 
probation precisely  baceuse  they  saw  in  it  a  strong  act 
instead  of  mere  words,  and  a  decisive  indication  that  Ger- 
many was  once  more  about  to  intervene  in  the  shaping  of 
events  in  Morocco.  ' '  There  are  mischief-makers, ' '  replied 
the  Emperor,  "in  both  countries.  I  will  not  attempt  to 
weigh  their  relative  capacity  for  misrepresentation.  But 
the  facts  are  as  I  have  stated.  There  has  been  nothing  in 
Germany's  recent-  action  with  regard  to  Morocco  which 
runs  contrary  to  the  explicit  declaration  of  my  love  of 
peace  which  I  made  both  at  Guildhall  and  in  my  latest 
speech  at  Strassburg." 

His  Majesty  then  reverted  to  the  subject  uppermost  in 
his  mind — his  proved  friendship  for  England.  "I  have 
referred,"  he  said,  "to  the  speeches  in  which  I  have  done 
all  that  a  sovereign  can  to  proclaim  my  goodwill.  But,  as 
actions  speak  louder  than  words,  let  me  also  refer  to  my 
acts.  It  is  commonly  believed  in  England  that  throughout 
the  South  Africa  War  Germany  was  hostile  to  her.  Ger- 
man opinion  undoubtedly  was  hostile — bitterly  hostile. 
But  what  of  official  Germany?  Let  my  critics  ask  them- 
selves what  brought  to  a  sudden  stop,  and,  indeed,  to 
absolute  collapse,  the  European  tour  of  the  Boer  delegates 
who  were  striving  to  obtain  European  intervention?  They 
were  feted  in  Holland:  France  gave  them  a  rapturous 

332 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

welcome.  They  wished  to  come  to  Berlin,  where  the  Ger- 
man people  would  have  crowned  them  with  flowers.  But 
when  they  asked  me  to  receive  them — I  refused.  The 
agitation  immediately  died  away,  and  the  delegation  re- 
turned empty-handed.  Was  that,  I  ask,  the  action  of  a 
secret  enemy? 

"Again,  when  the  struggle  was  at  its  height,  the  German 
Government  was  invited  by  the  Governments  of  Prance 
and  Russia  to  join  with  them  in  calling  upon  England  to 
put  an  end  to  the  war.  The  moment  had  come,  they  said, 
not  only  to  save  the  Boer  Republics,  but  also  to  humiliate 
England  to  the  dust.  What  was  my  reply  ?  I  said  that  so 
far  from  Germany  joining  in  any  concerted  European 
action  to  put  pressure  upon  England  and  bring  about  her 
downfall,  Germany  would  always  keep  aloof  from  politics 
that  could  bring  her  into  complications  with  a  Sea  Power 
like  England.  Posterity  will  one  day  read  the  exact  terms 
of  the  telegram — now  in  the  archives  of  Windsor  Castle — 
in  which  I  informed  the  Sovereign  of  England  of  the 
answer  I  had  returned  to  the  Powers  which  then  sought 
to  compass  her  fall.  Englishmen  who  now  insult  me  by 
doubting  my  word  should  know  what  were  my  actions  in 
the  hour  of  their  adversity. 

"Nor  was  that  all.  Just  at  the  time  of  your  Black 
Week,  in  the  December  of  1899,  when  disasters  followed 
one  another  in  rapid  succession,  I  received  a  letter  from 
Queen  Victoria,  my  revered  grandmother,  written  in  sor- 
row and  affliction,  and  bearing  manifest  traces  of  the 
anxieties  which  were  preying  upon  her  mind  and  health. 
I  at  once  returned  a  sympathetic  reply.  Nay,  I  did  more. 
I  bade  one  of  my  officers  procure  for  me  as  exact  an 
account  as  he  could  obtain  of  the  number  of  combatants 
in  South  Africa  on  both  sides,  and  of  the  actual  position 
of  the  opposing  forces.  With  the  figures  before  me,  I 
worked  out  what  I  considered  to  be  the  best  plan  of  cam- 
paign under  the  circumstances,  and  submitted  it  to  my 
General  Staff  for  their  criticism.  Then  I  dispatched  it  to 
England,  and  that  document,  likewise,  is  among  the  State 
papers  at  Windsor  Castle,  awaiting  the  serenely  impartial 
verdict  of  history.  And,  as  a  matter  of  curious  coinci- 
dence, let  me  add  that  the  plan  which  I  formulated  ran 

333 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

very  much  on  the  same  line  as  that  which  was  actually 
adopted  by  Lord  Roberts  and  carried  by  him  into  success- 
ful operation.  Was  that,  I  repeat,  the  act  of  one  who 
wished  England  ill?    Let  Englishmen  be  just  and  say! 

' '  But,  you  will  say,  what  of  the  German  navy  ?  Surely 
that  is  a  menace  to  England !  Against  whom  but  England 
are  my  squadrons  being  prepared  ?  If  England  is  not  in 
the  minds  of  those  Germans  who  are  bent  on  creating  a 
powerful  fleet,  why  is  Germany  asked  to  consent  to  such 
new  and  heavy  burdens  of  taxation  ?  My  answer  is  clear. 
Germany  is  a  young  and  growing  Empire.  She  has  a 
world-wide  commerce,  which  is  rapidly  expanding,  and 
to  which  the  legitimate  ambition  of  patriotic  Germans 
refuses  to  assign  any  bounds.  Germany  must  have  a 
powerful  fleet  to  protect  that  commerce,  and  her  manifold 
interests  in  even  the  most  distant  seas.  She  expects  those 
interests  to  go  on  growing,  and  she  must  be  able  to 
champion  them  manfully  in  any  quarter  of  the  globe. 
Germany  looks  ahead.  Her  horizons  stretch  far  away. 
She  must  be  prepared  for  any  eventualities  in  the  Far 
East.  Who  can  foresee  what  may  take  place  in  the  Pacific 
in  the  days  to  come — days  not  so  distant  as  some  believe, 
but  days,  at  any  rate,  for  which  all  European  Powers  with 
Far  Eastern  interests  ought  steadily  to  prepare  ?  Look  at 
the  accomplished  rise  of  Japan ;  think  of  the  possible 
national  awakening  of  China ;  and  then  judge  of  the  vast 
problems  of  the  Pacific.  Only  those  Powers  which  have 
great  navies  will  be  listened  to  with  respect  when  the 
future  of  the  Pacific  comes  to  be  solved;  and  if  for  that 
reason  only  Germany  must  have  a  powerful  fleet.  It  may 
even  be  that  England  herself  will  be  glad  that  Germany 
has  a  fleet  when  they  speak  together  on  the  same  side  in 
the  great  debates  of  the  future." 

Such  was  the  purport  of  the  Emperor's  conversation. 
He  spoke  with  all  that  earnestness  which  marks  his  manner 
when  speaking  on  deeply  pondered  subjects.  I  would  ask 
my  fellow-countrymen  who  value  the  cause  of  peace  to 
weigh  what  I  have  written,  and  to  revise,  if  necessary, 
their  estimate  of  the  Kaiser  and  his  friendship  for  Eng- 
land by  his  Majesty's  own  words.  If  they  had  enjoyed 
the  privilege,  which  was  mine,  of  hearing  them  spoken, 

334 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

they  would  doubt  no  longer  either  his  Majesty's  firm 
desire  to  live  on  the  best  of  terms  with  England  or  his 
growing  impatience  at  the  persistent  mistrust  with  which 
his  offer  of  friendship  is  too  often  received. 

No.  IV 

The  leaders  of  virtually  all  the  parties  in  the 
Keichstag  in  some  degree  manifested  their  disap- 
probation of  the  Kaiser's  statements. 

Doctor  Albrecht,  speaking  for  the  Socialists,  de- 
manded, "What  is  the  Chancellor  prepared  to  do  to 
prevent  such  occurrences ?" 

Herr  Bassermann,  on  behalf  of  the  National  Lib- 
erals, asked,  "Is  the  Chancellor  prepared  to  take 
constitutional  responsibility  for  the  publication  of 
the  utterances  of  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  in  the 
Daily  Telegraph?" 

Doctor  Ablass,  of  the  Progressive  group,  after 
asserting  that  matters  had  become  known  "which 
indicate  serious  shortcomings  in  the  management  of 
foreign  affairs  that  tended  to  affect  unfavorably 
the  foreign  relations  of  the  German  Empire,"  in- 
quired, "What  does  the  Chancellor  propose  to  do 
to  prevent  such  occurrences!" 

Even  the  Conservatives,  through  Prince  von 
Hatzfeldt  and  Herr  von  Norman,  demanded  "fur- 
ther information  regarding  the  circumstances  that 
led  to  the  publication  of  the  Emperor's  utterances 
in  the  English  press,"  and  called  for  "precautions" 
that  it  should  not  be  repeated. 

To  these  questions  Prince  von  Billow  replied : 

335 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Gentlemen,  I  shall  not  apply  myself  to  every  point 
■which  has  just  been  raised  by  previous  speakers.  I  have 
to  consider  the  effect  of  my  words  abroad,  and  will  not 
add  to  the  great  harm  already  caused  by  the  publication 
in  the  Daily  Telegrapli  ["Hear,  hear!"  on  the  Left  and 
Socialists]. 

In  reply  to  the  interpellations  submitted,  I  have  to  de- 
clare as  follows : 

His  Majesty  the  Kaiser  has  at  different  times,  and  to 
different  private  English  personalities,  made  private  utter- 
ances which,  linked  together,  have  been  published  in  the 
Daily  Telegraph.  I  must  suppose  that  not  all  details  of 
the  utterances  have  been  correctly  reproduced  ["Hear, 
hear!"  on  the  Right].  One  I  know  is  not  correct;  that 
is  the  story  about  the  plan  of  campaign  ["Hear,  hear!" 
on  the  Right].  The  plan  in  question  was  not  a  field 
campaign  worked  out  in  detail,  but  a  purely  academic 

[laughter  among  the  Socialists] Gentlemen,  we  are 

engaged  in  a  serious  discussion.  The  matters  on  which  I 
speak  are  of  an  earnest  kind  and  of  great  political  im- 
portance— be  good  enough  to  listen  to  me  quietly;  I  will 
be  as  brief  as  possible.  I  repeat  therefore:  the  matter  is 
not  concerned  with  a  field  campaign  worked  out  in  detail, 
but  with  certain  purely  academic  thoughts — I  believe  they 
are  expressly  described  as  "aphorisms" — about  the  con- 
duct of  war  in  general,  which  the  Kaiser  communicated  in 
his  interchange  of  correspondence  with  the  late  Queen 
Victoria.  They  are  theoretical  observations  of  no  prac- 
tical moment  for  the  course  of  operations  and  the  issue 
of  the  war.  The  chief  of  the  General  Staff,  General  von 
Moltke,  and  his  predecessor,  General  Count  Schlieffen, 
have  declared  that  the  General  Staff  reported  to  the 
Kaiser  on  the  Boer  War  as  on  every  war,  great  or  small, 
which  has  occurred  on  the  earth  during  the  last  ten  years. 
Both,  however,  have  given  assurances  that  our  General 
Staff  never  examined  a  field  plan  of  campaign,  or  anything 
similar,  prepared  by  the  Kaiser  in  view  of  the  Boer  War, 
or  forwarded  such  to  England  ["Hear,  hear!"  on  the 
Right  and  Centre].  But  I  must  also  defend  our  policy 
against  the  reproach  of  being  ambiguous  vis-a-vis  the 
Boers.     We  had — the  documents  show  it — given  timely 

336 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

warning  to  the  Transvaal  Government.  We  called  its 
attention  to  the  fact  that  in  case  of  a  war  with  England 
it  would  stand  alone.  "We  put  it  to  her  directly,  and 
through  the  friendly  Dutch  Government  in  May,  1899, 
peacefully  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  England, 
since  there  could  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  result  of  a  war. 

In  the  question  of  intervention,  the  colors  in  tne 
article  of  the  Daily  Telegraph  are  too  thickly  laid  on.  The 
thing  itself  had  long  been  known  ["Hear,  hear!"].  It 
was  some  time  previously  the  subject  of  controversy  be- 
tween the  National  Review  and  the  Deutsche  Revue. 
There  can  be  no  talk  of  a  "revelation."  It  was  said  that 
the  Imperial  communication  to  the  Queen  of  England, 
that  Germany  had  not  paid  any  attention  to  a  suggestion 
for  mediation  or  intervention,  is  a  breach  of  the  rules  of 
diplomatic  intercourse.  Gentlemen,  I  will  not  recall  indis- 
cretions to  memory,  for  they  are  frequent  in  the  diplo- 
matic history  of  all  nations  and  at  all  times  ["Quite 
right,"  on  the  Right].  The  safest  policy  is  perhaps  that 
which  need  fear  no  indiscretion  ["Quite  right,"  on  the 
Left].  To  pass  judgment  in  particular  cases  as  to 
whether  or  not  a  breach  of  confidence  has  occurred,  one 
must  know  more  of  the  closely  connected  circumstances 
than  appears  in  the  article  of  the  Daily  Telegraph.  The 
communication  might  be  justified  if  it  were  attempted  in 
one  quarter  or  another  to  misrepresent  our  refusal  or  to 
throw  suspicion  on  our  attitude ;  circumstances  may  have 
previously  happened  which  make  allusion  to  the  subject 
in  a  confidential  correspondence  at  least  intelligible.  Gen- 
tlemen, I  said  before  that  many  of  the  expressions  used 
in  the  Daily  Telegraph  article  are  too  strong.  That  is  true, 
in  the  first  place,  of  the  passage  where  the  Kaiser  is  rep- 
resented as  having  said  that  the  majority  of  the  German 
people  are  inimically  disposed  towards  England.  Be- 
tween Germany  and  England  misunderstandings  have 
occurred,  serious,  regrettable  misunderstandings.  But  I 
am  conscious  of  being  at  one  with  this  entire  honorable 
House  in  the  view  that  the  German  people  desire  peaceful 
and  friendly  relations  with  England  on  the  basis  of  mutual 
esteem  [loud  and  general  applause]  and  I  take  note  that 
the  speakers  of  all  parties  have  spoken  to-day  in  the 

337 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

same  sense  ["Quite  right"] •  The  colors  are  also  too 
thickly  laid  on  in  the  place  where  reference  is  made  to  our 
interests  in  the  Pacific  Ocean.  It  has  been  construed  in 
a  sense  hostile  to  Japan.  Wrongly ;  we  have  never  in  the 
Far  East  thought  of  anything  but  this — to  acquire  and 
maintain  for  Germany  a  share  of  the  commerce  of  East- 
ern Asia  in  view  of  the  great  economic  future  of  this 
region.  "We  are  not  thinking  of  maritime  adventure  there ; 
aggressive  tendencies  have  as  little  to  say  to  our  naval 
construction  in  the  Pacific  as  in  Europe.  Moreover,  his 
Majesty  the  Kaiser  entirely  agrees  with  the  responsible  di- 
rector of  foreign  policy  in  the  complete  recognition  of  the 
high  political  importance  which  the  Japanese  people  have 
achieved  by  their  political  strength  and  military  ability. 
German  policy  does  not  regard  it  as  its  task  to  detract  from 
the  enjoyment  and  development  of  what  Japan  has  acquired. 
Gentlemen,  I  am,  generally  speaking,  under  the  impres- 
sion that  if  the  material  facts — completely,  in  their  proper 
shape — were  individually  known,  the  sensation  would  be 
no  great  one ;  in  this  instance,  too,  the  whole  is  more  than 
all  the  parts  taken  together.  But  above  all,  gentlemen, 
one  must  not,  while  considering  the  material  things,  quite 
forget  the  psychology,  the  tendency.  For  two  decades 
our  Kaiser  has  striven,  often  under  very  difficult  circum- 
stances, to  bring  about  friendly  relations  between  Ger- 
many and  England.  This  honest  endeavor  has  had  to 
contend  with  obstacles  which  would  have  discouraged 
many.  The  passionate  partisanship  of  our  people  for  the 
Boers  was  humanly  intelligible;  feeling  for  the  weaker 
certainly  appeals  to  the  sympathy.  But  this  partisanship 
has  led  to  unjustified,  and  often  unmeasured,  attacks  on 
England,  and  similarly  unjust  and  hateful  attacks  have 
been  made  against  Germany  from  the  side  of  the  English. 
Our  aims  were  misconstrued,  and  hostile  plans  against 
England  were  foisted  on  us  which  we  had  never  thought 
of.  The  Kaiser,  rightly  convinced  that  this  state  of  things 
was  a  calamity  for  both  countries  and  a  danger  for  the 
civilized  world,  kept  undeviatingly  on  the  course  he  had 
adopted.  The  Kaiser  is  particularly  wronged  by  any 
doubt  as  to  the  purity  of  his  intentions,  his  ideal  way  of 
thinking,  and  his  deep  love  of  country. 

338 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

Gentlemen,  let  us  avoid  anything  that  looks  like  exag- 
gerated seeking  for  foreign  favor,  anything  that  looks  like 
uncertainty  or  obsequiousness.  But  I  understand  that  the 
Kaiser,  precisely  because  he  was  anxious  to  work  zeal- 
ously and  honestly  for  good  relationship  with  England, 
felt  embittered  at  being  ever  the  object  of  attacks  casting 
suspicion  on  his  best  motives.  Has  one  not  gone  so  far 
as  to  attribute  to  his  interest  in  the  German  fleet  secret 
views  against  vital  English  interests — views  which  are  far 
from  him?  And  so  in  private  conversation  with  English 
friends  he  sought  to  bring  the  proof,  by  pointing  to  his 
conduct,  that  in  England  he  was  misunderstood  and 
wrongly  judged. 

Gentlemen,  the  perception  that  the  publication  of  these 
conversations  in  England  has  not  had  the  effect  the  Kaiser 
wished,  and  in  our  OAvn  country  has  caused  profound 
agitation  and  painful  regret,  will — this  firm  conviction  I 
have  acquired  during  these  anxious  days — lead  the  Kaiser 
for  the  future,  in  private  conversation  also,  to  maintain 
the  reserve  that  is  equally  indispensable  in  the  interest  of 
a  uniform  policy  and  for  the  authority  of  the  Crown 
["Bravo!"  on  the  Right]. 

If  it  were  not  so,  I  could  not,  nor  could  my  successor, 
bear  the  responsibility  ["Bravo!"  on  the  Right  and 
National  Liberals]. 

For  the  fault  which  occurred  in  dealing  with  the  manu- 
script I  accept,  as  I  have  caused  to  be  said  in  the  Nord- 
deutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  entire  responsibility.  It 
also  goes  against  my  personal  feelings  that  officials  who 
have  done  their  duty  all  their  lives  should  be  stamped 
as  transgressors  because,  in  a  single  case,  they  relied  too 
much  on  the  fact  that  I  usually  read  and  finally  decide 
everything  myself. 

With  Herr  von  Heydebrand  I  regret  that  in  the  mech- 
anism of  the  Foreign  Office,  which  for  eleven  years  has 
worked  smoothly  under  me,  a  defect  should  on  one  occa- 
sion occur.  I  will  answer  for  it  that  such  a  thing  does 
not  happen  again,  and  that  with  this  object,  without  re- 
spect to  persons,  though  also  without  injustice,  what  is 
needful  will  be  done  ["Bravo!"]. 

When  the  article  in  the  Daily  Telegraph  appeared,  its 
fateful  effect  could  not  for  a  moment  be  doubtful  to  me, 
23  339 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

and  I  handed  in  my  resignation.  This  decision  was  un- 
avoidable, and  was  not  difficult  to  come  to.  The  most 
serious  and  most  difficult  decision  which  I  ever  took  in 
my  political  life  was,  in  obedience  to  the  Kaiser's  wish,  to 
remain  in  office.  I  brought  myself  to  this  decision  only 
because  I  saw  in  it  a  command  of  my  political  duty,  pre- 
cisely in  the  time  of  trouble,  to  continue  to  serve  his 
Majesty  the  Kaiser  and  the' country  [repeated  "Bravos!"]. 
How  long  that  will  be  possible  for  me,  I  cannot  say. 

Let  me  say  one  thing  more :  at  a  moment  when  the  fact 
that  in  the  world  much  is  once  again  changing  requires 
serious  attention  to  be  given  to  the  entire  situation,  wher- 
ever it  is  matter  of  concern  to  maintain  our  position 
abroad,  and  without  pushing  ourselves  forward  with  quiet 
constancy  to  make  good  our  interests — at  such  a  moment 
we  ought  not  to  show  ourselves  small-spirited  in  foreign 
eyes,  nor  make  out  of  a  misfortune  a  catastrophe.  I  will 
refrain  from  all  criticism  of  the  exaggerations  we  have 
lived  through  during  these  last  days.  The  harm  is — as 
calm  reflection  will  show — not  so  great  that  it  cannot  with 
circumspection  be  made  good.  Certainly  no  one  should 
forget  the  warning  which  the  events  of  these  days  have 
given  us  ["Bravo!"] — but  there  is  no  reason  to  lose  our 
heads  and  awake  in  our  opponents  the  hope  that  the 
Empire,  inwardly  or  outwardly,  is  maimed. 

It  is  for  the  chosen  representatives  of  the  nation  to 
exhibit  the  prudence  which  the  time  demands.  I  do  not 
say  it  for  myself,  I  say  it  for  the  country:  the  support 
required  for  this  is  no  favor,  it  is  a  duty  which  this 
honorable  House  will  not  evade  [loud  applause  on  the 
Right,  hisses  from  the  Socialists]. 

No.  V 

The  important  part  of  Chancellor  Bethmann- 
Hollweg's  defense  of  the  Kaiser's  speech  at  Konigs- 
berg  is  as  follows : 

The  discourse  at  Konigsberg  is  not  a  manifestation  of 
absolutist  opinion,  inconsistent  with  the  Constitution,  but, 

340 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

it  is  true,  a  strong  affirmation  of  the  monarchical  prin- 
ciple— which  is  a  foundation  of  the  Prussian  State  law, 
as  well  as  an  expression  of  profound  religious  convictions 
which  are  understood  and  which  are  shared  by  numerous 
classes  of  the  nation.  [Lively  approbation  on  the  Right 
and  the  Centre.] 

In  its  development  of  many  centuries,  it  is  not  the  Prus- 
sian people  that  has  given  itself  the  royalty,  but  it  is 
the  work  of  the  great  monarchs  of  the  House  of  Hohen- 
zollern,  who,  seconded  by  the  tenacity  and  ability  of  the 
population,  has  created  first  a  Prussian  nation,  then  a 
Prussian  State  [Applause  on  various  benches]. 

The  Prussian  Constitution,  which  rests  on  these  historic 
developments,  does  not  recognize  the  conception  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people.  This  is  why  the  Kings  of 
Prussia  are,  in  relation  to  their  own  people,  Kings  in 
their  own  right;  and  if  in  our  days  it  is  attempted,  on 
the  democratic  side,  to  regard  the  King  of  Prussia  in  a 
manner  more  lively  than  before  as  a  dignitary  named  by 
the  people,  it  is  not  an  occasion  for  astonishment  that 
the  King  affirms  strongly  his  consciousness  of  not  being 
subject  to  any  sovereignty  of  the  people. 

Personal  irresponsibility  of  the  King,  independence  and 
original  existence  of  his  monarchical  right,  here  are  the 
fundamental  ideas  of  our  State-life,  which  remain  alive  in 
the  period  of  constitutional  development. 

With  the  exception  of  the  Social  Democrats,  the 
speakers  of  nearly  all  parties  spoke  in  terms  similar 
to  those  employed  by  the  Chancellor,  and  the  inci- 
dent was  thus  closed. 

No.  VI 

The  essential  part  of  Kaiser  William  II  fs  Letter 
on  Religion  to  Admiral  Hollmann  is  as  follows : 

I  distinguish  between  two  different  sorts  of  Revelation : 
a  current,  to  a  certain  extent  historical,  and  a  purely 
religious,  which  was  meant  to  prepare  the  way  for  the 

341 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

appearance  of  the  Messiah.  As  to  the  first,  I  should  say 
that  I  have  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  God  eternally 
revealed  Himself  to  the  race  of  mankind  He  created.  He 
breathed  into  man  His  breath,  that  is,  a  portion  of  Him- 
self, a  soul.  With  fatherly  love  and  interest  He  followed 
the  development  of  humanity;  in  order  to  lead  and  en- 
courage it  further  He  "revealed"  Himself,  now  in  the 
person  of  this,  now  of  that  great  wise  man,  priest  or  king, 
whether  pagan,  Jew  or  Christian.  Hammurabi  was  one 
of  these,  Moses,  Abraham,  Homer,  Charlemagne,  Luther, 
Shakespeare,  Goethe,  Kant,  Kaiser  William  the  Great — 
these  He  selected  and  honoured  with  His  Grace,  to  achieve 
for  their  peoples,  according  to  His  will,  things  noble  and 
imperishable.  How  often  has  not  my  grandfather  ex- 
plicitly declared  that  he  was  an  instrument  in  the  hand 
of  the  Lord!  The  works  of  great  souls  are  the  gifts  of 
God  to  the  people,  that  they  may  be  able  to  build  further 
on  them  as  models,  that  they  may  be  able  to  feel  further 
through  the  confusion  of  the  undiscovered  here  below. 
Doubtless  God  has  "revealed"  Himself  to  different  peo- 
ples in  different  ways,  according  to  their  situation  and 
the  degree  of  their  civilization.  Then  just  as  we  are  over- 
borne most  by  the  greatness  and  might  of  the  lovely  nature 
of  the  Creation  when  we  regard  it,  and  as  we  look  are 
astonished  at  the  greatness  of  God  there  displayed,  even 
so  can  we  of  a  surety  thankfully  and  admiringly  recog- 
nize, by  whatever  truly  great  or  noble  thing  a  man  or  a 
people  does,  the  revelation  of  God,  His  influence  acts  on 
us  and  among  us  directly. 

The  second  sort  of  Revelation,  the  more  religious  sort, 
is  that  which  led  up  to  the  appearance  of  the  Lord.  Prom 
Abraham  onward  it  was  introduced,  slowly  but  foresee- 
ingly,  ail-wisely  and  ail-knowingly,  for  otherwise  human- 
ity were  lost.  And  now  commences  the  astonishing  work- 
ing of  God's  Revelation.  The  race  of  Abraham  and  the 
peoples  that  sprang  from  it  regard,  with  an  iron  logic, 
as  their  holiest  possession,  the  belief  in  a  God.  They  must 
worship  and  cultivate  Him.  Broken  up  during  the  cap- 
tivity in  Egypt,  the  separated  parts  were  brought  together 
again  for  the  second  time  by  Moses,  always  striving  to 
cling  fast  to  monotheism.    It  was  the  direct  intervention 

343 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

of  God  that  caused  this  people  to  come  to  life  again.  And 
so  it  goes  on  through  the  centuries  till  the  Messiah,  an- 
nounced and  foreshadowed  by  the  prophets  and  psalmists, 
at  last  appears  the  greatest  revelation  of  God  to  the  world. 
Then  He  appeared  in  the  Son  Himself ;  Christ  is  God ;  God 
in  human  form.  He  redeemed  us,  He  spurs  us  on,  He 
allures  us  to  follow  Him,  we  feel  His  fire  burn  in  us,  His 
sympathy  strengthens  us,  His  displeasure  annihilates  us, 
but  also  His  care  saves  us.  Confident  of  victory,  building 
only  on  His  Word,  we  pass  through  labor,  scorn,  suf- 
fering, misery,  and  death,  for  in  His  "Word  we  have  God 's 
revealed  Word,  and  He  never  lies. 

That  is  my  view  of  the  matter.  The  Word  is  especially 
for  us  evangelicals  made  the  essential  thing  by  Luther, 
and  as  good  theologian  surely  Delitzsch  must  not  forget 
that  our  great  Luther  taught  us  to  sing  and  believe — 
"Thou  shalt  suffer,  let  the  Word  stand."  To  me  it  goes 
without  saying  that  the  Old  Testament  contains  a  large 
number  of  fragments  of  a  purely  human  historical  kind 
and  not  "God's  revealed  Word."  They  are  mere  his- 
torical descriptions  of  events  of  all  sorts  which  occurred 
in  the  political,  religious,  moral,  and  intellectual  life  of 
the  people  of  Israel.  For  example,  the  act  of  legislation 
on  Sinai  may  be  regarded  as  only  symbolically  inspired 
by  God,  when  Moses  had  recourse  to  the  revival  of  per- 
haps some  old-time  law  (possibly  the  codex,  an  offshoot 
of  the  codex  of  Hammurabi),  to  bring  together  and  to 
bind  together  institutions  of  His  people  which  were  be- 
come shaky  and  incapable  of  resistance.  Here  the  his- 
torian can,  from  the  spirit  or  the  text,  perhaps  construct 
a  connexion  with  the  Law  of  Hammurabi,  the  friend  of 
Abraham,  and  perhaps  logically  enough ;  but  that  would 
no  way  lessen  the  importance  of  the  fact  that  God  sug- 
gested it  to  Moses,  and  in  so  far  revealed  Himself  to  the 
Israelite  people. 

Consequently  it  is  my  idea  that  for  the  future  our  good 
Professor  would  do  well  to  avoid  treating  of  religion  as 
such,  on  the  other  hand  continue  to  describe  unmolested 
everything  that  connects  the  religion,  manners,  and 
customs  of  the  Babylonians  with  the  Old  Testament.  On 
the  whole,  I  make  the  following  deductions : — 

343 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

1.  I  believe  in  One  God. 

2.  We  humans  need,  in  order  to  teach  Him,  a  Form, 
especially  for  our  Children. 

3.  This  Form  has  been  to  the  present  time  the  Old 
Testament  in  its  existing  tradition.  This  Form  will  cer- 
tainly decidedly  alter  considerably  with  the  discovery  of 
inscriptions  and  excavations;  there  is  nothing  harmful  in 
that,  it  is  even  no  harm  if  the  nimbus  of  the  Chosen 
People  loses  much  thereby.  The  kernel  and  substance 
remain  always  the  same — God,  namely,  and  His  work. 

Never  was  religion  a  result  of  science,  but  a  gushing 
out  of  the  heart  and  being  of  mankind,  springing  from  its 
intercourse  with  God. 

No.  VII 

The  substance  of  the  Austrian  demands  and  of 
the  replies  by  Serbia  is  expressed  in  the  following 
summaries,  for  which  abbreviated  form  I  am  in- 
debted to  McClure's  Obstacles  to  Peace,  pp.  60,  61. 

DEMANDS 

1.  Serbia  shall  suppress  all  anti- Austrian  publications. 

2.  Dissolve  the  Narodna  Odbrana  and  all  similar  socie- 
ties, confiscate  their  funds,  and  prevent  their  re-forming. 

3.  Remove  from  public  education  in  Serbia  all  teachers 
and  teaching  that  are  anti- Austrian. 

4.  Remove  from  military  and  civil  service  all  officers 
and  officials  guilty  of  anti- Austrian  propaganda;  Austria 
will  name  the  persons. 

5.  Accept  collaboration  of  Austrian  representatives  in 
the  suppression  of  anti-Austrian  propaganda. 

6.  Take  judicial  proceedings  against  accessories  to  the 
plot  against  the  Archduke;  Austrian  delegates  will  take 
part  in  the  investigations. 

7.  Arrest  Major  Voija  Tankositch  and  the  individual 
named  Milan  Ciganovitch. 

8.  Prevent  and  punish  the  illegal  traffic  in  arms  and 
explosives. 

344 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

9.  Send  to  Austria  explanations  of  all  unjustifiable 
utterances  of  high  Serbian  officials,  at  home  and  abroad. 

10.  Notify  without  delay  that  the  above  measures  are 
executed.    Reply  before  6  p.m.  on  Saturday,  July  25. 

ANSWERS 

1.  Yes ;  will  suppress  all  anti- Austrian  publications. 

2.  Yes ;  will  suppress  the  Narodna  Odbrana  and  similar 
societies. 

3.  Yes ;  will  expel  all  anti- Austrian  teachers  and  teach- 
ing as  soon  as  evidence  given. 

4.  Yes ;  will  expel  all  anti- Austrian  officers  and  officials, 
if  Austria  will  furnish  names  and  acts  of  guilty  persons. 

5.  Yes;  will  accept  collaboration  of  Austrian  repre- 
sentatives in  these  proceedings,  as  far  as  consonant  with 
principles  of  international  law  and  criminal  procedure 
and  neighborly  relations. 

6.  Yes;  will  take  the  judicial  proceedings;  will  also 
keep  Austria  informed;  but  cannot  admit  the  participa- 
tion of  Austrians  in  the  judicial  investigations,  as  this 
would  be  a  violation  of  the  Constitution. 

7.  Yes;  have  arrested  Tankositch;  ordered  arrest  of 
Ciganovitch. 

8.  Yes;  will  suppress  and  punish  traffic  in  arms  and 
explosives. 

9.  Yes ;  will  deal  with  the  said  high  officials,  if  Austria 
will  supply  evidence. 

10.  Yes,  will  notify  without  delay. 

If  this  answer  not  satisfactory,  Serbia  will  abide  by 
decision  of  the  Hague  Tribunal. 

No.  VIII 

The  reply  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  the  German  bid 
for  neutrality  was  as  follows : 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Gosclien,  British  Ambassa- 
dor at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  30,  1914. 

Your  telegram  of  the  29th  July. 

345 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

His  Majesty's  Government  cannot  for  a  moment  enter- 
tain the  Chancellor's  proposal  that  they  should  bind  them- 
selves to  neutrality  on  such  terms. 

What  he  asks  us  in  effect  is  to  engage  to  stand  by  while 
French  colonies  are  taken  and  France  is  beaten  so  long  as 
Germany  does  not  take  French  territory  as  distinct  from 
the  colonies. 

From  the  material  point  of  view  such  a  proposal  is 
unacceptable,  for  France,  without  further  territory  in 
Europe  being  taken  from  her,  could  be  so  crushed  as  to 
lose  her  position  as  a  Great  Power,  and  become  subordi- 
nate to  German  policy. 

Altogether  apart  from  that,  it  would  be  a  disgrace  for 
us  to  make  this  bargain  with  Germany  at  the  expense  of 
France,  a  disgrace  from  which  the  good  name  of  this 
country  would  never  recover. 

The  Chancellor  also  in  effect  asks  us  to  bargain  away 
whatever  obligation  or  interest  we  have  as  regards  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium.  We  could  not  entertain  that  bar- 
gain, either. 

Having  said  so  much  it  is  unnecessary  to  examine 
whether  the  prospect  of  a  future  general  neutrality  agree- 
ment between  England  and  Germany  offered  positive  ad- 
vantages sufficient  to  compensate  us  for  tying  our  hands 
now.  We  must  preserve  full  freedom  to  act  as  circum- 
stances may  seem  to  us  to  require  in  any  such  unfavor- 
able and  regrettable  development  of  the  present  crisis  as 
the  Chancellor  contemplates. 

You  should  speak  to  the  Chancellor  in  the  above  sense, 
and  add  most  earnestly  that  the  one  way  of  maintaining 
the  good  relations  between  England  and  Germany  is  that 
they  should  continue  to  work  together  to  preserve  the 
peace  of  Europe;  if  we  succeed  in  this  object,  the  natural 
relations  of  Germany  and  England  will,  I  believe,  be  ipso 
facto  improved  and  strengthened.  For  that  object  His 
Majesty's  Government  will  work  in  that  way  with  all  sin- 
cerity and  good-will. 

And  I  will  say  this:  If  the  peace  of  Europe  can  be 
preserved,  and  the  present  crisis  safely  passed,  my  own 
endeavor  will  be  to  promote  some  arrangement  to  which 
Germany  could  be  a  party,  bv  which  she  could  be  assured 

34*6 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

that  no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would  be  pursued 
against  her  or  her  allies  by  France,  Russia,  and  ourselves, 
jointly  or  separately.  I  have  desired  this  and  worked 
for  it,  as  far  as  I  could,  through  the  last  Balkan  crisis, 
and,  Germany  having  a  corresponding  object,  our  rela- 
tions sensibly  improved.  The  idea  has  hitherto  been  too 
Utopian  to  form  the  subject  of  definite  proposals,  but  if 
this  present  crisis,  so  much  more  acute  than  any  that 
Europe  has  gone  through  for  generations,  be  safely  passed, 
I  am  hopeful  that  the  relief  and  reaction  which  will  follow 
may  make  possible  some  more  definite  rapprochement 
between  the  Powers  than  has  been  possible  hitherto. 

No.  IX 

The  following  is  Sir  Edward  Grey's  report  of  the 
"private"  conversation  referred  to  in  the  Kaiser's 
message  to  the  President  of  the  United  States : 


Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Gosclien,  British  Ambassa- 
dor at  Berlin. 

Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 

Sir: 

After  speaking  to  the  German  Ambassador  this  after- 
noon about  the  European  situation,  I  said  that  I  wished 
to  say  to  him,  in  a  quite  private  and  friendly  way,  some- 
thing that  was  on  my  mind.  The  situation  was  very  grave. 
While  it  was  restricted  to  the  issues  at  present  actually 
involved,  we  had  no  thought  of  interfering  in  it.  But  if 
Germany  became  involved  in  it,  and  then  France,  the  issue 
might  be  so  great  it  would  involve  all  European  interests ; 
and  I  did  not  wish  him  to  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone 
of  our  conversation — which  I  hoped  would  continue — into 
thinking  that  we  should  stand  aside. 

He  said  that  he  quite  understood  this,  but  he  asked 
whether  I  meant  that  we  should,  under  certain  circum- 
stances, intervene  ? 

I  replied  that  I  did  not  wish  to  say  that,  or  to  use  any- 
thing that  was  like  a  threat  or  an  attempt  to  apply  pres- 

347 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

sure  by  saying  that,  if  things  became  worse,  we  should 
intervene.  There  would  be  no  question  of  our  intervening 
if  Germany  was  not  involved,  or  even  if  France  was  not 
involved.  But  we  knew  very  well,  that  if  the  issue  did 
become  such  that  we  thought  British  interests  required  us 
to  intervene,  we  must  intervene  at  once,  and  the  decision 
would  have  to  be  very  rapid,  just  as  the  decisions  of  other 
Powers  had  to  be.  I  hoped  that  the  friendly  tone  of  our 
conversations  would  continue  as  at  present,  and  that  I 
should  be  able  to  keep  as  closely  in  touch  with  the  German 
government  in  working  for  peace.  But  if  we  failed  in  our 
efforts  to  keep  the  peace,  and  if  the  issue  spread  so  that  it 
involved  practically  every  European  interest,  I  did  not 
wish  to  be  open  to  any  reproach  from  him  that  the  friendly 
tone  of  all  our  conversations  had  misled  him  or  his  gov- 
ernment into  supposing  that  we  should  not  take  action, 
and  to  the  reproach  that,  if  they  had  not  been  so  misled, 
the  course  of  things  might  have  been  different. 

The  German  ambassador  took  no  exception  to  what  I  had 
said ;  indeed,  he  told  me  that  it  accorded  with  what  he  had 
already  given  in  Berlin  as  his  view  of  the  situation. 

No.  X 

The  reply  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
to  the  proposal  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  answer  to 
the  Imperial  German  Government's  telegram  of 
caution,  was  thought  of  so  little  importance  that  it 
was  not  published  or  referred  to  in  the  German 
White  Book.  Its  substance  is,  however,  contained 
in  the  following  telegram : 

Count  Bercktold  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Ambassa- 
dors at  London  and  St.  Petersburg. 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  31,  1914. 

I  am  telegraphing  as  follows  to  Berlin : — 
Herr  von  Tschirschky  has  in  accordance  with  his  instruc- 
tions yesterday  communicated  a  discussion  between  Sir 
E.  Grey  and  Prince  Liehnowsky  in  which  the  British  Sec- 

348 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

retary  of  State  made  the  following  announcement  to  the 
German  ambassador : — 

Sazonof  has  informed  the  British  government  that  after 
the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria-Hungary  against  Serbia, 
he  is  no  longer  in  a  position  to  deal  directly  with  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  he  therefore  requests  that  Great  Britain 
will  again  take  up  her  work  of  mediation.  The  Russian 
government  regarded  the  preliminary  stoppage  of  hostili- 
ties as  a  condition  precedent  to  this. 

To  this  Russian  declaration,  Sir  E.  Grey  remarked  to 
Prince  Lichnowsky  that  Great  Britain  thought  of  a  media- 
tion a  quatre,  and  that  she  regarded  this  as  urgently  neces- 
sary if  a  general  war  was  to  be  prevented. 

I  ask  your  Excellency  to  convey  our  warm  thanks  to 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  the  communications  made  to  us 
through  Herr  von  Tschirschky,  and  to  declare  to  him  that 
in  spite  of  the  change  in  the  situation  which  has  since 
arisen  through  the  mobilization  of  Russia,  we  are  quite 
prepared  to  entertain  the  proposal  of  Sir  E.  Grey  to 
negotiate  between  us  and  Serbia. 

The  conditions  of  our  acceptance  are,  nevertheless,  that 
our  military  action  against  Serbia  should  continue  to  take 
its  course,  and  that  the  British  Cabinet  should  move  the 
Russian  government  to  bring  to  a  standstill  the  Russian 
mobilization  which  is  directed  against  us,  in  which  case, 
of  course,  we  will  at  once  cancel  the  defensive  military 
counter-measures  in  Galicia,  which  are  occasioned  by  the 
Russian  attitude. 

No.  XI 

The  German  reply  to  Great  Britain's  inquiry  re- 
garding the  intention  to  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  is  thus  reported,  on  July  31,  1914,  by  the 
British  ambassador  at  Berlin: 

Sir  E.  GoscJien  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
Received  August  1 
(Telegraphic)  Berlin,  July  31,  1914. 

Neutrality  of  Belgium,  referred  to  in  your  telegram 
of  July  31  to  Sir  F.  Bertie. 

349 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

I  have  seen  Secretary  of  State  (Von  Jagow),  who  in- 
forms me  that  he  must  consult  the  Emperor  and  the  Chan- 
cellor before  he  could  possibly  answer.  I  gathered  from 
what  he  said  that  he  thought  any  reply  they  might  give 
could  not  but  disclose  a  certain  amount  of  their  plan  of 
campaign  in  the  event  of  Avar  ensuing,  and  he  was  there- 
fore very  doubtful  whether  thev  could  return  any  answer 
at  all— British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  121. 


No.  XII 

The  care  observed  by  the  French  not  to  take  the 
offensive  or  invade  German  territory  is  evident 
from  the  following  secret  general  order  of  August  2, 
1914,  issued  by  General  Joffre  at  Paris: 

(1)  From  information  received  it  appears  that  the 
Germans  have  this  morning  violated  the  French  frontier 
at  three  points,  namely,  between  Delle  and  Belfort,  oppo- 
site Cirey-sur-Vezouze,  and  both  to  the  north  and  south  of 
Longwy. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  order  forbidding  the 
passage  of  troops  eastwards  beyond  the  line  laid  down  by 
telegram  No.  129 — 3/11  T.  situated  generally  at  a  dis- 
tance of  10  kilometres  from  the  frontier,  is  hereby  re- 
scinded. Nevertheless,  for  national  reasons  of  a  moral 
kind  and  for  most  important  reasons  of  diplomacy,  it  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  leave  to  the  Germans  all  respon- 
sibility for  hostilities.  Therefore,  until  further  orders, 
covering  troops  will  confine  themselves  to  driving  back 
attacking  forces  beyond  the  frontier  without  pursuing 
them  and  without  penetrating  into  the  territory  of  the 
enemy. 

(2)  The  Commander-in-Chief  intends  to  take  up  the 
general  offensive  only  when  his  forces  have  been  concen- 
trated. 

350 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 
No.  XIII 

It  is  evident  that  it  had  been  decided  that  unless 
Russia  gave  way  entirely,  and  declared  her  total 
abstention  from  the  purpose  to  protect  Serbia,  the 
German  declaration  of  war  on  Russia,  whatever  its 
consequences,  would  be  issued.  The  following  re- 
port of  the  Imperial  German  Government's  state- 
ments confirms  this  view : 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey 

(Received  August  1) 
(Telegraphic)  Berlin,  July  31, 1914. 

Your  telegram  of  31st  July. 

I  spent  an  hour  with  Secretary  of  State  urging  him 
most  earnestly  to  accept  your  proposal  and  make  another 
effort  to  prevent  terrible  catastrophe  of  a  European  war. 

He  expressed  himself  very  sympathetically  towards 
your  proposal,  and  appreciated  your  continued  efforts  to 
maintain  peace,  but  said  it  was  impossible  for  the  Im- 
perial Government  to  consider  any  proposal  until  they 
had  received  an  answer  from  Russia  to  their  communi- 
cation of  to-day;  this  communication,  which  he  admitted 
had  the  form  of  an  ultimatum,  being  that,  unless  Russia 
could  inform  the  Imperial  Government  within  twelve 
hours  that  she  would  immediately  countermand  her  mobil- 
ization against  Germany  and  Austria,  Germany  would 
be  obliged  on  her  side  to  mobilize  at  once. 

I  asked  his  Excellency  why  they  had  made  their  demand 
even  more  difficult  for  Russia  to  accept  by  asking  them 
to  demobilize  in  the  south  as  well.  He  replied  that  it  was 
in  order  to  prevent  Russia  from  saying  all  her  mobilization 
was  only  directed  against  Austria. 

His  Excellency  said  that  if  the  answer  from  Russia  was 
not  satisfactory  he  thought  personally  that  your  proposal 
merited  favorable  consideration,  and  in  any  case  he 
would  lay  it  before  the  Emperor  and  Chancellor,  but  he 

351 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

repeated  that  it  was  no  use  discussing  it  until  tlie  Russian 
Government  had  sent  in  their  answer  to  the  German  de- 
mand. 

He  again  assured  me  that  both  the  Emperor  William, 
at  the  request  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  and  the  German 
Foreign  Office  had  even  up  till  last  night  been  urging 
Austria  to  show  willingness  to  continue  discussions — and 
telegraphic  and  telephonic  communications  from  Vienna 
had  been  of  a  promising  nature — but  Russia's  mobiliza- 
tion had  spoilt  everything.— British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  121. 

No.  XIV 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, to  Sir  Edward  Grey  (Received  July  31). 
(Telegraphic)  St.  Petersburg,  July  31, 1914. 

It  has  been  decided  to  issue  orders  for  general  mobili- 
zation. 

This  decision  was  taken  in  consequence  of  report  re- 
ceived from  Russian  Ambassador  in  Vienna  to  the  effect 
that  Austria  is  determined  not  to  yield  to  intervention  of 
Powers,  and  that  she  is  moving  troops  against  Russia  as 
well  as  against  Serbia. 

Russia  has  also  reason  to  believe  that  Germany  is  mak- 
ing active  military  preparations,  and  she  cannot  afford  to 
let  her  get  a  start. — British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  113. 

No.  XV 

The  German  newspapers  did  not  fail  to  con- 
tribute as  much  as  possible  to  the  impression  that 
Germany  was  attacked.  In  this,  however,  there  was 
a  lack  of  co-ordination  that  renders  it  easy  to  ex- 
pose the  erroneous  charges  against  the  French. 
Two  French  professors,  whose  report  is  cited  by 
McClure,  have  disproved  certain  widely  circulated 
falsehoods.    They  say : 

As  we  wished  to  ascertain  whether  the  German  news- 
papers had  given  a  more  detailed  account  of  these  oc- 

352 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

currences,  we  consulted  five  of  the  principal  newspapers 
{Vorwaerts,  Arbeiter  Zeitung  of  Vienna.  Frankfurter 
Zeitung,  Kolnische  Zeitung,  Miincliner  Neueste  Nach- 
richten)  from  the  end  of  July  to  the  5th  of  August.  First 
of  all  we  noticed  that  the  aviator  who  is  said  to  have  flown 
over  Karlsruhe  is  not  mentioned.  As  for  the  others,  the 
account  of  them  is  as  vague  as  it  is  in  the  official  note. 
These  incidents,  given  as  the  cause  determining  war,  take 
up  one  line,  two  or  three  at  the  most.  The  bombs  never 
left  any  trace.  One  of  these  aeroplanes,  that  at  Wesel, 
is  said  to  have  been  brought  down ;  nothing  is  said  of  the 
aviator  and  what  became  of  him,  nor  is  there  anything 
about  the  aeroplane  itself.  In  a  word,  the  Germans  took 
care  to  draw  attention  to  their  arrival  in  Germany  and 
then  never  spoke  of  them  again.  They  were  never  seen 
to  return  to  their  starting-point. 

But  we  have  still  more  convincing  evidence.  We  have 
been  able  to  procure  a  Nuremberg  newspaper,  the  Frank- 
iscJier  Kurrier.  On  the  2d  of  August,  the  day  the  bombs 
are  supposed  to  have  been  thrown,  not  a  word  is  said 
about  the  incident,  Nuremberg  received  the  news  on  the 
3d  by  a  telegram  from  Berlin  identical  to  that  published 
by  the  other  newspapers.  Again,  the  Kolnische  Zeitung 
of  the  3d,  in  its  morning  edition,  published  a  telegram 
from  Munich  which  read  as  follows :  ' '  The  Bavarian  Min- 
ister of  War  is  doubtful  as  to  the  exactness  of  the  news 
announcing  that  aviators  had  been  seen  above  the  lines 
Nuremberg-Kitzingen  and  Nuremberg- Anspach  and  that 
they  had  thrown  bombs  on  the  railway." 


No.  XVI 

The  following  telegrams  explain  the  circum- 
stances which  determined  the  entrance  of  Great 
Britain  into  the  war : 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassa- 
dor at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  4,  1914. 

The  King  of  the  Belgians  has  made  an  appeal  to  His 

353 


IMrRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

Majesty  the  King  for  diplomatic  intervention  on  behalf 
of  Belgium  in  the  following  terms: — 

"Remembering  the  numerous  proofs  of  your  Majesty's 
friendship  and  that  of  your  predecessor,  and  the  friendly 
attitude  of  England  in  1870  and  the  proof  of  friendship 
you  have  just  given  us  again,  I  make  a  supreme  appeal 
to  the  diplomatic  intervention  of  your  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment to  safeguard  the  integrity  of  Belgium." 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  also  informed  that  the 
German  Government  have  delivered  to  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment a  note  proposing  friendly  neutrality  entailing 
free  passage  through  Belgian  territory,  and  promising  to 
maintain  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  kingdom 
and  its  possessions  at  the  conclusion  of  peace,  threatening 
in  case  of  refusal  to  treat  Belgium  as  an  enemy.  An 
answer  was  requested  within  twelve  hours. 

We  also  understand  that  Belgium  has  categorically  re- 
fused this  as  a  flagrant  violation  of  the  law  of  nations. 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  bound  to  protest  against 
this  violation  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  is  a  party  in 
common  with  themselves,  and  must  request  an  assurance 
that  the  demand  made  upon  Belgium  will  not  be  proceeded 
with  and  that  her  neutrality  will  be  respected  by  Ger- 
manv.  You  should  ask  for  an  immediate  reply. — British 
Blue  Book,  I,  No.  153. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassa- 
dor at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  4, 1914. 

We  hear  that  Germany  has  addressed  note  to  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  stating  that  German  Gov- 
ernment will  be  compelled  to  carry  out,  if  necessary,  by 
force  of  arms,  the  measures  considered  indispensable. 

We  are  also  informed  that  Belgian  territory  has  been 
violated  at  Gemmenich. 

In  these  circumstances,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
Germany  declined  to  give  the  same  assurance  respecting 
Belgium  as  France  gave  last  week  in  reply  to  our  request 
made  simultaneously  at  Berlin  and  Paris,  we  must  repeat 
that  request,  and  ask  that  a  satisfactory  reply  to  it  and 
to  my  telegram  of  this  morning  be  received  here  by  12 

354 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

o'clock  to-night.  If  not,  you  are  instructed  to  ask  for 
your  passports,  and  to  say  that  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment feel  bound  to  take  all  steps  in  their  power  to  uphold 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  the  observance  of  a  treaty 
to  which  Germany  is  as  much  a  party  as  ourselves. — Brit- 
ish Blue  Book,  I,  No.  159. 

Sir  E.  Gosclien,  Britisli  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey. 

London,  August  8, 1914. 
Sir, 

In  accordance  with  the  instructions  contained  in  your 
telegram  of  the  4th  instant  I  called  upon  the  Secretary 
of  State  that  afternoon  and  enquired,  in  the  name  of  His 
Majesty's  Government,  whether  the  Imperial  Government 
would  refrain  from  violating  Belgian  neutrality.  Herr 
von  Jagow  at  once  replied  that  he  was  sorry  to  say  that 
his  answer  must  be  "No,"  as,  in  consequence  of  the  Ger- 
man troops  having  crossed  the  frontier  that  morning, 
Belgian  neutrality  had  been  already  violated.  Herr  von 
Jagow  again  went  into  the  reasons  why  the  Imperial 
Government  had  been  obliged  to  take  this  step,  namely, 
that  they  had  to  advance  into  France  by  the  quickest  and 
easiest  way,  so  as  to  be  able  to  get  well  ahead  with  their 
operations  and  endeavor  to  strike  some  decisive  blow  as 
early  as  possible.  It  was  a  matter  of  life  and  death  for 
them,  as  if  they  had  gone  by  the  more  southern  route  they 
could  not  have  hoped,  in  view  of  the  paucity  of  roads 
and  the  strength  of  the  fortresses,  to  have  got  through 
without  formidable  opposition  entailing  great  loss  of  time. 
This  loss  of  time  would  have  meant  time  gained  by  the 
Russians  for  bringing  up  their  troops  to  the  German 
frontier.  Rapidity  of  action  was  the  great  German  asset, 
while  that  of  Russia  was  an  inexhaustible  supply  of  troops. 
I  pointed  out  to  Herr  von  Jagow  that  this  fait  accompli 
of  the  violation  of  the  Belgian  frontier  rendered,  as  he 
would  readily  understand,  the  situation  exceedingly  grave, 
and  I  asked  him  whether  there  was  not  still  time  to  draw 
back  and  avoid  possible  consequences,  which  both  he  and 
I  would  deplore.  He  replied  that,  for  the  reasons  he  had 
given  me,  it  was  now  impossible  for  them  to  draw  back. 
24  355 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

During  the  afternoon  I  received  your  further  telegram 
of  the  same  date,  and,  in  compliance  with  the  instructions 
herein  contained,  I  again  proceeded  to  the  Imperial  For- 
eign Office  and  informed  the  Secretary  of  State  that  un- 
less the  Imperial  Government  could  give  the  assurance  by 
12  o'clock  that  night  that  they  would  proceed  no  further 
with  their  violation  of  the  Belgian  frontier  and  stop  their 
advance,  I  had  been  instructed  to  demand  my  passports 
and  inform  the  Imperial  Government  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  would  have  to  take  all  steps  in  their  power  to 
uphold  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  the  observance  of 
a  treaty  to  which  Germany  was  as  much  a  party  as  them- 
selves. 

Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that  to  his  great  regret  he  could 
give  no  other  answer  than  that  which  he  had  given  me 
earlier  in  the  day,  namely,  that  the  safety  of  the  Empire 
rendered  it  absolutely  necessary  that  the  Imperial  troops 
should  advance  through  Belgium.  I  gave  his  Excellency 
a  written  summary  of  your  telegram  and,  pointing  out 
that  you  had  mentioned  12  o'clock  as  the  time  when  His 
Majesty's  Government  would  expect  an  answer,  asked  him 
whether,  in  view  of  the  terrible  consequences  which  would 
necessarily  ensue,  it  were  not  possible  even  at  the  last 
moment  that  their  answer  should  be  reconsidered.  He 
replied  that  if  the  time  given  were  even  twenty-four  hours 
or  more,  his  answer  must  be  the  same.  I  said  that  in  that 
case  I  should  have  to  demand  my  passports.  This  inter- 
view took  place  at  about  7  o'clock.  In  a  short  conversa- 
tion which  ensued  Herr  von  Jagow  expressed  his  poignant 
regret  at  the  crumbling  of  his  entire  policy  and  that  of 
the  Chancellor,  which  had  been  to  make  friends  with 
Great  Britain,  and  then,  through  Great  Britain,  to  get 
closer  to  France.  I  said  that  this  sudden  end  to  my  work 
in  Berlin  was  to  me  also  a  matter  of  deep  regret  and  dis- 
appointment, but  that  he  must  understand  that  under  the 
circumstances  and  in  view  of  our  engagements,  His  Maj- 
esty's Government  could  not  possibly  have  acted  other- 
wise than  they  had  done. 

I  then  said  that  I  should  like  to  go  and  see  the  Chancel- 
lor, as  it  might  be,  perhaps,  the  last  time  I  should  have  an 
opportunity  of  seeing  him.     He  begged  me  to  do  so.     I 

356 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS^ 

found  the  Chancellor  very  agitated.  His  Excellency  at 
once  began  a  harangue,  which  lasted  for  about  twenty 
minutes.  He  said  that  the  step  taken  by  His  Majesty's 
Government  was  terrible  to  a  degree;  just  for  a  word — 
"neutrality,"  a  word  which  in  war  time  had  so  often 
been  disregarded — just  for  a  scrap  of  paper  Great  Britain 
was  going  to  make  war  on  a  kindred  nation  who  desired 
nothing  better  than  to  be  friends  with  her.  All  his  efforts 
in  that  direction  had  been  rendered  useless  by  this  last 
terrible  step,  and  the  policy  to  which,  as  I  knew,  he  had 
devoted  himself  since  his  accession  to  office  had  tumbled 
down  like  a  house  of  cards.  What  we  had  done  was  un- 
thinkable; it  was  like  striking  a  man  from  behind  while 
he  was  fighting  for  his  life  against  two  assailants.  He 
held  Great  Britain  responsible  for  all  the  terrible  events 
that  might  happen.  I  protested  strongly  against  that 
statement,  and  said  that,  in  the  same  way  as  he  and  Herr 
von  Jagow  wished  me  to  understand  that  for  strategical 
reasons  it  was  a  matter  of  life  and  death  to  Germany  to 
advance  through  Belgium  and  violate  the  latter 's  neu- 
trality, so  I  would  wish  him  to  understand  that  it  was, 
so  to  speak,  a  matter  of  "life  and  death"  for  the  honor 
of  Great  Britain  that  she  should  keep  her  solemn  engage- 
ment to  do  her  utmost  to  defend  Belgium's  neutrality  if 
attacked.  That  solemn  compact  simply  had  to  be  kept,  or 
what  confidence  could  anyone  have  in  engagements  given 
by  Great  Britain  in  the  future?  The  Chancellor  said, 
"But  at  what  price  will  that  compact  have  been  kept. 
Has  the  British  Government  thought  of  that  ?  "  I  hinted 
to  his  Excellency  as  plainly  as  I  could  that  fear  of  con- 
sequences could  hardly  be  regarded  as  an  excuse  for 
breaking  solemn  engagements,  but  his  Excellency  was  so 
excited,  so  evidently  overcome  by  the  news  of  our  action, 
and  so  little  disposed  to  hear  reason  that  I  refrained  from 
adding  fuel  to  the  flame  by  further  argument.  As  I  was 
leaving  he  said  that  the  blow  of  Great  Britain  joining 
Germany's  enemies  was  all  the  greater  that  almost  up  to 
the  last  moment  he  and  his  Government  had  been  working 
with  us  and  supporting  our  efforts  to  maintain  peace 
between  Austria  and  Russia.  I  said  that  this  was  part 
of  the  tragedy  which  saw  the  two  nations  fall  apart  just 

357 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

at  the  moment  when  the  relations  between  them  had  been 
more  friendly  and  cordial  than  thev  had  been  for  years. 
—British  Blue  Book,  I,  No.  160. 

No.  XVII 

The  attitude  of  Italy  regarding  the  casus  foederis 
■with  Austria-Hungary  is  shown  in  the  following 
communication  of  August  3,  1914,  made  by  the 
French  ambassador  at  London  to  Sir  Edward  Grey : 

In  reply  to  the  German  Government 's  intimation  of  the 
fact  that  ultimatums  had  been  presented  to  France  and 
Russia,  and  to  the  question  as  to  what  were  the  intentions 
of  Italy,  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  replied: — 

' '  The  war  undertaken  by  Austria,  and  the  consequences 
which  might  result,  had,  in  the  words  of  the  German  Am- 
bassador himself,  an  aggressive  object.  Both  were  there- 
fore in  conflict  with  the  purely  defensive  character  of  the 
Triple  Alliance,  and  in  such  circumstances  Italy  would 
remain  neutral." 

In  making  this  communication,  M.  Cambon  was  in- 
structed to  lay  stress  upon  the  Italian  declaration  that 
the  present  war  was  not  a  defensive  but  an  aggressive 
war,  and  that,  for  this  reason,  the  casus  foederis  under  the 
terms  of  the  Triple  Alliance  did  not  arise. — British  Blue 
Book,  I,  No.  152. 

No.  XVIII 

The  only  written  agreement  to  protect  France  on 
the  part  of  Great  Britain  is  contained  in  the  follow- 
ing letter  of  November  22,  1912,  written  by  Sir 
Edward  Grey  to  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  ambas- 
sador at  London : 

Foreign  Office,  November  22,  1912. 
My  dear  Ambassador, 

From  time  to  time  in  recent  years  the  French  and  Brit- 

358 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

ish  naval  and  military  experts  have  consulted  together. 
It  has  always  been  understood  that  such  consultation  does 
not  restrict  the  freedom  of  either  Government  to  decide 
at  any  future  time  whether  or  not  to  assist  the  other  by 
armed  force.  We  have  agreed  that  consultation  between 
experts  is  not,  and  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as,  an  en- 
gagement that  commits  either  Government  to  action  in  a 
contingency  that  has  not  arisen  and  may  never  arise.  The 
disposition,  for  instance,  of  the  French  and  British  fleets 
respectively  at  the  present  moment  is  not  based  upon  an 
engagement  to  co-operate  in  war. 

You  have,  however,  pointed  out  that,  if  either  Govern- 
ment had  grave  reason  to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack 
by  a  third  Power,  it  might  become  essential  to  know 
whether  it  could  in  that  event  depend  upon  the  armed 
assistance  of  the  other. 

I  agree  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave  reason  to 
expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power,  or  some- 
thing that  threatened  the  general  peace,  it  should  im- 
mediately discuss  with  the  other  whether  both  Govern- 
ments should  act  together  to  prevent  aggression  and  to 
preserve  peace,  and,  if  so,  what  measures  they  would  be 
prepared  to  take  in  common.  If  these  measures  involved 
action,  the  plans  of  the  General  Staffs  would  at  once  be 
taken  into  consideration,  and  the  Governments  would  then 
decide  what  effect  should  be  given  to  them. 
Yours,  Etc., 

E.  GREY. 

British  Blue  Book,  I,  Enclosure  I  in  No.  105. 

The  manner  in  which  this  very  attenuated  en- 
gagement was  understood  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  in 
July,  1914,  is  shown  in  the  following  letter  to  Sir  F. 
Bertie,  British  ambassador  at  Paris : 

Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 
Sir, 

After  telling  M.  Cambon  [French  ambassador  at  Lon- 
don] to-day  how  grave  the  situation  seemed  to  be,  I  told 
him  that  I  meant  to  tell  the  German  ambassador  to-day 

359 


IMPRESSIONS  OF  THE  KAISER 

that,  he  must  not  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of  our 
conversations  into  any  sense  of  false  security  that  we 
should  stand  aside  if  all  the  efforts  to  preserve  the  peace, 
which  we  were  now  making  in  common  with  Germany, 
failed.  But  I  went  on  to  say  to  M.  Cambon  that  I  thought 
it  necessary  to  tell  him  also  that  public  opinion  here  ap- 
proached the  present  difficulty  from  a  quite  different  point 
of  view  from  that  taken  during  the  difficulty  as  to  Mo- 
rocco a  few  years  ago.  In  the  case  of  Morocco  the  dispute 
was  one  in  which  France  was  primarily  interested,  and  in 
which  it  appeared  that  Germany,  in  an  attempt  to  crush 
France,  was  fastening  a  quarrel  on  France  on  a  question 
that  was  the  subject  of  a  special  agreement  between 
France  and  us.  In  the  present  case  the  dispute  between 
Austria  and  Servia  was  not  one  in  which  we  felt  called 
to  take  a  hand.  Even  if  the  question  became  one  between 
Austria  and  Russia  we  should  not  feel  called  upon  to 
take  a  hand  in  it.  It  would  then  be  a  question  of  the 
supremacy  of  Teuton  or  Slav — a  struggle  for  supremacy 
in  the  Balkans;  and  our  idea  had  always  been  to  avoid 
being  drawn  into  a  war  over  a  Balkan  question.  If  Ger- 
many became  involved  and  France  became  involved,  we 
had  not  made  up  our  minds  what  we  should  do ;  it  was  a 
case  that  we  should  have  to  consider.  France  would  then 
have  been  drawn  into  a  quarrel  which  was  not  hers,  but 
in  which,  owing  to  her  alliance,  her  honor  and  interest 
obliged  her  to  engage.  We  were  free  from  engagements, 
and  we  should  have  to  decide  what  British  interests  re- 
quired us  to  do.  I  thought  it  necessary  to  say  that,  be- 
cause, as  he  knew,  we  were  taking  all  precautions  with 
regard  to  our  fleet,  and  I  was  about  to  warn  Prince 
Lichnowsky  not  to  count  on  our  standing  aside,  but  it 
would  not  be  fair  that  I  should  let  M.  Cambon  be  misled 
into  supposing  that  this  meant  that  we  had  decided  what 
to  do  in  a  contingency  that  I  still  hoped  might  not  arise. 
M.  Cambon  said  that  I  had  explained  the  situation  very 
clearly.  He  understood  it  to  be  that  in  a  Balkan  quarrel, 
and  in  a  struggle  for  supremacy  between  Teuton  and  Slav, 
we  should  not  feel  called  to  intervene ;  should  other  issues 
be  raised,  and  Germany  and  France  become  involved,  so 
that  the  question  became  one  of  the  hegemony  of  Europe, 

360 


ILLUSTRATIVE  DOCUMENTS 

we  should  then  decide  what  it  was  necessary  for  us  to  do. 
He  seemed  quite  prepared  for  this  announcement,  and 
made  no  criticism  upon  it. 

He  said  French  opinion  was  calm,  but  decided.  He 
anticipated  a  demand  from  Germany  that  France  would 
be  neutral  while  Germany  attacked  Russia.  This  assur- 
ance France,  of  course,  could  not  give ;  she  was  bound  to 
help  Russia  if  Russia  was  attacked. — British  Blue  Book, 
I,  No.  87. 

The  manner  in  which  France  understood  the  en- 
gagement is  shown  in  President  Poincare's  letter 
of  July  31,  1914,  to  H.  M.  King  George  V,  which 
affirms : 

It  is  true  that  our  military  and  naval  arrangements 
leave  complete  liberty  to  your  Majesty's  Government,  and 
that,  in  the  letters  exchanged  in  1912  between  Sir  Edward 
Grey  and  M.  Paul  Cambon,  Great  Britain  and  France 
entered  into  nothing  more  than  a  mutual  agreement  to 
consult  one  another  in  the  event  of  a  European  tension, 
and  to  examine  in  concert  whether  common  action  was 
advisable. — British  Blue  Book,  I,  Appendix  I,  V,  No.  1. 


INDEX 


Abdul,  Hamid,  72,  75,  210. 

Abraham,  142. 

Adams,  John,  104. 

Agadir,  193,  194,  197,  233. 

Albania,  214,  220,  221,  222. 

Albert  of  Brandenburg,  138. 

Alexander  III,  Czar  of  Russia, 
25,  26. 

Algeciras,  Act  of,  192,  196,  197. 

All-Deutscher    Verband,    33,    53. 

Alsace-Lorraine,  108,  109,  181, 
182,   186. 

Althusius,  162. 

Anatolian  Railway,  229. 

Angola,  226. 

Arbitration,  84,  85,  86,   102,  103. 

Armament,  reduction  of  contem- 
plated by  Bismarck,  28.  See 
also  Hague  Conferences. 

Army,  views  of  William  II  re- 
garding the,  10,  13. 

Art,  use  of  by  William  II,  67, 
68,   70,   71. 

Asquith,  Mr.,  British  Prime  Min- 
ister, quoted,  193,  197. 

Bagdad  Railway,  126,  210,  224, 
225,  229,  230. 

Balkan  Confederation,  210. 

Barbarossa,  15. 

Belgium,  neutrality  and  invasion 
of,  162,  260,  263,  275,  276,  279, 
293,  294,  295,  309. 

Belgrade,  occupation  of  pro- 
posed, 264,  265. 

Berchtold,  Count,  Austrian  Min- 
ister, 249,  289. 

Berlin,  the  treaty  of,  183. 

Bernhardi,  referred  to  or  quoted, 
170,  171,  189,  190,  198,  206, 
207. 


Bethmann-Hollweg,  Imperial 
German  Chancellor,  133,  134, 
197,  202,  203,  205,  214,  227,  231, 
246,  279,  293,  294,  318. 

Beyens,  Baron,  Belgian  Minis- 
ter at  Berlin,  quoted,  198,  213, 
233,  236,  247,  297. 

Bismarck,  Count  Herbert,  18,  21. 

Bismarck,  Prince  von,  Imperial 
German  Chancellor,  7,  8,  13, 
15,  17,  18,  19,  20,  21,  24,  25, 
26,  27,  28,  29,  35,  36,  38,  65, 
66,  68,   171,   172,   182,   183,   310. 

Bjorko,  secret  treaty  of,  59,  62. 

Bosnia,  annexation  of,  122,  123, 
124,  183,  237. 

Boxer  Rebellion,  174. 

Brussels,  imaginary  treaty  of, 
189. 

Bucharest,  treaty  of,  215. 

Bundesrath,  the,  referred  to,  6, 
22,  153. 

Bunsen,  Sir  Maurice,  referred 
to,  28. 

Busch,  Moritz,  quoted,  20. 

Biilow,  Prince  von,  Imperial 
German  Secretary  of  State  and 
Chancellor,  76,  96,  97,  104,  105, 
107,  112,  113,  114,  115,  118,  122, 
132,  133,  136,  175,  210. 

Byron,  Lord,  64. 

"Byzantines,"  name  applied  to 
adulators  of  the  Kaiser,  35. 

"Caligula,"  referred  to,  38. 

Cambon,  Jules,  French  ambassa- 
dor at  Berlin,  194,  285. 

Caprivi,  General  von,  Imperial 
German  Chancellor,  21. 

Cavell,  Edith,  320. 


363 


INDEX 


Chancellor,  the  Imperial  German, 
responsibility  of,  7. 

Charlemagne,  referred  to,  63,  67, 
142. 

Choate,  Honorable  Joseph  H., 
quoted,  88. 

Chun,  Prince,  176. 

Clausewitz,  170. 

Coal  for  Russian  Navy,  58. 

Conference  to  prevent  war  pro- 
posed by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  255, 
256,  257,  258,  266,  270. 

Congo  Convention,  the,  197. 

Copenhagen,  William  II,  visit  to, 
79. 

Constitution,  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man, 4,  5,  6,  7,  10,  48,  313,  314, 
315,  321,  323 ;  the  Prussian,  134, 
135,  136;  the  United  States, 
95. 

Crown  Council  of  July  5th  at 
Potsdam,  240,  241,  243,  245. 

Crown  Prince,  Frederick  Will- 
iam, 297,  321. 

Daily  Telegraph  interview,  110, 

111,  112,  113,  114,  118. 
Damascus,    visit   of   William    II 

to,   71. 
Declaration  of  war  by  Germany 

on  Russia,  270,  271,  280,  281, 

308 ;    by   Austria-Hungary   on 

Russia,  290. 
Decorations,  German  passion  for, 

42,  43. 
Delbriick,  Professor,  referred  to, 

39. 
Delcasse,     French     Minister     of 

Foreign  Affairs,  57,  78,  81. 
Delitsch,  Professor,  reproved  by 

William  II,  142. 
Deutschtum,  4,  15,  165,  166,  238. 
Divine    right,    the    German    idea 

of,  43 ;  essential  to  Junkertum, 

52 ;  the  Kaiser's  claim  to,  133, 

134,   137. 
Dopier,  Emile,  69. 


Durazzo,  contest  over,  214,  215. 
Duma,  the  Russian,  80,  82. 


Fast   Prussia,    Duchy   of,    138. 
Education,  influence  of  William 

II  on,  33,  34. 
Edward  VII,  King  of  England, 

53,    54,    81,    83,    108,    127,    128, 

178. 
Ems  Telegram,  310. 
Encirclement,  the  legend  of,  129, 

178,  225,  276,  300,  308. 
Enver  Bey,  225. 
Erdmannsdorfer,  36. 
Eulenberg,  Count,  Grand-Master 

of  Ceremonies,  98. 

Feudalism,  in  Germany,  145,  146, 

147. 
Forster,  Professor,  161. 
Foreign  Office,  the  German,  96, 

102. 
Frankfort,  the  treaty  of,  181. 
Francis      Ferdinand,      Austrian 

Archduke,   236,    238,   239,   245, 

309. 
Francis,    Joseph,    Emperor,    21, 

130,  236. 
Franklin,  Benjamin,  104. 
Frederick  I,  King  of  Prussia,  66, 

133,   139. 
Frederick  II   (the  Great),  King 

of  Prussia,  65,  104,  141. 
Frederick  III,  German  Emperor, 

4,  8,   15,  30,  60,  61,  323. 
Frederick,    William,    the    Great 

Elector,  36,  133,  178. 
Frederick,    William    I,    King   of 

Prussia,   51. 
Frederick,  William  IV,  King  of 

Prussia,  42. 
French  Colonies,  Germany's  in- 
tention to   take  the,   260,   261, 

263,  273. 
Fried,  Herr  Alfred  H.,  quoted, 

208,  209. 
364 


INDEX 


Fiirstenberg,  Prince,  112. 
Fryatt,    Captain,   320. 
Frymann,  Daniel,  190,  198. 

Giebel,  the  poet,  quoted,  158. 

George  V,  King  of  England,  252, 
253,  263,  267,  271,  276,  281,  301. 

George,  David  Lloyd,  quoted, 
195. 

German  Emperor,  the,  functions 
of,  8,  68;  title  of,  6;  William 

»  IPs  conception  of,  47,  48,  319, 
320,  322. 

Gierke,  Professor  von,  quoted, 
161,  162,  163,  164. 

Giolitti,  Signor,  Italian  Minis- 
ter, quoted,  215. 

Goethe,  the  poet,  42. 

Goschen,  Sir  Edward,  referred 
to  or  quoted,  255,  256,  259,  294, 
295. 

Great  Elector,  36,  133,  178. 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  British  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  quoted 
or  referred  to,  192,  206,  218, 
221,  222,  223,  227,  235,  254,  255, 
256,  257,  273,  276,  279,  293,  301, 
316,  318. 

Gross  Deutschland,  quoted,  184, 
185,  186,  190.  See  Tannen- 
berg. 

Hasse,  German  deputy,  241. 
Hague   Conferences,   59,   84,   85, 

86,  87,  91,  96,  110,  127. 
Hague  Tribunal,  Serbia's  appeal 

to  the,  248 ;  Russia's  appeal  to, 

269,  307. 
Hakki  Pasha,  229. 
Haldane,  Lord,  his  mission,  202, 

203,  204,  206,  216,  217,  218,  231, 

232,  240,  254. 
Hammurabi,  142. 
Hanotaux,  M.,  quoted,  197. 
Hegel,   147,   322. 

Helfferich,  Doctor,  242,  243,  244. 
Helgoland,  49. 


Henry,    Prince   of   Prussia,  252, 

253,  271. 
Herzegovina,  annexation  of,  122, 

123,  124,  183,  187. 
Heydebrandt,  Herr,  quoted,  199, 

200. 
Hohenlohe,  Prince  von,  Imperial 

German  Chancellor,  quoted,  24. 
Hohenzollern,   House   of,   tradi- 
tions,  2,    137,   138. 
Hohneck,     proposed     ascent    of 

the,   109. 
Hollmann,     Admiral,     letter    of 

William  II  to,  142. 
Holstein,    Herr,    20,    21,    26,    27, 

74. 
Holland,  see  Netherlands. 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  3. 
Hindenburg,  Field  Marshal,  291. 
Homer,  142. 

Humboldt,  William  von,  34. 
Huns,  William  IPs  aspiration  to 

emulate  the,  175. 

Isvolski,  Mr.,  Russian  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  131. 

Jagow,  Herr  von,  Imperial  Ger- 
man Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  244,  245,  246, 
256,  257,  265,  285. 

Janouchkevitch,  General,  283,  287. 

Japan,  referred  to,  55,  56,  57,  60, 
80. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  104. 

Kaiseridee,  the  legend  of  the,  15. 

Kant,  Immanuel,  quoted  or  re- 
ferred to,  34,  159,  160,  161,  163, 
312,  313. 

Ketteler,  von,  German  Minister 
to  China,  174,  176. 

Kiderlen-Wachter,  von,  Imperial 
German  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  193,  197,  198, 
213. 

Kiel  Canal,  49,  196. 
365 


INDEX 


Konopischt,    interviews    at,    237, 

238,  245. 
Kopenick,  the  shoemaker  of,  149. 
Kluck,  General  von,  174. 
Kouropatkin,  General,  173. 
Kramer,  Hugo,  308. 
Kruger  telegram,  73,  76,  111. 
Krupp,  Doctor  von  Bohlen  und 

Halbach,  243. 
Kiihlmann,    Herr   von,    Imperial 

German  Secretary  of  State  for 

Foreign   Affairs,  277. 
Kulturkampf,  65. 

Laband,  Professor  Paul,  182. 

Lansdowne,  Lord,  106. 

Lasson.  Professor,  322. 

Lauff,  Joseph,  64. 

Lausanne,  the  Peace  of,  211. 

Leoncavallo,  64. 

Leopold  I,  Emperor  of  the  Holy 

Roman  Empire,  139. 
Lese  Majeste,  44. 
Lichnowsky,  Prince,  referred  to 

or   quoted,   217,   218,  219,   220, 

221,    222,    223,    225,    228,    237, 

241,  244,  246,  249,  273,  274,  275, 

278,   279. 
Liman  von  Sanders,  General,  234, 

235. 
Lohengrin,  referred  to,  98. 
London,  treaty  of,  215. 
Lusitania,  320. 
Luxemburg,    neutrality    of,    293, 

294. 
Luther,  142,  169. 

Majestatsbeleidigung,  44. 

Marschall,  von  Bieberstein,  Bar- 
on, Imperial  German  diplomat- 
ist, 74,  87,  89,  209,  216,  217. 

Mecklenburg,  no  constitution  in 
the  Grand-Duchies  of,  158. 

Mediation,  German,  262,  263,  264, 
265,  282. 

Mensdorff,  Count,  222,  226,  241, 
287. 


Mercenary  soldiers  in  Germany, 
145. 

Mercier,  Doctor  Charles,  on  the 
sanity  of  William  II,  319,  320, 
323. 

Metz,  William  IPs  image  on  the 
cathedral  of,  68. 

Morgenthau,  Honorable  Henry, 
quoted,  241,  242. 

Morocco,  the  question  of,  75,  76, 
77,  78,  79,  112,  192,  193,  194, 
195,  219,  246. 

Mobilization,  Austrian  and  Rus- 
sian, 266,  267,  268,  269,  270, 
280,  282,  283,  288,  289,  308,  318 ; 
German,  270,  272,  277,  278,  280, 
284,  285,  286,  287. 

Moltke,  the  Elder,  77;  the 
Younger,  172. 

Moses,  142. 

Mozambique,  226. 

Miihlon,  Doctor  Wilhelm,  quoted, 
242,    243,    244. 

Miinster,  Count,  quoted  or  re- 
ferred to,  85,  89. 

Nabopolassar,  177. 

Napoleon   I,   146. 

Naumann,  Frederick,  German 
Deputy,  quoted,  307. 

Navy,  the  German,  11,  53,  225, 
230.    See  also  Sea-power. 

Netherlands,  neutrality  of,  260, 
263. 

Neutrality  of  Belgium.  204,  260, 
263,  275,  276,  279,  293,  294,  295, 
309 ;  of  France,  discussed,  274, 
275,  276,  277,  278,  308 ;  of  Great 
Britain  sought,  189,  193,  196, 
200,  202.  204,  205,  206,  207,  208, 
258,  259,  260,  261,  262,  263, 
272,  273,  274,  275. 

Nicholas,  King  of  Montenegro, 
°°2 

Nicholas  II,  Czar  of  Russia,  54, 
58,  59,  62,  79,  80,  82,  84,  108, 
261,  262,  263,  264,  267,  268,  269, 


366 


INDEX 


270,  281,  284,  288,  291,  297,  308, 

318. 
Nogi,  General,  173. 
North  German  Confederation,  6. 
Nuremberg,    alleged    attack    on, 

315. 

Orientalism  of  William  II,  177, 

180. 
Oxford   University,   William    II 

at,  83. 
Oyama,  General,  173. 

Pan-German  movement  and 
party,  33,  53,  56,  184,  185,  186, 
187,  188,  190,  197,  198,  200,  206, 
231,  288. 

Panther,  the,  sent  to  Agadir. 
See  Agadir. 

Parties.    See  political  parties. 

Peace,  as  understood  by  William 
H,  199,  209;  opportunity  for 
organizing,  90. 

Personal  authority  of  the  Kaiser, 
32. 

Personal  diplomacy  of  William 
II,  14,  15,  25. 

Personality  of  William  II,  100, 
101. 

Podewils,  Minister  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  141. 

Political  parties,  hostility  of 
William  II  toward,  45,  46 ;  pe- 
culiarities of  German,  152,  153. 

President  of  the  United  States, 
his  powers  as  compared  with 
those  of  the  German  Emperor, 
104,  105 ;  the  representative  of 
the  people,  305. 

President  Poincare,  284,  287,  301. 

Press,  freedom  of  the,  not  al- 
lowed in  Germany,  44. 

Prussia,  Constitution  of,  10,  134, 
135,  136. 

Creator  of  the  German  Empire, 
1 ;  the  traditions  of,  2 ;  the  re- 
lations   of   to    France,   27 ;   to 


Russia,  26,  27,  28;  the  hostil- 
ity to  democracy,  34. 

Quidde,  Professor,  38,  39. 

Rank,  in  Germany,  148,  149. 
Reichstag,    the,    referred    to,    5, 

6,  22,  153,  308. 
Religion.  William  IPs  conception 

of,  140,  141,  142,  143. 
Reval,   meeting  of   Edward   VII 

and   Nicholas   II   at,   103,   116, 

131. 
Riga,    the    imaginary   treaty   of, 

189. 
Right,    Prussian    ideas    of,    162, 

163,  164,  167. 
Rights  of  Man,  referred  to,  145. 
Roberts,  Lord,  111. 
"Roland  von  Berlin,"  64. 
Roon,  General,  172. 
Roosevelt,  President,  56,  60,  99, 

100. 
Ruprecht,  Prince,  of  Bavaria,  47. 

Saladin,  71. 

"Salt  of  the  Earth"  speech  by 
William  II,  60,  61,  75. 

Sanity  of  William  II,  219,  221. 

San  Thorne,  226. 

Sarajevo,  237,  240,  241. 

Sardanapalus,  65. 

Sazanof,  Russian  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  249,  255,  269, 
284,  287. 

Schlieffen,  General.  120. 

Schon,  Baron  von,  Imperial  Ger- 
man Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  96. 

Schleswig-Holstein,  49. 

Schiicking,  Professor,  161. 

"Scrap  of  Paper,"  Bethmann- 
Hollweg's  reference  to  the,  294. 

Sea-power,  development  of  Ger- 
man, 48,  49,  50,  51,  55. 

Secret  Treaties,  39,  62,  81. 

German  separatism,  3,  4. 

Serbia,  relations  of  to  Austria- 


367 


INDEX 


Hungary,  123,  124,  125,  126. 
See  also  Hague  Tribunal  and 
Ultimatum. 

Shakespeare,  142. 

Silesia,   141. 

Skutari,  the  question  of,  222. 

Social  Democrats,  45,  152,  153. 

Socialism,  Bismarck's  attitude  to- 
ward, 18. 

Soukhomlinof,  General,  283,  284, 
287. 

South  African  War,  the,  111. 

State,  Prussian  conception  of 
the,  322. 

Stead,  William  T.,  quoted,  208. 

StSssel,  General,  173. 

Sybel,  von,  36. 

Szogenyi,  Count,  222. 

Tangier,  William   II's  visit  to, 

75,  77. 
Tannenberg,     Otto     Richard, 

quoted,  184,  185,  186,  190,  191, 

192,  198. 
Teutonic  Order,  138. 
Theatre,  the,  William  II's  use  of, 

63. 
Tiglath-Pileser,  177. 
Titles,  in  Germany,  148,  149. 
Treaties,  Prussian  conception  of, 

164. 
Tirpitz,  Grand  Admiral  von,  202, 

236,  242,  245. 
Treitschke,  quoted,  36,  37. 
Tribalism,   German   spirit  of,   3. 
Triple  Alliance,  19,  26,  130,  131, 

181,  202,  207,  225,  246. 
Triple  Entente,  190,  225. 
Tschirschky,  von,  Imperial  Ger- 
man   Ambassador    at   Vienna, 

265. 


Turco-Italian  War,  125,  126,  210. 
Tweedmouth,  Lord,  William  II's 

letter  to,  106,  108. 
Tyrrell,  Sir  William,  275. 

Ultimatum  of  Austria-Hungary 
to  Serbia,  244,  248;  of  Ger- 
many to  Russia,  270. 

"Uncle  Albert,"  "Uncle  Bertie." 
See  Edward  VII,  King  of  Eng- 
land. 

Universities,  the  German,  subju- 
gation of  by  William  II,  33, 
34,  35,  36,  37. 

Verdun  Prize,  35,  36. 

Wagner,  Richard,  15. 
Walter  von  der  Vogelweide,  16. 
Wangenheim,  Baron,  241,  242. 
War,  the  Prussian  idea  of,  168, 

169. 
White,  Honorable  Andrew  D.,  85. 
Wilamowitz-Mollendorff,  41,  42. 
William  I,  German  Emperor,  9, 

26,  30,  36,  68,  69,  135,  136,  142, 

155,  182,  323. 
Windthorst,  19. 
World    Empire,    as    viewed    by 

William  II,  28,  61,  291,  292. 

Young  Turk  Revolution,  209, 
210. 

Zeppelin,  Count,  119,  120. 

Zimmermann,  Herr,  later  Impe- 
rial German  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  194,  197, 
246,   280. 

Zollverein,  the  German,  4. 

Zurlinden,  quoted,  307,  308. 


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